Indian Council of World Affairs

In a historic election,[i] the people of Hungary have voted out Viktor Orbán, a liberal turned right wing populist, who ruled Hungary for sixteen years and remains the poster boy of the European far-right politics. 

Orbán had ruled Hungary with an absolute majority since 2010. His government has been accused of consciously undermining democratic institutions and actively shaping a pro-incumbent electoral system which denied level playing field to the opposition leaders. This included undermining press freedom, compromising judicial apparatus, tweaking electoral laws in his favour and modifying electoral constituencies to favour his candidates.[ii]

His tenure was marked by economic stagnation, weak GDP growth, and declining standard of living in a system, which Orbán proudly described as an “illiberal state”[iii] within a European Union which projects itself as a progressive and liberal normative force.  On the foreign policy front, Orbán was a known Eurosceptic, who had constantly challenged the EU’s mandate, consistently trampled upon Ukraine’s EU ambitions and took pro-Moscow stance on the ongoing war in Ukraine

Since the beginning of the War, Orbán had criticized Ukraine and taken position closer to the Russian interests such as blocking crucial EU financial loan packages for Ukraine. He considered Russia crucial for Hungary’s energy security (including nuclear energy) and favored a cordial relationship with Moscow even to the extent of going against the EU and NATO of which Hungary is a member.

Orbán’s energy policies directly conflicted with EU’s energy transition goals where Hungary emerged as a critical weak link. In 2025, for example, Hungary was importing 100,000 barrels of Russian crude per day, accounting for around 90 % of its supply.[iv]

During his electoral campaign he described the EU and the Hungarian opposition leaders as warmongers and warned that the opposition will drag Hungary into a war with Russia if elected to power.[v] He also accused Ukraine of directly interfering in the election process using money, pressure, and agents.[vi] Orbán was also a crucial conservative voice in Europe where he fashioned Hungary into an “intellectual, institutional and financial hub” for the European conservative voice and supported Trump’s disdain for liberal European values.[vii].

The Magyar Phenomenon

The man who defeated Orbán is Peter Magyar who was once a member of Orbán’s Fidesz Party. He now leads the Respect and Freedom Party commonly known as the Tisza party, the party that will form the government.

Magyar distanced himself from Orbán’s government and party in 2024 following a high-level child abuse pardon scandal, and accused the government of corruption and mismanagement. His prime ministerial campaign heavily focused on the declining rule of law, widespread corruption, strained relations with Europe and democratic backsliding in Hungary.

Building on the frustrations caused by a largely stagnant economy, failing public services and deep corruption, Magyar had promised to restore the rule of law, repair Hungary’s strained relations with the EU, restructure the economy and boost social spendings to elevate Hungary’s image as a “peaceful, functioning and humane” system.[viii]

At the core of his electoral manifesto was to tackle endemic corruption through systematic restoration of the rule of law, as the key to save public money and unlock frozen EU funds worth billions. As per the Transparency International’s Corruption Index of 2025, Hungary is now the most corrupt country in EU. These reforms are thus expected to create a domino effect, where money saved through clamping down on unjustified investments, corruption and restoring the rule of law would bring back investors’ confidence and boost economic growth.

Magyar, being an insider into the Orbán system, managed to outplay his rival by focusing on the domestic upheaval and curating an effective social media campaign that directly targeted the voters. His most important strategy was to directly engage with the voters travelling and addressing voters across the countries. The strategy proved successful as Magyar’s candidates significantly won in constituencies which were stronghold of Orbán’s Fidesz. Magyar’s ability to connect with rural voters who traditionally supported Orbán was crucial to his success especially given that urban voters typically opposed Orbán.  

Magyar’s Domestic and Foreign Priorities

The most important domain of Magyar’s prospective actions will be focused on the domestic front of Hungary which has been the focal point of his campaigns. This includes a promise to retrospectively amend the constitution to limit the terms of the Prime Minister to a maximum of two terms. His domestic agendas also prominently feature tax cuts, doubling basic allowances for the family, lowering retirement age, salary rise and reducing public sector borrowings.

The core of his domestic agenda will primarily pivot around anti-corruption reforms, particularly to unlock roughly 17 billion euros of EU funds currently frozen  due to concerns over Hungary’s pending anti-corruption measures. Magyar may begin with joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, an independent prosecutorial body of the EU, which Hungary had not joined after its accession into EU.[ix] The anti-corruption measures, as per Magyar, will also include restoring judicial independence, empowering investigative and ensuring press and academic freedom in the country.[x]

Due to the Europe wide implication of the elections, Magyar’s views on Hungary’s foreign policy were much discussed and debated in Europe. Hungary’s foreign policy under Victor Orbán was marked by his confrontational stance towards EU and Ukraine and a soft attitude towards the Russian Federation. He has been a known Eurosceptic for years arguing in favour of severely undermining the institutional authority of the European Union and to reshape the organization from the inside i.e., without leaving the EU. Arguing about the institutional overreach of the EU, he campaigned against the Brussels bureaucracy and was especially vocal against the EU on the issue of migration and its support to Ukraine.

When analyzing Magyar’s foreign policy, it is important to note that he comes from the same right wing conservative camp, which Orbán belonged to, and is expected to continue many policy positions (which seems practical to Magyar) which were central to Orbán’s narrative as a protector of Europe.

Although Magyar’s main goal is to end Hungary’s spoiler role in EU decision-making process and establish Hungary’s position as a reliable member of the EU, reset relationship with regional countries like Poland, he will remain conservative on EU’s migration pact by opposing EU’s policies on migration and maintain the border fences which were built under Orbán government. Many analysts consider him more hard liner on the issue of immigration than his predecessor. He has announced to completely end the system of non-EU guest workers arriving primarily from South and South-East Asia and make the renewal rules for the existing workers stricter than the previous government.

On Ukraine, Magyar supports the EU position and is open to rebuild ties with Kiev on friendly terms. Although he remains sympathetic to Ukraine’s sufferings, sees Ukrainians as victims of the Russian war and supports Ukraine’s positions on the peace talks, his support for Ukraine has limits.[xi] Hungary is not in a position to financially support Ukraine given its own precarious budgetary constraints and thus supports Orbán negotiated opt-out from the EU’s 90 billion euros loan package to Ukraine. Yet there are visible signs of a slow return of normalcy between the countries as favourable comments have been made from both sides. Magyar for example will not bloc EU’s loan package to Ukraine which Orbán consistently did in his tenure. However, Hungary will remain outside of any EU based financial commitment for Ukraine.  In return, Ukraine is willing to repair the damaged Druzhba pipeline which used to bring Russian oil to Hungary. However, Magyar remains indifferent to Ukraine’s fast accession to an EU membership and maintains that Ukraine must first meet the accession criteria’s before being invited to join the bloc.

On the question of ties with Russia, Magyar is set to adopt a more “pragmatic approach” where he aims to reduce Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy through diversification and building new infrastructures for importing non-Russian oil and gas before committing to a complete halt of energy imports from Russia. Although this is in consonance with EU’s intention to completely end Russian gas imports by 2027, this time line is not feasible for Hungary, given its stark dependency on Russia for its energy needs. Hungary may need another decade to completely end its dependence on Russian energy. However, his Russia policy will definitely be guided by his motivation to return Hungary closer to Europe and thus we may see a policy of minimal engagement with Moscow.

Conclusion

Magyar’s policies and priorities will become clearer in coming days but it is clear that the days of Hungary’s isolation in Europe is now over where Budapest is set to engage more actively with Brussels. However, his challenges are more domestic where he has inherited from Orbán a struggling economy with runaway budgetary deficits and low sovereign credit ratings. Another front of his struggle would be the challenge in dislodging Orbán’s loyalists who continue to enjoy high ranks and positions in government and judicial systems and thus may hamper his plans for drastic reforms in the political and economic system of the country including amending the constitution and changing electoral laws which favoured Orbán. However, the electoral supermajority will definitely help in launching and implementing much needed reforms.

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*Aman Kumar is a Research Associate at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Paul Kirby. “Orbán era swept away by Peter Magyar’s Hungary election landslide”, BBC, April 13, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd9vg782kx7o (Accessed April 13, 2026)

[ii] Aman Kumar. “Into the ideas and politics of Viktor Orbán”, ICWA, February 18, 2025, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=12462&lid=7616 (Accessed April 13, 2026)

[iii] Viktor Orbán. “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp”, PM Office of the Hungarian Government, July 30, 2014, https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp (Accessed April 13, 2026).

[iv] Marto Pacheco. “Can Peter Magyar break Hungary’s reliance on Russian oil”, Euronews, April 13, 2026 https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/13/can-peter-magyar-break-hungarys-reliance-on-russian-oil (Accessed April 13, 2026)

[v]  Jean-Baptiste Chastand.“ Hungarian PM Orban campaigns on fears of war and hatred of Ukraine”, Le Monde, March 11, 2026, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/03/11/hungarian-pm-orban-campaigns-on-fears-of-war-and-hatred-of-ukraine_6751327_4.html (Accessed April 13, 2026)

[vi] Gabor Kiss and Gavin Blackburn. “Hungary’s PM Viktor Orbánaccusses Ukraine of election interference and summons ambassador”, Euronews, 26 January 2026,  https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/26/hungarys-pm-viktor-orban-accuses-ukraine-of-election-interference-and-summons-ambassador (Accessed April 13, 2026)

[vii] Chrlstlan Edwards. “Trump could soon lose his best friend in Europe”, CNN World, April 09, 2026, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/09/europe/orban-hungary-election-trump-ally intl#:~:text=That%20crisis%20felt%20a%20world,Jonathan%20Ernst/Pool/Reuters (Accessed April 14, 2026)

[viii] Justin Spike and Sam McNeil. “Hungary voted for ‘complete change in regime’, Peter Magar says, calling for new parliament ASAP”, Fortune, April 13, 2026, https://fortune.com/2026/04/13/hungary-voted-for-complete-change-in-regime-peter-magyar-says-calling-for-new-parliament-asap/ (Accessed April 14, 2026)

[ix] Sandor Zsiros. “EU cash, Ukraine, Russia and migration: Five takeaways from Peter Magyar’s presser”, Euronews, April 13, 2026 https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/13/eu-cash-ukraine-russia-and-migration-five-takeaways-from-peter-magyars-press-conference (Accessed April 14, 2026)

[x] Ibid

[xi] Veronika Melkozerova. “What Peter Magyar’s victory in Hungary means for Ukraine”, Politico, April 13, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/what-peter-magyar-victory-means-for-ukraine/ (Accessed April 15, 2025)