Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Since the beginning of the Gaza War in October 2023, the Houthis' offensive actions have surged quite significantly. The Houthis have developed a strong firepower, encompassing missiles, UAVs, and maritime warfare capabilities. The Houthis' booming offensive capabilities have repercussions for regional and trade security.    

Introduction 

According to the SIPRI-2023 report, Houthis became the third largest recipient of Iranian arms and military platforms, accounting for 7.4 per cent of Iran’s overall arms export.^[i] The rise of Houthis, the only non-state actor, to the list of the top 25 global suppliers and their recipients indicates an alarming situation in the West Asian region, mainly over the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. 

The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, emerged as a local insurgent group in northern Yemen in the 1990s. However, over the years, the group has gained power and prominence, evolving into a significant non-state military actor that affects regional geopolitics. After capturing Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, the group became a major power faction in West Asian regional politics. Reports by Amnesty International indicate that the Houthis have been recruiting child soldiers and younger bloods into their frontline combat ranks to increase the group’s mobilisation and logistical capacity.^[ii] Since seizing Sanaa in 2014, the group has established multiple sources of generating regular revenue, including taxes, levies, and income from gas and oil resources. Additionally, it benefits from customs revenues from the port of Hodeidah, a primary Yemeni seaport located on the Red Sea.[iii]

The Houthis have also received extensive material and ideological support from Iran, a key player in West Asian politics. The assistance from Iran, both legitimate and illegitimate, has helped Houthis possess a diverse range of weapons and equipment that enable armed operations far beyond Yemen’s borders. Since 2020, Houthis' armed operations have increased significantly in the nearby region; however, there has been a notable shift in the Houthis' scope of operations after late 2023. The trend has indicated an increase in their engagements and armed campaigns against international shipping lanes, and Israeli and US military assets over land and sea, positioning them as a proactive destabilising force in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea regions.^[iv]

Houthis’ Capabilities and Major Components of their Arsenal

Unlike conventional militaries, the Houthis lack advanced capabilities, such as missile and air-defence systems, aircraft, helicopters, submarines, and equipment and accessories, as well as a network-centric warfare capability that enables offensive strikes and counter external airstrikes or intercept sophisticated incoming weapons. As they cannot challenge sustained air campaigns by major powers^[v], they rely on mobile launchers, hard-to-detect sites, and dispersal tactics to survive bombardment, employing guerrilla strategies. However, despite repeated coalition strikes against their bases and launch infrastructure, a significant portion of the Houthis’ offensive capabilities remains intact due to their mobility, concealment, and local production.

Over the past decade, the group has significantly increased its offensive capabilities with Iranian assistance. Besides small arms and rocket systems, the Houthis' modern arsenal and operational capabilities primarily consist of three key components: missile capabilities, modern armed drones, and maritime capabilities. Their arsenal includes both foreign-supplied and locally manufactured military equipment developed with assistance from abroad. Apart from manufacturing, the Houthis have also engaged in assembling equipment, parts of which are sourced from different origins. 

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Capability

Houthis’ modern inventory includes ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, encompassing an array of short-range to long-range missile systems, against land, air and sea-based targets. All the current ballistic missiles in the Houthis’ inventory are of a tactical nature only. Reports based on the IISS and the Wilson Centre indicate that the faction possesses missiles based on Soviet models, such as the Tochka missile series and at least three variants of SCUD missiles, as well as Iranian models, including the Zelzal-3 and Burkan series, among others.[vi] They also possess advanced Iranian systems such as Quds-series land-attack cruise missiles and claim missiles with up to 2,000 km range. These long-range missiles enable the capability to strike deep into regional theatre areas, including large parts of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel. The missile capability allows Houthi forces to target far from their base, creating leverage in regional conflicts.^[vii]

In the maritime domain, anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles are a critical component of their anti-ship and marine warfare capability. The Houthis have been documented firing anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) like ‘Asef and Tankeel’, believed to stem from Iranian ‘Fateh and Raad’ missile designs, with a range of hundreds of miles. They also operate Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missiles.[viii] These systems are configured to target vessels in strategic waterways, such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the wider Red Sea.^[ix] Besides land, the maritime capability allows Houthis to use the sea as a launchpad for their rockets and missiles. Figure 1 highlights some of the modern ballistic and cruise missiles in the Houthis’ inventory, inducted during the last half-decade, since 2019. 

Fig. 1: Some Major Missile Systems in Houthis' Arsenal

Source: Wilson Centre; *all the mentioned missiles are derived from the Iranian models

Apart from the above-mentioned missiles, Houthis have possessed various other potent missiles in their inventory, such as ‘Badr series, Mion, Obedient, Saeer, Qaher series, Falaq, Julfiqar, Mirjal, Fater, Saqr series and others’.^[x]

Unmanned Aerial System (Drones) Capabilities

Drones are perhaps the Houthis’ most operationally viable and easy-to-access asset, which they have been using reportedly since 2015, during the Yemen Civil War. Although most of the drone attacks have been conducted against the Yemeni adversaries, the group, since late 2023, has conducted long-range drone attacks on international waters and Israeli territory, such as Eilat and Tel Aviv, where drones penetrated advanced air defences to inflict damage. Like other arms, Iran is said to be the primary supplier of ready-to-use drones and its technology to the Houthis. With the assistance, the group has also developed the capability for local engineering, manufacturing, and assembling drones, such as DIY models.

Houthis have deployed both short-range and long-range unmanned systems that carry explosive payloads for combat and suicidal purposes (kamikaze drones). For instance, the Samad-2 and Samad-3 drones utilise Iran’s low-end technology in their one-way attack. Other advanced UAVs in the Houthis' arsenal, with significant Iranian assistance, include the long-range Yaffa, Shahed-131, and Shahed-136 drones.[xi] These long-range drones allow strikes on urban centres and military facilities outside Yemen’s boundaries.

Although many components are believed to originate from Iran, the Houthis assemble drones locally using commercially available parts and imported navigation systems, enhancing adaptability and scale of deployment. For instance, Houthis have also assembled drones, parts of which were of US origin and transferred illegally by China. In October 2025, the US added 15 Chinese companies to the trade restriction list for facilitating the purchase of US electronic items found in Houthis’ drones.^[xii] Figure 2 lists several modern drones based on Iranian designs. 

Fig. 2: Some Major Drone Systems in Houthis' Arsenal

Source: Wilson Centre

Apart from the major drone system mentioned in the list, Houthis have an ample number of drones, such as the ‘Mersad series, Raqib, and Shihab’.^[xiii] Figure 3 illustrates the role of Iranian assistance in the development of the Houthis’ modern missile and drone capabilities. 

Fig-3: The role of Iran in Houthis’ Missile and Drone Development

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)

Marine Weapon Systems

In addition to UAVs and missile systems, Houthis have also developed several maritime warfare capabilities. It includes Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and sea mines. USVs are remote explosive boats disguised as fishing vessels and are used against commercial and military shipping.^[xiv] These combat boats, such as ‘Asif, Mallah and Nazir’, have the ability to carry medium and light weapons as well as anti-aircraft guns and rockets.^[xv] They also have self-driving boats for combat and maritime reconnaissance purposes.

Moreover, they possess a strong sea denial capability, including sea mines, booby traps, manned or remotely guided torpedoes, and underwater drone systems.[xvi] Displayed at a military parade at Sana’a in September 2023, Houthis' sea mines are of various types, such as ‘Masjoor, Mujahid, Saqib, and Karar’, and others.^[xvii] Installed at various depths in the waters, these sea mines are a self-contained explosive device placed to damage or destroy surface boats, vessels and submarines. These threats further complicate naval operations and trade in narrow shipping corridors and strategic chokepoints, like the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal.^[xviii] These maritime capabilities multiply threat vectors, particularly against undefended or lightly defended vessels.

Looming Threat and Implications

Houthis’ expanding military capabilities and regional influence have caused two major shifts. First, the escalation of military strikes and counter-strikes over the Southern West Asian region, including the Arabian Sea, and second, trade disruptions and economic consequences. Houthis' attacks have triggered regional tension and caused international military responses, including coalition strikes from the US, UK, and Israel to protect military vessels and critical infrastructures. These strikes, from both sides, risk escalating into a broader confrontation and geopolitical instability. Moreover, Houthis’ expansion of operations toward the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea indicates their firepower capability and potential for future attacks.^[xix]

According to the ACLED database (Armed Conflicts Location & Event Data), the Houthis have conducted more than a thousand drone activities on their adversaries in Yemen and regional countries, as well as on maritime trade routes in the Red Sea, between January 2015 to mid-2024.^[xx] The activities were conducted for both attack and reconnaissance purposes against land-based critical infrastructure, military installations, sea-based commercial shipping, military vessels, and others.

The ACLED data also shows that, by mid-2023, the Houthis’ drone activities were mainly against land-based targets, and attacks on international waters began in late 2023 and surged in 2024. Although most of the Houthis’ attacks have been unsuccessful, multiple merchant ships were damaged and sunk by a combination of missiles, drones, and USVs in the Red Sea corridor of the Gulf of Aden. It caused severe disruption in global trade passing through the region. According to several reports, by April 2025, the group had shot down seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones, inflicting damage of over $200 million, with an average cost of $30 million per drone.^[xxi] Intermittent attacks have also prompted the rerouting of trade and shipping, resulting in increased sea traffic, higher shipping costs, a surge in energy prices and heightened risks for global supply chains.^[xxii]

Unlike other non-state actors, Houthis have developed the capability to strike on land, sea and air. Moreover, its capacity to project force into international waters, challenging major states (the US and Israel) and global shipping, renders it a distinctive non-state maritime threat. This capability reflects a hybrid model combining insurgent tactics with quasi-state capability.

The Houthis’ control of Yemen’s vast coastlines along the Red Sea region provides them with direct access to one of the world’s most vital trade and maritime corridors. The 2200 km (approx.) of Red Sea stretch connects the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait (south) and the Suez Canal (north). Estimates suggest these corridor accounts for approximately 12 per cent of global trade annually, valued at $1 trillion.^[xxiii] Since Houthis attacked vessels on the Red Sea in November 2023, the overall trade fell by almost 50 per cent in the first quarter of 2024.^[xxiv] The trade disruption caused many shipping companies to divert their trade around the Cape of Good Hope, which increased the overall transit time to over 10 days.^[xxv]

Conclusion

Over the years, the Houthis have evolved from a local insurgent group into a complex armed actor capable of conducting asymmetric and large-scale offensive operations. Supported by external powers, their drone, missile, and maritime capabilities, along with adaptive local engineering and imitation capacities, pose serious threats to regional security, particularly maritime stability in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The challenge is multifaceted with strategic implications for global trade and regional security. Houthis’ transforming arsenal, access to ballistic and cruise missile systems and capability to strike on land, air, and sea is alarming for the regional security. Moreover, the Houthis' rising armed capability underscores how non-state actors can leverage relatively low-cost technologies, such as drones, to wield influence far beyond their territorial confines, compelling multinational responses and reshaping security dynamics across critical international trade routes.

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*Dr. Mukesh Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] “TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, 2023.” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2024, 3. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/fs_2403_at_2023.pdf.

[ii] Amnesty International. “Yemen: Huthi Forces Recruiting Child Soldiers for Front-Line Combat.” February 28, 2017. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/02/yemen-huthi-forces-recruiting-child-soldiers-for-front-line-combat/.

[iii] “The Houthis’ Economic War Threatens Lasting Peace in Yemen.” AGSI, n.d. Accessed January 8, 2026. http://agsi.org/analysis/the-houthis-economic-war-threatens-lasting-peace-in-yemen/.

[iv] Houthi Arsenal | Wilson Center.” July 26, 2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/houthi-arsenal.

[v] “MENA Defense Intelligence Digest | Assessing and Addressing the Houthi Threat | Hudson Institute.” December 9, 2025. https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/mena-defense-intelligence-digest-assessing-addressing-houthi-threat-can-kasapoglu.

[vi] IISS. “Made in Yemen? Assessing the Houthis’ Arms-production Capacity,” n.d. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/04/made-in-yemen-assessing-the-houthis-arms-production-capacity/.

[vii] “Houthi Arsenal | Wilson Center.” July 26, 2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/houthi-arsenal.

[viii] This Is Beirut. “Houthis: What Military Power?” Accessed January 8, 2026. https://thisisbeirut.com.lb/articles/1309715/houthis-what-military-power.

[ix] “MENA Defense Intelligence Digest | Assessing and Addressing the Houthi Threat | Hudson Institute.” December 9, 2025. https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/mena-defense-intelligence-digest-assessing-addressing-houthi-threat-can-kasapoglu.

[x] SabaNet - Yemen News Agency. “Armed Forces Reveal New Weapons Systems in Military Parade.” Accessed January 8, 2026. https://www.saba.ye/en/news3266848.htm.

[xi] The Houthi Drone Supply Chain - Orion Policy Institute. July 26, 2025. https://orionpolicy.org/the-houthi-drone-supply-chain/.

[xii] The Jerusalem Post | JPost.Com. “15 Companies Restricted for Aiding Iranian Terror Axis | The Jerusalem Post.” October 8, 2025. https://www.jpost.com/international/article-869799.

[xiii] SabaNet - Yemen News Agency. “Armed Forces Reveal New Weapons Systems in Military Parade.” Accessed January 8, 2026. https://www.saba.ye/en/news3266848.htm.

[xiv] “Non-State Actors with Tech and Tactics: A Case Study of Houthis in Yemen.” Accessed January 6, 2026. https://rsdi.ae/en/publications/non-state-actors-with-tech-and-tactics-a-case-study-of-houthis-in-yemen?

[xv] “Yemen / Houthi Missiles.” Accessed January 8, 2026. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/yemen/index.html.

[xvi] “Under Fire in the Bab Al-Mandab: Houthi Military Capabilities and U.S. Response Options | The Washington Institute.” Accessed January 8, 2026. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/under-fire-bab-al-mandab-houthi-military-capabilities-and-us-response-options.

[xvii] SabaNet - Yemen News Agency. “Armed Forces Reveal New Weapons Systems in Military Parade.” Accessed January 8, 2026. https://www.saba.ye/en/news3266848.htm.

[xviii] Houthi Aggression and a Roadmap for Peace in Yemen. September 4, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/houthi-aggression-and-roadmap-peace-yemen.

[xix] Frantzman, Seth J. “The Secret Houthi Plan to Move Missiles, Drones beyond Red Sea.” FDD, January 17, 2024. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/01/17/the-secret-houthi-plan-to-move-missiles-drones-beyond-red-sea/.

[xx] “Six Houthi Drone Warfare Strategies: How Innovation Is Shifting the Regional Balance of Power | ACLED.” December 11, 2025. https://acleddata.com/report/six-houthi-drone-warfare-strategies-how-innovation-shifting-regional-balance-power.

[xxi] The Economic Times. “U.S. Military Stunned as Houthi Rebels down 7 High-Tech Reaper Drones in Weeks, Costing over $300 Million and Raising Eyebrows.” April 26, 2025. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/u-s-military-stunned-as-houthi-rebels-down-7-high-tech-reaper-drones-in-weeks-costing-over-300-million-and-raising-eyebrows/articleshow/120647451.cms?from=mdr.

[xxii] “Israel and the Houthis Are Entering a Dangerous Escalation Cycle | The Washington Institute.” Accessed January 6, 2026. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-and-houthis-are-entering-dangerous-escalation-cycle.

[xxiii] “Red Sea Crisis: What It Takes to Reroute the World’s Biggest Cargo Ships.” January 21, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240119-red-sea-crisis-how-global-shipping-is-being-rerouted-out-of-danger.

[xxiv] Kamali, Parisa, Robin Koepke, Alessandra Sozzi, and Jasper Verschuur. “Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade.” IMF Blog, March 7, 2024. https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2024/03/07/red-sea-attacks-disrupt-global-trade.

[xxv] “Yemen’s Quagmire: Why Isn’t U.S. Might Winning?” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, n.d. Accessed January 6, 2026. https://mecouncil.org/publication/yemens-quagmire-why-u-s-might-isnt-winning/.