China-Russia relations are reaching a new height of bonhomie in the face of Western sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014. Moscow’s core economic sectors like state finance, arms and energy exports are targets of this sanction. Clubbed with domestic economic turbulence and declining oil prices, sanctions forced Moscow to begin forging stronger economic tie ups with Asian countries and rebuild its economy by exploring markets in Asia. China, as a partner, is emerging as one such lucrative option for Moscow. An external factor like eastward1 migration of NATO has increased security concerns for Russia and has pushed it further towards China. However, the process of Russia looking towards Asia in search of partners began much earlier, from 19922. Between 2013, the year Xi Jinping became China’s President and the first quarter of 2016, Xi and Putin met 12 times, a sign of growing convergence on their part in building better relationship.
Beijing, on the other hand, has regional security concerns, larger connectivity goals through OBOR and growing energy needs in signing latest energy, economic and arms deals with Moscow. With increasing American presence in the Asia Pacific region, and US’s proactive role in aggravating China’s security concerns in the East Asian region and on the South China Sea, Beijing is looking at Moscow as a significant partner, however distancing itself from any alliance. Thus, as China’s President Xi puts it, in the context of 15th anniversary of China-Russia 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2016, ‘Practical Needs’ and ‘Development Strategies’ are guiding principles in China’s “close high-level exchanges”3 with Moscow at present. It is imperative to identify and analyse these ‘Practical Needs’ and the ‘Development Strategies’ in understanding the nature of current China-Russia relations, and its implications at the regional and global levels.
For India, relationship with China and Russia carry strategic importance. For example, support from both these partners, China and Russia is imperative for India in achieving some of its important foreign policy goals like membership in NSG (Nuclear Supplier Group) and a permanent seat in UN Security Council. It is essential to note in this regard that Russia has supported India’s demand for UN Security Council and the NSG membership while China has shown reservations in doing so. In fact, Beijing, Pakistan’s ‘all weather friend’4, supports Pakistan against India to maintain balance of power in its favour in South Asia.
However, before coming to conclusion on the outcome of recent China-Russia relations and its implications at large, it is essential to analyse the nature and impact of the sanctions on Russian economy and whether it has bridged the distance between Moscow and Beijing. Western along with Beijing and Moscow’s media projections on the China-Russia relations constitute a part of this study, identifying through it the scepticism with which the global media is viewing this bonhomie. Chinese and the Russian media on the other hand are questioning such scepticism created around their growing relationship by the western media and are, in fact, presenting their relationship as development oriented and a continuum from the past. Taking a critical approach this study will then undertake a sector wise analysis to find out the nature of Moscow and Beijing relationship, identifying whether it is transient or a long term relationship and its possible implications at the regional and global level.
Russia Facing Sanctions
Russia is facing partial sanctions from US and Europe since 2014 mainly in the areas controlled by the Russian elites like, finance, arms and energy sector. Three major state oil firms: Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom Neft, the oil unit of gas giant Gazprom, have also suffered because of these sanctions. Since Russian economy is primarily oil and arms export driven, sanctions along with worldwide decline in oil prices has affected Russian economy and these “twin shocks caused its real GDP to contract to -3.7 percent”5 in 2015 from 0.76 percent real GDP growth in 2014 as per World Bank Russian Economy Report of April 2016. In countering the affects of sanctions on its economy Russia is drawing closer to China and is signing various energy and arms deals with Beijing. Some of these deals between Moscow and Beijing include the “30-year, $400bn (£237bn) deal for Gazprom to deliver Russian gas to China” signed in May 2014, Gapzprom, the Russian state oil giant accepting to “borrow €2bn from Bank of China in its largest ever bilateral loan as it braces for export gas prices to fall to a 10-year low”, in March 2016 and Russia inking one of the largest Sino-Russian arms deals of $ 3 billion in the last decade, selling “long range S-400 surface to air missile (SAM) system”7 to China in November 2014. Thus sanctions have played a push factor in increasing the convergence between China and Russia.
Scepticism and Reality
The recent growing convergence in China-Russia relations is projected with scepticism in the global media, presenting it either as a temporary affair, or as a newly emerging strategic partnership that can threaten Western interest in the Asian region. Notably, while the Wall Street Journal viewed the recent bonhomie between Moscow and Beijing as “Xi and Putin—a Camaraderie of Convenience, Necessity drives a friendship in which China sees itself as top dog” 8, The Economist presented it as “An uneasy friendship, The crisis in Ukraine is drawing Russia closer to China, But the relationship is far from equal9. According to BBC news reports as well, the Russia–China growing relations is a ‘marriage of convenience’ as per its article titled “Brothers again? How deep is the Xi-Putin bromance?”10 The Fox News on the other hand presented it as “The Russia-China axis and its threat to West”11
Russian and the Chinese official media however have curtailed these western media assumptions and they rather emphasise on economic cooperation and strategic partnership as guiding principles in China-Russia relations at present. To note, Premier Li Keqiang’s statement in this relation from Xinhua, China’s official media on 27th March 2016 “China and Russia are each other's biggest neighbour, and there is a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in bilateral relations.”12 The prospects of China-Russia relations expressed with “four full confidence”13 on 11th March 2016 by Wang Yi, the present Chinese Foreign Minister in a press conference in Moscow gives an insight into how China is trying to project its relationship with Russia in both Beijing and Moscow. These confidences include, firstly, China’s belief that Russian economy will recover; secondly, in the China-Russia pragmatic cooperation and thirdly in the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination and lastly in their cooperation in the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union. These confidences indicate China’s growing realisation of Russia as an important economic and strategic partner for Beijing, especially in its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative.
In line with the Chinese official media, the Russia media as well presents the Moscow-Beijing contemporary improving relations as driven by the economic and strategic goals and a continuum from the past and not just an outcome of sanctions on Russian economy, as is claimed by the western media. To quote Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in this relation in the magazine Russia in Global Affairs on 23rd March 2016 “Moscow state naturally played an increasing role in European affairs, the European countries had apprehensions about the nascent giant in the East and tried to isolate it whenever possible and prevent it from taking part in Europe’s most important affairs.”14 And therefore, Russia has drawn closer to China, just as Vladimir Putin, the Russian President pointed out in relation to Beijing that "we seek ultimately to reach a new level of partnership”15
However it is imperative to do a sector wise analysis of bilateral relations between China and Russia to identify the basic nature of their relationship and the possible implications it carries for the international world order.
Trade Relations
Bilateral trade between China and Russia, to begin with, is favourable for China in terms of trade surplus. China is also Russia’s largest trading partner since 2011 whereas Russia is China’s ninth16 largest trading partner. For China, it is rather United States (US) that is on the top of the list as import-export destination.
China’s Total value of Imports and Exports by Major Country (Region), April. 2015 Unit: USD 1,000 |
||||||
Import Source |
Imports and Exports |
Exports |
Imports |
Total Year-on Year (+/- %) |
||
Export Destinations |
Jan. till Apr. in Total |
Jan. till Apr. in total |
Jan. till Apr. in Total |
Imports and exports |
Exports |
Imports |
Total |
1,222,507,012 |
690,156,552 |
532,350,460 |
-7.6 |
1.6 |
-17.3 |
Of which : India |
22,535,905 |
17,782,025 |
4753880 |
2.6 |
15.4 |
-27.4 |
United States |
171,621,028 |
122,189,534 |
49,431,493 |
2.1 |
9.0 |
-11.7
|
Russian Federation |
19,512,013 |
9,370,322 |
10,141,691 |
-32.9 |
-35.6 |
-30.1 |
Going by these trade figures from the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China from January to April 2015, under the effect of ongoing global economic crisis, and sluggish17 Source: General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China18
growth in the volume of world trade, China’s volume of foreign trade has also slowed down, reducing to 32.9 percent with Russia, while with the US or India it has increased to 2.1 and 2.6 percent respectively. The Trade figures mentioned above also indicates the high volume of trade China has with US in comparison to the marginal trade with Russia.
Russia’s Total Value of Imports and Exports by Major Country, 2014 and 2015
Country |
Export |
Import |
||
2014 |
2015 |
2014 |
2015 |
|
China |
37494 |
28606 |
50856 |
34946 |
Netherland |
68013 |
40826 |
5287 |
3096 |
United States |
10636 |
9506 |
18496 |
11453 |
(Figure in million US dollars)
Source : Rosstat, i. e., Federal State Statistics Service of Russian Federation
For Russia, as per the 2014 figures19 available from Rosstat, i. e., Federal State Statistics Service of Russian Federation, in its total volume of exports, China with 7.5 percent share is the second largest export destination for Russia. Netherland (13.7 percent) was the top export destination for Russia. In the total volume of imports to Russia, China accounts the maximum with 17.8 percent, whereas Germany with 11.5 percent and USA with 6.5 percent, are the second and third largest import destinations for Russia in 2014. However by the last quarter of 2015, Netherland, though continued to be the top most export destination for Russia, its percentage20 in it reduced to 11.6 percent from 13.7 percent in 2014 in the total volume of export from Russia and China’s share increased to 8.2 percent from 7.5 percent in 2014.
Moreover, before the counter sanctions by Russia, it used to import its food items mainly from European countries. But as a counter measure to European and American sanctions on “August 7, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree to ban imports of beef, pork, poultry, meat, fish, cheese, milk, vegetables and fruit from Australia, Canada, the EU, the US and Norway.”21 However as China floods Russian market mainly with consumer goods, trade with China has not been able to fill the import vacuum created due to counter sanctions imposed by Russia on European Union.
Also, Russia’s trade deficit with China in bilateral trade stands at US $ 6.8 billion, another area of concern for Moscow, as was pointed out in the second international conference on “Russia and China: Taking on a New Quality of Bilateral Relations”, held in Moscow in June 2016 the Russian businessman and policymakers proposed to the Russian and Chinese Government on the increase of Russian products apart from oil and gas, the main22 item of export (Oil shares 70 percent of Russia’s total export to the world) from Russia in the Chinese market.
Energy Factor
In the field of energy, China is “the world’s second-largest oil consumer behind the United States”23. Oil, on the other hand, constitutes 70 percent in Moscow’s export items. Since America and Europe targeted Russian oil companies’ in 2014 sanctions, Russia tried to diversify its oil export destination and targeted the huge Chinese market for exporting oil. As per the EIA data, and as the pie chart below shows, Saudi Arabia was the main supplier of crude oil to China till 2014. In fact “according to data from RBC Capital Markets, the Saudi share of Chinese crude imports at the beginning of the decade was about 20 percent, while Russia's was below 7
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN
percent.”24 However by 2015 Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia as the largest exporter of crude oil to China.25 China’s state owned gas and oil producer, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), signed a joint venture with Russia’s Rossneft on 17th October 2013 in which CNPC holds 4926 percent stake to develop Russia’s East Siberian oil fields and in return Russia will export oil to China. Thus by providing funds and infrastructural facility China is ensuring its access to Russia’s untapped oil reserves in Eastern Siberia. In the area of nuclear energy cooperation as well, China and Russia have made some progress, and the “Nuclear energy cooperation saw positive results, as the building of generator units 3 and 4 of the second phase of the Tianwan Nuclear Power Station was successfully launched”27 in the year 2012. China and Russia are also planning the “construction of the China-Russia east-route natural gas pipeline and the Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) project,”28 in the coming days.
However, in the near future Russia is going to face constraints in exporting energy to China. The ongoing energy security strategies of China will be the main deadlock in this relation. As one of its strategy, as shown in the pie chart above, Beijing is diversifying the regions of its energy import to mitigate geopolitical uncertainties in its supply to China, importing oil from Middle East, Africa, America and various other regions. This may increase in future the competition Russia faces today in exporting oil to China. Since 2010 Beijing is also the top country in world in producing renewable energy. It is developing renewable and green energies like the shell gas energy, off shore wind and solar energy. It needs to be emphasised here that China, the second largest coal producer in the world, once develops its renewable and alternate sources of energy as well on a large scale, the demand for oil in China will face a decline.
Growing Economic Cooperation
In the area of economic cooperation and connectivity, Russia is emerging as a significant partner for China. Russia’s support to China in Beijing’s initiatives, like the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative that includes Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road are significant in this relation. Russia was initially hesitant in supporting Beijing’s Silk Road Economic Belt initiative until 2014. But with European sanctions, Russia has changed its stance on this issue. It is because “there is a great interest for Russia in realisation of the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative as this initiative is a factor for expanding Russia’s own economy and a factor to develop the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).”29
Map of China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative
Source: Xinhua30
Map of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
Source: STRATFOR31
EAEU was created as an international organisation for regional economic integration. The member states of this Union at present include “the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic, with total population standing at around 182 million people.”32 OBOR, on the other hand, has been projected by China as an initiative for ensuring “a way for win-win cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity and a road towards peace and friendship by enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening all-round exchanges.”33 In May 2015, agreements were signed between China and Russia for joining OBOR and EAEU. The statement made by Kirill Dmitriev, Russia Direct Investment Fund Chief Executive to China Daily on 21st January 2016 is important to note in this regard. According to him, in OBOR initiative, “Russia is strategically placed between China and Europe, (and) we (Russia) can participate to provide more connectivity in the initiative."34 Russia is an important connecting point on the Silk Road Economic Belt as “on land, the Initiative will focus on jointly building a new Eurasian Land Bridge and developing China-Mongolia-Russia” 35 economic corridor as a part of the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative. With the joining of these two projects, China will benefit in terms of market access to the EAEU, while the infrastructure building in the EAEU zone by China as part of the OBOR will be the prime gain for Russia.
Financial Linkages
As an evidence of the growing China-Russia interest in forging greater financial links with each other, following the sanctions imposed on Russia, one can note the “deal this year (2016) that would link China’s national electronic payment network into its own (Russian) soon-to-be-launched credit card system as part of measures aimed at reducing reliance on the west,”36 said the Russian Finance Minister Alexei Moiseev. To note in this relation Russia lunched its own card payment system named “Mir” after US warned Visa and Master card, both of which are incorporated in United States and process 90 percent of Russian payment transaction to not to operate with two banks in Russia. While Visa and Master card continue to work in Russia, ban on two banks came as a warning to Moscow and it built its own card payment system and linked it with China’s electronic payment network to ensure less reliance on the west on financial areas. China and Russia are using their respective national currencies for bilateral trade since 2010. They are also cooperating on new multinational financial institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (BRICS) and BRICS foreign exchange reserve pool.
Arms Trade
In the area of arms trade, Russia is the second largest arms supplier in the world followed only by the US. China is Russia’s third largest arms export destination accounting for 1137 percent of the export. As the table below shows, between 2011 and 2015 Russia exported maximum, 39 percent, weapons to India while China and Vietnam, each, received 11 per cent.
Exporter |
Share of International Arms Exports (%) |
Main Clients (share of exporter’s total exports %), 2011–15 |
|||
2011–15 |
2006–10 |
1st |
2nd |
3rd |
|
USA |
33 |
29 |
Saudi Arabia (9.7) |
UAE (9.1) |
Turkey (6.6) |
Russia |
25 |
22 |
India (39) |
China (11) |
Viet Nam (11) |
China |
5.9 |
3.6 |
Pakistan (35) |
Bangladesh (20) |
Myanmar (16) |
Ukraine |
2.6 |
1.9 |
China (26) |
Russia (12) |
Ethiopia (9.2) |
Source: SIPRI fact Sheet, February 2016, Trends in International Arms Transfer 2015.38
China, on the other hand, is the third largest importer of arms in the world followed by India and Saudi Arabia. Various Chinese and Russian concerns affected China-Russia arms trade so far. China has criticised Russia for selling outdated products to China. Russian fear that China will surpass Russia in possessing superior military technology in the region, and China’s reverse engineering capabilities from the arms transferred to Beijing from Moscow are main areas of concerns for Russia.
China has concerns regarding “Russia’s arms transfer and its relations with India and other countries”39 as well. Beijing worries that Russia’s defence deals with other countries in the region, selling the advanced weapons it sold to China will jeopardize the purpose of its purchasing advanced weapons from Moscow. As per SIPRI database40 between 2010 and 2015 China-Russia defence deals included, Kh-31 A1/AS-17 Anti Ship Missile, AK-176 76 mm naval gun in 2010, AL-31 and D-30 Turbofan produced for China by Russia between 2009 and 2012. However, in November 2014 Russia inked one of the largest Sino-Russian arms deals of $ 3 billion in the last decade, selling “long range S-400 surface to air missile (SAM) system”41 to Beijing. Russia’s ongoing financial crisis might have propelled it for this decision. The air missile system with a 400 km range is valuable for China in terms of strategy as it will provide it with a quick missile upgrade in response to any adversarial situation, for example, North Korea acquiring ballistic missiles that include “a variety of missile types, such as anti-ship missiles and extended-range KN – 02 tactical missiles.”42 Meanwhile, the S-400 which China has purchased has the capability “of countering all air attack weapons, including tactical and strategic aircraft, ballistic missiles and hypersonic targets, such as the US F-35 fighter jet.”43
Prospects and Concerns for India, in Moscow-Beijing Partnership
It is important to understand how India manoeuvres its way in the growing China and Russia relations. As a background to it, it is important to note that both China and Russia are strategically important for India. In terms of GDP China’s economy is the largest in Asia and is the second largest after US in the world. At present it is India’s largest trading partner as well. However, China and India have long drawn boundary dispute and Beijing continues to support its ‘all weather friend’ Pakistan against India at the regional and global level, to maintain balance of power in south Asia in its favour. Russia on the other hand is New Delhi’s “longstanding time-tested partner.”44 It is also the top supplier of defence equipment to India.
However in recent years, with Russia drawing closer to China to counter the affects of European and American sanctions on its economy, there is growing concern about Beijing influencing Moscow’s future dealings with India. This influencing power of Beijing will emanate from China’s growing role in Russian economic recovery, especially when Beijing is providing monetary and infrastructural assistance to Moscow in exploring oil fields in East Siberia, linking Russia’s card (named Mir in Russia) payment system with China’s electronic payment system, providing oil-for-loan45, linking OBOR with EAEU and providing EAEU with infrastructural facility.
In relation to India, its relation with China, however, suffers from various geo-strategic concerns. India for example has not joined OBOR officially. Indian official position on OBOR is that it is “a Chinese initiative”46 and as Indian Foreign Secretary, Dr. Jaishankar stated “A national initiative is devised with national interest, it is not incumbent on others to buy it,"47 and "where we (India) stand is that if this is something on which they want a larger buy in, then they (China) need to have larger discussions, and those haven't happened."48 China’s emphasise on “opening free trade areas”49 within the countries accepting OBOR is one such concern for India when India’s trade deficit with China has “increased to $ 44.7 billion between April January 2015-2016.”50 As another geo-strategic concern for India, China has bid for Pakistan’s entry if non signatories of NPT1 (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon Treaty) like India are allowed membership in NSG, targeting New Delhi’s demand for membership in NSG. China has not been supportive of India’s demand for membership in UN Security Council as well. Thus the distance in China-India relations increases India’s concerns on the possibility of Beijing influencing Russia in future in Moscow’s dealing with India, especially on the issues related to geo-political strategy.
However, keeping all its apprehensions aside with China, India has continued engaging with it both bilaterally and multilaterally. In relation to Russia, India has confirmed signing a free trade agreement with the EAEU, as Amit Telang, First Secretary of India's embassy in Russia told, “We are definitely signing this agreement"51 to TASS, the Russian News Agency on 18th June 2015. In February 2016, Joint Study Groups’52 report of India and Russia came out on the possibility of signing this pact, however there in no information available as yet as when India-EAEC are signing the free trade agreement. In fact, by becoming a member of the SCO, and as a part of the trilateral party – RIC (Russia, India, China) Forum, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and G20, AIIB and EPEC, India is trying to ensure its presence as an important stakeholder in regional and global affairs.
Regional and Global Implications of Russia-China Ties
China-Russia growing ties can have varying scales of implications at the regional and global level.
While at the regional level, China and Russia as partners can mitigate the impact of western sanctions and challenge US’s strategic intervention in the Northeast Asia, East Asia and in the Asia Pacific region, as member states of regional organisations like BRICS and SCO, they can also emerge as united force in fighting against various global concerns like terrorism and drug trafficking and be pillars of support in each other’s regional financial, economic and connectivity ventures like AIIB, OBOR and EAEU. China and Russia’s united voice against sanction policy of the west (both against Russia and North Korea), criticism of the deployment of THAAD53 (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system2) by US in South Korea against North Korea’s recent missile tests, are examples of China –Russia voicing together in the strategic issues too. Thus China and Russia as united force can propel economic growth prospect at the regional level while strategically they can be a challenge to the western intervention in the region.
At the international level, as economic interest is the prime driver in China-Russia relations at present, and China has categorically distanced itself from forging any alliance with Russia, Beijing-Moscow partnership does not pose any security threat to the global order. However, with growing convergence in China-Russia relations, they as member states in G20, United Nation Security Council can ensure an effective united voice on all global issues that involves Chinese and Russian interests. So both, regionally and globally, China and Russia as partners can be an effective force, but not a security threat.
Conclusion
The history has been testimony to the fact that the difference between China and Russia has been exploited by the US in late 1970s. It was also perceived as a phase when US-China detente was much publicised. In the post-Soviet phase the bad state of economy of Russia as well as the changed strategic outlook of US transformed the relationship to a comfortable understanding between the two major powers. Resurgent Russia, supported by high oil prices, capitalised on the oil money to regain its place in the international order. However, the Iran nuclear crisis and the deluge of illegal oil as well as drastically reduced prices of crude oil have deprived Russia of its planned larger role in the global politics. Given the fact that China was seen as bright light in the recession phase and the sanction regime on Russia created conditions for the two countries to come together. The supporting factors have been Russia’s energy export to China, their increasing synergy under SCO, linking of OBOR and EAEU, Russia’s military industrial complex and the urge of China to match US both in economic and strategic terms galvanised the partnership between these two countries. However, the Russian pride and Chinese overarching ambitions, which even though are latent, can have the potential to derail the camaraderie. In case the resistance of US to both the countries, China and Russia, in the Eurasian theatre and Asia-Pacific continues, both Russia and China would prolong their marriage of convenience. As it is well stated, in geopolitics there are no permanent friends or enemies, the geopolitical matrix and the strategic priorities might reconfigure the understanding.
End Notes
1 Both India and Pakistan are Non-signatory of NPT (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon).
2 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system deployed in South Korea by US and its radar capabilities pose direct threats to North Korea, China and Russia’s security interests.
1 “Russia seeks to turn post-Soviet military bloc into universal organization” TASS Russian News Agency,
Russian Politics & Diplomacy, 18 January, 2016,
http://tass.ru/en/politics/850266 (accessed on 17 May 2016).
22 Ying, Fu. “How China Sees Russia” 18 December, People’s Daily, 2015. At http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1218/c90000-8992446.html (accessed on 02 May, 2016).
3 “Xi Jinping Meets with Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei Ivanov of Russia”, ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China’ 25 March, 2016, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1351344.shtml (accessed on 28 March, 2016).
4 Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, and Both Sides Decide to Upgrade China-Pakistan Relations to All-weather Strategic Partnership of Cooperation 2015/04/21, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdbjstjxgsfwbfydnxycxyfldrhyhwlhy60znjnhd/t1256854.shtml (accessed on 07 June 2016).
5 “Russia Economic Report 35: The Long Journey to Recovery”, 6 April, 2016, The World Bank Press Release, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/06/russia-economic-report-35 (accessed on 9 April, 2016).
6 Ibid.
7 Reuters, “China Signs Huge Arms Deal With Russia, Buys World's Best Missile” Russia Insider, 27 April 2015, at http://Russia-insider.com/en/China-signs-huge-arms-deal-Russia-buys-worlds-best-missile/6089, (accessed on 27 April 2016).
8Andrew Browne, “Xi and Putin—a Camaraderie of Convenience Necessity drives a friendship in which China sees itself as top dog” The Wall Street Journal, 12 May 2015, at http://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-and-putina-camaraderie-of-convenience-1431409904 (accessed on 13 May 2016).
9 “Russia and China An uneasy friendship The crisis in Ukraine is drawing Russia closer to China. But the relationship is far from equal” 9 May 2015, at http://www.economist.com/news/China/21650566-crisis-ukraine-drawing-russia-closer-China-relationship-far-equal (accessed on 19 March 2016).
10Carrie Gracie, “Brothers again? How deep is the Xi-Putin bromance?” 24 April 2015, at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-China-32409409 BBC, (accessed on 27 April 2016).
1111 Meylik Kaylan, “The Russia-China axis and its threat to west” The Fox News Opinion, 10 September 2014 at http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/09/10/russia-China-axis-and-its-threat-to-west.html (accessed on 18 March 2016).
12 Xinhua, “China-Russia ties not to be affected by changing int'l situation: Premier Li”, Xinhuanet, 16 March, at 2016, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/16/c_135194245.htm (accessed on 27 march 2016).
13“Wang Yi: China Holds Full Confidence in China-Russia Relations”, 11 March 2016, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/dozys_664276/gjlb_664280/3220_664352/3222_664356/t1347794.shtml (accessed on 4 April 2016).
14 Lavrov, Sergey. “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background” Russia in Global Affairs, 3 March, 2016. at, http://en.interaffairs.ru/actual/620-sergey-lavrovs-article-Russias-foreign-policy-historical-background-for-Russia-in-global-affairs-magazine-march-3-2016.html (accessed on 9 April, 2016).
15 Ivan Nechepurenko, “Russia-China Alliance Could Launch New World Order”, 15 June 2016 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-China-alliance-could-launch-new-world-order/523711.html (accessed on 15 May 2016).
16 Xinhua “Xinhua Insight: E-commerce boosts cross-border trade between China, Russia”, Xinhuanet, 15 October 2015, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/15/c_134716604.htm. (accessed on 26 April 2016).
17 “Trade growth to remain subdued in 2016 as uncertainties weigh on global demand”, 7 April 2016,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres16_e/pr768_e.htm (accessed on 18 April 2016).
18 “China's Total USD Value of Imports and Exports by Major Country (Region)”, Apr. 2015, at
http://english.customs.gov.cn/newsroom/statisticsdetail/c64b5a25-c8b0-4205-b5da-d52d4e6d0fa3 (accessed on 17 April 2016).
19 “External Trade of Russian Federation with Other Countries”, Russia in Figures, 2015,
Russian Federal State Statistics Service at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b15_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d02/27-06.htm (accessed on 20 March 2016).
20‘Russia’s Top Import Partners’ Worlds Top Exports 19 February 2016, at http://www.worldstopexports.com/russias-top-import-partners/ (accessed on 13 June 2016).
21 “President Putin signs order to extend counter-sanctions for another year”, 24 June 2015, at https://www.rt.com/business/269413-Russia-putin-counter-sanctions/ (accessed on 28 March 2016).
22 Commodity structure Exports and Imports of the Russian Federation”, (percent) 2015, at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b15_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d02/27-04.htm. (accessed on 17 April 2016).
23 China International Energy Data and Analysis, US Energy Information Administration, 14 May 2016 http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/China/China.pdf (accessed on 14 May 2016).
24 “Reuters, “Russia steals Saudi's crown as China’s top oil supplier”, 3 February 2016, at https://www.rt.com/business/331139-Russia-China-saudi-arabia-oil/, (accessed on 3 April, 2016).
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35 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” 28 march 2016, The National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. (accessed on 20 April 2016).
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48 Ibid.
49“ Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March 2015, at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html (accessed on 7 July 2016).
50 “India –China Trade Deficit at $ 44.7 billion in April-January”, The Economic Times, 02 march 2016, at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-China-trade-deficit-at-44-7-billion-in-april-january/articleshow/51223260.cms (accessed on 27 June 2016).
51 Pyotr Kovalev, “India confirms it will sign free trade agreement with EAEU”, TASS Russian News Agency, 18 June 2015, at http://tass.ru/en/economy/801569 (accessed on 26 march 2016).
52 Amiti Sen, “India’s proposed trade pact with Russia-led EAEU bloc on fast track”, 7 February 2016, at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/indias-proposed-trade-pact-with-russialed-eaeu-bloc-on-fast-track/article8206297.ece (accessed on 13 May 2016).
53 Vishakha Sonawane, “THAAD In Korean Peninsula: Russia, China Concerned Over Possible US Missile System Deployment, Lavrov Says” International Business Times, 13 April 2016, at http://www.ibtimes.com/thaad-korean-peninsula-russia-China-concerned-over-possible-us-missile-system-2352920 (accessed on 18 May 2016).