Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Following the Gen-Z movement, Nepal has entered a significant phase of transition characterised by numerous challenges, which test the resilience and ingenuity of its political parties, leadership, and citizenry. The dilemmas faced by the Interim Government in its pursuit of fulfilling its mandate clearly reflected a broader quest for transformation. This endeavour was further underscored by the outcomes of the House of Representatives election held in March 2026. Post-election scenario signals a departure from the trend of “certain uncertainty,” as Nepal has seen a single-party majority government for the first time since the 1991 elections. This development offers hope for a full five-year term and paves the way for political stability. However, the newly formed government also faces challenges at both the domestic and foreign policy levels. Navigating this transition requires a deep understanding of the evolving dynamics and a strong commitment to achieving long-term political stability in Nepal. 

Introduction 

The Gen-Z movement of September 2025 led Nepal into a new phase of political transition and uncertainty. With the dissolution of the House of Representatives (HoR) and the formation of an Interim Government, debate sparked whether the interim government could fulfil its mandate to conduct the election within six months. Despite these speculations, the elections were completed with approximately 60 per cent voter turnout, not only signifying the transfer of power to a democratically elected government but also suggesting a generational shift in leadership. 

The newly formed government has critical issues to address during this transition, including ensuring transparency, accountability, and outlining a clear foreign policy outlook. In this evolving context, the stakes are high, and the choices made today will resonate for generations to come. Questions about political stability, good governance, accountability, transparency, and the representation of the younger generation are paramount. Achieving this is a delicate balance, recognising the sacrifices made by the younger generation while upholding the values of federalism and democratic republicanism, alongside the hopes and aspirations of both the new and older generations in light of present realities and breaking the trail of 'certain uncertainty' in Nepal.

Against this backdrop, this paper examines Nepal’s political dilemmas, analysing the profound challenges and opportunities that define this crucial moment in the country’s history.

Interim Government’s Mandate and Dilemmas

The interim government was formed with the mandate to conduct a free and fair election, and the election date was set for 5 March 2026. However, it sparked the debate over whether the interim government would be able to conduct the election within the limited timeframe and complete all necessary preparations, such as updating the electoral rolls, ensuring law and order, strengthening security arrangements to guarantee a free and fair elections and uniting political forces to participate, especially when several party leaders went to the apex court for reviving the HoR.

After the formation of the interim government, significant efforts commenced to prepare for the March 2026 HoR elections, including the launch of a new electoral roll that registered a total of 18,903,689 voters,^[i] including 915,119 new voters,^[ii] with 23,112 polling centres across the 10,967 polling stations nationwide.^[iii] Further, the Election Commission of Nepal implemented a new ‘Election Code of Conduct’^[iv] to ensure that the polls are free, fair, transparent and conducted without fear.^[v] Additionally, extensive security measures were enacted through an Integrated Election Security Plan, featuring the deployment of over 338,000 security personnel,^[vi] including the army, Nepal Police, newly recruited Election Police and the Armed Police Force,^[vii] to protect voters, polling locations, ballots and candidates across various constituencies.

To ensure an inclusive election, the interim government held several rounds of discussions convened under the leadership of Prime Minister Karki, and all the political parties eventually agreed to participate in the upcoming elections. During these discussions, all the major parties and stakeholders were invited,^{[viii], [ix], [x]} and assured of free and fair elections and security. The interim government engaged in discussions with various stakeholders, including those who oppose the election and supporters of the monarchy, urging them to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.^[xi] Prime Minister Karki encouraged support for a national campaign aimed at ensuring successful and free polls, reaffirming the interim government’s commitment to justice, anti-corruption efforts and ongoing dialogue.^[xii]

The extensive political participation and campaigns by leaders and supporters, along with online social campaigns across the country, indicated the interim government’s firm commitment to complete its mandate of conducting the election.

Additionally, in line with the mandate of the violence-related probe, the interim government established a three-member high-level commission, led by former judge Gauri Bahadur Karki, to investigate the violence that occurred during the Gen-Z-led protest.^[xiii] The commission received its third extension from the interim government to submit its report^[xiv] just before the March 2026 elections. It was debated that the extension was granted to avoid any potential friction^[xv] before the election. Following the conclusion of polling on March 5, the Karki Commission submitted its report to the interim government on March 8.[xvi] However, the report was not made public, which led to scrutiny of the interim government by both academic and political experts. Concerns were raised regarding its failure to fulfil its mandate while also lacking transparency and accountability to the public.

Generally, the reports investigating political violence often attribute responsibility to political leaders, security forces, or senior officials and governments may delay the publication of such reports or release them in part. A pertinent example is the Lal Commission report, established to investigate violent clashes from 2015 to 2019, which resulted in the deaths of 56 protesters and 10 police personnel; its findings remain unreleased.[xvii] Importantly, the role of these commissions is confined to fact-finding and evidence analysis.[xviii] As determined by the Nepalese Supreme Court, no individual may be convicted solely based on a commission’s report.[xix] Therefore, at first, it appeared that the report would be handed over to the newly established RSP government and the new Council of Ministers would review and decide whether to approve it and make it public. However, just two days before the oath-taking ceremony, the 907-page report was leaked[xx] and widely published on social media platforms.

The Question of Inclusive and Diverse Participation

The 2026 HoR election presented a complex picture of political inclusivity and diversity. A total of 68 political parties filed nominations for both proportional representation (PR) and first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems. For the 165 FPTP seats, these parties fielded 2,263 candidates, alongside 1,143 independents.^[xxi] Among the FPTP candidates, 3,017 were male, 388 were female, and only one candidate identifies as a member of the sexual and gender minority community.^[xxii] For the 110 proportional representation seats, 3,135 candidates were in the field.^[xxiii]

In terms of social representation, candidates were selected from a diverse ethnic and community groups, including the Khas Arya, Indigenous Janajati, Madhesi, Dalit, Muslim, and Tharu communities (Table 1). This illustrates a degree of inclusivity reflecting Nepal’s diverse population. However, a deeper analysis shows discrepancies in actual representation compared to the population size. Gender diversity remained limited, particularly in the FPTP system, where male candidates overwhelmingly outnumber female and non-binary candidates. Major political parties primarily relegated marginalised groups to PR lists, which restricted their influence in the directly elected FPTP constituencies. While Dalits comprise 13.4 per cent of Nepal’s population, only one Dalit candidate is fielded by the Nepali Congress (NC), three each by the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified-Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Nepali Communist Party (NCP), and two by the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) in direct contests (Table 1).^[xxiv] On women’s representation, despite the Election Commission’s recommendation to nominate at least one-third women in FPTP races, female candidates represented only 6.67 per cent of the NC, 4.85 per cent of the CPN-UML and under 11 per cent of the RSP nominees.^[xxv] Similarly, smaller indigenous communities faced marginalisation and under-representation.^[xxvi]

Table 1. Inclusive and Diverse Participation in the HoR 2026 Election

Source: New Spotlight Magazine[xxvii]

Overall, while the election demonstrated broad community representation across age groups, gender parity and youth inclusion remained limited. The 2026 HoR election underscored the need for stronger measures to ensure equitable participation of women, sexual and gender minorities, Dalits and smaller indigenous communities, not just confined to proportional lists but also in directly contested seats. However, in comparison to the recent general elections in Bangladesh, the March 2026 elections in Nepal demonstrate a significantly higher level of inclusivity regarding political participation. This inclusivity is reflected in the representation of diverse ideologies and various social groups within the political spectrum.

A New Election Model!

Media reports indicate that March 2026 election campaigns in Nepal have expanded significantly, reflecting recent political developments. Experts note a shift from traditional reliance on money and muscle power towards strategies centred on youth mobilisation, digital platforms, AI-driven outreach and social media.^[xxviii] The increasing engagement of the Nepalese diaspora^[xxix] and the active participation of young voters highlighted a transformative approach to the March HoR elections. However, this evolution also brings challenges, including the proliferation of fake and misleading information. Nearly one million new voters, primarily Gen-Z, underscored a politically aware, digitally connected generation eager for change.

Given that, the Election Commission of Nepal’s TikTok video competition reflected a strategic shift toward digital civic engagement by leveraging social media to promote election awareness and voter education.^[xxx] By inviting citizens, especially youth, to create original, informative content and rewarding high-view videos, the Commission harnessed participatory communication, peer influence and platform algorithms to organically expand outreach. This approach helped modernise traditional voter education, increased relatability through user-generated content; and encouraged democratic participation in a format familiar to younger demographics. At the same time, it signals institutional recognition of social media as a powerful tool for shaping political awareness and mobilising voters in contemporary electoral processes. Social media has emerged as a crucial platform for political communication, allowing candidates to engage directly and cost-effectively with large audiences, and it has fundamentally transformed campaign dynamics in Nepal.

Further, on the question of transformation, it appears that the March 2026 election was less about ideology or party strength and more about generational change. It was a contest of competing political narratives, challenging the corrupt “old guard”, contrasting experienced politicians with social-media-driven populist figures, and attempting a reform-from-within approach that bridges tradition with aspiration. Further, unlike previous generations, Gen-Z voters are impatient for tangible progress. They expect leadership transformation, visible development, and reforms to materialise quickly, unlike the Millennials, who tolerate longer transition periods.

At this critical juncture, when people have been seeking political stability, good governance, accountability, employment opportunities and visible development, the March 2026 election’s results have sparked debate on the future of the traditional political parties in Nepal, particularly those adhering to leftist ideologies and Madhes-based parties. Although during the electoral campaigns and political manifestos, the focus across the political spectrum remained on themes of stability, accountability, justice, a corruption-free government and economic growth, the people’s mandate chose alternative forces.

Overall, it appears that the mode and direction of electoral politics in Nepal have witnessed a gradual yet significant transformation.

HoR & Government Formation, Generational Shift and the Fate of Political Parties

The RSP secured the highest number of seats, falling short by two seats to achieve an absolute majority in the House of Representatives with a total of 125 seats obtained through the First Past the Post (FPTP) system and 57 seats through Proportional Representation (PR), out of a combined total of 275 seats (165 FPTP and 110 PR) (Tables 2 and 3). Hence, President Ram Chandra Paudel administered the oath of office and secrecy to Balendra Shah, the senior leader of the RSP, as the Prime Minister of Nepal.[xxxi]

The NC, which secured a total of 38 seats, including 18 FPTP and 20 PR seats, is the 2^nd largest party in the HoR. In contrast, the CPN-UML obtained 9 FPTP and 16 PR seats, while the NCP gained 8 FPTP and 9 PR seats (Tables 3 and 3). The electoral performance of NC and the two major leftist parties, namely the CPN-UML and the NCP, has substantially declined. The election results indicate a significant decline in leftist political influence in Nepal, alongside the decline of the Madhesi Political Parties, as none of the Madhesi Parties secured a seat in the HoR. Nonetheless, both the CPN-UML (10 seats) and the NCP (17 seats), along with the Nepali Congress (24 seats), maintain significant representation in the 59-seat National Assembly (Table 4). The Janata Samajbadi Party Nepal has two seats, the Democratic Socialist Party Nepal and the National Front each have one seat, and two seats are nominated, while the RSP currently holds no seats in the upper house (Table 4).

Table 2. Age-Group Representation of the FPTP System Results of HoR Elections 2026

Source: Prepared by the author based on data available on the Election Commission of Nepal website.[xxxii]

Table 3. Age-Group Representation of the Proportional System Results of HoR Elections 2026

Source: Prepared by the author based on data available on the Election Commission of Nepal website.[xxxiii]

Table 4. Party-wise Representation of the National Assembly

*Two seats are currently unoccupied; one resulting from the passing of a member of the Nepali Congress, and the other being a nominated position.

Source: Official website of the National Assembly of Nepal. https://na.parliament.gov.np/np/members

The Generational Transformation

The election results reveal a distinct trend of generational transformation across party lines. The RSP demonstrates a strong presence among younger representatives, particularly within the 20-29, 30-39 and 40-49 age groups (Figure 1). Among the 275 legislators elected to the HoR, 183 individuals are aged under 50, including 87 who are under 40 years of age. While this shift points to an increase in political participation among the younger generation, it also raises concerns about the potential impact of their relative lack of experience and practical knowledge on parliamentary proceedings and law-making. This situation prompts questions regarding the depth of insights they can offer in these critical areas.

Figure 1. Age-Group Representation in the House of Representatives

Source: Prepared by the author with the help of Napkin AI

In recent decades, Nepal has developed a culture of uncritical reverence for political figures, which has hindered accountability and fostered an environment of unquestioning loyalty. It is essential to demand responsibility and transparent leadership from all leaders, including those who are newly emerging.^[xxxiv] Otherwise, the tendency to worship populist figures^[xxxv] could undermine the political transition and potentially leave it incomplete.

The March 2026 election also reflects a gradually maturing democratic culture. Triggered by a youth-led uprising, voters have increasingly been scrutinising candidates on performance and concrete plans rather than relying solely on rhetoric.^[xxxvi] However, along with the growing insistence on accountability, the recent election campaigns have also witnessed a rise in populism across party lines. It remains to be seen whether the increase in populism will lead to and sustain authoritarian tendencies among leadership or if critical questioning and accountability will remain robust.

The Fate of the Political Parties

Over the past seven months, internal political rivalries among various parties in Nepal have resulted in significant shifts in leadership, fragmentation, mergers, and reforms following the post-Gen-Z movement. While internal discord within political factions is not new, the recent turbulence and frequent leadership changes have heightened dissent against leaders who resisted relinquishing power, leading to increasingly authoritarian practices. The longevity and effectiveness of these divisions and alignments, however, remain uncertain.

Ravi Lamichhane’s Rastriya Swatantra Party persuaded popular figure Balendra Shah, former Mayor of Kathmandu, to join the party as its Prime Ministerial candidate. Alongside Balen, several other youths and influential leaders, including Sudan Gurung, one of the major faces of the September 2025 Gen-Z movement and Amresh Kumar Singh, former Nepali Congress (NC) leader and later independent MP from Sarlahi-4 constituency and others, joined the RSP, contested the HoR elections and won.

Balen contested and won from the Jhapa-5 constituency in Koshi Province. This is the same constituency where CPN-UML chief and former Prime Minister KP Oli has won in the last two House of Representatives elections and contested for the third time and lost to Balendra Shah. Since the restoration of the multiparty system in Nepal in 1991, Oli has represented Jhapa-2, Jhapa-6 and Jhapa-7, except for one loss in the 2008 Constituent Assembly election. What was once considered a safe seat for Oli and UML has now transformed into the support base for RSP.

The electoral defeat of former Prime Minister KP Oli, along with other notable leaders of the CPN-UML, sparks debate regarding the future of leftist ideology within Nepal’s political landscape. This outcome not only reflects the challenges faced by the UML in securing continued electoral support but also suggests an underlying uncertainty about its ability to revitalise its political base and align its strategies with the evolving sentiments of the electorate. The defeat serves as a pivotal moment, prompting a re-evaluation of the party’s ideological commitments and its resonance with the populace. As the UML grapples with the implications of this setback, it faces the urgent task of redefining its political narrative and policies to regain credibility and influence in a rapidly changing socio-political environment of Nepal. The interplay of leftist principles and contemporary political dynamics will be crucial for the UML’s potential resurgence and its role in shaping Nepal’s future governance.

The RSP’s strategy to incorporate Balendra Shah into the party and present him as the prime ministerial candidate proved to work, especially given that the other major parties faced huge criticism from the people regarding their authoritarian, plutocratic and ineffectual leadership in the past. Whereas the restructuring of the core committee of the Nepali Congress,[xxxvii] the oldest and largest democratic political party in Nepal, and intra-party reforms did not truly translate into political gains. RSP’s Amresh Kumar Singh defeated NC’s Prime Ministerial Candidate and current party president from Sarlahi-4 constituency of Madhes Pradesh. However, the NC, being the second largest party in HoR and the largest party in the National Assembly, remains to play a significant role as the opposition in parliament. Furthermore, the voting patterns observed in both the FPTP and PR systems suggest that the NC is often viewed as the second choice for voters in numerous constituencies. This trend indicates potential for the revival of the NC.

On 5 November 2025, ten communist parties in Nepal, including the CPN (Maoist Centre) led by former Prime Minister Prachanda and the CPN (Unified Socialist) led by former Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, merged to form the Nepali Communist Party (NCP)[xxxviii] on the verge of the March 2026 Elections. This new party also included several other left-oriented parties, such as the Nepal Samajwadi Party, Janasamajwadi Party Nepal, CPN (Maoist Socialist) and NCP (Samyabadi).[xxxix] Consequently, Prachanda successfully secured victory in his respective constituency. However, this achievement stood in stark contrast to the performance of other prominent leaders, such as Madhav Kumar Nepal, who faced electoral defeats. The NCP’s underperformance in the March 2026 elections raises significant questions about the party’s future viability and influence, as well as the broader leftist movement in Nepal.

Unsurprisingly, the Madhes-based parties were unable to secure a single seat under FPTP or even meet the 3 per cent threshold under PR. The decline of these parties can be attributed to several interrelated factors. Firstly, their opportunistic behaviour over the past decade has alienated potential supporters. The fragmentation of these parties into various factions has resulted in a lack of coherent representation for their constituents. Additionally, the absence of fresh leadership and innovative perspectives within these groups, along with the youth turning to support the RSP, has worsened their failure in the electoral landscape. As a result, these issues have led to a diminished electoral mandate and reduced relevance for the Madhes-based political parties in the parliamentary elections. However, given that the provincial elections are due in 2027, the actual ground testing of the Madhes-based parties remains to be seen.

The declining support and inability of these parties to secure favourable outcomes reflect shifting public sentiment and disaffection and warrant careful examination, given the past strategies and alliances of political parties as well as the prospect of broader political dynamics of provincial assembly party politics in Nepal.

The Challenges before the Newly Appointed Government

The Question of Domestic Political Discourse

The newly formed RSP government have several significant challenges deeply rooted in the political and governance system. These include addressing pervasive corruption and rent-seeking behaviours, proceeding with pending investigations and trials related to corruption and fraud cases across the country, ensuring proper implementation of federal provisions outlined in the constitution, and empowering federal units. Although the new government have been in action just after the oath-taking ceremony and cabinet formation, its actions have drawn praise as well as criticism from political analysts and critics.

The government has received praise for its efforts to reshape public perception by introducing an 18-point “national commitment” draft that consolidates the election manifestos of major political parties into a cohesive policy roadmap.[xl] This initiative emphasises economic reform, job creation, governance enhancements, and social inclusion, while inviting stakeholder feedback prior to its finalisation. However, the current administration has also been criticised for the recent arrests of political leaders, with allegations of evading due process[xli] and engaging in politically motivated retribution. Furthermore, the newly established high-level inquiry commission, which is responsible for investigating the assets of high-ranking officials and public employees over the past two decades, is also facing scrutiny. Concerns have been raised regarding potential political pressure on these investigative bodies, which may compromise their ability to conduct impartial inquiries.[xlii] Furthermore, recent media reports have pointed to an internal rift within the RSP, particularly between its Chair Rabi Lamichhane and the party’s parliamentary leader, Prime Minister Balendra Shah.[xliii] This discord over decision-making processes may present significant challenges for the current government.

On the question of ensuring Federalism, the new government is required to take steps to fully implement constitutional mandates and ensure the effective decentralisation of powers. Although Madhes-based parties and other regional parties may have vanished from the central legislature, they continue to hold power at the provincial and municipal levels, often in coalition with older political parties. With the next provincial and local-level elections due in 2027, political decisions, policies, and legislation at the federal parliament will determine whether political stability at the centre will also extend to the provincial levels.

Furthermore, the government may also face challenges in addressing pro-monarchist sentiments and political pressures advocating for Nepal to be declared a Hindu state. Additionally, a sustainable strategy for growth and development is essential, alongside addressing environmental and climate-related challenges. Most importantly, the government must tackle the rising unemployment among the youth in Nepal. The National Statistics Office (NSO) conducted the Nepal Living Standards Survey in 2022-23, revealing an unemployment rate of 12.6 per cent[xliv] which require great attention from the government.

It is essential to recognise that the current political transition is predominantly driven by the youth. This younger generation has adeptly utilised digital platforms, particularly social media, to assert their political presence and engage in the political process. This dynamic was particularly evident during the establishment of the interim government. It is crucial for the newly elected government to acknowledge and actively engage with this evolving political landscape, characterised by the digital realm. It becomes imperative that the government incorporate provisions in policy and legislation to ensure a secure and free digital space where all voices are heard, thereby contributing to the political stability of the country.

The Question of Foreign Policy Outlook

The new government is confronted with significant foreign policy challenges during these tumultuous times. Post-COVID-19, the world has experienced a surge in wars and conflicts, leading to significant disruptions in global food and energy supply chains. These ongoing crises have not only resulted in substantial human suffering, including the loss of lives, particularly among vulnerable populations such as women and children, but have also had a profound impact on migration patterns and the conditions faced by migrant workers. Given the ongoing conflict in West Asia, where a significant number of Nepalese labour migrants are working,[xlv] it is particularly concerning, as it places Nepalese citizens in vulnerable situations.[xlvi]

Further, the ongoing war has disrupted shipping routes, significantly impacting the supply of oil and gas. As a result, fuel and gas prices in Nepal have risen, leading to increased costs for cooking gas, which is widely used in households.[xlvii] This rise in fuel prices is directly affecting consumers, and they are also witnessing substantial increases in the prices of food grains, vegetables, and fruits.[xlviii] It creates a huge challenge for the government to ensure the safety and security of its people abroad in the host countries and manage inflation at the domestic level. Additionally, the government may require plans for the safe return of Nepalese migrant workers to Nepal if the conflict continues for an extended period. Additionally, the government may also have to consider how to accommodate this substantial segment of the diaspora upon their return to the country.

Although the present political transition is both new and rapid, Nepal’s core foreign policy dilemmas remain largely unchanged. As a landlocked and environmentally vulnerable country with an economy heavily dependent on remittances and tourism, Nepal must adopt nuanced shifts in its external engagements.

The current government will require a new strategy, neither balancing nor distancing itself from both of its immediate neighbours, but rather a fully ‘development diplomacy’[xlix]-oriented approach as hinted by the RSP Chair, Ravi Lamichhane. However, the government need also to not undermine the cross-border people-to-people connections and economic relations and bring up practical solutions to the problems of smuggling and unauthorised trade.

Overall, the India-Nepal relations are expected to remain strong, given the developmental aspirations of the people of Nepal and the new government’s priority areas of development cooperation in the field of energy security, trade, commerce and tourism. There are emerging and prospective fields, such as artificial intelligence, digital governance, data management and environmental sustainability, which offer promising opportunities for enhancing the partnership. Moreover, the robust development cooperation, deep-rooted ties among the people across the border and India’s constant support during crises, both within Nepal and for the Nepali diaspora abroad, continue to strengthen mutual trust, respect and collaboration.

Additionally, Nepal probably requires a fresh approach to enhance its developmental engagement with the USA, as well as with other bilateral and multilateral partners amid evolving regional and global geopolitical dynamics. Such recalibration is essential to navigate the current shifting geopolitical landscape to ensure human security, sustain economic growth and minimise influence from extra-regional powers.

Conclusion

The transition led by the Gen-Z movement in Nepal offers an opportunity to break the ‘certain uncertainty’ by achieving political stability, eliminating uncertainty, addressing existing gaps and promoting a more inclusive and representative political environment. The youth-supported RSP has now formed a majority government in Nepal, breaking the decades-long trail of coalition politics. However, achieving political stability requires that legislators and parties break the cycle of power struggles, embrace constructive opposition roles when necessary and prioritise governance over personal ambition. Without this, Nepal risks remaining stuck in a state of “certain uncertainty”, unable to realise its development and reform agenda. Ultimately, engagement and collaboration among all segments of society will be critical in shaping a stable and equitable future.

*****

*Dr. Subodh Chandra Bharti is a Research Associate at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Nepal News. “Everything You Need to Know About Nepal’s March 5, 2026 House of Representatives Election,” Nepal News. January 25, 2026. https://english.nepalnews.com/s/politics/everything-you-need-to-know-about-nepals-march-5-2026-house-of-representatives-election/ (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[ii] Aarya Chand, “First-Time Voters Claim Their Stake,” The Kathmandu Post. January 1, 2026. https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/01/01/first-time-voters-claim-their-stake. (Accessed Feb. 11, 2026).

[iii] “Nepal News. “Everything You Need to Know About Nepal’s March 5, 2026 House of Representatives Election.” Nepal News. January 25, 2026. https://english.nepalnews.com/s/politics/everything-you-need-to-know-about-nepals-march-5-2026-house-of-representatives-election/ (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[iv] Election Commission, Nepal. “आचारसंहिता मसौदा [Draft Election Code of Conduct] (Draft, 2082 B.S.).” Election Commission of Nepal. https://election.gov.np/admin/public/storage/HOR%252082/आचारसंहिता%2520मसौदा%2520Scan%2520copy.pdf. (Accessed February 17, 2026).

[v] The Kathmandu Post, “Election code of conduct comes into effect.” January 19, 2026. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/01/19/election-code-of-conduct-comes-into-effect. (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[vi] “Nepal: Additional Security Forces Deployed to Districts to Maintain Security for Upcoming Polls.” ANI News. February 22, 2026, https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/nepal-additional-security-forces-deployed-to-districts-to-maintain-security-for-upcoming-polls20260222212436/ (Accessed February 22, 2026).

[vii] Ratopati. “Nepal Deploys Joint Security Forces for Upcoming Federal Parliament Elections Under Integrated Security Plan.” Ratopati. February 3, 2026. https://english.ratopati.com/story/46675/army-to-be-mobilized-for-election-security-from-tomorrow. (Accessed February 11, 2026).

[viii] The Himalayan Times. “PM Karki Calls Meeting of Seven Political Parties to Discuss Upcoming Election.” The Himalayan Times. October 20, 2025. https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/pm-karki-calls-meeting-of-seven-political-parties-to-discuss-upcoming-election (Accessed February 20, 2026).

[ix] The Rising Nepal. “Stakeholders’ Meeting on Polls, Everyone Wants Elections: PM Karki.” The Rising Nepal. December 23, 2025. https://risingnepaldaily.com/news/72982 (Accessed February 20, 2026).  

[x] Rajdhani Daily. “सुरक्षा सर्तमा निर्वाचनमा भाग लिन ‘ठूला दल’ तयार.” RajdhaniDaily.com. पुष १३, २०८२ (Nepali calendar). https://rajdhanidaily.com/id/127309/ (Accessed February 20, 2026).

[xi] Spotlight Nepal. “PM Karki Encouraged Prasain to Participate in Elections,” Spotlight Nepal (Kathmandu), December 30, 2025, https://www.spotlightnepal.com/2025/12/30/pm-karki-encouraged-prasain-participate-elections/ (Accessed February 22, 2026).

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] The Kathmandu Post. “Government Forms Judicial Commission to Probe Excessive Use of Force During Gen-Z Protests,” Kathmandu Post. September 21, 2025, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/09/21/government-forms-judicial-commission-to-probe-excessive-use-of-force-during-gen-z-protests (Accessed February 20, 2026).

[xiv] Anil Giri, “Karki Commission Gets Third Term Extension.” The Kathmandu Post. February 10, 2026. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/02/10/karki-commission-gets-third-term-extensio. (Accessed February 27, 2026).

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] The Kathmandu Post. “Karki-led Commission Submits Report on Gen Z Uprising.” 2026. Kathmandu Post. March 8, 2026. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/03/08/karki-led-commission-submits-report (Accessed March 10, 2026).

[xvii] कृष्ण बहाब, “कार्यान्वयन होला कार्की आयोगको प्रतिवेदन ? यी ६ प्रश्नउत्तरमा बुझ्नुहोस्.” Ekantipur. March 11, 2026. https://ekantipur.com/politics/2026/03/11/en/will-the-karki-commission-report-be-implemented-understand-in-these-6-questions-and-answers-05-25.html (Accessed March 12, 2026).

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] Ibid.

[xx] Purushottam Poudel, “Karki Probe Report under Fire for Gaps, Contradictions,” The Kathmandu Post, March 27, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/03/27/karki-probe-report-under-fire-for-gaps-contradictions (Accessed March 30, 2026).

[xxi] Binod Ghimire, “Upcoming House Election Explained,” Kathmandu Post (January 29, 2026), https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/01/29/upcoming-house-election-explained (Accessed March 10, 2026).

[xxii] Ibid.

[xxiii] New Spotlight Online, “HoR Election: Dominance of 40–49 Age Group Among Candidates,” New Spotlight Magazine, February 27, 2026, https://www.spotlightnepal.com/2026/02/27/hor-election-dominance-of-4049-age-group-among-candidates/ (Accessed March 10, 2026).

[xxiv] New Kathmandu Post, “Diversity Deficit,” The Kathmandu Post (February 16, 2026), https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2026/02/16/diversity-deficit (Accessed March 10, 2026).

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii]  New Spotlight Online, “HoR Election: Dominance of 40–49 Age Group Among Candidates.” New Spotlight Magazine, February 27, 2026, https://www.spotlightnepal.com/2026/02/27/hor-election-dominance-of-4049-age-group-among-candidates/ (Accessed February 29, 2026).

[xxviii] Dr. Pramod Jaiswal, “Before the Ballots: How Oli Lost the Political Narrative.” KathmanduPati, February 24, 2026. https://english.kathmandupati.com/?p=27733 (Accessed February 26, 2026).

[xxix] Ibid.

[xxx] Election Commission, Nepal. "निर्वाचन प्रचार प्रसार तथा मतदाता शिक्षाका लागि टिकटक भिडियो बनाउनुहोस्, रु. ५० हजार जित्नुहोस्।" Public notice. February 17, 2026. https://election.gov.np/np/ (Accessed February 26, 2026).

[xxxi] The Kathmandu Post. “Balendra Shah Sworn In as Prime Minister,” The Kathmandu Post, March 27, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/03/27/balendra-shah-sworn-in-as-prime-minister (Accessed March 27, 2026).

[xxxii] https://result.election.gov.np/FPTPWLChartResult2082.aspx

[xxxiii] https://election.gov.np/admin/public//storage/HOR%202082/PR/Samanupatik_Elected.pdf

[xxxiv] E-Kantipur. “राजनीतिमा नयाँ आएका नेतृत्वलाई पनि प्रश्न गर्न थाल्नुपर्छ : तनुजा पाण्डे,” E-Kantipur, February 9, 2026, https://ekantipur.com/news/2026/02/09/we-should-also-start-questioning-the-leadership-that-has-entered-politics-tanuja-pandey-45-16.html (Accessed March 10, 2026).

[xxxv] Ibid.                                                                                  

[xxxvi] The Kathmandu Post. “Voters are No Longer Passive Listeners. They Are Actively Seeking Answers from Candidates,” The Kathmandu Post. February 24, 2026. https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/02/24/voters-are-no-longer-passive-listeners-they-are-actively-seeking-answers-from-candidates/ (Accessed March 10, 2026).

[xxxvii] “Nepali Congress Elects Gagan Thapa as New President,” Kathmandu Post (Kathmandu), January 15, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/01/15/here-is-the-list-of-newly-elected-office-bearers-central-committee-members-of-nepali-congress (Accessed February 15, 2026).

[xxxviii] The Rising Nepal. “Nepali Communist Party formed forging 10 left parties,” The Rising Nepal, November 06, 2025, https://risingnepaldaily.com/news/70671 (Accessed February 05, 2026).

[xxxix] Ibid.

[xl] The Kathmandu Post. “On Shah Government’s Accommodative Commitment Framework,” The Kathmandu Post, April 15, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2026/04/15/on-shah-government-s-accommodative-commitment-framework (Accessed April 17, 2026).

[xli] Biken K Dawadi, “Those in Power Now May Avoid Probe of Their Own Action,” The Kathmandu Post, March 29, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/interviews/2026/03/29/those-in-power-now-may-avoid-probe-of-their-own-action (Accessed April 07, 2026).

[xlii] Matrika Dahal and Durga Dulal, “Government Moves to Probe Assets: Questions Linger Over Panel’s Mandate and Impact,” The Kathmandu Post, April 18, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/04/18/government-moves-to-probe-assets-questions-linger-over-panel-s-mandate-and-impact (Accessed April 19, 2026).

[xliii] Ratopati. “Internal Tensions Surface Between PM Balen Shah and RSP Chair Rabi Lamichhane,” Ratopati, April 17, 2026. https://english.ratopati.com/story/59430/has-the-rashtriya-swayamsevak-sangh-rss-faced-any-problems-regarding-the-running-of-the-party-and-government (Accessed April 19, 2026).

[xliv] Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Nepal Living Standards Survey IV (NLSS IV), dataset report, June 2024. https://data.nsonepal.gov.np/dataset/b6c3c19b-4b15-44bf-8653-1571e76dad14/resource/e2d52301-1c25-498b-8732-4326c62a2372/download/nlss-iv.pdf (Accessed April 20, 2026)

[xlv] MyRepública. “2,293 Nepali Migrant Workers in West Asia Return Home Due to War Effects,” MyRepublica, March 21, 2026, https://www.myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/2293-nepali-migrant-workers-in-west-asia-return-home-due-to-war-effects-36-10.html (Accessed March 22, 2026).

[xlvi] Prakash Baral, Menuka Dhungana, Ram Prasad Chauhan, and Nawaraj Shrestha, “Nepali Migrant Workers Face Uncertainty as West Asia Conflict Disrupts Jobs,” Kathmandu Post, March 22, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/03/22/nepali-migrant-workers-face-uncertainty-as-west-asia-conflict-disrupts-jobs (Accessed March 23, 2026).

[xlvii] Kalpana Ghimire. “Nepali Kitchen Hit by Inflation: Edible Oil Prices Rise by 45 Percent in 6 Months, Vegetables Rise by 200 Percent,” Ratopati, April 19, 2026, https://english.ratopati.com/story/59588/nepali-kitchen-hit-by-inflation-edible-oil-prices-rise-by-45-percent-in-6-months-vegetables-rise-by-200-percent (Accessed April 20, 2026).

[xlviii] Ibid.

[xlix] Rabi Lamichhane (@hamrorabi), “Thank you, Prime Minister @narendramodi…,” X, March 10, 2026, https://x.com/hamrorabi/status/203104231001704479 (Accessed March 22, 2026).