Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction

On 15^th April, 2026, a trawler carrying 250 Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshi nationals while en route to Malaysia capsized due to rough seas and overcrowding.^[i] This was not an isolated incident but rather is part of a growing trend of fatal maritime accidents.^[ii] For decades, Rohingyas have faced “systematic discrimination” and “persecution” in Myanmar, with successive governments denying them basic civic, social and political rights.^[iii]

Nine years since the mass exodus of 2017, the situation for the Rohingyas still remains precarious, forcing them to migrate to the countries in the neighbourhood via sea and land. They have increasingly been opting for maritime passages to Malaysia due to a “pervasive sense of hopelessness” in Myanmar and Bangladesh.^[iv] Furthermore as international aid continues to dwindle, many find themselves left stranded in temporary camps across Bangladesh.^[v] Desperate individuals continue to undertake these journeys despite the very high risks of interceptions, pushbacks and even death by dehydration, starvation and drowning.^[vi]

Asserted as illegal migrants from Bangladesh, they have been denied citizenship under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, and derogatorily referred to as ‘Bengali’ or ‘Kalars’^[vii]. One of the Ethnic Armed Groups (EAG), the Arakan Army (AA), which has controlled most of the Rakhine state for the last few years, has been making efforts to promote social harmony among the region’s other diverse ethnic communities like Chin, Arakanese, Mro, Khami and Maramargyi.^[viii] However, it continues to pursue policies of oppression against the Rohingya similar to those previously imposed by the Myanmar military.^[ix]

1982 Citizenship Law

Myanmar’s 1948 Union Citizenship Act, which preceded the 1982 Citizenship Law, allowed for citizenship through jus sanguinis (right of blood), jus soli (right of the soil), and naturalisation. Under this earlier framework, individuals could also acquire citizenship based on five years' residence in Myanmar, three years’ service in the armed forces, or, in the case of women, marriage to a citizen. In 1982, however, all of these provisions of acquiring citizenship were removed to only allow citizenship by descent from citizen parents for children born after 1982.^[x] It significantly curtailed the citizenship rights of those considered non-indigenous to Myanmar, particularly those of Chinese or South Asian descent, including Indian and Malay, creating a special legal position for ‘natives’.^[xi]

Due to this exclusion, the Rohingyas were prohibited from military service and Buddhist Rakhine villagers replaced Rohingya civil servants.^[xii] Their mobility is strictly restricted even within Arakan, requiring travel permits from their local Peace and Development Council Chairman to cross township and state boundaries.^[xiii] They are denied access to state-run schools beyond primary education, and cannot participate in local government.^[xiv] The local government authorities also continue to force Rohingyas into “compulsory, unpaid labour,” including work in state-run, profit-making industries and construction of "model villages" for non-Muslim migrants in Arakan.^[xv]

These conditions reflect a process of campisation wherein they are confined to a particular space; their mobility, livelihoods, and social life are tightly regulated, reinforcing segregation and deepening their exclusion from social, political and economic life.

Rendering the Rohingyas Stateless

The Rohingyas are a Bengali-speaking^[xvi] Muslim minority in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Under successive regimes, they have been subjected to ethnic and religious discrimination.^[xvii] Thousands of Rohingyas fled to what is now Bangladesh in five main phases: the late 1700s and early 1800s, the 1940s, 1978, 1991-1992^[xviii] (Operation Pyi Thaya, or “Clean and Beautiful Nation”), and the largest exodus in 2016-2017^[xix].

Muslims have been part of the Arakan Kingdom for centuries. In the eighth century, Muslim traders came to the Arakan region, some of them settling along the shores.^[xx] Successive waves of migration took place in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.^[xxi] In 1799, British records distinguished between long settled Muslim Rohingya and the Arakan Buddhists.^[xxii].

After Burma fell to the British following the three Anglo-Burmese Wars between 1824 and 1886, and with the rise of early nationalism in Burma, the tensions between the two communities grew. The two groups supported different sides. The Rakhine Buddhists welcomed the Japanese when the latter invaded Burma during the Second World War, while the Rohingyas remained pro-British.^[xxiii]

In 1948, when Burma became independent, a group of Arakanese Muslims pushed for the merger of the two bordering districts of Maungdaw and Buthidaung with Pakistan, wanting to integrate with East Pakistan, a decision the Constituent Assembly in Rangoon rejected.^[xxiv] Discontent grew with the government treating the Rohingya as illegal immigrants.

Shortly after, General Ne Win and his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) staged a coup in 1962, and the government began to dissolve Rohingya social and political organisations.^[xxv] To add further to these tensions, in 1971, during the Bangladeshi Liberation War, several Bengalis were forced to find refuge in neighbouring Arakan, which prompted large-scale protests from the local Buddhist population, who were afraid of being outnumbered in Arakan.^[xxvi] Consequently, the Burmese government forcibly expelled over 200,000 Bengali Muslims from the region back to Bangladesh, which also included native Rohingya.

In 1977, Burmese immigration and military authorities conducted Operation Nagamin (Dragon King), a nationwide drive to register citizens and filter out foreigners prior to a national census.^[xxvii] By May 1978, more than 200,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh, which the Burmese authorities claimed signified the illegal status of Rohingyas in Burma. Following the 1990 national elections, the military launched Operation Pyi Thaya or “Clean and Beautiful Nation”, forcing 250,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh.

The situation peaked in the 2010s when the largest exodus occurred. Periodic violence continued with state-backed clashes between the Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim communities in Rakhine in 2012.^[xxviii] Furthermore, the April 2014 National Census again excluded the Rohingyas.^[xxix] In 2015, the Race and Religion Laws were passed, which regulated interfaith marriage, religious conversion and childbearing, specifically targeting Rohingyas. The same year, the Rohingya were again denied the right to vote or run for office, leading to a landslide win for the NLD.^[xxx]

With this, Aung San Suu Kyi became the State Counsellor and, in September 2016, established a nine-member International Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.^[xxxi] The goal of the committee was to provide recommendations to the Government of Myanmar to achieve lasting peace in Rakhine.^[xxxii] The report suggested three steps going forward: first, to end the military operations; secondly, to allow unfettered access for humanitarian support; and thirdly, to ensure the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of the refugees to their areas of origin.^[xxxiii]

However, shortly after the commission had begun its work, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed Rohingya group, attacked Myanmar security forces in October and November, 2016, provoking a brutal response from the Myanmar military that “very likely” involved “crimes against humanity”.^[xxxiv] 

Despite her reputation as a democratic icon, Nobel laureate Suu Kyi lost international support as her NLD government defended the military operation against the Rohingya. The key argument of the government has been that the Rohingyas did not settle in Burma before British rule began in 1823, and therefore, they are not considered to be “indigenous” under the 1982 Citizenship Law, making them the largest stateless population in the world.

Current Situation

Prior to 2017, an estimated one million Rohingya in Myanmar resided in Rakhine State. However, since the brutal crackdown by Myanmar’s military in August 2017, more than 700,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar’s Rakhine state to Cox’s Bazar in neighbouring Bangladesh.^[xxxv] As of 2024, more than one million Rohingya were registered as residing in 33 refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, more than 200,000 in Malaysia,^[xxxvi] around 40,000 in India^[xxxvii] and several thousand in Indonesia and Thailand (around 100,000).^[xxxviii] One of the major issues of asylum is that most of the countries in Myanmar’s vicinity are not signatories to the Refugee Convention.^[xxxix]

As a country of “first asylum”, Bangladesh has long had the burden of providing asylum to Rohingya refugees. Given the pressure of its own large population and limited resources, following through with these obligations has remained a challenge.^[xl] Large-scale refugee flows put significant strain on already scarce resources in host regions, which generates tensions between refugees and host communities.^[xli]

Faced with hopelessness in Bangladesh, the Rohingyas turned to Malaysia for refuge. Being a Muslim-majority country, Malaysia has been more tolerant towards hosting refugees who profess Islam, but refugee status is not recognised by the Malaysian state, depriving them of basic rights such as work, education, and healthcare. However, this tolerance is temporary^[xlii] and does not include formal integration.^[xliii] They, too, have pushed back Rohingya refugees who arrived in boats via sea.^[xliv]

Thailand, another neighbouring country, has also borne a significant brunt of the crisis. With the US cutting funds, more than 100,000 Rohingyas have lost access to food and medical aid in Thailand. The Rohingyas are dependent on this aid because, lawfully, they are not permitted to work and travel outside the refugee camps.^[xlv]

Conclusion

Since the 2017 exodus, the capsizing of overcrowded boats carrying Rohingya refugees has been a common occurrence. Rohingyas have been institutionally excluded, leaving them legally stateless through systematically redefining the idea of “nativity”. Furthermore, regular periodic military operations have repeatedly displaced them into neighbouring countries. Facing severely strained resources of their own, these host nations frequently view the Rohingyas as a socio-economic burden. Consequently, they tend to adopt strict asylum regimes, repatriating them to Myanmar, regardless of the certainty of their inevitable persecution in Myanmar, a direct violation of the principle of Refoulement^[xlvi] under international human rights law. Involuntary repatriation, limited local integration and prolonged vulnerability continue to plague their lives. Humanitarian assistance alone is not enough to break this quagmire; it must be accompanied by political recognition and inclusion.

*****

*Soumyadeepa Moulik, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

References

^[i] International Organization for Migration. “Over 250 Rohingya and Bangladeshi nationals feared dead in latest Andaman Sea tragedy”, International Organization for Migration, April 2026, https://www.iom.int/news/over-250-rohingya-and-bangladeshi-nationals-feared-dead-latest-andaman-sea-tragedy (Accessed April 29, 2026)

^[ii] According to the UNHCR, 2025 was the deadliest year for maritime movements with 900 Rohingyas were reported dead or missing in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “2025 was the Deadliest year yet for maritime movements of Rohingya refugees”, UNHCR India, April 17, 2026, https://www.unhcr.org/in/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-2025-was-deadliest-year-yet-maritime-movements-rohingya-refugees (Accessed April 29, 2026)

^[iii] Amnesty International, “We will Destroy Everything” Military Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State, Myanmar, Amnesty International, June 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/8630/2018/en/ (Accessed April 29, 2026)

^[iv] Antje Missbach and Gerhard Hoffstaedter. “Deadly Sea Passages: Navigating Risks and Uncertainties Aboard Rohingya Refugee Boats”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 52:5, 2026, p. 1162. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2578388 (Accessed April 29, 2026).

^[v] Saanya Sidhra. “The Rohingya Crisis amid Shifting Dynamics in Rakhine”, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis. (Accessed April 29, 2026). https://idsa.in/publisher/issuebrief/the-rohingya-crisis-amid-shifting-dynamics-in-rakhine

^[vi] Antje Missbach and Gerhard Hoffstaedter. “Deadly Sea Passages: Navigating Risks and Uncertainties Aboard Rohingya Refugee Boats”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 52:5, 2026, p. 1163. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2578388 (Accessed April 29, 2026).

^[vii] ‘Kalars’ is used as a local racist term to refer to dark-skinned people of Indian origin or Muslims. Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin. “The Rohingya Refugee Crisis and Human Rights: What Should ASEAN Do?”, Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 19, 1 (2018), p.7 https://doi.org/10.1163/15718158-01901001 (Accessed May 1, 2026)

^[viii] Aung Marm Oo. “Rakhine Between War and Ethnic Harmony”, The Irrawaddy, April 21, 2026, https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/rakhine-between-war-and-ethnic-harmony.html (Accessed April 29, 2026)

^[ix] Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch. “Myanmar: Arakan Army Oppresses Rohingya Muslims”, Human Rights Watch, July 28, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/28/myanmar-arakan-army-oppresses-rohingya-muslims (Accessed April 29, 2026).

^[x] Peggy Brett and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law in Context, Policy Brief Series No. 122, 2020. https://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/122-brett-kyh/ (Accessed April 30, 2026)

^[xi] Elizabeth L. Rhoads, “Citizenship Denied, Deferred and Assumed: A Legal History of Racialized Citizenship in Myanmar,” Citizenship Studies 27, no. 1, 2023, p. 41 https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2022.2137468; Brett, P., and Kyaw Yin Hlaing. 2020. “Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law in Context.” Policy Brief Series No. 122. TOEAP.  (Accessed May 2, 2026)

^[xii] Moshe Yegar, The Muslims of Burma: The Study of a Minority Group, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz, 1972, p. 95. (Accessed April 30, 2026)

^[xiii] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Discrimination and Abuse against Rohingya,” Human Rights Watch Report, 2000, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm (Accessed May 1, 2026)

^[xiv] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Discrimination and Abuse against Rohingya,” Human Rights Watch Report, 2000, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm (Accessed May 1, 2026)

^[xv] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Discrimination and Abuse against Rohingya,” Human Rights Watch Report, 2000, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm (Accessed May 1, 2026)

^[xvi] Saanya Sidhra. “The Rohingya Crisis amid Shifting Dynamics in Rakhine”, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis. https://idsa.in/publisher/issuebrief/the-rohingya-crisis-amiDrd-shifting-dynamics-in-rakhine (Accessed April 29, 2026).

^[xvii] Antje Missbach and Gerhard Hoffstaedter. “Deadly Sea Passages: Navigating Risks and Uncertainties Aboard Rohingya Refugee Boats”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 52:5, 2026, p. 1162. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2578388 (Accessed April 29, 2026)

^[xviii] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Discrimination and Abuse against Rohingya,” Human Rights Watch Report, 2000, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xix] Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin. “The Rohingya Refugee Crisis and Human Rights: What Should ASEAN Do?”, Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 19, 1 (2018), p.3, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718158-01901001 (Accessed May 1, 2026)

^[xx] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Discrimination and Abuse against Rohingya,” Human Rights Watch Report, 2000, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxi] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Discrimination and Abuse against Rohingya,” Human Rights Watch Report, 2000, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxii] Dr Francis Buchanan made the distinction between Rohingya (Rooinga or natives of Arakan^[xxii]) as Mohammedans who had long settled in Arakan, and the Buddhist Rakhing, essentially referring to an indigenous Muslim minority in Arakan as distinct from the majority Rakhine Buddhist population. Francis Buchanan. “A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken in the Burma Empire.” SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research, 1(1), (Spring 2003), p. 55.

^[xxiii] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Burma’s Path to Genocide: Timeline,” Burma’s Path to Genocide Exhibition, https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/burmas-path-to-genocide/timeline (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxiv] Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Year of Independence, (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press) 1957, p. 357.

^[xxv] Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Discrimination and Abuse against Rohingya,” Human Rights Watch Report, 2000, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxvi] Rohingya Culture Center, “History of the Rohingya,” Rohingya Culture Center, https://rccchicago.org/history-of-the-rohingya/ (Accessed May 2, 2026)

^[xxvii] K. Maudood Elahi, "The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Historical Perspectives and Consequences," In John Rogge (ed.), Refugees: A Third World Dilemma, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987, p. 231.

^[xxviii] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Burma’s Path to Genocide: Timeline,” Burma’s Path to Genocide Exhibition, https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/burmas-path-to-genocide/timeline (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxix] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Burma’s Path to Genocide: Timeline,” Burma’s Path to Genocide Exhibition, https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/burmas-path-to-genocide/timeline (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxx] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Burma’s Path to Genocide: Timeline,” Burma’s Path to Genocide Exhibition, https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/burmas-path-to-genocide/timeline (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxxi] Amnesty International, “We will Destroy Everything” Military Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State, Myanmar, Amnesty International, June 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/8630/2018/en/ (Accessed April 29, 2026)

^[xxxii] Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine: Final Report, August 2017, https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxxiii] United Nations Security Council, “Provisional Record of the 8060th Meeting,” S/PV.8060, September 28, 2017, https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.8060 (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxxiv] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report of OHCHR Mission to Bangladesh: Interviews with Rohingyas Fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016 (Flash Report), February 3, 2017, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/MM/FlashReport3Feb2017.pdf (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xxxv] Antje Missbach and Gerhard Hoffstaedter. “Deadly Sea Passages: Navigating Risks and Uncertainties Aboard Rohingya Refugee Boats”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 52:5, 2026, p. 1162. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2025.2578388 (Accessed April 29, 2026).

^[xxxvi] Sullivan, Daniel P., Priyali Sur, and Ankita Dan. 2024. “A Lifetime in Detention: Rohingya Refugees in India.” Refugees International, December 16, 2024. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/a-lifetime-in-detention-rohingya-refugees-in-india/ (Accessed May 1, 2026)

^[xxxvii] Ministry of Home Affairs. Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 534. (2017), p. 1. https://www.mha.gov.in/MHA1/Par2017/pdfs/par2017-pdfs/rs-20122017/534.pdf (Accessed May 1, 2026)

^[xxxviii] Sullivan, Daniel P., Priyali Sur, and Ankita Dan. 2024. “A Lifetime in Detention: Rohingya Refugees in India.” Refugees International, December 16, 2024. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/a-lifetime-in-detention-rohingya-refugees-in-india/ (Accessed May 1, 2026)

^[xxxix] Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, India.

^[xl] Utpala Rahman, “The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh,” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 8, no. 2 (2010): 233–239, https://doi.org/10.1080/15562941003792135 (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xli] Shin-wha Lee, When Refugees Stream: Environmental and Political Implications of Population Displacement, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005 (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xlii] United Nations News. “Malaysia’s forced return of Myanmar’s most vulnerable must stop: UNHCR”, October 25, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129842 (Accessed May 9, 2026).

^[xliii] Aslam Abd Jalil, “Rohingya Refugees in Klang Valley, Malaysia: Permanent (Im)Mobility?” Mobilities, February 2026, 1–16, https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2026.2628104 (Accessed April 30, 2026).

^[xliv] United Nations News. “Malaysia’s forced return of Myanmar’s most vulnerable must stop: UNHCR”, October 25, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129842 (Accessed May 9, 2026).

^[xlv] Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Aid Cuts Put Myanmar Refugees at Grave Risk,” (August 11, 2025) https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/11/thailand-aid-cuts-put-myanmar-refugees-at-grave-risk (Accessed April 30, 2026)

^[xlvi]Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Principle of Non-Refoulement Under International Human Rights Law”, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf (Accessed May 19, 2026).