Costa Rica has long maintained an autonomous and neutral foreign policy, steadfastly refusing alignment with any external power. This commitment to neutrality has distinguished the nation within a region historically marked by civil wars, political upheavals, and intense great power rivalries. While Central America endured prolonged periods of internal strife and served as a theatre of competition during the Cold War, Costa Rica managed to navigate these turbulent decades without succumbing to the patterns of instability that afflicted its neighbours. The abolition of its standing army in 1948 further reinforced this posture, allowing the country to prioritise domestic development, democratic governance, and peaceful dispute resolution over militarised engagement.
Yet, in an era defined by shifting geopolitical dynamics and renewed assertiveness on the part of the United States, this longstanding neutrality has come under increasing scrutiny. President Donald Trump, has articulated a comprehensive strategy aimed at consolidating influence across Central America while systematically diminishing China’s presence. This vision emphasises enhanced regional security architectures, counter-narcotics operations, migration management, and the protection of strategic chokepoints such as maritime routes and infrastructure corridors.
Within this framework, Costa Rica occupies a position of growing salience due to its location, and economic linkages. The choices confronting San José are stark. Defiance towards Washington remains untenable for a small nation lacking military deterrence and acutely aware of precedents involving US pressure on other Latin American states. Conversely, pragmatic alignment with the US priorities offers a pathway to sidestep confrontation while potentially securing tangible benefits in the form of investment, security cooperation, and developmental assistance.
As Costa Rica gradually remodels aspects of its foreign policy in response to these larger realities, its trajectory reflects broader adaptations to an international order increasingly characterised by competitive great power dynamics.
This article examines the contours of Costa Rica’s emerging alignments, the specific events underscoring its closer ties to the United States, and the wider implications.
The Recent Events that Suggest a Closer Alignment between Costa Rica and the United States
Several recent developments illustrate a discernible shift towards deeper cooperation between Costa Rica and the United States, particularly in the domains of security, migration, and regional defence initiatives. These steps signal not merely tactical adjustments but a broader recalibration that integrates Costa Rica into US-led frameworks for hemispheric stability.
A pivotal indicator of this evolving relationship can be found in the rapport between Costa Rican President Rodrigo Chaves and Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele. Both leaders have expressed admiration for the leadership style and priorities associated with President Trump. In January 2026, President Bukele travelled to Costa Rica to participate for the inauguration of a new maximum security prison facility in Alajuela, known as the Centro de Alta Contención y Crimen Organizado[i]. This project, modelled explicitly on El Salvador’s high-profile Terrorism Confinement Center, represents a collaborative effort to address rising organised crime and narcotics-related violence through robust deterrence measures. This exchange underscores a convergence of views on governance and security, positioning both leaders as part of an informal alignment sympathetic to US objectives in countering transnational threats. The resulting coordination between Costa Rica and El Salvador effectively contributes to a nascent axis of conservative governments[ii] in Central America that prioritises decisive action against criminal networks over traditional emphasis on rehabilitation alone.
Further evidence of alignment emerged with Costa Rica’s enthusiastic participation in the Shield of the Americas initiative[iii], launched under US auspices in March 2026. This multinational security coalition, convened at a Summit in Florida, brings together like-minded hemispheric partners to enhance collective capabilities in combating drug trafficking, and organised crime. Costa Rican representatives, including President Chaves and the President-elect Laura Fernandez, engaged actively in the proceedings, which emphasised military and law enforcement interoperability, intelligence sharing, and joint operational planning. By committing resources and political capital to this framework, Costa Rica has signalled its willingness to integrate into a US-orchestrated security architecture that extends beyond bilateral arrangements and encompasses coordinated regional responses. This involvement marks a departure from earlier reticence towards formalised defence pacts and aligns Costa Rica more closely with the operational tempo of US priorities.
Complementing these security ties, Costa Rica has been incorporated into the US conceptual framework of Greater North America for the purposes of defence, border security, and anti-cartel operations. This framework encompasses territories from the northern reaches of the continent southward to the Panama Canal corridor, treating Central American states such as Costa Rica as integral to an immediate zone of strategic interest[iv]. The designation reflects recognition of Costa Rica’s role as a transit hub and underscores the mutual benefits of deepened collaboration in these spheres.
Migration policy provides another concrete manifestation of alignment. In March 2026, Costa Rica concluded an agreement[v] with the United States to accept a limited number of third-country deportees, specifically up to twenty-five individuals[vi] per week who are neither Latin American nationals nor possess criminal records. This accord, now formalised facilitates the implementation of US immigration enforcement measures while demonstrating Costa Rica’s readiness to shoulder shared responsibilities. Such cooperation strengthens the partnership between the two countries in ways that help the US achieve its goals, creating goodwill and opportunities for mutual support in economic and development issues.
Parallel to these engagements with the United States, Costa Rica has exhibited a measured distancing from China[vii], the principal strategic competitor n in the region. Officials in San Jose have publicly attributed instances of cyber intrusion and criminal activity in national telecommunications and technology sectors to actors believed to be based in China. These concerns have led to the exclusion of Huawei from participation in the development of Costa Rica’s fifth-generation mobile network[viii] infrastructure on grounds of national security and the absence of adequate safeguards against espionage. Moreover, the government has initiated reviews of existing Chinese investments across various sectors, scrutinising their alignment with Costa Rican strategic interests and long-term autonomy. This recalibration diminishes potential points of friction with the United States while reinforcing Costa Rica’s commitment to partnerships grounded in shared values of transparency and rule-based governance.
Collectively, these events delineate a pattern of incremental yet substantive convergence between Costa Rica and the United States. They reflect a strategic choice to embed the nation within emerging US-led mechanisms for regional order, thereby enhancing its relevance in hemispheric affairs while addressing immediate domestic challenges related to security and economic resilience.
Larger Implications
The evolving alignment between Costa Rica and the United States carries profound implications for the nation’s geopolitical standing, its internal policy orientation, and the broader architecture of influence in Central America. Its location renders it both vulnerable and an asset in the context of regional dynamics. As a transit corridor[ix] for migrants and narcotics originating from South America and destined for North American markets, Costa Rica finds itself at the intersection of transnational flows. The absence of a standing military, while emblematic of its pacifist tradition, heightens its dependence on external partners for deterrence and enforcement capabilities. In this sense, its geostrategic centrality presents an advantage for the United States, which can leverage Costa Rican territory and cooperation to project influence without the complications associated with more adversarial neighbours. Yet this same centrality exposes Costa Rica to pressures that could erode its cherished neutrality if not managed with foresight.
The presence of prior Chinese investments and diplomatic engagements adds another layer of complexity. For years, China cultivated economic ties with Costa Rica through infrastructure projects, trade agreements, and technological cooperation. While these linkages provided diversification and developmental support, they have increasingly become points of contention within the US grand strategy[x], which views such activities as encroachments on hemispheric primacy. President Trump’s approach has consistently sought to curtail external powers’ footholds in the Americas, as evidenced by diplomatic initiatives targeting Chinese involvement in strategic assets. Costa Rica’s recent measures to curtail certain Chinese technological and investment initiatives thus serve to alleviate tensions with Washington but simultaneously risk straining relations with Beijing, potentially placing the nation in the crossfire of great power competition, and also reducing its options in the realm of external affairs.
Questions naturally arise regarding the long-term consequences of Costa Rica’s closer alignment with the United States. On one hand, this orientation may yield substantial dividends in the form of enhanced US investments, security assistance, trade preferences, and technical support for infrastructure and governance reforms. The alignment could shield Costa Rica from the more coercive aspects of US policy observed elsewhere, allowing it to maintain a degree of autonomy while deriving tangible benefits. On the other hand, deeper integration into US security frameworks may accelerate processes of militarisation, even if indirect, through joint exercises, equipment transfers, and operational dependencies. Such shifts could challenge Costa Rica’s constitutional commitment to demilitarisation[xi] and its identity as a neutral actor, potentially complicating its relations with other regional states and external powers over time.
It is instructive to situate Costa Rica’s choices within the wider pattern of US engagement under President Trump. The administration has applied sustained pressure on a range of Latin American countries to align with its priorities, beginning with demands concerning the Panama Canal, extending to economic and security measures directed at Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela. This sequence of actions conveys a clear message regarding expectations of compliance from hemispheric partners. For a smaller state such as Costa Rica, lacking the leverage or defensive capacity to resist outright, alignment emerges as a prudent mechanism to avoid isolation or punitive measures. By demonstrating proactive cooperation, San Jose positions itself favourably within the US calculus, thereby mitigating risks associated with defiance.
This dynamic is further illuminated by the band wagoning behaviour of other Central American nations. El Salvador, under President Bukele, has forged robust security partnerships with the United States, emphasising anti-gang operations and migration control. Honduras has similarly integrated into initiatives such as the Shield of the Americas[xii], contributing to collective efforts against transnational crime. Additional states, including Guatemala and Panama, have exhibited varying degrees of alignment through participation in US-sponsored forums and bilateral agreements focused on security and economic integration. In this context, Costa Rica appears poised to serve as the missing link in the US grand strategy for Central America. Its incorporation completes a contiguous network of cooperative governments spanning the isthmus, enabling more effective coordination on migration routes, narcotics interdiction, and countering external influences. This configuration strengthens the US ability to shape outcomes across the region while diminishing opportunities for rival powers to exploit gaps in alignment.
Nevertheless, the sustainability of this posture remains contingent upon careful balancing. Costa Rica must navigate the tensions between immediate gains in security and development and the preservation of its independent voice in international forums. Overreliance on US support could constrain policy, while insufficient engagement might invite neglect or secondary pressures. The calculus thus demands ongoing assessment of both opportunities and risks inherent in closer association with Washington.
Conclusion
At this critical juncture, Costa Rica finds itself undergoing a metamorphosis in its foreign policy under a conservative government attuned to prevailing geopolitical realities. By forging closer ties with the United States and integrating into regional security architectures, the nation seeks to play a more prominent role in Central American affairs while securing advantages in investment, stability, and influence. This adaptation reflects a pragmatic response to an international environment, where neutrality, once a source of strength, may prove increasingly untenable amid assertive great power competition.
In the shorter term, these alignments promise to deliver concrete benefits, including bolstered capacities to address domestic challenges such as crime and migration management.
On a longer term, Costa Rica confronts the prospect of gradual militarisation, significant shifts in its strategic posture, and the imperative of balancing relations with multiple external actors. The challenge lies in preserving core elements of its democratic and pacifist identity while navigating the demands of a more contested regional order. As the missing link in the US vision for Central America consolidates, Costa Rica’s trajectory will serve as a bellwether for smaller states seeking relevance amid great power realignments. The ultimate success of this approach will depend on the government’s ability to translate alignment into enduring prosperity and autonomy rather than dependency. In doing so, Costa Rica may not only safeguard its interests but also contribute meaningfully to a more stable and cooperative hemispheric framework.
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*Dr. Arnab Chakrabarty, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
End Notes
[i] Alvaro Murillo. (15th January 2026). Bukele exporta a Costa Rica su modelo de megacárcel: “La fuerza es la única forma de solucionar la violencia”. Accessed 27th April 2026. El Pais, https://elpais.com/america/2026-01-15/bukele-exporta-a-costa-rica-su-modelo-de-megacarcel-la-fuerza-es-la-unica-forma-de-solucionar-la-violencia.html.
[ii] Sergio Ramirez. (31st March 2026). Centroamérica y los vientos que soplan
Los sistemas democráticos en la región, precariamente construidos, ceden al impulso renovado del caudillismo autoritario, El Pais, Accessed 12th April 2026. https://elpais.com/america/iberoamerica-democracia/2026-03-31/centroamerica-y-los-vientos-que-soplan.html.
[iii] Vladimir de la Cruz. (11th March 2026). El Escudo de las Américas, la lucha contra las drogas y la entronización del militarismo en Costa Rica. Accessed 18th April 2026. https://www.larepublica.net/noticia/el-escudo-de-las-americas-la-lucha-contra-las-drogas-y-la-entronizacion-del-militarismo-en-costa-rica.
[iv] The Conversation. (3rd April 2026). Escudo das Americas: o que a inciativa de Trump significa para o Brasil e para a regiao? Accessed 16th April 2026. https://theconversation.com/escudo-das-americas-o-que-a-iniciativa-de-trump-significa-para-o-brasil-e-para-a-regiao-279063.
[v] Swissinfo. (18th April 2026). Costa Rica recibe segundo grupo de 22 migrantes deportados por EEUU como parte de convenio. Accessed 21st April 2026. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/costa-rica-recibe-segundo-grupo-de-22-migrantes-deportados-por-eeuu-como-parte-de-convenio/91276493.
[vi] Álvaro Murillo. (27th March 2026). Rodrigo Chaves consolidates his alignment with Trump: Costa Rica will receive more migrants from the US. El Pais. Accessed 18th April 2026. https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-03-27/rodrigo-chaves-consolidates-his-alignment-with-trump-costa-rica-will-receive-more-migrants-from-the-us.html.
[vii] Álvaro Murillo. (27th February 2026). Costa Rica and China: A Frozen Smile. Divergentes. Accessed 13th April 2026. https://www.divergentes.com/costa-rica-china-us-geopolitical-balance-5g-tensions/.
[viii] Ecuavisa. (29th May 2024). La fiesta de Huawei costó el cargo a gerentes de Costa Rica. Accessed 19th April 2026. https://www.ecuavisa.com/mundo/la-fiesta-de-huawei-costo-el-cargo-a-gerentes-de-costa-rica-20240529-0048.html.
[ix] CrHoy. (21st April 2026). Comandante de EE. UU. confirma que corredor Costa Rica-México es el principal punto de desembarco de droga en el Pacífico. Accessed 21st April 2026. https://crhoy.com/nacionales/comandante-de-ee-uu-confirma-que-corredor-costa-rica-mexico-es-el-principal-punto-de-desembarco-de-droga-en-el-pacifico/.
[x] John Hopkins University. (8th December 2025). The role of Central America amid U.S.-China competition. Accessed 11th April 2026. https://washingtondc.jhu.edu/news/role-of-central-america-amid-u-s-china-competition/.
[xi] Luis Roberto Zamora Bolaños. (2nd August 2025). Is Costa Rica the only neutral country in the world? Geneva Centre for Neutrality. Accessed 19th April 2026. https://genevaneutrality.ch/en/research/iscostaricatheonlyneutralcountryintheworld.
[xii] Brownstein. (13th March 2026). Trump Administration Commits to Hemispheric Security Cooperation. Accessed 19th April 2026. https://www.bhfs.com/insight/trump-administration-commits-to-hemispheric-security-cooperation/.