Abstract: Xi Jinping has used the anti-corruption campaign to remove threats to his power. He has purged military generals under the pretext of disciplinary measures and has often linked this to the “Two Centenary” goals of national rejuvenation.
Since Xi Jinping became the President of China, he has launched an anti-corruption campaign. His predecessor, Hu Jintao, had also mentioned that corruption is a “corrosive challenge” to the Party. Xi Jinping pledged “to combat both ‘killing tigers and swatting flies’.” This meant that he would punish all corrupt leaders, including top-level bureaucrats and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officials involved in corruption. He has often emphasised that the military should operate under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. In his inaugural speech as the General Secretary of the CCP in 2012, he highlighted that corruption is the most urgent issue to address. Through his anti-corruption measures, he consolidated his power and became the core leader of the Party, second only to Mao Zedong. To further strengthen his control over the military, he reorganised the seven military regions into five theatre commands in 2016: Eastern Theatre Command, Western Theatre Command, Southern Theatre Command, Northern Theatre Command and Central Theatre Command. The paper aims to analyse the purges in the PLA and their internal and external implications.
In 2025, China ranked 43rd on the Corruption Perception Index, unchanged from last year. It also implies that China ranks 76 out of 182 countries in the corruption index.[i] According to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission, a report was issued on the supervision, inspection and investigation work of discipline inspection and supervision organs nationwide in 2025. It states that 983,000 people were disciplined.[ii] These data suggest that corruption remains endemic in China.

Source: https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/china
Xi Jinping purged Bo Xilai (former politician and Communist Party chief in Chongqing) in 2012-13 on anti-graft charges. Seemingly, he was seen as a potential challenge to Xi Jinping. In 2014, Xu Caihou, a former CMC Vice Chair, was arrested in a “cash for ranks” scheme. In 2015, another former CMC Vice Chair, Guo Boxiong, was arrested on similar charges.[iii] According to CSIS data and analysis, 36 generals and lieutenant generals have been officially purged since 2022.

Source: https://chinapower.csis.org/china-pla-military-purges/
The issue of purges resurfaced in 2023 when the Defence Minister, Li Shangfu, was removed. For the last year, there has been a substantial intensification in the number of purges. In 2025, 15 general officers were officially purged, of whom nine were expelled from the CCP and six dismissed from their positions.[iv] Amongst all the purges, the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli are intriguing. On 24 January, PLA Daily published an editorial stating that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has commissioned an investigation into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli for “violations of discipline and law”.[v]
Zhang Youxia was a princeling and a close friend of Xi Jinping. He was a close ally of Xi Jinping within the armed forces. He had combat experience during the Vietnam War and had fought the Vietnam border clash of 1984.[vi] He was born in 1950 July and graduated from the People’s Liberation Army Military Academy. In 2013, Zhang joined the CPC Central Military Commission and the PRC Central Military Commission. From 2013 to 2017, he headed the Equipment Development Department of the CMC. Later, in 2022, he became the Vice-Chairman of the CMC.[vii] His purge is often compared to that of Lin Bao in 1971 under Mao Zedong.[viii] General Liu Zhenli was from Luancheng, Hebei Province. He was born in August 1964. He held the rank of General in the Army and was the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of China.[ix] The purge of the two PLA high-ranking officers is important because after their purge, the six-member CMC has been reduced to two members: Xi Jinping and General Zhang Shengmin. General Zhang Shengmin is the secretary of the discipline inspection body.[x]
On 10 February 2026, in a virtual address, Xi Jinping alluded to the fact that the PLA has effectively addressed “various risks and challenges” and that many in the army had undergone “in-depth political rectification”. This is the first time since 2022 that he has mentioned corruption in his Chinese New Year greetings.[xi] Just before the two sessions of the National People’s Congress, he ordered the removal of 19 officials, including 9 from the military. No official reason has been cited for their removal.[xii] It may be noted that Xi Jinping could have waited until the two-session meeting scheduled for March 4-11, 2026, in Beijing. Thus, regardless of the consequences, Xi Jinping is waging the campaign against corruption.
Two Sessions of the NPC and the Purges
The effect of the purges was evident during the two sessions. This year, the contingent was smaller, representing the PLA at the two sessions. The military delegation was comparatively reduced from 281 to 243 members.[xiii]
On 7 March, while attending the plenary meeting of the delegation of the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Force at the fourth session of the 14th National People’s Congress, China’s legislature, Xi Jinping said, “There must be no place in the military for those who are disloyal to the Party, nor any place for corrupt elements, Xi warned, adding that the fight against corruption must be unwaveringly advanced.”[xiv] He stressed loyalty to the Party and emphasised, “It is important to consolidate the ideological foundation that ensures officers and soldiers follow the Party and its guidance and ensure that modern weaponry and equipment are placed in the hands of politically committed personnel.”[xv] Xi Jinping also announced a 7 per cent increase in the defence budget to approximately $270 billion. It is slightly lower than the 7.2 per cent annual increase over the last three years.[xvi]
Implications of the Purges for Internal and External Security
The purges of PLA officials elucidate that there is no compromise on absolute loyalty to Xi Jinping. By purging the military officials, Xi Jinping has sent a signal that political loyalty is non-negotiable even for the closest allies like General Zhang Youxia. He purged them before the two sessions that led to empty seats during the meeting. However, Xi Jinping was unconcerned about it and emphasised that China’s structural ambition cannot be compromised, and nothing can come in the way of “National Rejuvenation”. It showcases Xi Jinping’s control over the PLA.
Further, to reassure the domestic population, a commentary was published in PLA Daily stating that the investigation process would strengthen the PLA in the long term, despite short-term “difficulties and pain.”[xvii] Although the purge may not directly affect China, it could impact regional security, which remains tense, with the PLA’s disruptions contributing to volatility rather than outright stability.
There are several conjectures about the purging of Zhang Youxia, related to the military and specifically to Taiwan. Xi Jinping has set two goals for the PLA: to complete its modernisation by 2035 and to become a world-class armed force by 2049. Possibly, there may have been a disagreement between them about the timeline for military development as well.[xviii] Zhang prioritised resolving long-standing training deficiencies in the near term and did not support moving aggressively into joint operations training to meet Xi Jinping’s 2027 deadline.[xix] Reportedly, Zhang Youxia gained political influence within the PLA. Xi Jinping had become concerned about Zhang’s accumulation of unchecked power,[xx] as the military is the only organisation that can challenge leaders in China.
Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli had likely voiced opposition to Xi’s drive to prepare the military for combat in the Taiwan Strait by 2027.[xxi] Reportedly, they failed to meet Xi Jinping’s requirements for force building related to a Taiwan invasion and may even have engaged in open disagreement or defiance within the PLA.[xxii] Zhang Youxia might have raised opposition to Xi Jinping’s drive to prepare for combat in the Taiwan Strait by 2027.[xxiii] The immediate impact on Taiwan is moot. However, there was not much effect of the purge in the South China Sea region and other areas. China continued to conduct naval and air combat operations in the South China Sea.
As China prepares for the 21st National Congress, wherein Xi Jinping is likely to become the leader for the fourth time, he wants to eliminate threats to his power. Xi Jinping sees his military agenda as a centrepiece of his legacy, and he wants to specifically alarm the administration and military. The quintessence of the recent purges is that he wants to remove threats to his power and is trying to secure it in every possible way. Xi Jinping will continue to purge officials until the time he is convinced that his position is unchallenged; until then, the purges will be the “New Normal” for China.
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*Dr. Teshu Singh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
End Notes
[i] Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/china , Accessed on March 16, 2026.
[ii] The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission issued a report on the supervision, inspection, and investigation work of discipline inspection and supervision organs nationwide in 2025,
https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiaon/202601/t20260117_470450.html Accessed on March 16, 2026.
[iii] Xi's Purge of the Military Prepares the Chinese Army for Confrontation, RAND report 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2016/04/xis-purge-of-the-military-prepares-the-chinese-army.html Accessed on February 12, 2026.
[iv] Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Leon Li, Suyash Desai, Truly Tinsley, Linda Yang, Feifei Hung, "The Purges Within China’s Military Are Even Deeper Than You Think", February 24, 2026, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-pla-military-purges/ Accessed on March 11, 2026.
[v] Lin Congyi, China resolute in winning anti-corruption war in military: PLA Daily, January 24, 2026, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/O_251451/16439158.html Accessed on February 6, 2026.
[vi] Amy Hawkins and agencies, China’s top general under investigation for alleged violations amid corruption crackdown, The Guardian, January 26, 2026https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/26/china-top-ranking-general-zhang-youxia-investigation Accessed on March 3, 2026.
[vii] Zhang Youxia's Profile, https://news.cgtn.com/news/7a59444d79454464776c6d636a4e6e62684a4856/share_p.html
Accessed on 10 February 2026.
[viii] Vision Times, Zhang
https://www.visiontimes.com/2026/01/25/zhang-youxia-as-the-second-lin-biao-how-the-chinese-communist-party-is-racing-toward-collapse.html Accessed on 10 February 2026.
[ix] Biography of Liu Zhenli, https://www.china-arms.com/2024/06/biography-of-liu-zhenli/ Accessed on February 10, 2026.
[x] PTI, Enhance political loyalty, Xi Jinping tells Chinese military after purges, Economic Times, March 7, 2026.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/enhance-political-loyalty-xi-jinping-tells-chinese-military-after-purges/articleshow/129220036.cms?from=mdr Accessed on March 12, 2026.
[xi] Yvette Tanand Stephen McDonell, China's Xi Jinping makes rare reference to recent military purge, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg5n7064p9eo
Accessed on March 12, 2026.
[xii] Yvette Tan, China removes nine military officials ahead of key political meeting, 27 February 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c6270z0dr6noAccessed on March 12, 2026.
[xiii] AP, China’s President calls for political loyalty among military as anti-graft purge widens, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinas-president-calls-for-political-loyalty-among-military-as-anti-graft-purge-widens/article7071680 March 11, 2026.
[xiv] Xi stresses enhancing political loyalty in the military to advance defence modernisation,
https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202603/07/content_WS69abea9cc6d00ca5f9a09b3b.html , Accessed on March 11, 2026.
[xv] Ibid.
[xvi] AP, China’s Xi calls for political loyalty in the military as anti-corruption purge widens, https://apnews.com/article/china-congress-military-purge-jinping-1f13700eec749f9476810a878368a62a March 11, 2026.
[xvii] China Bulletin: February 4, 2026
https://www.uscc.gov/trade-bulletins/china-bulletin-february-4-2026 , Accessed on March 13, 2026.
[xviii] K. Tristan Tang, Zhang Youxia’s Differences with Xi Jinping Led to His Purge, https://jamestown.org/zhang-youxias-differences-with-xi-jinping-led-to-his-purge/ Accessed on March 11, 2026.
[xix] Ibid
[xx] Dennis Wilder, The meaning of Xi’s Military Purge, January 30, 2026 https://www.ft.com/content/1e722210-d6c6-4972-a60c-92d460059fa8Accessed on March 11, 2026.
[xxi] Dennis Wilder, The meaning of Xi’s military purge, https://www.ft.com/content/1e722210-d6c6-4972-a60c-92d460059fa8 Accessed on March 11, 2026.
[xxii] K. Tristan Tang, Zhang Youxia’s Differences with Xi Jinping Led to His Purge, https://jamestown.org/zhang-youxias-differences-with-xi-jinping-led-to-his-purge/ Accessed on March 11, 2026.
[xxiii] Dennis Wilder, The meaning of Xi’s military purge, https://www.ft.com/content/1e722210-d6c6-4972-a60c-92d460059fa8Accessed on March 11, 2026.