Days before the campaign for Iran’s 13th presidential election officially began in May 2021, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei clarified his earlier remarks that the next government should be ‘young and revolutionary.’ He argued that the administration should have both youth and experienced individuals but the most important condition was that they should have ‘faith and, sincere and revolutionary motivation’.[i] In the same speech, he went on to criticise those ‘who have a tendency towards Western methods and concepts’ and seek ‘transformation’ by calling on the “country and the revolution to ‘normalise’ itself – in other words become closer to international norms.” Leader’s remarks underlined that the ‘internationalist’ approach of the Rouhani administration, defined by an ‘open and engaging’ policy towards the West as a means to ‘de-radicalise’ Iran’s overall foreign policy and also some aspects of domestic policy, especially social and cultural freedoms, had not only failed but also has been delegitimised. The ‘revolutionary’ elements – many of them drawn from younger generations of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) –subscribe to an ideological view of the West as an adversary and excoriate internationalists for their failed outreach to the West. Their diplomatic engagement with the West is closer to Supreme Leader’s view that is considered ‘technical’ and limited to ensure full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and sanction relief.
Raisi Administration’s Foreign Policy Priorities
President Ebrahim Raisi, at his inauguration ceremony on August 5, argued that “all illegal US sanctions against the Iranian nation must be lifted. The new government will work to improve the economy to resolve the nation’s problems... We want to stabilise the economy and attain self-sustainability”. [ii] Raisi’s remarks on the economy resonated with the concept of ‘resistance economy’ championed by Ayatollah Khamenei. The ‘resistance economy’, instead of focussing on the West for technological and investment needs of the country, seeks to strengthen domestic capacities, while deepening of trade ties with Iran’s neighbours in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, Central and South Asia. The contours of the Raisi administration’s long-term strategic vision became further clear when Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, a career diplomat with long wide-ranging experience in Iran’s Arab neighbourhood, including deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and North Africa Affairs (2011-16), and Iran’s ambassador to Bahrain (2007), was appointed the Foreign Minister of the country. Until recently, he was Foreign Policy advisor to Parliament speaker Bagher Ghalibaf and his predecessor, Ali Larijani, who was advisor to the Supreme Leader and Iran’s Special Representative for Strategic ties with the Peoples Republic of China and played a crucial role in negotiating the 25-years comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with China.
As the parliament casted confidence votes for the cabinet nominees, Amir-Abdollahian told lawmakers that the foreign policy of Raisi government is ‘Asia-centered’ and that he ‘will not link the Foreign Ministry to Barjam (JCPOA) and will use all efforts to neutralise sanction.’[iii] Further, the appointment of Ali Bagheri-Kani, a diplomat critical of the JCPOA, as the Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs indicates the new administration’s approach towards negotiations on the JCPOA. Bagheri-Khani was deputy to Saeed Jalili, who as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2007 to 2013. The duo had pursued what they describe as ‘resistance diplomacy’, marked by an uncompromising and brinkmanship approach to negotiations with the Western negotiating partners.
About the foreign policy orientation of the Raisi government, Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian has stated that it will pursue a ‘balanced foreign policy’ that is good relations with neighbours and Asian countries “because the 21st century belongs to Asia and that we are witnessing the new emerging economic powers in Asia.”[iv] The principle of equilibrium or balance (tavazon), rooted in Iran’s geopolitical position between the West and East, is a cardinal principle of modern Iranian foreign policy dating back to 1848-51, when Qajar era prime minister Mirza Taqi Khan – better known as Amir Kabir – sought to maintain Iran’s independence in rivalry between Britain and Russia by adopting a policy of ‘impartiality (bitarafi) or non-alignment.[v] A ‘balanced foreign policy’ therefore puts premium on retaining strategic independence and manoeuvrability. Over the last decade, Iran has come to see its relations with rising powers such as China, Russia and India in systemic terms that is the shifting balance of global political economy towards Asia and the opportunities it presents to Iran. Similarly, Iran’s view of regionalism in Eurasia and its long-standing quest to join Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is seen as advancing new world order which is less dependent on the US and West.
Iran’s Long Quest for SCO Membership
Iran had applied for full membership of SCO in 2008, as part of the Ahmadinejad administration’s Look to the East Policy to counterbalance the US pressure on the nuclear issue, through institutionalising cooperation with Russia and China. However, the membership bid was rejected on the ground that SCO regulations disqualify the country under UN sanctions from the membership status. Following the signing of the JCPOA, Russia became a main supporter of the Iran’s membership, but Tehran’s strained relations with Tajikistan over Iran’s 2015 invitation to Muhiddin Kabiri, the leader of Islamic Revivalist Party of Tajikistan remained an issue. Further, China supported consolidation of the grouping over expansion following the accession of India and Pakistan in 2017. As Iran found its membership to the SCO stalled for the second time, it downgraded its representation at the 2016 and 2017 SCO summits to the Foreign Minister level.
However, Tehran’s mending of ties with Dushanbe after former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s visit in 2017, changes in the regional geopolitical environment, especially the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Beijing’s converging views with Moscow on balancing the US through expansion of regional cooperation, have paved the ground for the approval of Iran’s membership in the Eurasian grouping. Also, Iran has been opposed to the spread of Sunni Jihadist movements in Central Asia. Thus, it shares SCO’s focus on cooperation against extremism and terrorism in the region. It is noteworthy that despite the security-oriented focus of the SCO, some in the government are looking at Iran’s membership in SCO through geoeconomic lens, which is closer to China’s view of the future development of the grouping. Mohsen Rezaei, Vice President for Economic Affairs, argued that Iran’s membership will be ‘an important step to turn Iran into an economic corridor between East and West and North and South Eurasia’.[vi]
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm in Tehran, Iran’s accession to the SCO should take two years from the approval of the membership, if the previous round of expansion completed in 2017 is any guide. In the meantime, the new administration’s focus will be on resuming the JCPOA talks. The recent last minute agreement between the new chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Oranisation and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to avert an anti-Iran resolution in the board of governors meeting, indicates that Raisi’s team does not want jeopardize the talks before they have even resumed.[vii]
*****
*Dr. Deepika Saraswat is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views are of the author.
Endnotes
[i] “Only those believe in the people and youth and who pursue justice should hold executive power, Khamenei.ir, 11 May, 2021, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/8493/Only-those-who-believe-in-the-people-and-youth-and-who-pursue
[ii] “Raisi in his inauguration speech; hands extended to neighbours, strike oppression everywhere,” Shafaq News, 5 August, 2021, https://shafaq.com/en/World/Raisi-in-his-inauguration-speech-hands-extended-to-neighbors-striking-oppression-everywhere
[iii] Amir Abdollahian: I will use my efforts to make sanctions ineffective, Iran News, 23 August, 2021, https://irannewsdaily.com/2021/08/amir-abdollahian-i-will-use-all-my-effort-to-make-sanctions-ineffective/
[iv] Ibid.
[v] R.K. Ramazani, “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations,” Middle East Journal, Vol.23, No.2, 1989, pp-202-217.
[vi] “Iranian officials hail importance to obtain permanent membership in SCO”, Xinhuanet, 19 September, 2021, http://www.news.cn/english/2021-09/19/c_1310198050.htm
[vii] “New memory cards, but no access to footage: Iran’s deal with the UN atomic agency,” Hindustan Times, 12 September, 2021, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/new-memory-cards-but-no-access-to-footage-iran-s-deal-with-un-atomic-agency-101631457466578.html