The Cambodian Prime Minister (PM) Hun Sen’s visit to Nay Pyi Daw on January 7-8, 2022 was the first such engagement by a Head of State/ Government after the military takeover in Myanmar on February 1, 2021. Reflecting on this visit, the Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah took to Twitter to express his reservations on this development.[i] Abdullah, in his post on the social media platform, expressed his disappointment on Cambodia, the current Chair of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for not taking the regional grouping into confidence prior to the visit. The social media post was explicit in not questioning the prerogative of the Cambodian Head of Government in undertaking the visit at a bilateral level but only questioned the same as the Chair of ASEAN.
This distinction by Minister Abdullah is not only important in terms of diplomatic protocol but also in the context of the current political landscape in Myanmar. For ASEAN, both as a collective body and its members individually have kept a close eye on the internal affairs of Myanmar since the coup and have taken efforts for a constructive engagement in resolving the political deadlock by engaging with the regime of Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. The efforts of Southeast Asian nations have not been indifferent to ground realities in Myanmar either. However, the said social media post, on its own is also a reflection of the complexities in terms of both the body politic of Myanmar and the multi-layered nature ASEAN’s ties with Nay Pyi Daw.
ASEAN’s Peace Initiative
Since the February Coup, the neighbours of Myanmar have been measured in their reaction to the same. They have called for normalisation of the situation in Myanmar by restoring the legitimate civilian government. ASEAN on its part had also proposed a road map on April 24, 2021 titled as ‘Five-Point Consensus’.[ii] The Consensus was not only a call for normalisation of Myanmar’s polity but also a reflection of the actual situation in the nation that is invariably unnoticed by many commentators.
The first of the ‘five points consensus’ was a call for the ‘immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and for all parties to exercise utmost restraint.’ This at the outset may be interpreted as ASEAN calling for restraint on the part of the junta. However it is also a call for the same from other players in the nation, especially the plethora of ethnic armed insurgent groups in the nation and the newly formed People's Defense Force (PDF) which in parts is an extension of the National Unity Government (NUG) that undertakes a people’s defensive war.[iii] The role of the ethnic groups and the PDF gains importance in the current context as they bring with them another dimension to the ongoing challenge in Myanmar. Additionally, the ethnic question is not only limited to political differences within the nation but has resulted in numerous ethnic insurgent and militant movements operating in the nation.
As part the Five Point Consensus, cessation of violence was to be followed by a “...constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people”. This too is a reflection of the complex nature of Myanmar’s polity as the nation not only faces ethnic question but also a political question. It is to be noted that the coup was a knee jerk reaction by the military to the near complete sweep by the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the November 2020 elections. The NLD’s victory for the second consecutive time was seen as a threat to the constitutional scheme that the military had drafted for the nation in 2008.
However, for a nation that has been facing multiple challenges on the question of government and governance, the ASEAN’s call for a ‘constructive dialogue among all parties’ was in part also a reflection of past initiative taken by Myanmar- the now defunct Panglong peace dialogue between the State and the ethnic groups. But in the current context, the constructive dialogue between all parties also includes democratic political players, of which the NLD is the most prominent and all others who have been adversely impacted by the coup, too.
The third and fifth point was that the “...special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the Secretary General of ASEAN”. A delegation led by the special envoy was to “... meet with all parties concerned” so as to enable the regional group to play the role of an honest broker. And lastly, as an honest broker, ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) was to carry out humanitarian assistance in Myanmar.
The Nuances of the Peace Initiative
Keeping up with the Five Point Consensus, the then ASEAN’s Chair, Brunei Darussalam’s Second Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erywan Yusof was nominated as the regional group’s Special Envoy to Myanmar on August 4, 2021.[iv] The Envoy was to have visited the nation in mid-October 2021 as part of the road map as identified in the Five Point Consensus. Despite the regional group’s initiative, Myanmar was reluctant to accept the same. This was made evident when the military government denied Minister Erywan Yusof’s request to interact with all stakeholders, especially with Aung San Suu Kyi, the face of Myanmar’s civilian polity and the leader of the NLD, who was also State Counsellor-cum-Foreign Minister and the deposed President Win Myint.[v] Resultantly the Envoy’s visit was cancelled.
Subsequently, Myanmar’s participation in the biannual ASEAN Summit held on October 26-28, 2021 was limited. The regional group’s Chair, Brunei on behalf of ASEAN had discouraged Myanmar from directly participating in the Summit by only permitting a non-political representation from the nation. By excluding Gen. Min Aung Hlaing from the bi-annual summit, ASEAN had directly communicated its frustration over the junta’s disregard of the peace plan.
Despite this posturing by ASEAN, the change in Chairmanship, with Cambodia taking over from Brunei, new dynamics to the Myanmar question came into play. This change had raised question in the regional bloc[vi] about Phnom Penh diluting the position of ASEAN. This scepticism had been rationalised by the fact that ASEAN failed to issue a joint statement for the first time under the chairmanship of Cambodia in 2012[vii] as Phnom Penh ‘refused to accept language criticising China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.’[viii]
What raised eyebrows in the current context was the statement issued by Cambodia when taking over the role of the bloc’s Chair. It read that Phnom Penh “should set up an ad hoc taskforce to work with Myanmar’s conflicting parties quietly or through back-door diplomacy” for “peace building and win-win policy implementation”.[ix] This position was further reinforced by PM Hut Sen when he called for an unrestricted participation of Myanmar in all ASEAN engagements, and had even expressed his intent to visit the country.[x] The bone of contention was over PM Hut Sen’s intent and his subsequent visit to Myanmar, as the potential of the same being projected as legitimising the military take-over and also the junta that is now in office. The consternation is even more as the visit came at a time when much of the international community has been working towards the restoration of the legitimately elected government in Myanmar.
However, prior to this visit, the Cambodian premier had also called for the unrestricted participation of Myanmar in all ASEAN engagements.[xi] This was justified by him on two counts. The first was in the belief that it is important to work with those in charge in Myanmar. Secondly, engaging with the junta at the highest levels was within ASEAN norms as “... (the regional forum) can’t stray from ASEAN’s common principles or the ASEAN Constitution which mandates non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries”[xii].
ASEAN Sticking to its Position
PM Hut Sen, prior to the visit, had echoed ASEAN’s position as enunciated in the Five-Point Consensus and called for restraint from all sides. He had also called for the implementation of the Peace Plan.
The visit at the outset did not produce any positive outcomes. On the contrary, the Myanmar issue left its first imprint on the regional grouping when the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Retreat (AMM Retreat) that was to be held in Siem Reap Province of Cambodia on January 18-19 was rescheduled.[xiii] Travel difficulties had been cited by the Cambodian Foreign Minister Koy Kuong as the official reason.[xiv] However, according to media reports the internal differences over Myanmar was the real cause for the rescheduling of the Retreat,[xv] as some ASEAN Foreign Ministers were reluctant to share the same platform with the Wunna Maung Lwin, Myanmar’s Foreign Minister.[xvi]
Apart from this, some of the ASEAN nations had also expressed their position publicly, especially their disappointment over the reluctance on the part of Myanmar to make any progress on the Five-Point Consensus. Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong conveyed his government’s position on Myanmar to Cambodia, the new Chair. He is reported to have told Hun Sen on January 15 that Myanmar’s participation in ASEAN meetings will be only at the non-political level, in continuation of their 2021 decision. Any changes to this position should be based on visible progress on the Consensus.[xvii]
Indonesian President Joko Widodo also took to Twitter[xviii] on January 5 and echoed similar views on the subject. The nation’s Foreign Minister, Abdul Kadir Jailani, added that the “Cambodian chairmanship can consistently implement what has been agreed in previous ASEAN meetings – the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus – and make efforts to achieve significant progress.”[xix] Similar sentiments have been expressed by the Philippines, both with regard to the situation in Myanmar and the nation’s future participation in ASEAN proceedings.
The sentiments expressed by some of the Southeast Asian nations has also been echoed in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in its Resolution of February 2, 2022. The UNSC also reiterated its support to the regional grouping’s role in facilitating a peaceful solution by seeking a “swift and full implementation of ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus”.[xx]
Complexities of dealing with Myanmar
Despite the stated position by ASEAN and the UNSC, not all nations in the immediate region share a similar posture on Myanmar. The notable players who have extended what can be seen as a tacit acknowledgment of the junta are China and Japan followed by Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. They are in favour of the initiative taken by Phnom Penh to directly engage Nay Pyi Daw.[xxi] Tokyo, in a statement had ‘welcomed Cambodia’s active engagement as ASEAN Chair on the situation in Myanmar’,[xxii] while Beijing continues to be a reliable partner of Nay Pyi Daw.
The silent and also vocal support extended from some quarters to the initiative taken by PM Hut Sen does not seem to be in vain. This is because the junta has been reported to have granted in principle approval for the ASEAN Special Envoy, Prak Sokhonn who is the Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to interact with members of the NLD, including Aung San Suu Kyi, when he visits the nation.[xxiii] This development comes in the background of the military government levelled additional charges against the now imprisoned NLD leader[xxiv] and at a time when the ASEAN has stuck to its previous position of curtailing Myanmar’s engagement with the regional organisation to a non-political level. For the immediate, the Foreign Ministers’ Summit which is now rescheduled to be held on February 16-17 will not see the participation Wunna Maung Lwin from Myanmar .[xxv]
In this context, the future course of developments with respect to Myanmar including the Five Point peace plan will depend largely upon Nay Pyi Daw’s commitment to a positive engagement. This is especially so under the tenure of Cambodia as the ASEAN Chair. What is of note is that Cambodia’s efforts of a positive engagement of “plant trees, not cut them down”[xxvi] seem to be yielding some form of concession on part of the junta.
*****
*Dr. Sripathi Narayanan, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
End Notes
[i] Saifuddin Abdullah, Twitter @saifuddinabd, January 14, 2022, https://twitter.com/saifuddinabd/status/1481868450113163264?t=jVyS18DsvMqlM1mXepz_3w&s=08, accessed on January 18, 2022.
[ii] Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting, ASEAN Secretariat, April 24, 2021, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf, accessed on January 20, 2021.
[iii] Yun Sun, “One year after Myanmar’s coup, old and new resistance is undermined by divisions”, Brookings Institution, February 1, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/01/one-year-after-myanmars-coup-old-and-new-resistance-is-undermined-by-divisions/, accessed on February 11, 2022.
[iv] Tom Allard, “ASEAN appoints Brunei diplomat as envoy to Myanmar”, Reuters, August 4, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-appoints-bruneis-erywan-yusof-envoy-myanmar-sources-2021-08-04/, accessed on February 5, 2022.
[v] ASEAN envoy's Myanmar trip and meeting with political parties delayed, Myanmar Now, Octobers 12, 2021, https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/asean-envoys-myanmar-trip-and-meeting-with-political-parties-delayed, accessed on February 7, 2022
[vi] Charles Dunst, “What to Expect of Cambodia as ASEAN Chair”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies”, November 4, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-expect-cambodia-asean-chair#:~:text=On%20October%2028%2C%20Cambodia%20officially,joining%20the%20group%20in%201999, accessed on February 7, 2022.
[vii] ASEAN nations fail to reach agreement on South China Sea, BBC, July 13, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18825148, accessed on February 7, 2022.
[viii] Charles Dunst, “What to Expect of Cambodia as ASEAN Chair”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies”, November 4, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-expect-cambodia-asean-chair#:~:text=On%20October%2028%2C%20Cambodia%20officially,joining%20the%20group%20in%201999, accessed on February 7, 2022.
[ix] Cambodia and ASEAN Chairmanship 2022: Opportunities and Preparedness in the Process of ASEAN Political-Security Community Building, Kampuchea Press, October 28, 2021, https://akp.gov.kh/post/detail/241667, accessed on February 8, 2022.
[x] Hun Sen mulls Myanmar trip to find crisis solution, Phom Penh Post, December 6, 2021, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/hun-sen-mulls-myanmar-trip-find-crisis-solution, accessed on January 20, 2022.
[xi] Sebastian Strangio, “New ASEAN Chair Cambodia to Push Engagement With Myanmar Junta”, The Diplomat, December 07, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/new-asean-chair-cambodia-to-push-engagement-with-myanmar-junta/, accessed on February 9, 2022.
[xii] Hun Sen mulls Myanmar trip to find crisis solution, Phom Penh Post, December 6, 2021, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/hun-sen-mulls-myanmar-trip-find-crisis-solution, accessed on January 20, 2022.
[xiii] ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Retreat postponed, says Saifuddin, The Star, January 12, 2022, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2022/01/12/asean-foreign-ministers039-retreat-postponed-says-saifuddin, accessed on February 3, 2022
[xiv] Prak Chan Thul, “Cambodia Shelves First ASEAN Meeting Over Attendance 'Difficulties'”, US News, January 12, 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-01-12/cambodia-shelves-first-asean-meeting-over-attendance-difficulties, accessed on February 9, 2022.
[xv] Tomoya Onishi, “ASEAN foreign ministers to meet Feb. 16-17 in Cambodia”, Nikkei Asia, January 29, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ASEAN-foreign-ministers-to-meet-Feb.-16-17-in-Cambodia, accessed on February 3, 2022
[xvi] Cambodia Forced to Put Off ASEAN Meeting as Foreign Ministers Pull Out, The Irrawaddy, January 13, 2022, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/cambodia-forced-to-put-off-asean-meeting-as-foreign-ministers-pull-out.html, accessed on January 19, 2022
[xvii] Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's Video Call with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2022/01/20220115-PM-LHL-VC-Cambodian-PM-Hun-Sen, accessed on January 21, 2022.
[xviii] Joko Widodo, Twitter @Jokowi, January 5, 2022, https://twitter.com/jokowi/status/1478560727912771588?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw, accessed on January 21, 2022.
[xix] Sebastian Strangio, “‘No Progress’ on ASEAN Peace Plan for Myanmar: Singaporean PM”, The Diplomat, January 17, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/no-progress-on-asean-peace-plan-for-myanmar-singaporean-pm/, accessed on January 18, 2022.
[xx] Security Council Press Statement on the Situation in Myanmar, United Nations, February 2, 2022, https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14785.doc.htm, accessed on February 10, 2022.
[xxi] Delwar Hossain, The Diplomat, “Myanmar Crisis and Hun Sen’s Visit: ASEAN in Disarray?”, January 19, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/myanmar-crisis-and-hun-sens-visit-asean-in-disarray/, accessed on January 20,2022.
[xxii] “Japan-Cambodia Foreign Ministers’ Telephone Talk”, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 11, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000242.html, accessed on January 10, 2022.
[xxiii] Kay Johnson, “Myanmar junta chief said ASEAN envoy can meet Suu Kyi party members - Cambodian minister”, Reuters, February 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-junta-chief-said-asean-envoy-can-meet-suu-kyi-party-members-cambodian-2022-02-07/, accessed on February 10, 2022.
[xxiv] Grant Peck, “ Myanmar piles on 11th corruption charge against Suu Kyi”, Associated Press, February 4, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/elections-police-myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-849c2909d9e3bc0d1334da25efd2ec6b?utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter&utm_campaign=SocialFlow, accessed on February 10, 2022.
[xxv] Myanmar military barred from ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting, al Jazeera, February 3, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/3/myanmar-military-barred-from-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting, accessed on February 4, 2022.
[xxvi] Ry Sochan, “Myanmar trip ‘planted trees’: PM”, Phnom Penh Post, January 23, 2022, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/myanmar-trip-planted-trees-pm, accessed on February 10, 2022