Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), also known as Al-Hashd al-Shaʿbī, emerged in 2014 to counter the radical Islamist group – the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Since then, they have evolved into a powerful hybrid actor within Iraq’s military, political, and economic spheres, thus remaining relevant in Iraq’s state apparatus even today. The question of their relevance becomes even more important as their fate hangs in uncertainty amidst the recent withdrawal of a state law by the Iraqi government in August 2025, which aimed to integrate the PMF into the state security forces. Internal disagreements and external influences continue to shape the fate of the PMF. In this context, this special report examines the PMF’s origins, ideologies, and structure while analysing the factors that make it a unique hybrid group for Baghdad. It also assesses the implications of the recently withdrawn state law and explores the road ahead. 

Introduction 

The previous Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Shia Al-Sudani introduced a new state law in the Iraqi Parliament in March 2025 proposing to institutionalise the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), also known as Al-Hashd al-Shaʿbī, into the Iraqi state security forces, redefining the PMF’s legal status, restructuring and formally integrating them into the Iraqi state apparatus.^[i] The law subsequently went under two readings in the Parliament, one in March 2025 and the other in July 2025. Al-Sudani’s government withdrew the state law on 27 August 2025, citing external pressures and internal disagreements.^[ii]

Iraq’s National Security Advisor Qasim Al-Araji announced on 1 September 2025 that the proposed law has been postponed until after elections in the country,^[iii] which took place on 11 November 2025, but he did not disclose any reasons for this decision. Consequently, Iraq’s parliament postponed the PMF law to the next legislative term, which is expected to hold its first session on 29 December 2025.^[iv]

The PMF, which is an umbrella organisation consisting of various brigades and militias, including the Kata’ib Hezbollah, Badr organisation, Imam Ali Brigades, and Saraya Al Salam, among others, has helped fight the Iraqi army in the fight against the infamous radical Islamist terrorist group – the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – since 2014. The longstanding debate about the PMF’s nature (as a hybrid group with considerable powers) has been once again sparked with the now withdrawn bill. The legislation remains stalled, and the issue remains divisive in the Parliament amid continued US pressure and Iraq’s long government formation process after the elections in the country. 

The PMF in the present times, interestingly, continues to hold relevance in the Iraqi political and military landscape, evolving as a unique hybrid group over time. In political studies literature, hybrid security actors are defined as armed groups that acquire a share of the state’s ‘authority, legitimacy, and capacity’.^[v] In post-2003 Iraq, and especially after 2014, however, the diffusion of these three factors has meant that armed groups serve simultaneously as formal and informal actors, blurring the distinction between state, non-state, and hybrid.^[vi]

From Fatwa to a Force: The Rise of the Popular Mobilisation Forces 

After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and consequent destruction and instability, the Shia-dominated transitional government, backed by the US, had been in power. During this period, Iraq faced a civil war-like situation, sparked by sectarian violence,^[vii] insurgency, and the rise of ISIS in 2014. The Iraqi army was proven inadequate to fight the forces of ISIS, which were taking over the Iraqi cities of Fallujah, Tikrit, and Mosul. After the fall of Mosul, a fatwa was released by the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani (Iraq’s supreme Shia cleric) to take up arms and volunteer in the fight against ISIS. Though, according to some sources, approximately seven Shia paramilitary militias were already called upon by former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki to fight ISIS, and later on, Sistani’s fatwa acted as a catalyst and provided a certain religious legitimacy to this task.^[viii] Thus, many Iraqi citizens, along with already existing militias, formed the PMF.^[ix]  The emergence of PMF was not a spontaneous reaction but rather a confluence of factors, such as state collapse, sectarian polarisation, and the existential threat of ISIS. 

The then Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri Al-Maliki, issued an executive order in June 2014 after the PMF’s formation, establishing the Popular Mobilisation Commission (PMC) under the Office of the Prime Minister to coordinate, register, and pay volunteers fighting ISIS, giving them state support. The PMC is the official Iraqi state body created to manage and coordinate the PMF. Today, it is believed that the PMC is dominated by the influential Iran-aligned factions in the PMF. 

According to a report by the Council on Foreign Relations, many of these militias had pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader and were led by commanders who worked with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force (the elite paramilitary and intelligence wing of the IRGC).^[x] Allegedly, the IRGC Quds Force has supported the Shiite militias in Iraq (predating PMF) for decades, providing them with support including funding, weapons, and training as a part of its broader agenda of spreading its ideology of Islamic revolution, deterring western aggression, and maintaining its influence in the region.^[xi]

In 2016, the PMF and its subordinate militias were legalised by the Iraqi State Security forces as an ‘Independent Military Formation’ under Iraqi Law No. 40.^[xii]  PMF, with the Iraqi army and the US coalition forces, was largely responsible for eradicating ISIS from Iraqi territory, garnering considerable legitimacy from the Iraqi people, which some experts now say has eroded. The PMF forces were part of major operations against ISIS, notably the Western Nineveh Offensive in 2017, the Western Anbar Offensive in 2017 and post-liberation clearance operations.

In 2018, the PMF’s few powerful factions participated in the parliamentary elections in Iraq under the banner of the Fatah Alliance, led by Hadi Al-Ameri (leader of the Badr Organisation, part of the PMF),^[xiii] emerging second in its electoral debut. Thus, PMF emerged as a unique hybrid entity, as both a political actor and an independent military formation under Iraqi law.  Running for elections, PMF leaders could do both: defend their autonomy and push for a greater role and sustenance in the government and institutions, not just rely on being a wartime militia. According to a report by the Washington Institute, these electoral moves allowed some Iran-aligned factions in the PMF to convert battlefield legitimacy into political influence, gaining strong leverage in state affairs. It also argues that a turn towards politics was allegedly made to entrench a parallel political and armed architecture that strengthens Iran’s influence rather than completely subordinating to the Iraqi state.^[xiv]

In the year 2020, two crucial events happened which influenced the future course of PMF’s trajectory, also reflecting deep internal divisions. First was the assassination of the PMF’s official deputy head, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis,^[xv] along with IRGC Quds Commander Qassem Suleimani, by the United States. Their absence, especially that of Muhandis, left a leadership vacuum in the PMF.^[xvi] Muhandis was replaced by Abu Fadak Al-Mohammedawi as the new deputy commander of the PMF.^[xvii] After their assassination, some Iran-aligned militias in the PMF launched retaliatory strikes on US bases in Iraq.^[xviii]

Second, four pro-Sistani factions, namely the Imam Ali, Ali Al Akbar, Abbas, and Ansar Al Marjaiya brigades, split from the PMF command, with notice served to the head of the PMF that their “operations and administration” were to be directed by the Prime Minister’s office and the Ministry of Defence directly and not to the PMC. There were also frequent reports on Sistani’s concern with the nature of tasks undertaken by the PMF after the war with ISIS had come to an end, including deep-seated internal divisions related to power structures and the appointment of Mohammedawi as the successor of Muhandis.^[xix]

Three years later, in the 2023 Iraqi elections, the group fared well, projecting its resilience and continuing to do so. Regardless, there have been persistent tensions and debates on the level of autonomy, control, and lack of transparency that the PMF garners, including the alignment of some influential militias with Iran. On 11th November 2025, Iraq held its parliamentary elections, and although it's estimated that the bloc led by former Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani has won the majority of seats, it remains to be seen how the PMF members have fared. 

Source- This infographic has been made by the author using Napkin AI.
 

Chains of Control: Inside the PMF’s Internal Order

The PMF is an umbrella organisation consisting of various small brigades/militias (some of which had already been operating after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq), embodying a complex structure. The PMF is under the control of the Prime Minister of Iraq, who also serves as their Commander-in-Chief. The forces are overseen by the PMF commission, which is headed by a chairman. Since the commission’s inception in 2014, Falih Al-Fayyad, who is a veteran Iraqi politician, has been its chairman. The Chief of Staff/Deputy Commander of the PMF is Abu Fadak al-Muhammadawi (aka Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi).^[xx]

Source- This infographic has been made by the author using Napkin AI

Data Source- “1.2. Popular Mobilisation Forces and Tribal Mobilisation Militias.” 2022. European Union Agency for Asylum. 2022.

 
There is no official number of brigades released by The PMF has not officially released the number of brigades, but various reports suggest that they exceed sixty.^[xxi] These brigades consist of various sub-regiments, tribal mobilisation units, and minority units. Some of these brigades also retain the command and identity of pre-existing militias while being officially part of the PMF; for example, officially the 45th, 46th, and 47th Brigades of the PMF, linked with Kata’ib Hezbollah, retain their militia identity, command structure, and Iranian links while operating inside the PMF framework.^[xxii]

The PMF mainly consists of Shiite fighters, but also includes fighters from Kurdish, Sunni, Yazidi, and Turkmen minorities. According to a report by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) in 2022, the total manpower of the PMF consisted of 1,65,000 members, of whom 1,10,000 are Shia, 45,000 Sunni and 10,000 minorities.^[xxiii] A report by the Washington Institute in 2023 estimated that the number of PMF fighters has expanded considerably while analysing the increased allocation of funds in Iraq’s 2023–2025 budget, but they were not officially numbered. 

According to the EUAA, the Shia militias largely fall into three groups: – first, the Iran-aligned/backed militias, which are pro-Khameini, and mainly include influential groups like the Badr Organisation, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah and Saraya Talia al-Khorasan. Second are the other politically affiliated militias linked with Shia political parties but not aligned with Iran, such as populist Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades) and the Islamic Supreme Council. Third are the Hawza militias, who are smaller groups affiliated with the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and not connected to political parties. Other than these, there are Tribal militias, which consist of Sunni fighters, which are generally active in their local places of origin. Minority militias include Yazidis, Christians, Turkmen, and Shabak forces. Their links with the PMF are often speculated for financial purposes and are debated. The Sinjar Resistance Unit (YBS) is also said to be part of the PMF.^[xxiv] 

Source- This infographic has been made by the author using Napkin AI

Data Source- “1.2. Popular Mobilisation Forces and Tribal Mobilisation Militias.” 2022. European Union Agency for Asylum. 2022.
 

Iraq’s Unfinished Security Puzzle – Why the PMF Still Matters?

The PMF have managed to grow and sustain their influence in Iraq despite a continuous political upheaval in the country and an evolving debate on their hybrid nature. Today, the PMF maintains significant autonomy and has independent military, legal and economic structures, including a certain kind of societal legitimacy. Their significance can be thus analysed vis-a-vis their deeply embedded role in the social, military, political, and economic stratifications of the Iraqi landscape.

Societal Legitimacy and Influence

The PMF catalysed by Sistani’s Fatwa (religious declaration) possessed religious legitimacy and consequently garnered a certain kind of public support in Iraq, especially amongst the Shia population, though it remains contested in other sections of Iraqi society. Many young Iraqis even joined the PMF after Al-Sistani’s Fatwa to fight ISIS, apart from already existing militias/brigades.

After battling the Islamic State forces, the PMF’s popularity grew significantly between 2014 and 2017. They not only played a pivotal role in liberating these territories but also helped rebuild them by providing crucial security stabilisation and filling the power vacuum post-ISIS, thereby facilitating the return of displaced populations and supporting initial governance structures.^[xxv] It gave many Iraqis a sense that PMF was defending their nation and was different from other radical organisations. Second, the institutional recognition of the PMF, which gave a legal and formal legitimacy beyond its militia status, also helped assert its legitimacy amongst the population. Many regarded the PMF as equivalent to the Iraqi army.^[xxvi]

Another important factor is deep tribal and sectarian support within and outside the PMF.^[xxvii] However, this legitimacy is said to have been eroding increasingly with reports of various human rights abuses done by the PMF, specifically in the 2019 Tishreen Protests^[xxviii] in Iraq, lack of transparency and accountability, economic exploitation and the influence of external powers, especially related to the Iran-aligned militias.^[xxix] The result of the November elections will set forth the PMF’s standing despite this contested legitimacy amongst the Iraqi populace.

Military, Security, and Power Dynamics

The PMF was born at a time when the situation in Iraq was tumultuous and precarious. Since then, the PMF has played a vital role in fighting and eradicating ISIS forces as discussed above. ISIS forces have been largely defeated, and according to the previous Iraqi PM Shia Al-Sudani, they do not pose a considerable threat to the country at the moment.^[xxx] But operations against the group still continue, with the PMF playing a key role in them. 

After the PMF’s legalisation under Iraq’s Prime Minister in 2016, the PMF has worked along with the state forces and has become an important component of the Iraqi military architecture. Today, allegedly, the PMF comprises an estimated two lakh personnel (a considerable jump in their numbers)^[xxxi] along with Iraqi armed forces, providing a large amount of manpower to the state. Since it is formally tied to the state, the force provides the government a mechanism by bringing formerly informal armed groups into the state fold, increasing potential alignment with government policy.^[xxxii]

Since they hold a certain kind of autonomy in their decisions, some fear that the PMF has become a threat to the legitimacy and control of the Iraqi armed forces. For example, on 27 July 2025, members of the Kataib Hezbollah (KH), known to be one of the most influential and Iran-backed militias, stormed the Iraqi Agriculture Ministry over the dismissal of a director with links to the group. This was followed by a violent confrontation between members of KH and the ministry, resulting in the deaths of two people. Persistent tensions arose over the groups’ actions with the Iraqi government’s spokesperson Sabah al-Numan’s statement formally accusing the PMF units 45 and 46, both linked to Kataib Hezbollah, of acting without official authorisation and using weapons against state security personnel.^[xxxiii]

They are also said to have a symbiotic relationship with some parts of the Iraqi Security forces, including the military, where PMF officials have an outsized authority. This reflects debates about militia autonomy, including an internal struggle between some influential militias under the umbrella of the PMF and the state security forces.

Politics and Governance

After the territorial defeat of ISIS, the PMF transitioned towards politics with a supposed vision of capturing state power. Iraqi law states that no military entity can contest elections, but despite this hurdle, the PMF militias, by changing the name of their organisation and by splitting their political and military wings, were able to contest the parliamentary elections.^[xxxiv] For example, the Badr Corps, under the PMF, changed its name to the Badr Organisation. This shift towards elections transformed PMF into a politico-military actor, enhancing its status as a political actor in Iraq. Since then, the PMF has spread at every level of the Iraqi governance system.

According to PMF’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Yasser Al-Issawi, what distinguishes the PMF from other military institutions is that the PMF also took up its role as a service institution. The forces had been very active in the public sector at the time of the 2018–2019 floods in Iraq, playing a significant role in addressing epidemics like the Coronavirus in 2020, providing various education services like opening schools, helping the wounded and martyrs’ families, repairing roads, sponsoring other service institutions and also playing an active role in combating the issue of desertification. PMF launched a major operation of afforestation and the restoration of agriculture, providing employment to thousands.^[xxxv]The forces have also worked for the rebuilding of the post-liberated areas, including taking part in the governance of provinces like Anbar and Nineveh. These services, albeit, are not without allegations of discrimination against minorities.^[xxxvi]

Today, members of the PMF contest elections and provide considerable support to Sudani’s Coalition Bloc – the Shia Coordination Framework – and thus remain of importance in the Iraqi political landscape. Regardless of which government is in power, any coalition that wins will need the support of the PMF to maintain its position, given the PM’s significant sphere of influence.  Allegations have also been made that the PMF indirectly controls several ministries and the Supreme Court. Many PMF-affiliated individuals hold mid-to-high-level ‘special-grade’ posts across ministries and security institutions, sometimes simultaneously holding PMF and government roles. For example, the control of the interior ministry is said to be in the hands of the Badr Brigade.^[xxxvii]

Economic Networks and Resource Control

Over the past few years, the PMF’s economic power has expanded exponentially. As of 2024, the PMF has been allocated a budget of 3.4 billion dollars by the Iraqi government.^[xxxviii] The influential actors of the PMF (especially the Iran-aligned militias) in the provincial councils have considerable mandates and resources, including control over budgets, the employment of civil servants, contracts, and local security. The PMF also clashes with rivals for state contracts, diverted customs revenues that generate ten billion dollars annually, and control of illegal taxation that yields approximately three hundred thousand dollars per day and also earns tens of millions of dollars in the scrap metal trade.^[xxxix] Their legal status thus gives them access to the state budget and limited exposure to punitive measures, sanctions, and proscriptive designations. 

The PMF also has a vast property empire. According to a Brookings report, in November 2022, the Muhandis General Company (MGC), which is a commercial entity under the PMF and largely controlled by the influential militias, was awarded land half the size of Lebanon along the border with Saudi Arabia.^[xl] MGC was founded in 2022 and was named after Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (PMF’s former official deputy head) to facilitate an economic conglomerate under the PMF's control. Experts allege that MGC is based on a similar model as the conglomerate ‘Khatam Al-Anbia’, which is a commercial vehicle of the IRGC Quds Force.^[xli]

The PMF also allegedly draws funds from the Iranian state through the IRGC Quds Force.^[xlii] The Iranian elite paramilitary force is said to be the principal architect of Iran’s military support to the PMF, including providing them with financial and ideological support.^[xliii] Reportedly, the PMF also funnels back funds to the Quds forces by exploiting Iraqi oil and generating illicit revenues.^[xliv]

The Politics of Sustenance: Debating the PMF Draft Law

In March 2025, the previous Iraqi government, led by PM Shia Al-Sudani, introduced a draft law in the Parliament which aimed to formally integrate the PMF into Iraq’s armed forces under a unified military hierarchy and, according to some, labelled it as a parallel structure to the Defence Ministry, including independent funding and a military academy.^[xlv] It would standardise salaries, pensions, and ranks. According to experts, it also included proposals on giving the PMF Commission's chairman a ministerial-level position and to retire ageing or controversial commanders, such as the long-time PMF chairman – Falih Al-Fayyad.^[xlvi]

The 2016 legislation left significant legal and structural questions unresolved, like ambiguities around command hierarchy and budgetary oversight. According to the Iraqi government, this new bill aimed to fill these gaps by establishing clearer parameters for the PMF’s role within the Iraqi state. This new bill defined the organisation’s mission as contributing to the protection of Iraq’s constitutional and democratic system, as well as supporting national defence, territorial integrity, and counterterrorism efforts. But according to experts, it increases the PMF’s power at par with the Iraqi military and overlooks more deep-rooted issues like overriding state authority and extracting the state’s financial resources.^[xlvii] Some also argue that the focus should be to enhance state control, unify command structures, and facilitate DDR (disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration efforts) and transitional justice.

According to a statement by the former deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Baha al-Araji, the bill is designed to ensure the PMF’s loyalty to the state rather than to the political parties or factional leaders.^[xlviii] According to a few, the PMF operates as a parallel government, often acting independently and engaging in illicit activities, which undermines the state's authority and stability. Their continued autonomy and some influential militias’ loyalty to external powers such as Iran pose threats to Iraq's sovereignty and stability. Integration aims to bring these forces fully under the state's legal and political framework.

But this state law was withdrawn by the government amidst external pressure from the United States and supposed internal divisions. The US had been pressurising the Al-Sudani government to disarm the PMF and is against the integration of the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces apparatus, citing increasing entrenchment of Iran in Iraq’s affairs. Recently, in a call with the previous Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stressed the urgent disarmament of the supposed Iran-aligned militias, the PMF.^[xlix] According to Rubio, the group is believed to be strengthening Iran’s influence and undermining Iraq’s sovereignty. Many of them launched attacks and continue to do so against US troops in Iraq and Syria, as well as Israel,^[l] as these militias are against the US presence in Iraq.  For example, in January 2024, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of Iran-backed militias within the PMF, orchestrated a drone attack on Tower 22, a US military outpost near the Iraq-Jordan-Syria border, resulting in the deaths of three American soldiers.^[li] Recently, on 17 September 2025, the US designated four Iran-aligned militia groups – Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali – as Foreign Terrorist Organisations.^[lii]

According to some sources, even powerful factions in the PMF had objections about the law related to the restructuring, including standardising ranks, retiring commanders, and integrating them into the military hierarchy, leading to a political stalemate.^[liii]

The Al-Sudani government thus faced continued external as well as internal pressure regarding the fate of the PMF, which hangs in the midst of the long government formation process as of now. According to what sources estimate, Al-Sudani’s Construction and Development Coalition Bloc under the Shia Coordination Framework has emerged victorious once again in the Iraqi Parliamentary election held in November and would take approximately 50 out of the 329 seats.^[liv] Since this coalition is a broad one and, according to a few, is divided, it remains to be seen whether Sudani gets the premiership or not and how this new government will handle the future of the PMF.^[lv]

Conclusion

The integration of PMF into Iraqi state security remains a critical and persistent issue. The PMF remains deeply entrenched in Iraq’s military, political and socio-economic landscape, signalling its relevance for Baghdad as a hybrid entity today.

Without adequate integration, factions within the PMF risk either accruing excessive independent power, thereby intensifying political fragmentation as suggested by numerous experts, or devolving into an unsustainable entity that poses a destabilising risk. Both scenarios threaten the sustainability and legitimacy of Iraq.

The necessity of prioritising national stability after a prolonged period of political instability continues to guide Baghdad's strategic framework, making a balanced reform of the PMF not only essential but also urgently critical. Nevertheless, the influence of external powers, be it the United States or Iran, on PMF integration efforts will continue to complicate Iraq's internal security dynamics.

*****

*Sugandhi, Research Analyst, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i]Nashed, Mat. 2025. “Will Iraq Integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces into the State?” Al Jazeera. August 18, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/8/18/will-iraq-integrate-the-pmf-into-state-insitutions

[ii] The New Arab Staff. 2025. “Iraq Pulls Popular Mobilisation Forces Bill due to Internal Divisions, US Pressure.” Newarab.com. 2025. https://www.newarab.com/news/iraqi-govt-pulls-pmf-bill-due-internal-divisions-us-pressure.

[iii] “Iraq’s National Security Advisor: PMF Draft Law Postponed by Our Request until after Elections.” 2025. Channel8. 2025. https://channel8.com/english/news/43791. 

[iv] “Iraqi Parliament Defers PMF Law to next Term.” 2025. Shafaq News- Baghdad. July 15, 2025. https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Iraqi-Parliament-defers-PMF-Law-to-next-term.

[v] Boege, Volker, M. Anne Brown, and Kevin P. Clements. 2009. “Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States.” Peace Review 21 (1): 13–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/10402650802689997.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402650802689997

[vi] McGinn, Jack. 2018. “The Popular Mobilisation Forces and the Balancing of Formal and Informal Power - Middle East Centre.” Middle East Centre -. March 15, 2018. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/03/15/the-popular-mobilisation-forces-and-the-balancing-of-formal-and-informal-power

[vii] Council on Foreign Relations. 2025. “The Iraq War.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations. 2025. https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war.

[viii] Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. 2021. “Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Units: Intra-Sectarian Rivalry and Arab Shi’a Mobilisation from the 2003 Invasion to Covid-19 Pandemic.” International Politics, June. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00321-4.

[ix] Anbori, Abbas, Anwar Al-Mumin, Andika Bin Ab. Waha, and Robin Beaumont. 2024. “Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq: Obedience to Law Dilemma.” Geopolitics Quarterly . https://doi.org/10.22034/igq.2024.482451.1958.

[x] CFR.org Editors. 2019. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Council on Foreign Relations. May 6, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Jessa Rose Dury-Agri, Omer Kassim, and Patrick Martin. 2017. “AQI SECURITY FORCES and POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES.” 2017. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17468.6.

[xiii] Mansour, Renad, and Christine Van den Toorn. 2018. “THE 2018 IRAQI FEDERAL ELECTIONS A POPULATION in TRANSITION?” LSE Middle East Centre. 2018. https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89698/7/MEC_Iraqi-elections_Report_2018.pdf.

[xiv] “The Challenge of Sovereignty: The PMF and Iranian Entrenchment in Iraq.” n.d. The Washington Institute. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/challenge-sovereignty-pmf-and-iranian-entrenchment-iraq.

[xv] Hasan, Mustafa. 2020. “Abu Mahdi’s Legacy and the Future of Sunni-Shi’a Relations in Iraq.” Middle East Centre. March 4, 2020. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/03/04/abu-mahdis-legacy-and-the-future-of-sunni-shia-relations-in-iraq/.

[xvi] 2020. “Abu Mahdi’s Legacy and the Future of Sunni-Shi’a Relations in Iraq - Middle East Centre.” Middle East Centre -. March 4, 2020. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/03/04/abu-mahdis-legacy-and-the-future-of-sunni-shia-relations-in-iraq.

[xvii] “Iraq’s PMF Appoints New Deputy Head as Successor to Al-Muhandis.” 2020. Middle East Monitor. February 21, 2020. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200221-iraqs-pmf-appoints-new-deputy-head-as-successor-to-al-muhandis/.

[xviii] “Iraq Base Attack: US in Retaliatory Strikes on Iran-Backed Fighters.” 2020, March 13, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51865489.

[xix] “Pro-Sistani Factions Leave Shia Forces, but Iraq’s PM Signals They Are Here to Stay.” 2020. Middle East Monitor. May 18, 2020. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200518-pro-sistani-factions-leave-shia-forces-but-iraqs-pm-signals-they-are-here-to-stay/.

[xx] Cafarella, Jennifer. 2024. “The Leadership and Purpose of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces.” Institute for the Study of War. March 19, 2024. https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/

[xxi] “Popular Mobilization Forces: Exploring Iraq’s Armed Groups.” 2024. Grey Dynamics. June 8, 2024. https://greydynamics.com/popular-mobilization-forces-exploring-iraqs-armed-entities/

[xxii] Op Cit (6)

[xxiii]

“Popular Mobilisation Forces and Tribal Mobilisation Militias.” 2022. European Union Agency for Asylum. 2022.

 https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-iraq-2022/12-popular-mobilisation-forces-and-tribal-mobilisation-militias

[xxiv] The Sinjar Resistance Units, also known as the YBŞ or the Yekîneyên Berxwedana Sengalê, is an ethnic Yazidi militia which was formed in 2014, in order to protect the Yazidi community in Iraq following attacks upon their community by radical Islamist terrorist organisation- The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

 Dudley-Taylor, Edwin. 2024. “Sinjar Resistance Units (YBŞ).” Modern Insurgent. March 20, 2024. https://www.moderninsurgent.org/post/sinjar-resistance-units-yb%C5%9F.

[xxv] Ranj Alaaldin, and Vanda Felbab-Brown. 2022. “New Vulnerabilities for Iraq’s Resilient Popular Mobilization Forces.” Brookings. February 3, 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/new-vulnerabilities-for-iraqs-resilient-popular-mobilization-forces.

[xxvi] McGinn, Jack. 2018. “The Popular Mobilisation Forces and the Balancing of Formal and Informal Power - Middle East Centre.” Middle East Centre -. March 15, 2018. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/03/15/the-popular-mobilisation-forces-and-the-balancing-of-formal-and-informal-power.

[xxvii] Mansour, Renad. 2021. “Networks of Power | 04 PMF Networks and the Iraqi State.” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. 2021.

 https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/02/networks-power/04-pmf-networks-and-iraqi-state.

[xxviii]

 On October 1, 2019, a broad-based protest movement demanding systemic political reform took hold in Iraq. Activists dubbed their movement “Tishreen” from the Arabic word for October. Iraqi security forces and militias backed by Iran responded with lethal force, killing hundreds of protesters and wounding many thousands more.

“Tishreen Report.” 2021. EPIC - Enabling Peace in Iraq Center. 2021. https://enablingpeace.org/tishreen/.

[xxix] Matamis, Joaquin. 2025. “Reforming Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces: From Liability to National Asset • Stimson Center.” Stimson Center. May 8, 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/reforming-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces-from-liability-to-national-asset.

[xxx] “Iraqi News Agency.” 2025. Iraqi News Agency. 2025. https://ina.iq/en/43257-al-sudani-daesh-no-longer-represents-a-major-threat-inside-iraq.html.

[xxxi] “Extraordinary Popular Mobilization Force Expansion, by the Numbers | the Washington Institute.” n.d. Www.washingtoninstitute.org. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/extraordinary-popular-mobilization-force-expansion-numbers.

[xxxii] “From the Militias Serving the State to the State Serving the Militias: What Has Happened to Iraq?” 2025. INSS. November 13, 2025. https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/iraq-2025.

[xxxiii] Naser, Montadhar. 2025. “How the PMF Law Could Shape Iraq’s Political Trajectory.” The New Arab. 2025. http://newarab.com/analysis/how-pmf-law-could-shape-iraqs-political-trajectory.

[xxxiv] McGinn, Jack. 2018. “The Popular Mobilisation Forces and the Balancing of Formal and Informal Power - Middle East Centre.” Middle East Centre -. March 15, 2018. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/03/15/the-popular-mobilisation-forces-and-the-balancing-of-formal-and-informal-power.

[xxxv] “Iraqi News Agency.” 2022. Iraqi News Agency. 2022. https://ina.iq/en/reports/20042-pmf-counts-the-number-of-its-forces-elaborates-its-essential-duties.html.

[xxxvi] “International Religious Freedom Report for 2017 | Wilson Center.” n.d. Www.wilsoncenter.org. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/international-religious-freedom-report-for-2017.

[xxxvii] Op cit (17)

[xxxviii] Malik, Hamdi, and Michael Knights. 2025. “Iraq’s PMF Law Is No Substitute for Real Security Reform.” The Washington Institute. 2025. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-pmf-law-no-substitute-real-security-reform.

[xxxix] Op cit (17)

[xl]

 Alaaldin, Ranj. 2024. “The Popular Mobilization Force Is Turning Iraq into an Iranian Client State.” Brookings. February 2, 2024. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-popular-mobilization-force-is-turning-iraq-into-an-iranian-client-state/.

[xli] Knights, Michael, Crispin Smith , and Hamdi Malik. 2023. “Profile: The Muhandis General Company.” The Washington Institute. 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-muhandis-general-company.

[xlii] Gulmohamad, Zana. 2020. “The Evolution of Iraq’s Hashd Al-Sha’abi (Popular Mobilization Forces).” The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle East, 259–301. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45465-4_9.

[xliii] Ibid.

[xliv] Hummel, Kristina. 2025. “Iraqi Oil and the Iran Threat Network.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. April 30, 2025. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqi-oil-and-the-iran-threat-network.

[xlv] “Iraq’s Ruling Alliance Backs down on PMF Legislation.” 2025b. Aawsat.com. 2025. https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5180005-iraq%E2%80%99s-ruling-alliance-backs-down-pmf-legislation.

[xlvi] Nashed, Mat. 2025. “Will Iraq Integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces into the State?” Al Jazeera. August 18, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/8/18/will-iraq-integrate-the-pmf-into-state-insitutions.

[xlvii]  “The Growing Economic and Political Role of Iraq’s PMF.” n.d. Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/growing-economic-and-political-role-iraqs-pmf.

[xlviii] Matamis, Joaquin. 2025. “Reforming Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces: From Liability to National Asset • Stimson Center.” Stimson Center. May 8, 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/reforming-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces-from-liability-to-national-asset.

[xlix] Mahmoud, Sinan. 2025. “US Stresses Need for Urgency in Disarming Iran-Backed Militias in Iraq.” The National. October 22, 2025. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/10/22/us-stresses-need-for-urgency-in-disarming-iran-backed-militias-in-iraq/.

[l] Ibid.

[li] Matamis, Joaquin. 2024. “What Is the US Doing in a Disputed Triangle on the Jordan/Syria/Iraq Border? • Stimson Center.” Stimson Center. February 20, 2024. https://www.stimson.org/2024/tower-22-us-disputed-triangle-jordan-syria-iraq-border/.

[lii] “Terrorist Designations of Four Iran-Aligned Militia Groups - United States Department of State.” 2025. United States Department of State. September 17, 2025. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/terrorist-designations-of-four-iran-aligned-militia-groups.

[liii] “Iraq Pulls Popular Mobilisation Forces Bill due to Internal Divisions, US Pressure.” 2025. The New Arab. August 30, 2025. https://www.newarab.com/news/iraqi-govt-pulls-pmf-bill-due-internal-divisions-us-pressure.

[liv] “Sudani Wins Largest Bloc in Iraqi Elections but May Still Be Blocked from Second Term by Pro-Iran Coalition.” 2025. The Arab Weekly. November 14, 2025. https://thearabweekly.com/sudani-wins-largest-bloc-iraqi-elections-may-still-be-blocked-second-term-pro-iran-coalition.

[lv] Ibid.