Introduction
After a decade of political impasse and diplomatic and strategic confrontation between Turkey on one hand and Egypt-UAE-Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Quartet on the other, winds of normalisation have started blowing across the region. A dawn of diplomatic recalibration seems to have set in where regional dialogue and diplomatic negotiations are making a comeback. Over the months these attempts have moved beyond formal statements to visits and meetings among the regional leaders and senior officials. Despite these perceptible changes, one however needs to see if these trends are long lasting because the geopolitics in the region has been very transitory in nature since the outbreak of the Arab uprisings.
During the first decade of Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s rule (2002-2010) in Turkey under Recep Taayip Erdogan, then Prime Minister of Turkey, Arab world had become the focal point of Turkish foreign policy both formally and informally[i] which was long neglected due to Turkey’s westward pursuit. But with the outbreak of the Arab uprising in 2011 and subsequent Turkey’s support to the revolutionaries and its embrace of the Islamist forces, the warmth in the relationship with the Arab world not only waned but an era of ideological confrontation and strategic conflict followed.
The Gulf monarchs and the status quoist rulers of the Arab Republics conceived the Arab uprising as a threat to their rule. Turkey not only exhorted the revolutionary trends through its Islamist ideology but intended to shape the course of the revolutions as well. Turkey’s long-cherished philosophy of “Zero problem with the Neighbors” [ii] was replaced with overt ideological support to the rebel forces and later military intervention which continued to expand and deepen as the revolution proceeded.
But after a decade of diplomatic impasse, Turkey once again seems to be pursuing the path of diplomatic recalibrations and strategic rapprochement for various economic and strategic reasons. But one needs to see if these initiatives would lead to any long-lasting relationship and the Arab leaders would reciprocate equally to the “conciliatory” gestures exhibited by Turkey.
Decade of Souring Ties between Turkey and the Arab World
As the Arab uprising started in 2011, Turkey was the first country in the region to exhort the revolution in pursuit of projecting itself as a role model for those countries which had the dream of establishing a new polity in the Arab world. Turkey’s support to the revolution was vividly informed by its Islamist orientation.[iii] Turkey’s vision was that any democratic opening in the region would bring, like its own Islamic oriented ‘Justice and Development Party’ (AKP) in Turkey, Islamist forces to power because they would be the natural choice of the people in absence of any other opposition forces.[iv]
Turkey’s support of Islamism, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood (MBH) clubbed it together with Qatar in an ideological confrontation against a rival coalition consisting of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt[v] which always conceived the Islam as a political force as a threat to their regimes. They denounced anyone who supported the Islamists in the region and hence Turkey was in the line of their fire. Turkey was the first country to call for the removal of President Assad in Syria which was a departure from its foreign policy dictum, “Zero problems with the Neighbors”. Soon Turkey moved away from its policy of mediation and non-interference to the policy of direct military intervention and partisanship and many of the past components of its foreign policy were abandoned.
The relationship with Egypt too worsened when Turkey expressed solidarity with the ousted MBH-led government in 2013 and Erdogan described the removal of President Morsi as a coup.[vi] Many of the MBH fugitives’ members took shelter in Turkey after the coup and even today many self-exiled MBH members are running anti-regime satellite channels in Turkey. Further the dispute over the gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean created another rift between two sides where Egypt and Turkey are in opposite camps. Turkey has repeatedly tried to use its presence in Libya to put itself in better position in the gas dispute.[vii] According to Christian Brackel, an expert on Turkey’s global affairs, the conflict between Turkey and Egypt is directly linked to Turkey’s presence in Libya which is a security concern for Egypt. The creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum in January 2019[viii] with Egypt as its headquarters and with the absence of Turkey further deepened the conflict.
What further added a new gambit to the souring Arab-Turkey ties was Turkey’s support to Qatar when Quartet comprising Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade against Qatar in June 2017 for its alleged support to Islamist forces and other anti-GCC activities in the region. Then Qatar-Turkey relationship was so strong that Qatar refused to endorse an Arab League condemnation of Turkish military operation in Syria and Iraq.[ix] Amidst this crisis, murder of a dissident Saudi columnist, Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in Turkey in November 2018 brought Turkey and Saudi Arabia; two big powers in the region, to an open confrontation after President Erdogan said that the order for his killing had come from the highest office in Saudi Arabia.[x] The relationship further worsened when President Erdogan in a statement in October 2020 accused some of the Gulf countries of destabilising the region. In retaliation, Saudi Arabia called for a boycott of everything belonging to Turkey, be it products, investment or tourism.[xi] Saudi Arabia also decided to shut down many of the schools run by Turkish government in Saudi Arabia.
The strategic and military involvement of Turkey in Libya not only ruined the relations with the Arab world but transformed the rift into a major ideological conflict and positioned Turkey as an arch enemy of Egypt along with Saudi Arabia and UAE who were close allies of anti-Islamsit Colonel Haftar while Turkey was in alliance with anti-Haftar Islamist forces. Later the signing of maritime agreements[xii] between Turkey and the UN-recognised Government of National Accord in Libya, an anti-Haftar entity, dragged Egypt and Turkey into another set of rivalry where Egypt allied with other rivals of Turkey for over gas exploration deal in Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Turkey-Arab relations soured to a level when in a rare statement, President El-Sisi of Egypt said that, “Turkey being a non-Arab country, has no right to intervene in the Arab affairs”.[xiii] With the decline of old traditional powers such as Iraq, Syria and Egypt and the subsequent rise of UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, a new era of rivalry between Arab world and Turkey set in. Arabs seem to be apprehensive of the rising hegemony of Turkey as UAE once accused Turkey of reviving the old ‘Ottoman Empire.’[xiv] Moreover, Turkey’s military presence in Iraq, its growing military bases in the continent of Africa and other strategic initiatives in recent years have also alienated it from the Arabs.
A New Era of Reconciliation and Rapprochement
Over the months, Turkey’s foreign policy in the region has moved away from a security and ideology-centric approach to a trade and diplomacy-centric perspective after a decade of ideological and political confrontation. Turkey now seems to have preferred the path of diplomacy and negotiation to mend its strained ties with its Arab neighbours.
Since the beginning of the “rapprochement” drive on the part of Turkey, the dictum of ‘Zero problem with the Neighbors’ which seemingly lost its appeal, has been replaced with the philosophy of ‘Creation of a trouble-free Circle around Turkey’[xv] and normalising the diplomatic ties with regional countries have become one of its major foreign policy agendas. In June 2021, the spokesperson of the Turkish presidency in a press conference said that Turkey was keen to improve ties with all the Arab nations for bringing stability and peace in the region.[xvi] Amongst all the countries in the region, Turkey is trying to mend its relationship; the pace of normalisation with the UAE appears to be surprisingly very swift which was well evident in the high-level visit of Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Zayed al-Nahyan to Turkey in December 2021. Turkey would be the biggest beneficiary of the visit as the UAE announced to establish a special fund worth the US $ 10 billion[xvii] to help Turkey’s economy which is ‘apparently’ witnessing its worst phase in the last two decades. According to the official Emirates News Agency, UAE will focus on strategic investments, especially in the logistical sectors, including energy, health and food. During the visit, both sides signed ten agreements and memorandum of security, economic and technological cooperation.[xviii] After the visit of Crown Prince, President Erdogan said that Turkey intends to begin a “new chapter” of its relationship with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel after the UAE.[xix] While the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusuglu said, “a positive atmosphere is hanging over Turkish-Emirates relationship in recent times”.[xx] The visit of UAE’s Crown Prince was preceded by the visit of UAE’s National Security Advisor Tahnoun bin Zayed to Turkey in August, 2021.[xxi]
The Crown Prince’s visit was the first high-level visit in a decade as both sides during the Arab uprising were involved as foes both diplomatically and strategically in many of the regional conflicts. President Erdogan is also expected to make an exchange visit to UAE in February. In another apparent sign of diplomatic makeover in the region, officials from Energy Ministries from both Turkey and Qatar attended a three-day Gastech conference hosted by UAE in September 2021.[xxii] As a gesture of friendship, UAE also banned the release of fortnightly video from its soil by one of Erdogan’s defectors, Sadat Bekir, highlighting the economic and political scandals involving President Erdogan and his family members.[xxiii]
After the diplomatic fiasco between Turkey and Saudi Arabia following the killing of dissident Saudi columnist Jamal Khashoggi in November 2018, a high-level visit took place between the two countries for the first time when Turkey’s Foreign Minister visited Saudi Arabia in May 2021 and held consultations with his Saudi counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan who described the meeting very fruitful.[xxiv]
In November 2021, the Trade Minister of Saudi Arabia Majid Al-Qasabi paid an official visit to Turkey and met Mr. Fuad Aktay, advisor to President Erdogan and discussed mechanisms to strengthen the trade relations between the two countries.[xxv] One of the major objectives of the visit was to enhance the trade volume between the two countries that had declined substantially due to the boycott of Turkish products in Saudi Arabia. President Erdogan in an interview with TRT, A Turkish News Agency on December 1, said that Turkey would “wish to take relations with Saudi Arabia to the highest level”.[xxvi]
President Erdogan also told the media persons on January 3, 2022 that he would visit Saudi Arabia in February, 2022 at the invitation of King Suleiman and would discuss the suspension of the undeclared boycott of the Turkish imports to the country. There are reports that Saudi Arabia is keen to purchase the Turkish military drones, ‘Bayraktar’. [xxvii]The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is likely to benefit Turkey economically as Saudi Arabia is the third largest spender on military and Turkey is an emerging vibrant military industry. [xxviii]As a gesture of friendship, the Turkish judiciary has recently acquitted twenty Saudi citizens; accused of involvement in the killing of Mr. Khashoggi and the spokesperson of the Turkish Presidency, Ibrahim Kalin said that his country respects the Saudi rulings in the case of Khashoggi.[xxix]
Unlike the “speedy normalisation” of the relationship with the two GCC nations, the pace of normalisation with Egypt is “very slow”. The poor relationship between the two is marked by deep ideological and political differences which are much more complicated and its template is wider and deeper. The rapprochement process between Egypt and Turkey seems to be tedious because of maritime dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s overt military engagement in Libya- a bordering country with Egypt and the hosting of several MBH fugitives by Turkey.[xxx] Though the dialogue between the two is on but its pace is as slow as Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusuglu himself in an interview on October 29 2021 said that, “negotiation is on but no decision has been taken yet on the exchange of ambassadors”. [xxxi]
In September, 2021 Turkey Deputy Foreign Minister Sadat Olon visited Cairo in May 2021 which was later reciprocated by his Egyptian counterpart Hamdi Snad in September and both sides discussed a series of bilateral issues.[xxxii] Sadat Olon, welcoming his Egyptian counterpart said that there is no lasting friendship or enmity in international relations.[xxxiii] He also hinted that Turkey might sign a similar maritime deal with Egypt as it did with Libya in 2019. This mutual visit was the first official visit since 2013 when Erdogan had condemned the removal of Morsi in a civilian coup. In last November only, President Erdogan reportedly remarked that very soon the relationship between two countries would be upgraded to the ambassadorial level.[xxxiv]
Something similar is being witnessed in Turkey’s relations with Bahrain. The King of Bahrain, while welcoming new Turkey’s ambassador in September 2021 said that “the relations with Turkey have reached an advanced level and the cooperation is witnessing growth and development”.[xxxv] In November 2021, the Foreign Ministers of both countries met in Ankara and discussed the mechanism for enhancing cooperation, particularly in the field of trade and commerce.[xxxvi] On the sidelines of the meeting, Turkey’s Foreign Minister said that Turkey is keen to improve ties with all the Gulf countries. Bahrain also pledged to expedite the visa process for Turkish citizens. [xxxvii]
In addition, there is a deflation noticeable in anti-GCC rhetoric or pro-Islamist propaganda in the Turkish national media. A certain ‘apathy ’ of Turkey towards the Hamas is also noticeable in national media and many of the pro-Islamist satellite TV channels run by MBH in Turkey have gone off the air in recent months.[xxxviii]
Among all the countries with which Turkey has begun to mend its diplomatic ties, Syria holds an exception. President Erdogan has shown no inclination towards reordering its relationship with Syria. Turkey’s reluctance can be explained in the light of President Assad’s incessant support to Kurdish forces, an anathema for Turkey. Hassan Mahli, an expert on Turkey’s global politics said that President Erdogan is in a fix when it comes to Syria as it would not be easy for Turkey to abandon 100,000 Syrians who are enjoying Turkey’s support against Assad’s regime. [xxxix] Further, any move towards reconciliation with Syria would mean ignoring the issue of return of millions of Syrian refugees hosted by Turkey, particularly amidst rising hostility against them on the streets of Turkey.[xl]
Why this Change?
The new urge on part of Turkey to recalibrate its relationship with regional adversaries can be attributed to the rapid change in regional polity and that is best exemplified in the apparent retrenchment of the US from the region and emerging desires of many to fill the vacuum.
It is not only Turkey that is desirous of opening new diplomatic window in the region but countries like UAE and Saudi Arabia are also expressing keenness to forge ties with Turkey. UAE and Saudi Arabia do not need only Turkey’s cover to fill the power vacuum in the region but they need more allies to confront series of crisis emerging in the region as well.[xli]
President Trump’s era had allowed the GCC and other Arab countries to pursue an aggressive regional foreign policy but with the arrival of President Biden, the adventurism and enthusiasm of the past seem to be waning and pragmatism seems to be setting in. President Biden more than once has stated that the Arab world would not be the priority for his administration and the signal of US withdrawal seems to have imposed “new thinking” upon these countries not only to mend their differences but to recalibrate and re-strategise their policies.[xlii] The decade of diplomatic and strategic confrontation benefited none. Over the period, the pace of “normalisation” in the relationship between Israel on one hand and UAE, Sudan, Bahrain and Morocco on other might have induced Turkey to revisit its foreign policy and go for reconciliation. The Al-Ula Summit of GCC of January 2021 in Saudi Arabia ending the blockade of Qatar by the Quartet also opened the door for Turkey to settle its differences with the Gulf countries as President Erdogan remarked that the outcome of Al-Ula Summit is in the interest of all.[xliii] The end of Qatar’s blockade by its GCC partners was seen by Turkey as a golden opportunity to reach out to other GCC nations and consequently pursue the path of diplomacy to mend its ties. The gradual disengagement of the Gulf countries in Syria and Libya may have also affected some changes in the regional outlook of Turkey and this is evident in the recent de-escalation of tensions among past adversaries.
The collapse of President Erdogan’s earlier vision of creating an anti-Assad block with the help of GCC and other Arab countries seems to have proved a catalyst in reorienting Turkey’s foreign policy in the region. Many of the former rivals of President Assad have already hinted about opening missions in Syria as UAE has already opened it and Bahrain and Oman have reinstated their Ambassadors after a decade, and many like Algeria, Egypt and UAE have called for reinstating Syria in the Arab League. Further, the growing intimacy between UAE and Iran, evident with the recent visit of UAE’s National Security Advisor to Iran and apparent sign of some diplomatic opening between Saudi Arabia and Iran too seems to have widened the scope for diplomatic relationship between Turkey and the Arab world.
It is not the political file alone that defines the new phase of Turkey-Arab relationship but they are equally anchored in Turkish economic sphere. The severe economic crisis Turkey is trapped in also seems to have driven the country to go for these new diplomatic initiatives. Today Turkey is under immense economic pressure due to rising inflation (18%), unemployment and foreign debt. Last year, Turkish Central Bank sold US $ 128 billion foreign reserves to support the tumbling Turkish Lira.[xliv] Only before the visit of UAE’s Crown Prince, Turkish Lira was struggling with a rate of 13.5 to one US $.[xlv] Turkey has been on the GCC investment agenda since 2002 which had dwindled due to hostile relationship and bilateral trade between UAE and Turkey had fallen from US $ 15 billion to US $ 7 billion in 2018[xlvi] but it is likely to be revived once again. There has been substantial erosion in high economic graph achieved under the AKP in the first decade of its rule but today it is in such a poor shape that series of economic measures, including some religious decree against interest-based banking system[xlvii] failed to make any appeal to the masses. Turkish banks are mostly interest-based banks, and reducing the interest rate from 19% to 15% would not turn the Turkish economy into Islamic or interest free economy. The declining influence of political Islam in recent years in Egypt, Tunisia, more recently in Morocco and Libya has also created wider scope for cooperation and pacification between GCC countries and Turkey as the support of Turkey-Qatar axis to political Islam was a major source of contention among them[xlviii]
The surge in foreign policy change however is also accompanied by the growing political challenges to President Erdogan’s policy at home. His overarching military involvement in the region failed to win the support of the masses because it was an additional burden on the national economy. The opposition Republican Party leader, Kemal KiIicdaroglu recently in a public meeting ridiculed President Erdogan by asking him, “What happened to your support to the MBH and why this normalisation with the UAE which you had once branded as supporter of the so-called coup in Egypt”.[xlix]
Conclusion
There has been a noticeable shift in Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Arab world in general and the GCC in particular but it would be too early to predict anything about the longevity and consistency of this new emerging template of relationship. What is happening at the moment seems more to be a beginning of a relationship of interests rather than the emergence of a new political relationship.
There are however many key issues that with the Arab world cannot be resolved with some announcements, gestures and visits. It has been Turkey’s pro-Islamist policy and hosting of many Egyptian Islamist fugitives which is not allowing the establishment of full-fledged diplomatic relationship between Egypt and Turkey. Turkey would find it difficult to abandon political Islam because it has invested much in the ideology and sabotaging this ideology may cost President Erdogan dearly at home as well because the presidential elections are very much around.
Similarly, the forthcoming elections in Libya are likely to determine the pace of the relationship between Turkey and other GCC countries as both sides are sympathetic to opponent groups. It also needs to be seen if all the GCC countries would maintain the same pace of normalisation or some would maintain reservations given the nature of the differences as reportedly Egypt is not so happy with such hasty and passionate outreach of the UAE to Turkey. Turkey might also use its speedy renewal of ties with the UAE as a bargain chip against Egypt and Saudi Arabia which are hesitant to follow the pace of the UAE. The change in the template of relationship is likely to be in a phased manner and all stakeholders would follow the policy of wait and watch and pursue its exclusive paths because each country has a different set of grievances with Turkey. The ice accumulated in the decade seems to have begun melting but it is also a reality that there can be no lasting reconciliation without an agreement to seek common ground as far as geostrategic approaches are concerned.
*****
*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
[i] Ziya Onis, Multiple Phases of New Turkish Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, January , 2011
[ii] Zero problems with the Neighbors is a slogan summarizing Turkish policy with its neighboring countries
[iii] Katerina Dalacoura, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Power Projection and Post-Ideological Politics, International Affairs, Vol. 97, Issue 4, July 2021, Pages. 1125-1142
[iv] Birol Baskan, Islamism and Turkey’s Foreign Policy During the Arab Spring , Turkish Studies, 19:2, 2018. P. 264-88
[v] Katerina Dalacoura, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Power Projection and Post-Ideological Politics, International Affairs, Vol. 97, Issue 4, July 2021, Pages. 1125-1142
[vi] Turkish PM Condemns Removal of Morsi, Voice of America , July 5, 2013, Accessed https://bit.ly/3ILseIE January 10, 2022
[vii] Secret of Turkey’s Proximity to its Adversaries in the Middle East, DW ( Arabic)December 3, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3o9fuDN January 25, 2022
[viii] Eastern Mediterranean States Establish Gas Forum, Arab News , September 20,2020, Accessed https://www.arabnews.com/node/1738541/middle-east Accessed January 29, 2022
[ix]Guney Yildiz, IS GCC-Qatar Rapprochement Good or Bad News for Turkey m Fair Observer , January 18, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/34l7iZV January 23, 2022
[x] Saudi Arabia Calls Upon Citizens to Boycott Everything Turkish Following Erdogan’s Statement , Dawn, October 4, 2020 , Accessed https://www.dawn.com/news/1583215 January 20, 2022
[xi] Saudi Arabia Calls Upon Citizens to Boycott Everything Turkish Following Erdogan’s Statement , Dawn, October 4, 2020 , Accessed https://www.dawn.com/news/1583215 January 20, 2022
[xii] Turkey Signs Maritime Deal with Libya, Reuters, November 28, 2019, Accessed https://reut.rs/34ekfVv December 23, 2021
[xiv] Gargash: Erdogan Spreading MBH Ideology in Europe , Must Be Confronted, ASHARQ AL AWASAT , November 2, 2020, Accessed https://bit.ly/3ARbWeE January 24, 2022
[xv] https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-diplomacy-priority-normalization-with-regional-foes-171015
[xvi]Turkey-Saudi Intimacy after Isolation, Al-Majallah ( An Arabic Political Weekly ) Issue 1887, January 14, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3GdJF2E January 15, 2022
[xvii]What is the Secret of Sudden Turkish Turn Towards its Enemies , Turk Mgz ( AN Arabic Portal ), January 4, 2022, Accessed https://www.turkmgz.com/posts/22353/11 January 12, 2022
[xviii]UAE Announced US $ 10 Billion n Fund , Aljazeera Arabic, November 24, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3KAXpIp January 2, 2022
[xix]Why Erdogan is Mending his Fence with All His Enemies, Rail Youm, An Arabic Daily, December 1, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3qIpHJ5 January 2, 2022
[xx] UAE Crown Prince to Meet Erdogan for Talks to Improve Relation, Aljazeera, November 23, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3rygSlE January 23, 2022
[xxi] Erdogan Hold rare Meeting with UAE NSA. Al-Arabia News, August 18, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3HxKNQt January 29, 2022
[xxii]Asmahan Qarjoudi, Qatar’s Energy Minister Rules our Rejoining OPEC, Doha News, September 21, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/353zaCe January 29, 2022
[xxiii]Why Erdogan is Mending his Fence with All His Enemies, Rail Youm, An Arabic Daily, December 1, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3qIpHJ5 January 2, 2022
[xxiv] How Turkey-Saudi Ties Can Move Forward, TRT News, January 4, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3g5bXSw January 5, 2022
[xxv]Ashraf Kamal, Visits and Meetings: Did Turkey- GCC Ties Return to its Past, Khaleej Online, November 30, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/33S46ox January 15, 2022
[xxvi] Will Growing Turkey-Saudi Proximity Resolve the Crisis, Al-Majallah, An Arabic Weekly Political Magazine, December 12, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/32MSfrA January 20, 2022
[xxvii]Ashraf Kamal, Visits and Meetings: Did Turkey- GCC Ties Return to its Past, Khaleej Online, November 30, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/33S46ox January 15, 2022
[xxviii] How Turkey-Saudi Ties Can Move Forward, TRT News, January 4, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3g5bXSw January 5, 2022
[xxx]After the Visit of MBZ: Why UAE is ahead of Egypt in its Rapprochement with Turkey, Aljazeera Arabic, November 25, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3FTIsh3 January 25, 2022
[xxxi]After the Visit of MBZ: Why UAE is ahead of Egypt in its Rapprochement with Turkey, Aljazeera Arabic, November 25, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3FTIsh3 January 25, 2022
[xxxii]Turkey Egypt Hold Second Round of Talk in Ankara, Daily Sabah, September 7, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3GUfoHB January 5, 2022
[xxxiii]Turkey Egypt Hold Second Round of Talk in Ankara, Daily Sabah, September 7, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3GUfoHB January 5, 2022
[xxxiv]What is the Secret of Sudden Turkish Turn Towards its Enemies , Turk Mgz ( AN Arabic Portal ), January 4, 2022, Accessed https://www.turkmgz.com/posts/22353/11 January 12, 2022
[xxxv] Ashraf Kamal, Visits and Meetings: Did Turkey- GCC Ties Return to its Past, Khaleej Online, November 30, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/33S46ox January 15, 2022
[xxxvi]Ashraf Kamal, Visits and Meetings: Did Turkey- GCC Ties Return to its Past, Khaleej Online, November 30, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/33S46ox January 15, 2022
[xxxvii]Ashraf Kamal, Visits and Meetings: Did Turkey- GCC Ties Return to its Past, Khaleej Online, November 30, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/33S46ox January 15, 2022
[xxxviii] Turkey order MBH Channels to Stop Airing anti-Egypt Rhetoric, Al-Arabia News, March 18, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3HBJ1gU Jnauey 20, 2022
[xxxix]Why Erdogan is Mending his Fence with All His Enemies, Rail Youm, An Arabic Daily, December 1, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3qIpHJ5 January 2, 2022
[xl]Why Erdogan is Mending his Fence with All His Enemies, Rail Youm, An Arabic Daily, December 1, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3qIpHJ5 January 2, 2022
[xli] How Turkey-Saudi Ties Can Move Forward, TRT News, January 4, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3g5bXSw January 5, 2022
[xlii]Fawaz A. Gerges, Morning in the Middle East, Project Syndicate , August 24, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3GXCDAp January 20, 2022
[xliii]Ashraf Kamal, Visits and Meetings: Did Turkey- GCC Ties Return to its Past, Khaleej Online, November 30, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/33S46ox January 15, 2022
[xliv]Special report: Middle East Foreign Policy Recalibration Enhances Economic Cooperation, PANGEA RISK, September 8, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3AK6IBq December 20, 2022
[xlv]Why Erdogan is Mending his Fence with All His Enemies, Rail Youm, An Arabic Daily, December 1, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3qIpHJ5 January 2, 2022
[xlvi] Special report: Middle East Foreign Policy Recalibration Enhances Economic Cooperation, PANGEA RISK, September 8, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3AK6IBq December 20, 2022
[xlviii] Special report: Middle East Foreign Policy Recalibration Enhances Economic Cooperation, PANGEA RISK, September 8, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3AK6IBq December 20, 2022
[xlix]Why Erdogan is Mending his Ties with All His Enemies, Rail Youm, An Arabic Daily, December 1, 2021, Accessed https://bit.ly/3qIpHJ5 January 2, 2022