On 16 September 2021, the European Union (EU) released its final Indo-Pacific Strategy document titled ‘The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ with “intent to increase its engagement with the region”.[1] The initial plan for the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy was adopted by the members in April this year, when the European Council had laid down the deadline of September 2021 for a full-fledged Indo-Pacific Strategy. The strategy recognises growing importance of the region and “EU’s commitment to reinforcing cooperation with partners in the region, reiterating its major stakes in the Indo-Pacific”.[2] Europe had so far not figured prominently in the debates around the Indo-Pacific; however, European countries have recently been thinking strategically on the Indo-Pacific construct, as the world strives to embrace the transforming geo-political realities in the region.
EU’s Recent Pivot to the Indo-Pacific
The pivot of EU to the region is an acknowledgement that the strategic and economic interests of Europe are intrinsically linked to the Indo-Pacific. Prior to the EU’s strategy, France, Germany and the Netherlands have announced their policy documents outlining their Indo-Pacific approaches. The French strategy for Indo-Pacific 2019 stressed that “security of the Indo-Pacific is a strategic challenge”.[3] German Foreign Minister Heiko Mass, while announcing the German Government’s policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific, said that the “shape of international order will be decided” in this region[4] and that “Germany is working with the EU partners particularly France, for a European Indo-Pacific strategy”.[5] The Netherlands another EU member to release a new policy document after France and Germany, outlining strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, which significantly emphasises that “the EU must speak out more often and more firmly on developments in the South China Sea, which are in violation of the UNCLOS”.[6]
Europe, although geographically not a part of the Indo-Pacific region, a large chunk of Europe-Asia trade passes through the critical chokepoints located in the region. Any threat to the vital sea lanes and bottlenecks, and any conflict in the region, challenging the flow of energy and commerce, will have a direct impact on Europe’s prosperity and security”.[7] Given these stakes, European countries have begun to recognise that EU is a key stakeholder in the security of the Indo-Pacific.
Major Takeaways of the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
While announcing the strategy at the press conference on 16 September 2021, Josep Borrell High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said that Indo-Pacific is where the ‘world’s centre of gravity is moving both in geo-economic and geo-political terms’.[8] The EU’s strategy aims for cooperation in ensuring ‘open and rules-based regional order’ based on cooperation, not confrontation.[9] The motto of the strategy is “cooperate whenever possible and protect our values and interest”.
The strategy defines Indo-Pacific as “a vast region spanning from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific Island States”, which is strategically significant for Europe. Focusing on key challenges like the pandemic, climate change and security, it mentions seven priority areas in pursuit of the vision in a collaborative manner i.e. sustainable and inclusive prosperity with resilient and diversified value chains; green transition with clean Energy and transport, Ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, security and defence, and human security.[10]
The strategy highlights that “EU and the Indo-Pacific are natural partner region”.[11] EU has ten of its biggest trading partners located in the region and trade exchanges between the two regions are higher than any other geographical regions in the world. EU has emphasised on finalising the ongoing negotiations on trade agreements with Australia, New Zealand, and India soon. EU has also expressed keenness on “diversification” of regional partnerships beyond China[12], including with Taiwan. In addition, ensuring resilient supply chains and open, sustainable and rules based trade are among the primary focus areas.
The rise and increasing salience of the Indo-Pacific, is accompanied by the dynamic shifts in the geopolitical canvas of the region. A major challenge for the EU has been to balance its relationship with China and the US, to avoid getting caught into a zero-sum game. The EU’s 2018 China Strategic Outlook did note that China is a “systemic rival and economic competitor”.[13] The recent communiqué of the NATO 2021 Summit expressed concerns about China’s ‘lack of transparency, its assertive behaviour and use of disinformation’ that presents systemic challenges to the rules-based international order.[14] At the press conference, Josep Borrell pointed out that due to increasing tension between the US and China geopolitical competition will be sharply felt in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy highlights that geopolitical tension in the region particularly the developments in ‘South and East China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait’ may have implications for Europe’ security.
In geo-strategic terms, the strategy reiterates the EU’s willingness to engage with partners including ASEAN, India, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States, at the same time the strategy also expresses keenness to collaborate with the Quad. While launching the strategy, Josep Borrell also insisted the strategy was also open to China, to engage in areas of common interest.[15]
Infrastructure and connectivity, in all its dimensions is a major focus area in EU’s pivot to Indo-Pacific; the same is reiterated in the strategy as well. The strategy describes Japan and India as two core Indo-Pacific “Connectivity Partners”,[16] and also ASEAN. As Europe begins to realise the broader economic, political and security implications of China’s BRI, the initial enthusiasm seems to be turning into a concern about viability and transparency of Chinese projects in Europe. French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking at the EU Summit in 2019 in Brussels, had said that letting Chinese companies’ access EU infrastructures such as strategic ports had been a “strategic error”.[17] EU is, therefore, willing to collaborate with like-minded partners in the region to bridge infrastructural gaps and in a bid to provide a sustainable alternative to BRI.[18] EU released a Connecting Europe and Asia: Building Blocks for an EU Strategy in 2018 which emphasised the need for EU-Asia collaboration in promoting comprehensive, sustainable and rules based connectivity.[19] Under this, EU and Japan agreed on Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure in 2019, to coordinate actions based on a level playing field. The ‘EU-India Roadmap to 2025’ emphasises that joint efforts should be made to promote connectivity in line with ‘international norms, principles of sustainability both fiscal and environmental, transparency and inclusiveness’.[20] EU, therefore, is keen on exploring scope of such collaboration to enhance connectivity infrastructure between Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Maritime security is another priority area mentioned in the strategy. The strategy document highlights Indian Ocean as a key focus area and the need to deal with common challenges in cooperation with regional partners to secure major SLOC’S, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence in the region. The Ocean is the principal passage for Europe to and from Indo-Pacific markets. Despite geographical distance, the Ocean has significant economic and strategic value for Europe as it serves as the primary gateway for Europe to the Asia-Pacific market through the Suez Canal. The strategy reiterates need for enhanced naval deployments by EU Member States to deal with numerous non-traditional challenges and boost Indo-Pacific partners’ capacity to ensure maritime security.[21]
With the strategy, EU also reiterated its commitment to collaborate with partners in recovery from the COVID 19 pandemic which has tested the resilience of societies, economies and supply chains world over. It highlights the crucial significance of the need for collaboration in building back in a better manner to push for strengthening and diversifying relations, multilateral cooperation, resilient supply chains and medical preparedness to deal with such challenges in future.
Conclusion
The timely announcement of EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy recognises EU’s recent enhanced strategic focus and the need for a larger European role in the region. The strategy acknowledges the region as pertinent to Europe’s security and prosperity. Geopolitical changes in the Indo-Pacific will have direct and indirect implications for Europe. The strategy came just a day after the United States, United Kingdom and Australia announced a new security trilateral AUKUS on 15 September 2021. When asked about EU’s reaction to AUKUS, Josep Borrell said that “we regret not having been informed”.[22] Clearly, the dynamic equations in the region will have an impact at how Europe looks towards the Indo-Pacific and its push to enhance its role and engagement in collaboration with like-minded partners in ensuring open and rules-based order in the region.
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*Dr Pragya Pandey is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views are of the author.
Endnotes
[1] EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 19/04/2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/96741/EU%20Strategy%20for%20Cooperation%20in%20the%20Indo-Pacific
[3] France and the Security of Indo-Pacific, Minister for the Armed Forces, 2019, P. 2
[4] Foreign Minister Maas on the adoption of the German Government policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region, German Federal Foreign Office, 02.09.2020 - Press release, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-indo-pacific/2380474
[5] I.bid
[6] After France and Germany, the Netherlands pivot to the Indo-Pacific – Le diplomate, November 18, 2020, https://www.fr24news.com/a/2020/11/after-france-and-germany-the-netherlands-pivot-to-the-indo-pacific-le-diplomate.html
[7] Speech by Minister of State Annen at the reception of Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale on the occasion of the Raisina Dialogue 2020, 14.01.2020https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/annen-raisina/2292714
[8] Twitter, https://twitter.com/JosepBorrellF/status/1438533599628832777
[9] Twitter, https://twitter.com/JosepBorrellF/status/1438533599628832777
[10] https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf
[11] Ibid no.1
[12]VEERLE NOUWENS AND GARIMA MOHAN, EUROPE EYES THE INDO-PACIFIC, BUT NOW IT’S TIME TO ACT, 24 June 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/europe-eyes-the-indo-pacific-but-now-its-time-to-act/
[13] EU-China Strategic Outlook, European Commission, 12 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf, p.1
[14]Brussels Summit Communiqué, NATO, 14 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm
[15] After Australia arms deal flop, EU launches Indo-Pacific plan, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/after-australia-arms-deal-flop-eu-launch-indo-pacific-plan-2021-09-16/
[16] I.bid, no. 1, p. 12
[17][17] EU leaders call for end to 'naivety' in relations with China
Reuters, 22 March 2019, https://in.reuters.com/article/us-eu-china/eu-leaders-call-for-end-to-naivety-in-relations-with-china-idINKCN1R31H3
[18] Garima Mohan, ‘Europe in the Indo-Pacific: A Case for More Coordination with the Quad Countries’, January 14, 2020, Policy Brief, German Marshall Fund of the United States, https://www.gmfus.org/publications/europe-indo-pacific-case-more-coordination-quad-countries
[19] Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy, European Commission, 19 September 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_-_connecting_europe_and_asia_-_building_blocks_for_an_eu_strategy_2018-09-19.pdf
[20] The Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between Japan And the European Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000521432.pdf
[21] https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf
[22]Indo-Pacific: Remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President at the press conference on the Joint Communication, 16/09/2021
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/104215/indo-pacific-remarks-high-representativevice-president-press-conference-joint-communication_en