Indian Council of World Affairs

 

Abstract: The rise of the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) following the Gen-Z movement in Nepal has sparked a myriad of academic and intellectual discussions about the country’s evolving political dynamics and policy formulation. At a time when the influence of traditional political parties in national politics appears to be waning, the RSP positions itself as a catalyst for change. By advocating reforms in domestic and diplomatic arenas and actively engaging younger citizens, the RSP has sought to project an agenda of broader political and institutional transformation. 

Introduction

The ruling RSP of Nepal recently marked its first 100 days in the federal government. The party emerged victorious in the March 2026 elections with a compelling manifesto (Bacha Patra)[i] aimed at ensuring good governance and fostering economic development, social justice, inclusivity, equality, and balanced foreign relations, particularly emphasising the Nepali diaspora and enhancing soft power diplomacy. Soon after taking office, the RSP-led government unveiled a 100-point reform agenda,[ii] complemented by the policy and programme for 2026–27[iii] and an ambitious budget of 2.12 trillion Nepali rupees for the fiscal year 2026–27.[iv]

The RSP has articulated several significant areas of reform, predominantly emphasising economic reforms with particular attention to the growth of primary and secondary sectors, as well as energy and tourism. Furthermore, the RSP is advocating for social sector reforms, infrastructural advancements, including highways, railways, and enhanced air connectivity, constitutional and governance reforms, political stability, proactive engagement with environmental and climate change issues, and a forward-thinking foreign policy. These priorities have attracted extensive attention from academic, journalistic, and intellectual circles globally, influencing Nepal’s political discourse and reflecting a major shift in the aspirations of the Nepali populace.

New Political Reality in Nepal

The RSP’s emergence as a new political force in Nepal contrasts with that of other established political parties, including the Nepali Congress, various Communist Parties, and numerous regional and Madhesh-based parties. Many of the old political parties’ histories date back to the Rana regime and the democratic movements of the 1950s. While these established parties remained active throughout the Panchayat regime and participated in both the first and second Jana Andolan, the RSP represents a newer political emergence in the Nepali political landscape. Within months of its formation, the RSP became the fourth-largest party in the 2022 House of Representatives (HoR) elections[v] and effectively entered the government as a coalition partner,[vi] later sitting in opposition.[vii] Its rise in popularity can be attributed to widespread public frustration with prolonged political instability, endemic corruption, and impunity in Nepal. RSP’s founding chair, a journalist-turned-politician Rabi Lamichhane, gathered youth support through an anti-corruption campaign. Since then, social media has become an important means of political communication for the RSP.

The September 2025 Gen-Z-led movement subsequently acted as a catalyst for fresh elections, resulting in substantial setbacks for established political parties and RSP’s remarkable success. Despite the RSP’s lack of extensive grassroots organisational experience or long-term coalition governance, it has achieved an unprecedented level of electoral success, marking a significant instance not only in Nepal but also in a broader global context. This trajectory resembles that of political entities such as Forza Italia (1994, Italy), En Marche (2017, France), and the Telugu Desam Party (1983, Andhra Pradesh, India). More recently, it aligns with the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (2026) in Tamil Nadu, India.

Additionally, RSP has emerged without a long-standing ideological foundation or a history rooted in significant democratic movements, labour struggles, or revolutionary endeavours. Instead, it has relied on populism, leveraging educated unemployed youth as well as frustrated, disgruntled and disaffected people, and social media platforms amidst a strong anti-establishment sentiment.

Nepal has recently seemed to experience a decline in the influence of traditional political parties in its national politics. In this context, the RSP aims to act as a catalyst for change. This moment marks the beginning of a new political reality in Nepal.

The Current Discourse in Nepal’s Political Arena

The Governing Style

Nepal has experienced six significant waves of incomplete political transitions over the past 35 years, characterised by struggles to stabilise the democratic process.[viii] Throughout this period, political uncertainty and instability have remained recurring features of the country’s political landscape.[ix] With Nepal entering a new transitional phase, the emergence of the RSP marks a pivotal turning point in this trajectory, indicating a potential pathway towards political rejuvenation and stability. The party’s emphasis on transparency, accountability, and public engagement resonates with a populace yearning for change.

However, several RSP government decisions and actions in the past five months have incited considerable debate, with numerous individuals alleging violations of fundamental rights and the circumvention of due process.[x] Controversial actions include efforts to ban party-affiliated student organisations,[xi] the removal of Sukumbasis (landless squatters)[xii] and the demolition of their settlements, as well as the arrest of leaders from opposition parties.[xiii] Conversely, certain government actions have garnered appreciation. For instance, the government dismissed Deepak Kumar, the former Minister for Labour, Employment, and Social Security, over a disciplinary breach just after a mere 13 days in office.[xiv] Additionally, Sudan Gurung, the Home Minister of Nepal, resigned within 26 days of his appointment, citing moral responsibility in light of rising controversy and public pressure regarding his investments and connections with the disputed businessman Deepak Bhatta.[xv] Later, Gurung re-administered the oath to the Home Minister after a government-formed investigation committee concluded that no unusual findings were found in his landholdings.[xvi]

Moreover, the recent decision by Prime Minister Balendra Shah “Balen” to refrain from enforcing the newly introduced three per cent “equity fees”[xvii] on private education and health services highlights the government’s responsiveness to public sentiment. Opposition party leaders, including NC president Gagan Thapa, also welcomed it.[xviii] Prime Minister Shah stated that the government remains committed to listening to the people and would review policies where they generate widespread dissatisfaction.”[xix]

These developments suggest an approach in which the RSP government is cautious about implementing policies that encounter substantial public criticism or resistance. Notably, only those policy decisions that have received positive feedback and have not faced significant criticism on social media platforms have been fully enacted. It reflects a responsive populist style of governance where policy legitimacy is closely linked to public reaction and the level of popular support or backlash.

Prime Minister Balen has recently begun direct engagement with business leaders, professionals, and other stakeholders as a strategy to restore confidence in his administration and advance proposed reforms.[xx] Nonetheless, the notable absence of key government ministers, including finance, industry, energy, and infrastructure, during the majority of these meetings remained debatable. Experts suggest that the involvement of ministers is essential for ensuring accountability and facilitating effective implementation of policies.[xxi] Despite this, it is important to acknowledge that Balen’s working style as Mayor of Kathmandu, along with his effective use of social media, had gained significant popularity. His communication style diverges from that of the traditional older generation of politicians; instead, he employs a distinct approach to engage with individuals and stakeholders. Notably, his bold and radical strategies have received considerable commendation from the youth in Nepal, as evidenced in the recent elections.

Constitutional Reform Agendas

On the constitutional reforms debate, the RSP, at its general convention, proposed two major constitutional reforms: a directly elected executive and a fully proportional electoral system, with the objectives to ensure stability and accountability, reduce election costs, and ensure fair representation of all communities.[xxii] Additionally, RSP also seeks to abolish the provincial assemblies and make the National Assembly and local governments apolitical.[xxiii] Major opposition parties have resisted changes to the parliamentary system, arguing that democracy, federalism, and separation of powers must be reserved; conversely, parties such as the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) have indicated a willingness to consider improvements to proportional representation rules.[xxiv] Furthermore, Madhesi-based parties, notably the Janata Samajbadi Party, have supported the RSP’s proposals, asserting that direct elections would accurately reflect the will of the populace.[xxv]

Early in April 2026, the RSP-led government established a task force to prepare a Constitution Amendment Discussion Paper,[xxvi] with representation from all the major political parties, except the Nepali Congress. However, later on July 8, several political parties withdrew from the process,[xxvii] submitting a six-point dissenting memorandum that called for a binding commitment to preserve the preamble and the foundational principles of the existing constitution.[xxviii]^, [xxix] It was argued that any amendment process must be based on an all-party agreement and broader national consensus. Finally, with consultation and input from leaders, institutions, civil society and ordinary citizens, the paper was handed over to the Prime Minister’s Office on 16 July 2026 for consideration.[xxx]

While the RSP is advocating significant structural reforms to reshape constitutional arrangements, many opposing parties view these proposals as potentially challenging the achievements, struggles, and political settlements that underpin the current constitutional framework. Their resistance reflects concerns over both institutional stability and the preservation of the structural legitimacy of the constitution. It remains to be seen how the RSP government will navigate the disagreement, which highlights broader political divides across parties.

Economic and Structural Reforms Agenda

The RSP’s economic reform agenda emphasises privatisation, public-private partnerships, and private-sector-driven growth, attracting investment by improving an investment-friendly environment while maintaining a stable and predictable regulatory framework.[xxxi]^,[xxxii] Central to this approach is strengthening market competition, preventing monopolistic practices, and modernising Nepal’s regulatory framework by repealing or amending outdated economic legislation.[xxxiii],[xxxiv] The government also proposes simplifying business registration, reducing licensing requirements, and establishing faster approval mechanisms for major investment projects to improve the overall ease of doing business.[xxxv]

The reform programme extends beyond economic policy to include governance reforms,[xxxvi] which the RSP views as essential for accelerating structural transformation. These include merit-based appointments to public institutions, civil service reforms, and the expansion of digital governance initiatives to improve administrative efficiency, transparency, and good governance.[xxxvii] The government has identified tourism, hydropower, information technology, digital services, export-oriented industries, and commercial agriculture as priority sectors for growth. At the administrative level, the RSP’s political manifesto seeks to advance e-governance through digital public services, electronic tax administration, digital payment systems, integrated government databases, and technology-enabled public service delivery.[xxxviii]^{, [xxxix]}

The government’s broader economic modernisation strategy also includes significant financial and institutional reforms. It plans to establish a complementary “Matribhumi Fund” to finance strategic national infrastructure, including fuel storage facilities and artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure.[xl] To mobilise capital, the government intends to issue green energy bonds and diaspora bonds[xli] while introducing hedging mechanisms to reduce foreign exchange risks, improving Nepal’s sovereign credit rating, and pursuing removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list.[xlii]

State-owned enterprises are also expected to undergo restructuring as part of the reform agenda. Proposed measures include seeking strategic partners for Nepal Airlines, partial privatisation of Nepal Telecom, and broader public share offerings in selected state-owned enterprises.[xliii]^,[xliv] At the same time, the government aims to strengthen Nepal’s digital economy by expanding digital public services, supporting fintech innovation, and establishing a sovereign AI compute centre in Kathmandu to foster technological research, entrepreneurship, and startup development.[xlv] Collectively, these initiatives reflect a comprehensive strategy that combines regulatory reform, public sector restructuring, financial sector modernisation, and investment in digital infrastructure to enhance Nepal’s long-term economic competitiveness and attract both domestic and foreign investment.

Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy

Since the formation of the RSP government, the narrative around Nepal’s foreign policy has begun to shift, although the country’s core foreign policy dilemmas remain largely unchanged.[xlvi] One of the most notable developments in Nepal’s recent foreign policy discourse is the emphasis placed by the RSP-led government on “development diplomacy”.[xlvii] Government leaders have repeatedly endorsed Nepal as a vibrant bridge between South Asia and the Himalayan region rather than a buffer state.[xlviii]^{, [xlix]} While these narratives have gained prominence under the current government, neither concept is entirely new in Nepal’s foreign policy thinking. The idea of Nepal functioning as a bridge between its two major neighbours has been debated by scholars and policymakers for many years. Similarly, the current government’s emphasis on development diplomacy represents a continuation rather than a departure from earlier policy discussions.

Previous scholarship has already conceptualised Nepal’s foreign policy through a developmental lens. Madhu Raman Acharya (2019), former foreign secretary of Nepal, notes that Nepal’s foreign policy is evolving with the integration of development diplomacy.[l] This shift is reflected in the renaming and expanded focus of the Foreign Ministry’s Economic Diplomacy and NRN Division, now known as the Policy, Planning, Development Diplomacy & Overseas Nepali Affairs.[li] Bharti Subodh (2020, 2023) maintains that, in the wake of economic democratisation and liberal economic reforms, Nepal’s foreign policy has progressively shifted towards development-oriented objectives.[lii]^{, [liii]} This exemplifies a shift by adopting developmental diplomacy in both its bilateral and multilateral engagements.[liv]

The RSP advocates a liberal welfare state emphasising social democracy with market-oriented reforms,[lv] an approach that is broadly consistent with the emphasis on development diplomacy in relations with bilateral and multilateral partners. While this concept of development diplomacy has existed in Nepal’s foreign policy discourse at least for a decade, its practical implementation has often been constrained by prolonged political instability.[lvi] Previous governments frequently prioritised political survival, coalition management, and domestic power struggles over long-term developmental objectives in foreign policy.[lvii] However, the relatively more stable political environment under the RSP government creates greater opportunities for development diplomacy to become a central organising principle in Nepal’s external engagement.

Another notable development concerns changes in diplomatic protocol and foreign policy practice. During the initial phase of the new government, Prime Minister Balen reportedly declined to hold separate bilateral meetings with ambassadors and special envoys from major partner countries, including India, China, and the United States.[lviii] However, Prime Minister Balen held individual bilateral meetings with Indian and Chinese ambassadors recently.[lix] This sudden shift reflects a nuanced comprehension of the complexities of international relations and development partnerships. It suggests two critical insights. First, it indicates that the initial delay in meetings may have stemmed from Balen Shah’s need for proper familiarisation with the Prime Minister’s Office and the intricacies of the foreign policy-making process. Such acclimatisation is essential for a young leader to navigate diplomatic engagements effectively. Second, this approach underscores a strategic acknowledgement of India and China as pivotal development partners. India has constantly extended important economic and developmental support essential for Nepal’s holistic growth. The India-Nepal development partnership cannot be understated or readily equated with those of other nations.

Additionally, the recent visit of RSP Chair Lamichhane to India on the invitation of the Bharatiya Janata Party garnered significant attention from political analysts and journalists. During this visit, he engaged in discussions with BJP President Nitin Nabin and other leaders, the Indian Prime Minister, the Home Minister, External Affairs Ministers, and the National Security Advisor and discussed a new course in bilateral relations, India’s partnership and support, and future high-level visits and exchanges.[lx] Given that the RSP is a relatively new political party without the longstanding historical, ideological, or organisational relationships that traditional parties such as the Nepali Congress and the Communist parties have cultivated with Indian political actors, the visit resonates with a political and diplomatic familiarisation with India’s political establishment. A subsequent similar visit by Lamichhane to China is pending, contingent on the Chinese president agreeing to meet him, according to Nepalese media reports.[lxi]

Finally, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to have become more prominent under the current administration. The Foreign Minister has undertaken active bilateral and multilateral engagements,[lxii] including visits to both India and China,[lxiii]^{, [lxiv]} and has assumed a visible role in shaping Nepal’s diplomatic outreach. It may indicate greater institutional autonomy for the Ministry in foreign policy decision-making; however, it remains to be seen whether this represents a lasting structural change or merely a feature of the current government.

Taken together, these developments indicate that Nepal’s foreign policy under the RSP government demonstrates both continuity and gradual change. The government has reinforced existing ideas of development diplomacy while simultaneously introducing new diplomatic practices, institutional adjustments, and patterns of external engagement. Whether these developments represent a durable transformation of Nepal’s foreign policy or simply the characteristics of a new administration will become clearer as the government’s foreign policy continues to evolve.

Looking Beyond the Obvious

Nepal’s emerging political landscape presents both opportunities and challenges for the four-month-old RSP government, which faces the difficult task of maintaining public trust, ensuring accountability, and demonstrating effective governance. Its ability to sustain political stability will depend not only on policy performance but also on how it manages key areas such as social media engagement, internal party dynamics, relations with the opposition, dealing with civil society and protest, and foreign policy.

First, the rise of social media-driven political consciousness among Nepal’s younger generation has significantly transformed political engagement. Digital platforms have expanded access to constitutional, legal, financial, foreign policy, and technological knowledge, enabling citizens to participate more actively in political discussions. For the RSP, social media has become a crucial tool for communication, public outreach, and projecting its reform-oriented image. The party has effectively leveraged digital strategies to connect with younger voters and present itself as a responsive and accountable political force. However, increased digital visibility also means that public expectations and scrutiny will remain consistently high.

Second, the question of ideology and institutional strength remains a major challenge for the RSP. Political parties often derive long-term stability from a shared ideological foundation and an organisational identity that binds leaders, cadres, and supporters together. In contrast, the RSP’s rise has been largely driven by popular figures rather than a clearly established ideological framework. Balen’s association with the party appears to have been influenced more by his personal popularity and public image than by ideological alignment, while Rabi Lamichhane’s political rise was closely linked to public frustration over corruption and dissatisfaction with traditional parties. This reliance on individual popularity creates the possibility of competing centres of influence within the party, which could generate tensions over major policy decisions and governance priorities.

Kathmandu-based experts caution that the anti-establishment wave in Nepal, which brought Rabi-Balen together, despite having the potential to reshape the country's political landscape, depends on the internal division or rivalry within the RSP. The contrasting leadership styles and ambitions of Balen Shah and Rabi Lamichhane are a potential source of friction, warning that without institutional cohesion and a shared political vision, the movement risks repeating the shortcomings of the very parties it seeks to replace.[lxv] Party Chair Lamichhane and Prime Minister “Balen” appear to have emerged as the two main power centres within the RSP.[lxvi] The recent developments in cabinet appointments, the party’s general convention and election and appointments in core committees, as well as the other political appointments, indicate the same. Furthermore, the current dynamics of foreign policy remain ambiguous regarding the roles of Lamichhane as the party chair and Prime Minister Balen, alongside Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal. Any existing friction among these figures has the potential to significantly impact the internal cohesion of the RSP and may also influence foreign policy decisions. Critics argue that this could disappoint voters who supported RSP for its promises of change and transparency.[lxvii] Many parties in the past have struggled with internal democracy, and these emerging trends may undermine that promise.

Third, managing relations with the opposition will be a critical test of the RSP government’s political maturity. Unlike established parties with decades of parliamentary experience, the RSP has limited experience navigating legislative negotiations and institutional politics. Lamichhane’s previous ministerial tenure was brief, while Balen’s experience as Mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan City, although significant, differs considerably from the responsibilities of leading a national government. This experience gap may affect the government’s ability to build consensus and ensure smooth parliamentary functioning and policy implementation.

The parliamentary structure further complicates this challenge. Although opposition parties remain a minority in the House of Representatives, they hold a majority in the National Assembly, where the RSP has no representation. This imbalance could create obstacles for major legislative initiatives, constitutional amendments, and long-term policy reforms requiring approval from both chambers. Opposition’s resistance during the recent budget session, when proceedings were disrupted following Prime Minister Balen’s remarks on cross-border encroachments, demonstrated their willingness to challenge the government.[lxviii] Such confrontations suggest that, despite their limited strength in the lower house, opposition parties may continue to influence legislative outcomes and constrain the government, particularly when controversial decisions or statements create political openings.

Recent developments also raise important questions about the evolving character of civil society in Nepal and its relationship with the state. Episodes of violence during public demonstrations and cases of “communal violence”[lxix] in the southern plains, attacks on property, and confrontations with security forces suggest more confrontational modes of political expression. The escalation of some recent demonstrations into violence has intensified concerns regarding the state’s capacity to maintain law and order, manage communal tensions, and uphold public confidence in law enforcement institutions. These developments also invite broader reflection on the very nature of civic engagement in Nepal, particularly among younger generations, demographic change, and whether increasing political polarisation is reducing the space for peaceful democratic dissent.

Overall, it appears that RSP faces significant challenges in managing multiple dynamics of state affairs, including managing public support, addressing discontent and political opposition, and grappling with complex foreign policy dilemmas. The rise of the RSP should therefore be understood not merely as a transformation in political power dynamics but also as an opportunity to address the systemic problems that have historically constrained Nepal’s development. How effectively the party responds to the aspirations of the younger generation and wider society will be an important factor in shaping Nepal’s future political landscape.

Conclusion

The ongoing transition in Nepal is redefining political participation by integrating traditional political frameworks with contemporary influences. While the full implications of this shift have yet to emerge, the changing political landscape has the potential to transform not only the political dynamics but also the country’s broader socio-economic transformations.

For the RSP to write a new political reality in Nepal, it is imperative to remain responsive to its electoral mandate while addressing the pervasive public sentiment characterised by widespread frustration over past issues of corruption, impunity, and a lack of accountability. Similarly, a delicate balance in managing political opponents and fragmented civil societies will be crucial, as the commitment to fostering dialogue and deliberation. Furthermore, constructive engagement with established development partners will also remain important, guided by Nepal’s national interests that avoids distancing or balancing. The future trajectory of this new political landscape in Nepal remains uncertain, but the manner in which the RSP navigates these political, institutional, economic and foreign policy challenges will be critical to determining the durability of the change it represents.

*****

*Dr. Subodh Chandra Bharti is a Research Associate at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Rastriya Swatantra Party, Bacha Patra, https://bachapatra.rspnepal.org/. accessed July 20, 2026.

[ii] Anil Giri, “Government Unveils Ambitious 100-Point Roadmap for Effective Governance,” The Kathmandu Post, March 29, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/03/29/government-unveils-ambitious-100-point-roadmap-for-effective-governance. accessed June 18, 2026.

[iii] Kantipur Reporter, “Presenting Policies and Programs for the Financial Year 2083/84,” eKantipur, May 11, 2026, https://ekantipur.com/news/2026/05/11/en/presenting-policies-and-programs-for-the-financial-year-08384-20-54.html. accessed June 18, 2026.

[iv] MyRepublica, “Govt Announces Budget of Rs 2.124 Trillion for FY 2026/27,” myRepublica, May 29, 2026, https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/govt-announces-budget-of-rs-2124-trillion-for-fy-202627-15-63.html. accessed June 18, 2026.

[v] Binod Ghimire, “Two New Forces Enter Federal Parliament as National Parties,” The Kathmandu Post, November 30, 2022, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2022/11/30/two-new-forces-enter-federal-parliament-as-national-partie. accessed June 18, 2026.

[vi] Tika R. Pradhan, “Seniors Opting Out Citing Lamichhane’s High Cabinet Rank,” The Kathmandu Post, December 28, 2022, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2022/12/28/seniors-opting-out-citing-lamichhane-s-high-cabinet-ran. accessed June 18, 2026.

[vii] Nishan Khatiwada, “Swatantra Party Withdraws Support to the Government,” The Kathmandu Post, May 5, 2023, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2023/05/05/rastriya-swatantra-party-withdraws-support-to-government. accessed July 01, 2026.  

[viii] Subodh C. Bharti, The Certain Uncertainty in Nepal: A Region Marked by Ongoing Political, Economic, and Strategic Turbulence, in Tremors of Geo-Political Churn in South Asia: A Sapru House Assessment (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, November 2025), 107–124.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Purushottam Poudel, “Planned Ban on Student Unions Sparks Debate on Fundamental Right,” The Kathmandu Post, March 31, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/03/31/planned-ban-on-student-unions-sparks-debate-on-fundamental-right. accessed July 03, 2026.   

[xi] Abdul Rahman, “Nepali Students Demand Government Reverse Ban of Political Groups on Campus,” Peoples Dispatch, May 1, 2026, https://peoplesdispatch.org/2026/05/01/nepali-students-demand-government-reverse-ban-of-political-groups-on-campus. accessed July 03, 2026.   

[xii] Durga Dulal, “Supreme Court Orders Government Not to Evict or Displace Squatters Without Due Process,” The Kathmandu Post, May 8, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/05/08/supreme-court-orders-government-not-to-evict-or-displace-squatters-without-due-process. accessed July 03, 2026.   

[xiii] Ratopati. “Leaders Arrested, Released by Court Due to Lack of Evidence,” Ratopati (English), July 19, 2026, https://english.ratopati.com/story/70942/high-profile-leaders-arrested-without-sufficient-basis-and-evidence-lack-of-evidence-in-court. accessed July 21, 2026. 

[xiv] Jaya Singh Mahara, “Labour Minister Sah Sacked over Disciplinary Breach,” The Kathmandu Post, April 9, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/04/09/labour-minister-sacked-over-disciplinary-breach. accessed July 21, 2026. 

[xv] Binod Dhakal, “Why Home Minister Sudan Gurung Resigned Over Wealth Disclosures and Alleged Business Ties,” Nepal News, April 22, 2026, https://english.nepalnews.com/s/politics/why-home-minister-sudan-gurung-resigned-over-wealth-disclosures-and-alleged-business-ties/. accessed June 20, 2026. 

[xvi] The Kathmandu Post. “Sudan Gurung Returns as Home Minister, Mahabir Pun Gets Technology Ministry,” The Kathmandu Post, June 9, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/06/09/sudan-gurung-returns-as-home-minister-pun-appointed-technology-minister. accessed June 20, 2026.

[xvii] Yagya Banjade, “Balendra Shah Government Announces Rollback of 3 Percent Health, Education Fees,” The Kathmandu Post, July 22, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/money/2026/07/22/balendra-shah-government-announces-rollback-of-3-percent-health-education-fees. accessed July 23, 2026. 

[xviii] Gagan Thapa (@thapagk), "सरकारको निजी शिक्षा र स्वास्थ्य क्षेत्रमा लगाइएको ३% समता कर लागू नगर्ने निर्णयको स्वागत छ।" X, July 21, 2026, https://x.com/thapagk/status/2079526394007347589. accessed July 23, 2026. 

[xix] Balen [Balendra Shah], “निजी शिक्षा र स्वास्थ्य क्षेत्रमा लगाइएको ३% समता कर अहिले भने बमोजिम नै कार्यान्वयन गर्दा आममानिसले थप खर्च र निराशा भोग्नु पर्ने देखियो यसैले…,” Facebook, [July 21, 2026], https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1DHxF3wpqY/. accessed July 23, 2026. 

[xx] Jaya Singh Mahara and Durga Dulal, “Stakeholders Welcome PM’s Outreach, but Experts Question Absence of Line Ministers,” The Kathmandu Post, July 23, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/07/23/stakeholders-welcome-pm-s-outreach-but-experts-question-absence-of-line-ministers. accessed July 24, 2026. 

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Ganga BC, “RSP’s Push for a Directly Elected Executive and Fully Proportional Representation Sparks Political Debate,” The Kathmandu Post, June 25, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/06/25/rsp-s-push-for-a-directly-elected-executive-and-fully-proportional-representation-sparks-political-debate. accessed June 27, 2026. 

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Ganga BC, “Constitution Amendment Task Force Holds First Meeting Today,” The Kathmandu Post, April 8, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/04/08/constitution-amendment-task-force-holds-first-meeting-today. accessed June 24, 2026. 

[xxvii] Nepali Communist Party (NCP), Janata Samajwadi Party (JSP), Loktantrik Samajwadi Party (LSP), and Rastriya Janamorcha (RJM).

[xxviii] Setopati, “Four Parties Quit Task Force on Constitutional Amendments,” July 8, 2026, https://en.setopati.com/political/166708. accessed July 24, 2026. 

[xxix] Durga Dulal, “Major Parties Walk Out of Constitution Review Taskforce,” The Kathmandu Post, July 8, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/07/08/major-parties-walk-out-of-constitution-review-taskforce. accessed July 24, 2026. 

[xxx] Nepal News. “Task Force Submits Constitutional Amendment Discussion Paper to PM’s Office.” Nepal’s First Online News Portal. July 16, 2026. https://english.nepalnews.com/s/politics/task-force-submits-constitutional-amendment-discussion-paper-to-pms-office. accessed July 24, 2026. 

[xxxi] Heykha Rai and Manju von Rospatt. “Nepal at a Crossroads: Reading the RSP’s Reform Agenda,” Nepal Economic Forum, March 30, 2026, https://nepaleconomicforum.org/nepal-at-a-crossroads-reading-the-rsps-reform-agenda/. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xxxii] The Rising Nepal. “Govt to Establish High-Priority Response Desk for Investors,” The Rising Nepal, July 29, 2026, https://risingnepaldaily.com/news/84178. accessed July 29, 2026. 

[xxxiii] Nepal News. “Finance Minister Wagle Orders Economic Status Report, Announces Reform Measures.” Nepal News. March 27, 2026. https://english.nepalnews.com/s/politics/finance-minister-wagle-orders-economic-status-report-announces-reform-measures/. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xxxiv] The Rising Nepal. “Govt to Establish High-Priority Response Desk for Investors,” The Rising Nepal, July 29, 2026, https://risingnepaldaily.com/news/84178. accessed July 29, 2026. 

[xxxv] Ibid.

[xxxvi] Anil Giri, “Govt Unveils Ambitious National Commitment Paper Outlining Governance Reform Agenda,” The Kathmandu Post, July 9, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/07/09/govt-unveils-ambitious-national-commitment-paper-outlining-governance-reform-agenda. accessed July 13, 2026. 

[xxxvii] Silicon Himalayas Team, “Merit-Based Appointments: Nepal's Reform That Unlocks All Others,” Silicon Himalayas, June 12, 2026, https://www.silicon-himalayas.com/insights/-blog-merit-based-appointments-nepal-regulatory-bodies-sebon-nrb-reform. accessed July 13, 2026. 

[xxxviii] Dinesh, “What’s in It for Technology in RSP Manifesto?” NepaliTelecom, March 9, 2026, https://www.nepalitelecom.com/rastriya-swatantra-party-rsp-manifesto-for-technology-internet-digital-nepal. accessed July 03, 2026.   

[xxxix] Fiscal Nepal. “RSP Pledges Doorstep State Services, Law Repeals and Pro-Business Reforms in Election Manifesto,” Fiscal Nepal, February 19, 2026, https://www.fiscalnepal.com/2026/02/19/24565/rsp-pledges-doorstep-state-services-law-repeals-and-pro-business-reforms-in-election-manifesto/. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xl] Nepal News “Government to Launch ‘Matribhumi Fund’ for AI and Fuel Storage, Divest Nepal Telecom Shares to Build Tech Hub,” Nepal News, May 29, 2026, https://english.nepalnews.com/s/business/government-to-launch-matribhumi-fund-for-ai-and-fuel-storage-divest-nepal-telecom-shares-to-build-tech-hub. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xli] The Kathmandu Post. “Government Allocates Rs12.31 Billion for Forestry, Environment and Climate Sector,” The Kathmandu Post, May 29, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/money/2026/05/29/government-allocates-rs12-31-billion-for-forestry-environment-and-climate-secto. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xlii] Radio Nepal. “Budget 2026/27: Govt Plans Sovereign Wealth Fund by Utilizing Foreign Currency Reserve,” Radio Nepal, May 29, 2026, https://radionepalonline.com/en/2026/05/29/430546.html. accessed July 03, 2026.

[xliii] The Kathmandu Post. “Budget Proposes Sovereign Wealth Fund, Nepal Telecom Divestment and Energy Sector Reforms,” The Kathmandu Post, May 29, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/money/2026/05/29/budget-proposes-sovereign-wealth-fund-nepal-telecom-divestment-and-energy-sector-reforms. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xliv] Nepal News. “Government to Sell 34% Shares in Nepal Telecom to Public, Funds Target Tech Hub Plan,” Nepal News, May 29, 2026, https://english.nepalnews.com/s/business/government-to-sell-34-shares-in-nepal-telecom-to-public-funds-target-tech-hub-plan. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xlv] Radio Nepal. “Budget 2026/27: Govt Plans Sovereign Wealth Fund by Utilizing Foreign Currency Reserve,” Radio Nepal, May 29, 2026, https://radionepalonline.com/en/2026/05/29/430546.html. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xlvi] Subodh C. Bharti, “Breaking the ‘Certain Uncertainty’: Political Dilemmas of the New Transition in Nepal,” Indian Council of World Affairs, April 27, 2026, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=14442&lid=8857. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xlvii] Anil Giri, “RSP Advocates ‘Development Diplomacy’ over ‘Power-Centred Diplomacy’,” The Kathmandu Post, June 24, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/06/24/rsp-advocates-development-diplomacy-over-power-centred-diplomacy. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[xlviii] Ibid.

[xlix] Jagdishor Panday, “The Balen Government’s Foreign Policy: From Buffer to Bridge,” The Diplomat Nepal, April 15, 2026, https://diplomatnepal.com/cover-story/the-balen-governments-foreign-policy-from-buffer-to-bridge/. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[l] Acharya, Madhu Raman (2019), Nepal Worldview, Volume I: Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Adroit Publishers.

[li] Ibid.

[lii] Subodh C. Bharti, “Foreign Policy of Nepal: Shifts and Opportunities,” in Conference Proceedings 2020: The Annual Kathmandu Conference on Nepal & the Himalaya, ed. Shalini Gupta, Khem Shreesh, and Manesh Shrestha (Kathmandu: Social Science Baha, 2024), pp 1-17, https://soscbaha.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/akc-proceddings-2020-web.pdf. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[liii] Subodh C. Bharti. “Economic Liberalisation and Shifts in Foreign Policy of Nepal” (Ph.D. Thesis, JNU, 2023).

[liv] Ibid.

[lv] Yagya Banjade, “RSP Outlines Liberal Welfare-State Model, Social Market Economy at First Convention,” The Kathmandu Post, June 24, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/06/24/rsp-outlines-liberal-welfare-state-model-social-market-economy-at-first-convention. accessed July 13, 2026. 

[lvi] Subodh C. Bharti. “Economic Liberalisation and Shifts in Foreign Policy of Nepal” (Ph.D. Thesis, JNU, 2023).

[lvii] Subodh C. Bharti, “Coalition Politics, Political Jolts and Uncertainty in Nepal,” Indian Council of World Affairs, June 27, 2024, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&lid=7005&ls_id=11030. accessed July 13, 2026. 

[lviii] The Kathmandu Post. “PM’s Policy of Not Meeting Foreign Officials Needs More Nuance,” The Kathmandu Post, May 10, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2026/05/10/pm-s-policy-of-not-meeting-foreign-officials-needs-more-nuance. accessed July 13, 2026. 

[lix] The Kathmandu Post. “Prime Minister Shah Breaks with Self-Imposed Rule, Meets Indian Ambassador One-on-One,” The Kathmandu Post, August 10, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/08/10/prime-minister-shah-breaks-with-self-imposed-rule-meets-indian-ambassador-one-on-one. accessed August 11, 2026. 

[lx] Anil Giri, “Rabi Lamichhane’s Reception in New Delhi Amazes Watchers,” The Kathmandu Post, June 5, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/06/05/rabi-lamichhane-s-reception-in-new-delhi-amazes-watchers. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[lxi] Nepalkhabar. “Rabi Lamichhane to Visit Beijing Only if Meeting with Xi Is Assured,” Nepalkhabar, July 29, 2026, https://en.nepalkhabar.com/news/detail/19218/. accessed July 29, 2026. 

[lxii] Shisir Khanal, “Statement by the Hon. Mr. Shisir Khanal, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nepal at the 9th Indian Ocean Conference 2026, Port Louis, Republic of Mauritius,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Nepal, April 10, 2026, https://www.mofa.gov.np/content/1781/statement-by-the-hon--mr-shisir-khanal/. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[lxiii] Nepal News. “Foreign Minister Khanal Returns Home After Completing India Visit,” Nepal News, June 7, 2026, https://english.nepalnews.com/s/diplomacy/foreign-minister-khanal-returns-home-after-completing-india-visit/. accessed July 23, 2026. 

[lxiv] The Himalayan Times. “Nepal-China Agree to Expand Cooperation in Key Sectors,” The Himalayan Times, June 16, 2026, https://thehimalayantimes.com/kathmandu/nepal-china-agree-to-expand-cooperation-in-key-sectors. accessed July 23, 2026. 

[lxv] Lok Raj Baral. “Can the Balen-Rabi Wave Survive Its Own Friction?,” The Kathmandu Post, June 13, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2026/06/13/can-the-balen-rabi-wave-survive-its-own-friction. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[lxvi] The Kathmandu Post. Is RSP Becoming the Centralised Party It Once Decried?,” The Kathmandu Post, July 7, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2026/07/07/is-rsp-becoming-the-centralised-party-it-once-decried. accessed July 13, 2026. 

[lxvii] Is RSP Becoming the Centralised Party It Once Decried?,” The Kathmandu Post, July 7, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2026/07/07/is-rsp-becoming-the-centralised-party-it-once-decried. accessed July 13, 2026. 

[lxviii] Jaya Singh Mahara and Ganga BC, “Parliament Consumed by Controversies as Public Issues Take a Back Seat,” The Kathmandu Post, June 2, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/politics/2026/06/02/parliament-consumed-by-controversies-as-public-issues-take-a-back-seat. accessed July 03, 2026. 

[lxix] Durga Dulal and Jaya Singh Mahara. “Delayed Response, Absent Leadership: How Sunsari’s Violence Spread Unchecked,” The Kathmandu Post, July 31, 2026, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2026/07/31/how-sunsari-violence-spirals-into-madhesh. accessed July 31, 2026.