I would not be satisfied unless 10,000 MBH members are killed for every slain member of the armed force1: Former Justice Minister of Egypt in a TV interview.
Introduction:
It was more than five years ago when the crowd of millions thronged the Arab streets chanting anti-regimes slogans and expressing their aspirations for a new life. What followed in the span of next few months was something unprecedented in the Arab history. The longest serving President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak stepped down succumbing to the people’s outcry, Tunisia’s President Zine El Abidin Ben Ali fled the country and President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, who enjoyed the privilege of serving as the President of both the divided and united Yemen for almost three decades left power after a protracted negotiation between his regime and the GCC nations. The story did not end there only but very soon the ruler of Libya, Colonel Gaddafi was killed in an NATO-Arab League-led operation and those who were left out in that wave of revolution are somehow managing themselves in power with an unpredictable future.
If one thing can define the post-revolutionary era in the Arab world, it is disappointment. Disappointment seems to be the defining ethos of many new and old political orders of the region. It is an important force which exercises a significant influence on political engagement and participation. Similarly it has also marked the politics of post-uprising in Egypt as a result of infighting within the parties and the opposition and the wear and tear of the political process. Once the unifying goals of the revolution were achieved in the overthrow of Mubarak, the same politics became fractious and divisive which is contributing to the subsequent authoritative confidence.2
This paper will primarily focus on the five years of political trajectory in Egypt in the aftermath of the departure of President Mubarak. It would argue the hypothesis that revolution in Egypt has led nowhere and has come almost full circle. Today’s Egypt seems to be a story of disenchantment, not different from what it was before the revolution. Rather the post-revolution phase has witnessed that the ‘deep state’3 has emerged more powerful and aggressive, showing highhandedness both judicially and politically where political space for liberal voices has further shrunk. The much-lauded roadmap of the new regime of El-Sisi did not entail any noticeable change in the political domain of the nation. Though the current army regimes in Egypt like the past has opted for the democratic route but failed to remove the fear of the people and inject the democratic ethos in the political transition of the last five years. In the name of political parties, civil societies and opposition groups, one rarely comes across any voice or any sign of even mere existence of culture of political plurality or accommodation.
The conventional opposition in Egyptian political life in form of Islamists groups has been completely cramped and both top and mid-level leadership are languishing in jail. In the name of national security and the war on terror, the urge for democracy, a hallmark of the so-called Arab Spring, has been pushed to the backburner and the future is bleak for the country when it comes to political freedom.
This paper has been divided into three parts: part one will offer a brief snapshot of political transition in last five years, the second part will look into how army took the reign of power and suppressed all sort of political descents. Third and last section of the paper would highlight the judicial and political measures adopted to kill the political space for non-conceding Islamist groups which also engulfed other genuine liberal and secular voices in the name of security. This section will also look into the crippling of the economy of Egypt and how the democracy has been made subservient to the rhetoric and slogan of economic stability and welfare of the common people.
The Overthrow of Muslim Brotherhood Government and End of the Revolution:
The 18-day protest that began on January 25, 2011on the streets of Cairo and in different parts of the country was able to throw the shackles of fear and submission, transforming people from a century-old subject to the citizens. The removal of the barrier of fear and horror has been one of the historic achievements of the uprising across the Egypt.
The MBH and its political affiliates emerged as the biggest victors in the first-ever free and fair Parliamentary election held in three rounds between November 28 and January 11, 2012. Two Islamist blocs: Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), newly formed political wing of the MBH and Al-Nour party (a Salafist inspired political entity) achieved the overwhelming majority in the parliament. The sound victory defeated those predictions that viewed Islamists were not more than a salt in the ocean.4
The MBH had its own huge network made up of charitable organizations and thousands of mosques attached to it offering all the social services including health and education. The FJP alone got 35 % of votes and out of total 70 % of the Parliamentary seats captured by the Islamists, 40 % belonged to the MBH.5
But the story of the Presidential election was different where the Islamist candidate of MBH, Mohammad Morsi managed somehow to win the election with a thin margin. The runoff between the Islamists and Mubarak’s loyalist Mohammad Shafeeqe was an indication that post-revolutionary political domain in the country no more belong exclusively to the Islamists.
The arrival of Morsi ushered in a new battle between the power-aspirant Islamists and an old power-stuck military which was finding it difficult to abandon behind-the-curtain politics in the national affairs. To ascertain its hegemony on the political institutions and not let the new political institutions emerge, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) came out with a series of decrees amidst the presidential election itself creating a hitch to the newly evolving democratic institutions. On 13 June 2012, SCAF issued a decree authorizing itself to arrest the civilians and try them in the military court and in a sudden move, dissolved the parliament elected six months before citing the procedural irregularity in certain constituencies. Just before the Presidential election,, SCAF issued another decree arrogating several presidential powers to the itself like power to appoint the army chief. SCAF already declared that it had full control over matters relating to the armed forces and had exclusive powers to approve army budget. The army had already planned to impose the Silmi document6 on Egypt before the country had embraced for the democratic election.
The initial differences had not crept merely between military and the Islamic bloc but political spheres were already laden with a feeling of animosity between the masses and the MBH and its affiliates. The January protestors were in no mood to hand over the ownership of the revolution to the Islamists alone.
One of the protestors claimed, “I am not aware of any religious slogans in the street rallies and instead one slogan projected a very different meaning – “al-Thowratna Madaniyya, la Sayfiyya, la Diniyya”. “Our revolution is civil; neither violent nor religious”.7
FJP committed an array of blunders and its rule had become a baggage of delusions for the people that had high expectations from a democratically elected Islamic government. What scared and antagonized the people most and exposes the autocratic face of Morsi’s rule in Egypt was an announcement on November 21, 2012, by Morsi of a new Constitutional Declaration declaring himself and his decisions immune from judicial overview. The decree even prevented Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) from dissolving the constituent assembly or the upper house of the national assembly. Through the same decree, he removed the Attorney General of the country which was in complete defiance of the constitutional convention of the country.8
Morsi showed immaturity and naiveté what one scholar of the Arab world; Tariq Ramadan has called a political intoxication.9 Morsi failed to unite the Egyptians around an inclusive coalition government which was the need of the time what had been proved well in the political transition of Tunisia. MBH started the politics of dividing the society in the name of religion. The MBH had been outmaneuvered in positioning itself by other political actors in Egypt. The MBH was drawn in the binary conflict between the secularist and the Islamist which had emerged as a new template of division in Egypt today. Islamist government was more guided by their Guidance Bureau than immediate demands of the time with the chants of “Command Oh Badie, you command and we obey”10
MBH was trying to Ikhwanise the army and the state as a whole. The term ‘Ikhwanise’ has its etymology in the name of the movement itself. By Ikhwanization, one means the imposition of conservative Islamic ideology and policies on the Egyptian society and accordingly re-establish state-society relationship based on Shariah. The imposition will violate the fundamental freedom of expression and the MBH had already indicated of this politics of Ikhwanization by appointing majority of the governors from MBH background in different governorates in the country. The other aspect of Ikhwanization was revealed when students with links to the MBH and the Salafist were allowed to join the military academy. Before the revolution, army and police academy used to reject those who had political views or were influenced by Islamist ideology.11
Moreover Morsi’s policy of exclusion cost him dearly when he opted for an open altercation with the army. The MBH was not only intent on using the army for its own political use but were posing mockery and fun against the most prestigious institution of the country. One prominent member of MBH wrote poetry ridiculing the army, “In peace they are brave, in crisis they are frightened; what a value army does has when it is led by a rat”.12 The military came with an immediate reply:
“MBH is used to venture in the dark and hideouts and their history is full of blood and killing of the innocents. Army always defends the soil of the nation at the time of war and peace”.13
In one year of Morsi’s rule, the country went into further deep crisis, foreign currency reserve was depleting. Tourism was collapsing because of the prevailing instability and the chaos in the country, and local economy was in a shabby shape because of the fragile political situations. FDI was at halt and trade with EU had slipped to minus and the Egyptian budget deficit in 2014 was estimated to be 25, 4715 million Egyptian pounds and this figure in 2103 was 250,00014 which has sounded a warning bell towards the economic disaster.
MBH failed to present a balanced unity government that included important forces of Egypt without compromising the middle ground and the moderation required at the moment. The following words describe the journey of MBH in power for one year in the most comprehensive way, “MBH was pressured by the Salafist, outmaneuvered by the entrenched military, besieged by fearful secular liberals, and mistrusted by suspicious westerners”.15 It was the distrust, non-cooperation, stubbornness, blame game, inter-party, conflict, political ambition, ideology-driven politics that had reigned in the free political domain of the country during last two years.
These were the erstwhile political situations which paved the way for an anti-Morsi campaign launched by a group called ‘Tamarrod’ (rebellion, mutiny) which spearheaded a shrill campaign against the rule of Morsi in the month of June 2013. Tamarrod was a new group consisted of the veterans of a previous movement ‘Egyptians Movement for Change’ of 2004, members of Kifayah movement in the past dominated by the secularists, socialists, Nasserites, liberals, moderate Islamists and the communists as well. The group started a nationwide petition campaign in June and announced to have obtained 22 million signatures for the removal of Morsi. One of the Tamarrod members quoted by Observer on July 6 saying that
“El-Sisi and the army took their cue from the people. They had many previous chances to do what they did today. But once the millions of people came on the streets exhorting the army to intervene; they took their order from us16.
A nation which in recent past only had risen rebellion against the army was chanting for the army itself. It was perhaps another revolution in the post-revolution Egypt when on July 3, 2013, Egyptian Defence Minister and Chief Army Commander Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in a national televised address declared the removal of President Morsi, suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament, appointed Adley Mansour as an interim President, placed a civilian government in place . The military takeover was welcomed by Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Syria while Turkey criticized the move of the army. Saudi King praised the army for managing “to save Egypt at this critical point from a dark tunnel”.17
Abdel Fattah El-El-Sisi also announced a fresh Road Map stipulating his future political plan in which he promised to draft a constitution, hold a parliamentary election and at last nation would go for electing the new President. . What was more ironical was the embrace of the Salafist, a radical group, by the army and distancing of Salafist from MBH. The decision of Salafist to go along with the army military was perhaps taken not to let the Islamic space be captured by some other infringe groups.18 The removal of Morsi again brought the military at the centre-stage of the political affairs.
The overthrow of Morsi in the 21st century is similar to what had taken in the previous century in Iran, Congo, Chile, Haiti, and Turkey. The coup in Egypt had the DNA of these coups of the previous century. The coup in Iran was designated to replace the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mussaddegh (1953), Patrice Lumumba of Congo (1960) and Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti (1991). All were first democratically elected leaders. The existence of freedom in these countries was also very short like in Egypt. The coup was conducted by Generals trained in the West, loyal to it, having full technological and financial support .According to Freedom of Information Act, United States channeled funds to anti-Morsi groups in Egypt too19 and recently the hidden hand of some Monarchies of the Gulf has also become visible20 This might be read in the UNGA’s remarks of US President Obama in 2013 when he said that, “Mohamed Morsi was democratically elected but proved unwilling to govern in a way that was a fully inclusive”.21
Army at the Helm of the Affairs:
Army blamed the Islamists for the mishap and claimed that it was a move to correct the January 25 revolution, to restore the fundamental of logic of 11 February 2011 and achieve the real objective of mass’s revolution. Army Commander himself said in an interview with Egyptian Daily ‘ Almost-al-Yum’ “He had advised Mr. Morsi to be more inclusive and had asked him to resolve the outstanding issues with the opposition groups and the civic institutions- the church, Al-Azhar seminary, national media and the judiciary as well. 22
What followed immediately after fall of Morsi was a huge protest on the parts of the Islamists and road blockades in different cities. To break up Islamist sit-ins, army resorted to all sort of means and according to Ministry of Health; death toll was over 600, with nearly 4,000 injured.23 The vast majority of the dead were supporters of ousted President Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood group. In the midst of this turmoil, many Egyptians have shifted their priority from building a democracy to another concern: security. What remained as a defining political feature in Egypt in the aftermath of Morsi was a simplification of Egypt into “us versus them”, the military reestablished a dominant role for itself on Egypt’s political stage, one that has gone largely unchallenged by the Egyptian public. By the end of one of the bloodiest weeks in Egyptian history, state TV was covering the headline: “Egypt Fighting Terrorism.”
The rule book for El-Sisi like his predecessors remains the same and the supporters of El-Sisi have an intimate grasp of it. The regime of the day preferred law, order and stability rather than freedom, democracy and human rights24 and for the President of the time law, order, and stability mean the elimination of opposition and the suppression of protest. Nothing demonstrates more cynical the military’s sophisticated grasp of how to manipulate the public sentiments than El-Sisi’s speech calling for a mandate to crush the MBH what he said at a military parade on 24 July in the name of opposing terrorism.25 It reminded one of the famous quotes of General Sopomoza of Nicaragua when he had said, “You won the election but I won the count”.26
Abdal Fattah El-Sisi was represented as Nasser of the twenty-first century. He proudly claimed to represent the legacy of Colonel Nasser which was embodied in preserving the country from the radicalism and revolutionaries and rescuing the nation from anarchy. Not long after taking over the reign of power, the army became a sort of resistant force and declared an open war on the political opposition. The interim President Adly Mansour, who was the nominated President of the country after the overthrow of Morsi in July 2013 till the election of new President held in June 2014, issued a decree (107/2013) on November 24, 2103, known as anti-protest legislation.27
The law does not allow the assemblage of more than ten people even for the purpose of the election campaign. The Protest Laws failed to differentiate between extremist and non-violent political opponent and the law was primarily meant to ‘de-ikhwanisation’ of the political sphere of the country. The decree stipulated the imprisonment of two-five years and a fine of $ 7200-$ 14500 if found violating the law. 28
The law has no provision for gradual use of forces and instead it speaks of an abstract use of force against the civilians. This law purged the country of the spirit of freedom and some experts view today’s Egypt worse than what was before the revolution of 2011. Despite having been passed by the Parliament, the law criticized by the visiting delegation of the European parliament to Egypt in the month of February 2016. Reacting to the criticism, speaker of the house, Mr. Ali Abdul-Aal said that the law was never meant to decree against the protest but it was meant to discipline the protest and resistance.29
Months |
Jan |
Feb |
Mar |
April |
May |
June |
July |
Aug |
Sept |
Oct |
Nov |
Dec |
Total |
Total Number of Protest Marches |
109 |
112 |
120 |
109 |
86 |
103 |
105 |
167 |
113 |
141 |
236 |
114 |
1515 |
Events Attacked by Security Forces |
30 |
8 |
50 |
86 |
37 |
27 |
32 |
55 |
32 |
43 |
55 |
25 |
412 |
Above chart shows the number of the protests in 2014 and how it was treated by the security forces
In August 2015, El-Sisi passed another law increasing government surveillance power and restriction on the journalist stipulating there should be no discrepancy in the state version and the media version when it comes to the reporting the casualty out of terror activities. The President also added new amendment to Egyptian penal codes in October 2015, criminalizing failure to report knowledge of possession of explosive to authorities.30 Arab Network of Human Right reports that the arrest of the media person started immediately after the takeover of power by the armed forces. Media was also prohibited to give a briefing to foreign media and according to Organization of Journalists against Torture” there were around of 500 incidents of human right violation against journalists in 2015 alone and the report suggests that the number was around 674 in 2014.31
International Committee for the Protection of the Right of the Journalist in its annual report has claimed that 2015 was the worst for the media freedom in China and Egypt. While the media freedom is being promoted everywhere but the Egyptian records of 2015 was poor in comparison to 2014 and in 2015 when 23 journalists were arrested by the police authority while in 2012, there was no journalist in the jail of Egypt.32 In his address to the people on October one, El-Sisi had said that best way to deal with these journalists is to exile them abroad because they are the conspirators against the nation”.33
Recently entry, Egyptian authority introduced some amendment to the punishment laws in the field of freedom of expression that the domain of freedom further narrowed. In a meeting of January 13, 2016, the cabinet has approved new laws amending the last presidential decree which imposes an immediate arrest and the fine of 10,000-30,000 pounds for publication, production, promotion, importation, transfer (whether transferred within the country or abroad), possession, trafficking, distribution, rent or presentation of: symbols, drawings, posters, publications, signs, photos or other objects that symbolize terrorist entities or groups which operate inside the country or abroad34 This law has led to arrest of numerous reporters and closure of several visual, electronic, portal and print media houses. This has opened a new vista for the police forces for further crackdown on the opposition in the name of terrorism and this particular law offers big difficulty in differentiating between the voices of opposition and terrorism. Under these laws, the offices of various news agencies like Aljazeera of Qatar and Anadolu news agency of Turkey have been shut down.
According to the report of Human Right and Freedom Organization of Egypt, the army is involved in various kinds of human right violation in the part of Sinai in the name of war on terror. In the eight months of emergency in Sinai, 1347 people suffered a cold-blooded murder without any evidence of their involvement in the act of terror, 11906 people were arrested unwarrantedly, 2883 people were taken under preemptive arrest, 1883 huts of Bedouins were set on fire, 1967 motor vehicles set on fire, 2577 houses were demolished, 26000 people were forced to flee the houses.35 In a series of decrees, the state has expanded the orbit of defining the terror entity which has included the several civil society organizations as well.36
A steady growth has been noticed in the case of disappearance of political activists and according to a prisoner’s right group, Freedom of the Brave, between April and July l 2015, 165 people have disappeared in 2015. The members of the ‘April Six Youth Movement’ and cadres of MBH have been the targeted mostly and one has described present Egypt as an Argentina of Junta days.37
Arab Human Right Organization has called upon the UN body of the human right to conduct an inquiry into the tortures and oppression; prisoners are subjected to in the prison of Aqrab in Cairo. Around 253 prisoners have gone on collective hunger strike in protest against the treatment in the jail and the negligence of authority regarding their health and other humanitarian issues. Only in the jail of Aqrab, six prisoners died since the ‘coup’ of July 2013 because of the lack of basic human facilities and medicines they required. 38 According to the reports of Movement for the Freedom for of the Prisoners, around163 prisoners have been languishing in different jail of the twenty-two governorates of the country without trial since April of last year39 Another decree by the President in October 2015 gave sweeping powers to the prison authority to use forces against the prisoners in its defense. The same law stipulates that solitary confinement period can be extended from fifteen days to thirty days and transfer ordinary prisoner to solitary confinement.40
El-Sisi ha also amended a penal code in October 2015, to criminalize receiving foreign funds41 to stop the foreign funding for NGOs and launched a shrill campaign calling human right activist a western agent trying to create havoc in the country. Between July 2013 and May 2016, the total numbers of laws passed to curtail and suppress the opposition voices are around 510 and all were done in the name of national security and fighting the terrorism.42 All these laws were passed at the behest of the Presidency, PMO, home and justice ministry and judicial departments.
Unlike today, MBH in Mubarak’s era was allowed certain room to operate, to contest elections, and to have seats in parliament. Mubarak may have been a dictator, but he was not a radical.43 The army’s interventionist role in politics has become more entrenched today and the military and other state institutions have become explicitly partisan entities. MBH was declared by Hazim Bablavi, erstwhile Prime Minster of Egypt a terrorist organization in February 2014 while other organization like Ansar-al-Betul-Maqdas was declared a terrorist entity in April 2015.44 Very recently, a Cairo court has declared, Qaseem Brigade, - the military wing of Hamas, a terrorist organization on in January 2016.
The court accused the Brigade of abandoning their mission in Israel and shifting toward Egypt to destroy the nation.US has also put MBH it on the list of the terror organization. Thousands of charitable organizations affiliated with the MBH have been shut down and the properties of the MBH have been ceased while the beneficiaries of the charitable organizations were not only members of the MBH.45
On March 24, 20014 what came as a sign of degradation in the judiciary when a court handed over collective death sentences to 529 MBH members for the killing of one police person and penalty was awarded after merely two hearings.46 Amnesty International termed the verdict a grotesque47 and said it is the largest number of simultaneous death sentence in recent history worldwide and termed it “Injustice Writ Large” and stated that verdict should be overturned. In April, 2014 another death sentence came when 683 MBH members were sentenced to death for inciting violence during anti-Morsi campaign.48
Unlike past, Egypt has become once again the same playing field for army regime where to favor the loyalists has become a norm. The landscape for the political parties is notoriously weak as the system has become more authoritative. There are hundreds of parties but all are weak and independents are weaker.
Most generals who seize power promise to return the country to a democracy and so the general swaps his uniform for the business suit, crushes the opposition and creates a parliamentary democracy. El-Sis is striding this familiar path. Within one year, he removed all his military badges and like his predecessor won the election of president with the margin of 94 % vote, a sign of bullied society in a claimed vote of 50 % turnout. He has already declared that there will be no place for the MBH during his presidency49 and he also said that it is not he who has finished the MBH but it is the people of Egypt who have finished it.
The shape of the present parliament seems to be the replica of the old one followed by Mubarak which was just a rubber stamp. The Parliamentary election held in October-November, 2015 had the same game with different rules. In Mubarak time independent winner were co-opted by the NDP and to provide the legitimacy to the culture of political opposition, some members of NDP ran as an opposition but later were co-opted in the NDP itself. This time there is no ruling party and independent candidate were in orbit around the For the Love of Egypt Party which did the work of NDP this time because electoral laws prohibit to affiliate with any other party after the election.
Out of total 568 member parliament, 325 (57 %) have been elected on independent seats and 243 (43 %) are elected as party affiliates while 28 (5 %) are nominated from amongst the public figures by the President.50 Mr. Sameh Seif Elyazal former general and of top Intelligence person51 is heading the party list “For the Love of Egypt” which has won 120 seats and even in this parliament, the MBH is the targeted enemy and entire political discourse in the country has been confined to the binary template of MBH and non-MBH.
In the very first session of the parliament, Sameh Seif Elyazal said that “I can assure you that Brotherhood will be in parliament, they will enter parliament as independents and will reveal ... once they have won, that they are Brotherhood.52 The majority of the independent candidates for “For the Love of Egypt Party” were public figures, ex-military or police officers and former members of National Democratic Party (NDP), Mubarak’s ruling party53. New parliament was granted 15 days to scrutinize more than 500 decrees issued by the head of state since the previous legislature was dissolved. The first session of new parliament was held in January which passed all the decrees announced by President El -Sisi
Today’s columnists and the political commentators in Egypt are writing that Egyptians are new to democracy and there has been no history of democracy and protest in the country. This could be due to many factors: The current socio-political scenario has shrunken and political space for the dissenting voices after the coup of 2013 July has become narrower and more marginalized in comparison to pre-July coup or the revolution of 2011 itself. Any social action or protest is taken to be a conspiracy against the state and the society itself. This environment has created a period of apathy and dumbness among the masses behaving indifferently and lending no ear to any sort of political brutality and police’s highhandedness. This political atmosphere has created a social component who have become either subservient to the state narrative or become the victim of oblivion mentality.54
Another factor which led to the current lull in the political sphere of the country is reflected in the vulnerability of other non-Islamist forces and voices of resistance which have succumbed to the state-led pressure and embrace the autocratic regime without much resistance. These opposition groups represent a classical oppositional feature in Egyptian politics which have always remained a divided house barring amidst the revolution.
Other new voices of resistance like Six April movement and others which emerged in the post-revolutionary phase were either suppressed or became part of the regime jettisoning the cry of the people for the political foredoom and reform.
Other resistant groups like ‘League of Prisoners of Aqrab Jail’ and ‘Movement for the Freedom for the Prisoners’ later emerged in the country against the highhandedness of the police forces but gradually they also felt subdued.55
Democracy: A Hostage to Economic Rhetoric and Security Threat
One of the most entrenched political discourse that has been kept alive by the successive regimes in parts of the Arab world is that any shift towards democracy would yield into dominance of Islamists at the helm of the affairs and that would subsequently lead to a wave of violence. The binary simplification of democracy and security has sustained many rulers in the Arab world for decades and once again it is going to entrench the rule of the army in Egypt for seemingly an unknown period of time. Nothing could prove this dictum more pronounced than the victory of the Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia and the emergence of them in countries like Yemen, Syria, and Libya.
The other side of story of eroding democracy coupled with entrenchment of army rule is the rise of violence which has provided much-needed legitimacy and all justification for the current regime to steer the country away from the democracy. In the name of combating terror, army in Egypt is resorting to utmost limit of means at their disposal ignoring all political and legal norms. Today the region in the West Asia and particularly Egypt is a theater of war on terror and freedom is not an agenda when it threatens the law and order and democracy are considered to be a precursor to political instability.
In the last two years after the ousting of Morsi’s government, the security issue has been the most dominant theme within the political spectrum of the country. The country has witnessed a wave of violence justifying the overwhelming dominance of the army and the police and the biggest victim has been the democratic aspirations of the people.
The rise of violence and common concern for security has not made the democracy a redundant issue but has pushed the major plank of Arab uprising to the backburner and it has become a subservient to the growing threat within the country. Until 2014, terrorist attacks were exclusively isolated to the Sinai Peninsula. In 2014, this began to change, and today attacks are occurring regularly in provinces across the Egypt, with particular concentration in greater Cairo.
In the span of two years, there has been a sudden rise of many radical and terrorist affiliates in different parts of the country and each one having its ideological and political association with the global terrorist outfits like Al-Qaeda and the ISIS.
In one of the latest study, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy has noticed that 120 small and big terrorist attacks have taken place every month in Egypt in 2015 while this average was 30 in 2014. 56 The same study reports that between 2010 and 2016 so far there have 1691 attacks taken place across the country and total 1014 people have been killed.
Egypt has seen a series of bomb blast and killing of innocent and high profile political figures in this span of two years. On July 11, 2015, the ISIS claimed the responsibility for a bomb on Italian consulate while in June 2015, a car bomb ripped through an armed convoy of Hisham Baraka, Egypt’s prosecutor General who was appointed in July 2013 when the nation was polarized completely.57 On September 9, 2013, former Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim narrowly escaped a similar attack when a suicide bomber targeted him as he drove to work in the Cairo suburb of Nasr; other assassinations in the past includes high ranking police, military and judicial figures.
There are several groups which are active in Egypt today and the most prominent among them is the Wilayat-Sinai (Islamic State in Sinai) formerly known as Ansar-al-Betul-Maqdas It is known to be an affiliate of ISIS and has launched a mission called “Extermination of Judiciary”. It has local and as well as external source of funding and some of the business tycoons in Egypt also finance the group. This group has been most active in Sinai Peninsula and it has attracted large scale army involvement to crush the movement. Only in the last quarter of 2015, there were 118 terrorist attacks launched by the groups. In the same quarter, north Sinai witnessed 82 % of total attacks across the Egypt. 58
The Wilayat-Sinai further shot into fame after it allegedly shot down a Russian passenger plane in the Sinai peninsula killing more 224 people in October 2015. Though Egyptian authority has denied its involvement but the preliminary reports suggest that the group was involved in the act.
January |
Feb |
March |
April |
May |
June |
July |
August |
Sep |
October |
Nov |
Dec |
110
|
115 |
30 |
50 |
50 |
40 |
140 |
80 |
30 |
55 |
30 |
35 |
The above chart shows the numbers of reported terrorist attack took place only in northern Sinai in 2015.
January |
Feb |
March |
April |
May |
June |
July |
August |
Sep |
October |
Nov |
Dec |
110
|
125 |
250 |
75 |
175 |
125 |
75 |
70 |
25 |
60 |
30 |
20 |
The above chart shows the numbers of reported anti-terrorist operations in Egypt in 2015
This increase has coincided with the emergence of smaller groups inside the Sinai which aimed to restore the rule of Morsi and resist the army in the country. There are other groups like the Popular Resistant Movement which is very active and its core area of operation is from Luxor to North Sinai. Another group is Revolutionary Punishment which was founded by the dissatisfied members of the MBH. 59 These affiliates are active in greater Cairo and the Nile Delta region, including Alexandria, The main target of the group is military personnel and those who support the coup. Their main target also includes the government and economic institutions.
There are other groups like Soldier of Egypt operating in greater Cairo but unlike ISIS or Al-Qaeda it has no belief in Islamic Umma and its slogan and activism are confined to national boundaries. Their fight is for the restoration of the spirit of the Arab Spring. The group laments that goal of Arab Spring has not been fulfilled. Groups like Ansar-al-Jihad which is located in Sinai and claims to have been a military wing of Al-Qaeda in Sinai Peninsula and is in possession of portable air defense system and mortars. The group was founded by Ramzi Mohammad al-Moufi, one of the prisoners who fled the jail in the uprising in 2011.60 Another group is Army of Islam, active in Sinai and Gaza and works in close association with the Hamas of Egypt. Another militant outfit is “Takfir was Hijrah” which carries black flag to show the solidarity with the ISIS and is very active in Sinai.
Apart from the internal threat, Egypt is beset with equal level of threat from across the border. The rising instability and anarchy in nth neighboring Libya has made Egypt vulnerable to external attacks from groups like the ISIS which has usurped the security of the country after the demise of its ruler. The western border of the Egypt could be a fertile ground for the ISIS recruitment and there are reports of Egyptians joining the ISIS in Libya. The story of beheading of twenty one Egyptian Christians cannot be seen in isolation. Egypt is constantly fighting a battle to contain the ISIS in Libya and stop its infiltration in the country.
In the guise of combating terrorism, El-Sisi’s crackdown against the civic and political opposition is continued according to what President El-Sisi had said after the ouster of Morsi that people had given him a mandate to deal with the terrorist threat. His antiterrorism program seems to be less to deal with the terrorism and more to scuttle the democratic voice and people’s aspirations for freedom.
If the worsening security situation in the country seems to provide some legitimacy to the current military regime to navigate with certain authority in the political sphere, the economic situation is adversely affecting the credibility of the much-lauded economic rhetoric of the regime. The level of current economic crisis can by gauged by a recent statement of President El-Sisi when he in a televised national address said, “if all Egyptians begin their morning by donating one pound through their mobile application for the sake of Egypt, the nations would be able to have four billion pounds a year”.61 Faced with a lot of condemnation for human right oppression and political exclusion, President El-Sisi government has a lot of stake in economic promotion and removal of the poverty by putting the economy on the track.
Egypt's economy has been struggling since the uprising of 2011 which drove foreign investors and tourists away, putting a strain on the country's foreign reserves, which have more than halved, since the uprising, to $16.4 billion - enough to cover just three months of imports. The foreign reserves have shrunken from $ 36 billion at the eve of revolution to $ 16.4 billion in September 2015 which was in 2014 29 % of what was in 2010.
The paucity of foreign reserves makes the situation further complicated when Egypt is the largest importer of food (60%). It also imports fertilizers, animal feed and fuel. Moreover 95 % the oil Egyptians use on subsidized rate is imported.62(There is merely 50% availability of the total requirement at the moment) But in July, 2015 it has cut the fuel subsidy on oil raising the price at the pump by 78 percent. A property tax was also introduced as a part of fiscal reform program seeking to clamp down on ballooning budget deficit which hit 11.5 % in 2014-2015.63 There is a problem of paying the bills in dollars for gas and oil because there is a shortage of dollars in the country and so the bank has devalued the currency.
The fall in foreign exchanges reserve is causing three percent drop in the growth of GDP and a rapid devaluation of the Egyptian pound. Foreign currency shortage can be held as the Achilles heel of the Egyptian economy. The central bank's option for defending foreign reserves and the national currency through reducing imports has negatively affected the industrial sector's ability to access necessary production inputs. Managing Director of Italcementi’s local subsidiary Suez Cement told reporters that it has not been able to repatriate funds so decided to shift the hub outside Egypt.64
The government may not wish to depreciate the value of its pounds further because it imports many staples which might create another revolution because depreciation would make import costlier. Around two-thirds of Egypt's imports are made up of raw material and intermediate and capital goods. Restraints on capital mobility and anticipated devaluations of the pound have also deterred foreign investors from investing money into the Egyptian economy. Energy sector has witnessed two third of the FDI in Egypt since 1990 and energy exports constitute 40 % of the total export which has slowed down because of the low energy price rate in the global market.65
After the revolution of 2011, Egypt has experienced a drastic fall in tourism revenues. Tourists were only 35 % in 2013 of the number before the Arab Spring. More than 14.7 million tourists visited Egypt in 2010, dropping to 9.8 million in 2011. They rose the following year to 11.5 million but shrank back to about 10 million in 201466 The Russian plane crash in the Sinai dealt a strong blow to the already embattled tourism sector in a way that would add more pressure to already thinning foreign currency earnings. Tourism is badly hit and is still far from pre-2011 level. Years of political turmoil have hit tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI), which amounted to $6.4 billion in the last fiscal year (running from July until June). The government hopes for $10 billion in FDI this year—wishful thinking, an analysts said.67 IMF reports that growth improved to 3.8 from 2.2 in 2013-14 but still remains well below the 5.5 % growth in the decades of Mubarak.68
The above chart shows the numbers of tourists in thousands visited Egypt between year 2011-15.69
While the tourism is declining in the country and so the revenue is also declining. The total tourism revenue in 2010 was US $ 8.92 billion which shrunk to US $5.9 billion in 2013 but again recovered to US 4 7.5 billion in 2014.70
What further complicates the economic situation in the country is that three-quarters of Egypt’s budget goes to finance public sector salary, debt, subsidy, oil imports and rest 17.7 billion to cover the expenditure on the health and education of 88 million Egyptians.71
Foreign aid to Egypt has increased thirteen-fold between 2011 and 2013 only. Immediately after the ouster of Morsi, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE pledged $ 12 billion to Egypt in the form of central bank deposits.72 With oil at $20 a barrel, Egypt’s friends in the Gulf may struggle to bail Mr. El-Sisi out forever.73 Yemen adventure, together with halved oil prices, has also had a negative effect on the capacity of Egypt's allies to maintain their generous aid schemes, which amounted to about $23 billon in the past two years.74 The government has announced new loans worth $1.5 billion from the African Development Bank and the World Bank, and in negotiation for a separate $3 billion loan. Egypt expects a flow of more dollar by selling land to Egyptians living abroad, which might bring the total of $2.5 billion.75
The country faced $ 368 billion trade deficit last year in 2015.76 There is the talk of curbing imports and asking expatriates to deposit dollars immediately in the banks of Egypt. Because of the fiscal devaluation threat, the investors have been reluctant to put their money in state-owned banks in Egypt. Demand for dollars is rising, though the bill for oil has come down but other import bills are very high. Oil import bill in 2015 was 12.3 billion while the country spent $ 48.5 billion on other imports but the export was still $ 22 Billion only. 77
This vicious economic crisis has caused mushrooming of food prices, ballooning unemployment and a shortage of fuel and cooking gas what Professor Jalal Amin of Cairo University, a renowned political economist has termed it as the worst economic crisis since the 1930s.78 According to figures supplied by the Egyptian government, currently 25.2% of Egyptians are living below the poverty line and 23.7% hovering just above it. Youth unemployment increased from 23.7 % in 2013 to 29 % in 2014, 36.4 % amongst higher educated class in comparison to 14.7 % among lower educated class.79 Poverty rate also grew from 25.2 in 2013 to 26.3 in 2014. All this is happening when fifty percent of the population is below twenty five.
Moreover, the current regime failed to do anything on the human development front as the country is at 141st position out of total 144 nations in education standard indexing.80 Half of the population is under the age of twenty five, national economy needs to generate around 600000 jobs annually.
Economicly, President El-Sisi so far has opted for a grand project which was reflected in a plan for a new city far out in the desert and a branch of the Suez Canal. The country is running in huge budget and current-account deficits.
Much hyped parallel Suez Canal was opened in August 2015 and it was called a gift to the world. It is reported that it would increase the present volume of revenue of $ 5.3 billion to 13.2 billion by 2023. 81The Suez revenue stagnated because of the slowing Chinese economy and more over European market is also in a poor shape which is the biggest market for non-petrolium Egyptian exports, largely constituted by cotton fabric. In addition the optimum slowdown in Eurozone, Egypt’s main trading partner, is not good news for Egypt. The weak Euro will discourage FDI in Egypt because of the high cost of the investment and danger of not receiving the desirable return in future. Devaluation and inflation both discourages the integration with rest of the global economy. It causes uncertainly about then future prices, interest rate and exchange rate and this increases the risk among the potential investors. When devaluation makes nominal values uncertain, investment planning becomes difficult.
The Egyptian exports have also dwindled by 18.3 % despite the reduction by one-third in the price of pounds since 2011. Less trade in Europe adversely impacted the revenue earning from Suez Canal which, dropped from 5.46 billion (2014) to 5.2 in 2015.82
However the discovery of a vast gas field off the Egyptian coast, Zohr by ENI, an Italian oil firm has given some hope for future economic stability in Egypt. According to some estimates, the field could turn Egypt from an importer of gas to an exporter by 2020 but it is too farfetched a position to conclude anything. The biggest challenge for the government in Egypt would be to make it operational. The government has not yet established the detailed costing of the project and government is still grappling with who will bear investment cost. Moreover no foreign investment would be easy in given the current situation because investor are weary of the turmoil in the country for last five years.
In March 2015 Egypt hosted a donor conference in Sharma-el-Sheikh. It was at the behest of late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia who had called for a donor conference after the election of El-Sisi in June 2014. Realizing that donor conference would not bring much, it was later shifted it to Economic development conference after the GCC supported the coup.83 In this conference in March 2015, these three GCC countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) pledged another $ 12.5 billion in investment and other central bank deposits. In addition, they pledged $ 35 billion to Egypt in Aid in the form of oil shipment, cash grant, and the central bank deposits. This money has been instrumental in keeping the national economy of Egypt float.84 The conference was expected to collect $ 60 Billion for the investment but again failed to achieve the desired result. In addition to Sharma-el-Sheikh, another conference, ‘Egyptian international Economic Conference’ was held in October, 2015 in the Mediterranean town of Marsa Matrouh in northwest of Egypt to attract the foreign investment, particularly from the WANA region. This conference was mainly intended to woo the Arab investors to invest in staggering industrial and tourist projects in the country.85 This conference was preceded by the visit of governor of Marsa Matrouh to UAE when both sides signed a deal worth US $ 12 billion to establish ten investment projects in the governorate of Marsa Matrouh only.
There are indications that the year 2016 will be a difficult year for the Egyptian economy and it is already evident. Low oil prices will undermine the ability of Gulf Arab states to back Egypt financially, and weak global conditions are likely to narrow the prospects for exports, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and Suez Canal earnings growth. Indeed, the donation transfers (mostly from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait), which peaked in 2013-14 at the tune of US $ 11.9 billion fell considerably to just US $2.7 billion in the following year as the Gulf region began to grapple with the constraint of low hydrocarbons revenue. Equally important, Egypt's government will be aware that the oil price collapse could reverse the growth in capital flows from the Gulf Arab states, whose FDI to the country has more than doubled to around US$2.6 billion in the fiscal years of 2014-15.86
In 2015, there was an indication of the budget deficit by the margin of 5.7 % of the total GDP. Total revenue also declined while expenditure increased by 9.7 %.87According to WB report, Egypt's economic growth was expected to be 3.8 % annually in 2015-16 from 4.2 in 2013-2014 but the World Bank has recast it to be further dip by 0.7 %. The same report entitled “Global Economic Prospects: Spillovers amid Weak Growth” suggests that Egyptian tourism sector would weaken further following the downing of a Russian plane in October88.
In last two years since army has taken over the reign of power, President El-Sisi has focused more on private foreign investment and meanwhile has resorted to mega state-driven project like Suez Canal project and new Cairo project. The government decided in March 2015 to develop a new Cairo town as a new administrative capital to the east of present capital city of Cairo at the cost of US $ 45 billion. The project is to be funded by the UAE businessmen along with substantial amount to be funneled by the Egyptian government itself. Seven-year timetable has been fixed to complete the project but the past projects in Egypt have failed miserably like the project of New Cairo suburb failed to provide housing to millions as promised. There are other projects which are to be initiated in Egypt like Aguiba and Rommel Beach with price tags estimated at US$ 3 billion and 4 billion respectively. The latter is said to be the largest dancing fountain in the region after it gets completed.89 But IMF says that records of financing huge project in Egypt have not been good and it further claims that it can create jobs if assessed realistically when the public debt is already very high.
But this magnitude of the economic hardship does not seem to affect the perks of the armed forces. In a recent decree, President El-Sisi ordered the increase of 250 percent in the pension of the retired army officers showing another sign of deep economic interest of the army in propping up itself at the helm of the affairs. Another decree of December 2015 authorized the Ministry of Interior, Intelligence, and Defense to create private security companies.90 This will further militarize the economy of the country which is already alleged to control the forty percent of the national economy.91
Several retired general and senior official have been handed over the power of municipalities, appointed the governors in different governorates and have also been appointed a manager of large estate sector companies that indicates the level of army’s stake in national economy. This is happening when the corruption in the security establishment has been estimated to be $ 75 billion in the span of just two years92.
Conclusion:
Today’s Egypt has become another theater of war on terror and people’s urge for democracy and freedom has suffered large-scale collateral damage with no hope of an early end. In the name of combating terrorism and extremism, the current regime has appropriated all powers to crush political dispensations and not allowing any political space for minimum political engagement or negotiations. State itself seem to have bent upon polarizing the society by othering the Islamists which has remained indissoluble part of political discourse in the country. What is being witnessed at the moment in the political domain of the country is binary simplification of society into the Islamist and non-Islamist evocating the President Bush’s chorus ”Either with us or with them”
The entire sprit of the democratic urge of the Arab uprising has been subdued and all streams of political debates have been securitized. The media outlets have been stacked with pro-regime mouthpiece where one rarely comes across another version of what is happening in the political spheres. The existing situations in the other parts of the Arab world like in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen have largely contributed to the disenchantment of the common people. The common masses seem to have satisfied themselves with a delusion that army at least rescued the country from being replica of Syria or Libya and this sentiment has been exploited elegantly by the army.
As far as the future story of MBH is concerned in Egypt, it has seen many ups and down after its creation in 1928. There is nothing new to what is happening with MBH in the current political. The MBH has always remained an indispensible force in the national politics and almost every regime has used it for its political survival. It was Colonel Nasser who crushed it in 1950s and 60s projecting it as the biggest threat to the emerging socialist ideology. Later President Sadat used the same MBH to counter the remnant of Nasserites ideology to crush his political opponents. Similarly, for Mubarak it was a political asset to sustain himself in power by highlighting its radical ideology and telling the West that any democratic space in the country would bring the Islamists to the fore troubling the existing political order of the region. Same is happening today with the MBH when the same discourse has emerged in the country that MBH is the source of destitution in the country and they are the threat to the national unity and social harmony. But at the same time, another component of the Islamist in the form of the Salafist, seemingly more radical group, has been embraced by the same regime to earn an image that regime is not anti-Islamist and meanwhile to use it sporadically as political tool to crush the bigger enemy, MBH.
MBH has always been a controversial entity in term of its ideological underpinning in the history of modern Egypt and large section of society has always doubted its credentials. No doubt they committed an array of blunders when they were in power as they failed to understand that votes for them was merely a maiden fulfillment of people’s democratic aspiration and not a manifestation of their love for their political Islamic ideology.
In one year of its rule, MBH was pressured by the Salafist, outmaneuvered by the entrenched military, besieged by fearful secular liberals, and mistrusted by suspicious westerners. MBH became victim of self-fulfilling prophecies and a remarkable lack of strategic and tactical ability and wisdom. At the same time, the secularist and the liberals failed to position themselves after the defeat of MBH and showed no ability to provide an alternative to the failure of the Islamists.
As long as the Muslim Brotherhood is considered a danger to Egypt’s security, many Egyptians will see the military as the only force to rescue them. In turn, El-Sisi will be seen as the only leader to keep the country from spiraling into a civil war. It won’t be surprising if El-Sisi’s continue smiling at Egyptians for a while to come. But a democratic future in Egypt seems to remain far off.
The biggest challenge for the present regime is to improve the economic lot of the people. People can sacrifice their political desire and make certain compromise if they are assured of better economic future. In case of the economic failure, current regime may have to face tough times which would obviously lead to conflict in the social sphere.
What is needed at the moment is to create not the political groups but a network of pressure groups which would be operating in the different domains away from the mainstream politics. Their political input would revolve around socio-economic arena which would highlight social and economic index of the present regime like education, health, employment, corruption, non-performance of the government and these common issues might bring all factions together.
***
* The Author is a Research Fellow at Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are that of the Researcher and not of the Council
Endnotes:
1Human Right Watch https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/08/egypt-condemn-justice-ministers-hate-speech
2 Nermin Allam, Activism amidst Disappointment , Seminar, March 2016
3 In its original sense the concept of deep sate used in context of Turkey political system to describe the group of anti-democratic coalition embedded within it. The notion assumes the existence an influential group from military, intelligence, judiciary, and businessman who run the state from the behind.
4 Samuel Tadros.” Egypt ‘s Election: Why the Islamist Won” World Affairs (March-April, 20012). http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/egypt%E2%80%99s-elections-why-islamists-won
5 Mustafa Bakri. Al-Jaish—wal-Ikhwan: Asrar-khalf-al-Sataar( Cairo:Aldarul-Misrioyah-al-Lubnaniyah,2012), P.102
6 A document prepared by the deputy of Wafd Party, Ali Al-Silmi which called for creation of an (Sa, civic sate excluding the influence of religious groups like MBH and AlAzhar- in the country.
7 Asef Bayat. “Egypt and the Post-Islamist Middle East”, Open Democracy, February 8, 2011. http://www.opendemocracy.net/asef-bayat/egypt-and-post-islamist-middle-east
8 Mustafa Bakri. Al-Jaish—wal-Ikhwan: Asrar-khalf-al-Sataar( Cairo:Aldarul-Misrioyah-al-Lubnaniyah,2012)p.411
9 Charles Villa Vicencio, Erik Doxtader and Ebrahim Moosa (ed.) The African renaissance and the Afro-Arab Spring: A Season of Rebirth,( Washington: Georgetown press University, 2015), p. no 89
10 Hani Shukrullah. “The Decline and Fall of Muslim Brotherhood”, Ahram Online , December 6 , 2012 http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/59933.aspx
11 Egypt fears Ikhwanization of Military , Asharq al-Awsat http://english.aawsat.com/2013/03/article55296303/egypt-fears-ikhwanization-of-military
12 Mustafa Bakri.p.424
13 Mustafa Bakri. Al-Jaish—wal-Ikhwan: Asrar-khalf-al-Sataar( Cairo:Aldarul-Misrioyah-al-Lubnaniyah,2012),p.425
14 Ministry of Finance of Egypt http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/government-budget-value
15 Charles Villa Vicencio, Erik Doxtader and Ebrahim Moosa (ed.) The African renaissance and the Afro-Arab Spring: A Season of Rebirth,( Washington: Georgetown press University, 2015), p. no 96
16 Huge Roberts. “The Revolution that was not” London Review of Book. Issue September 12, 2013, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n17/hugh-roberts/the-revolution-that-wasnt Accessed on October 29, 2013
17 Talmiz Ahmad , The Islamist challenge in West Asia : Doctrinal and Political competition after the Arab Spring( New Delhi: IDSA/ Pentagon press, 2013) p. 120
18 Dr.Kama Habib. “Al-Islamiyyun wal-Anf Baad 30 Unuu”Al-Demoqeratiya,issue.no.52,(October,2013), pp.116-119
19 Emad Mekay Exclusive US Bankrolled Anti-Morsi Activities
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article35502.htm
20 Samira Shackle, Did the Gulf Kingdoms Engineer Morsi’s Demise? Middle East Monitor, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/5/articles-2/204
21 Charles Villa Vicencio, Erik Doxtader and Ebrahim Moosa (ed.) The African renaissance and the Afro-Arab Spring: A Season of Rebirth,( Washington: Georgetown press University, 2015), p. no 87
22 Almisr-al-Yum’ Cairo, October 11 , 2013
23 Rozina Ali, Democracy versus Security Cairo Review of Global Affairs, August 20, 2013 http://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/democracy-versus-security/
24 Ebrahim Moosa 88
25 Alastair Beach, Show Down in Cairo Independent , July 24, 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/showdown-in-cairo-egyptian-general-demands-permission-to-take-on-the-terrorists-8729903.html
26 Ebrahim Moosa
27 Human Right Watch,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law
28 Human Right Watch,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law
29 European Parliamentary Delegation criticizes the Law of Protest in Egypt, alarabi al jadeed
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2016/2/7/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1?utm_campaign=magnet&utm_source=article_page&utm_medium=related_articles
30 Mada Masr, Cairo Media ,http://www.madamasr.com/news/sisi-criminalizes-failure-report-information-possession-explosives
31 Malik Wanoos, Misr Daulatun Boliciyatun Egypt A Police State alarabi al jadeed
32 Report of International Committee for the Protection of the Right of the Journalist: 2015 was the Worst year for the reporters of Chinn and Egypt. alarabi al jadeed
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/medianews/2015/12/15/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-2015?utm_campaign=magnet&utm_source=article_page&utm_medium=related_articles
33 Egyptian Government: Did the Freedom of Press Go Away. alarabi al jadeed
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/medianews/2016/1/1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1?utm_campaign=magnet&utm_source=article_page&utm_medium=related_articles
34 Sayeed Abdul Raheem, Misr: Qamoo-Hurriyat-al-Tabeer Bi-Ghetain-Qanooni Egypt: Oppression of Freedom of Expression under Legal Cap alarabi al jadeed
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/medianews/2016/1/24/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%82%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A?utm_campaign=magnet&utm_source=article_page&utm_medium=related_articles
35 Human Right and Freedom organization of Egypt: Two years of Crimes , June, 2015
36 Muhammad Mansour, Decay of the Dictatorship: What the Arab Spring Will Survive, Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2016 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-02-02/decay-dictatorships
37 Moan Eltahavy, Egypt’s Vanishing Youth ,New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/opinion/egypts-vanishing-youth.html?_r=0
38 Arwi Abul Yazeed, UN demands an Inquiry into the Torture in the Aqrab prison of Egypt. alarabi al jadeed, March 2, 2015
39 Mahmood Hasunah, Alwatan, http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/746597 accessed on March 01, 2015
40 Mada Masr, Cairo Media http://www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/do-sisis-new-laws-give-prison-administrators-greater-powers
41 Mada Masr, Cairo Media ,http://www.madamasr.com/news/sisi-criminalizes-failure-report-information-possession-explosives
42Malik Wanoos, Misr Daulatun Boliciyatun Egypt A Police State alarabi al jadeed
43 Shahid Hamid , A Future Worse Than Mubarak , Brooking Institute http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/08/14-democratic-transition-egypt-hamid
44 Mada Misr, January 31, 2015 http://www.madamasr.com/news/hamas-affiliated-qassam-brigades-declared-terrorist-group
45 Amir Shammakh, Our Terrorist organization, Freedom and Justice Gate , March 2, 2016
http://www.fj-p.com/ByVisitorPen_Details.aspx?ID=3624
46 Mada Misr, June 21 , 2015 http://www.madamasr.com/news/minya-court-sentences-over-100-defendants-death
47 Equal Time, March 26, 2014 http://www.equaltimes.org/egypt-human-rights-groups-rally#.VueWU3197IV
48 Aljazeera, April 28, 2014 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/egypt-court-sentences-683-people-death-201442873249787688.html
49 Atlantic Council, El-Sisi Gives His First Ever interview to TV http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/top-news-abdel-fattah-al-El-Sisi-gives-first-ever-tv-interview
50 Ahramonline, December 20, 2015 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/164/173985/Egypt/Egypt-Elections-/Sisi-to-issue-three-decrees-before-Egypts-new-%E2%80%8Epar.aspx
51Former Egyptian General Sees His Bloc Leading New Parliament Reuter http://in.reuters.com/article/egypt-election-elyazal-idINKCN0S20YA20151008
52 Former Egyptian General Sees His Bloc Leading New Parliament Reuter http://in.reuters.com/article/egypt-election-elyazal-idINKCN0S20YA20151008
53 Ahram Online http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/164/161593/Egypt/Egypt-Elections-/For-the-Love-of-Egypt-only-alliance-to-secure-list.aspx
54 Khalil-al-Anani, Fi-Tafseer-al-Ajz-al-Jamaee Fi-Misr alarabi al jadeed
http://www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/2016/2/29/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AC%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1 accessed on March 01, 2015
55 Freedom and Justice Gate http://www.fj-p.com/Our_news_Details.aspx?News_ID=83993
56Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy http://timep.org/esw/
57 Nancy Okail and Alison McManus, Egypt’s strategy for New Terrorism, Foreign Affairs , July 21 , 2015 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2015-07-21/egypts-old-strategy-new-terrorism
58 Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy http://timep.org/esw/
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60 http://timep.org/esw/profiles/terror-groups/ansar-al-jihad/
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62 Isabel Sterman , MADA Masr Dollar Shortage are Hitting Egyptians from All walks of LOIfe http://www.madamasr.com/sections/economy/dollar-shortages-are-hitting-egyptians-all-walks-life
63 World Bank revises Down Egypt’ Predicted 2016 Growth Rate, Ahramonline http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/180351/Business/Economy/World-Bank-cuts-Egypts-predicted--growth-rate.aspx
64 Isabel Sterman , MADA Masr Dollar Shortage are Hitting Egyptians from All walks of LOIfe http://www.madamasr.com/sections/economy/dollar-shortages-are-hitting-egyptians-all-walks-life
65 Aljazeera, December 10, 2015 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/analysis-egypt-economy-entered-vicious-circle-151203112708562.html
66 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-tourism-minister-idUSKBN0MB0EX20150315
67 The Economist, Dwindling Dollars http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21676836-facing-shortage-foreign-exchange-egypt-allows-its-currency-fall-dwindling
68 IMF Country report, February 15, 2015 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr1533.pdf
69 Trading economics, //www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/tourist-arrivals
70 Ministry of Tourism of Egypt http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt/tourism-revenues
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74 Aljazeera, December 10, 2015 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/analysis-egypt-economy-entered-vicious-circle-151203112708562.html
75 The Economist, Dwindling Dollars http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21676836-facing-shortage-foreign-exchange-egypt-allows-its-currency-fall-dwindling
76 Isabel Sterman , MADA Masr Dollar Shortage are Hitting Egyptians from All walks of LOIfe http://www.madamasr.com/sections/economy/dollar-shortages-are-hitting-egyptians-all-walks-life
77 The Economist, Dwindling Dollars http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21676836-facing-shortage-foreign-exchange-egypt-allows-its-currency-fall-dwindling
78 The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/16/egypt-worst-economic-crisis-1930s
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87 One Year On: The Economy Under Sisi , Atlantic Council, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/one-year-on-the-economy-under-sisi
88 Global Economic Prospect, World Bank Group Flagship report, January 2016 https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2016a/Global-Economic-Prospects-January-2016-Spillovers-amid-weak-growth.pdf
89 The National Daily, November 10, 2015 http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/wave-of-pledges-for-egypt-port
90 Legislation Tracker, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy http://timep.org/legislationcatalog/
91 Dahil Kholafi, The Egyptian Army’s Economic Juggernaut, Aljazeera http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/20138435433181894.html
92 Muhammad Mansour, Decay of the Dictatorship: What the Arab Spring Will Survive, Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2016 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-02-02/decay-dictatorships