While the world is anxiously watching a flurry of diplomatic activity around Ukraine, great power politics is sharpening in and around the resource-rich countries in West Africa. France and Russia are key players in the crisis in Ukraine as well as in Mali. In fact, the geopolitics of Mali and the growing Russian presence in West Africa appears to be one of the key reasons behind the latest visit (which took place on 7th February) of French President Emmanuel Macron to Moscow. In a press briefing after the meeting, Russia’s President Putin said that “President Macron raised this issue [Mali] many times, we discussed it with him, and President Macron is aware of our position on this matter”.[1]
In the last few months, Mali has been at the center of debates about the counter-terror operations in the Sahel, the role of external players in regional security, and the future of democracy in Africa. The Sahel region has been fighting the Islamist insurgency and the States are struggling to contain the growing specter of terrorism. In 2013, the Malian capital Bamako was threatened by the Islamists and the prompt military intervention (known as the Operation Serval till 2013 and Barkhane since 2014) by France saved the capital. Since then, about 5000 French troops were deployed to the Sahel in counter-terror duties. However, the presence of French troops has progressively turned unpopular at home as well as in Africa. By 2022, France plans to reduce the troop presence by half.[2]
Meanwhile, amidst the continuing threat of terrorism and the failure to stop the growing presence of the Islamists, the domestic political upheavals in Mali have brought attention to the West African nation. Since 2020, Mali has undergone two coups (one each in 2020 and 2021) and sanctions have been imposed by the West African regional bloc ECOWAS.[3] The military junta has turned against the French military presence in the country and recently, has expelled the French ambassador. As the France-Mali relationship turned sour, the military junta turned to Russia. As per reports, Mali has invited a Russian private military contractor company, Wagner, to Mali. The Wagner group will train Malian forces and in return, Mali will pay US $ 10 million per month (a very high figure). They will also protect Russian companies engaged in mining.[4] Mali is rich in uranium, diamond, and gold. After Libya, Central African Republic (CAR), Madagascar, Sudan, and Mozambique, Mali will be the sixth African country to invite the Wagner group. The Wagner group is helping prop up the regime in CAR and a similar kind of role is on the cards in Mali.[5] The military junta of Mali has officially denied the presence of Russian “mercenaries” while acknowledging the deployment of Russian “trainers”.[6]
The activities of the Wagner group have been under the scanner for some time. As per the United Nations, in the CAR, “many forces, including the Wagner Group, are committing systemic and grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations, including arbitrary detention, torture, disappearances and summary execution”.[7] About the presence of Wagner group in Mali, when asked with the French President Macron alongside him, Putin framed the question in commercial terms. He said that “it concerns the commercial interests of our companies, which coordinate their activities with the local authorities”.[8] He was categorical that the Russian state has “nothing to do with the companies that are working in Mali. As far as we know, the Malian leadership has no complaints about the commercial activities of these companies”.[9]
In December 2021, a group of 15 nations including Germany, France, Canada, and Britain that have been fighting terrorists in the Sahel has released a statement that “firmly condemns[s] the deployment of mercenary troops on Malian territory”.[10] The statement noted that “we are aware of the involvement of the Russian Federation government in providing material support to the deployment of the Wagner group in Mali and call on Russia to revert to a responsible and constructive behaviour in the region”.[11] The United States (US) too has taken a strong stand about the presence of Wagner group in Mali. The US statement noted that, “countries that experience Wagner group deployments within their borders soon find themselves poorer, weaker, and less secure”.[12] The statement cites the examples of Libya and CAR where the Wagner group deployments have had a “detrimental impact”.[13]The purpose of Wagner's deployments in West and Central Africa is clear: undercut the Western influence and expand the Russian influence.
The strong reaction to the Wagner group in Mali points towards the sharpening of great power politics between the Western countries, particularly France, and Russia in Africa. The West and Central Africa have traditionally been part of the French sphere of influence. France was a colonial power in the region and maintained close political, economic, and military ties with regional States even after the decolonization. However, in the last few years, Russia has been taking incremental steps to expand its influence in Africa. Russia intends to establish a military base in the Red Sea at Port Sudan; it has organized the Russia-Africa summit (in 2019) and is a major supplier of weapons and technology to the Continent. The growing Russian presence in the region challenges the French primacy in West and Central Africa. And Mali is at the front and center of the evolving great power politics in Africa.
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*Dr. Sankalp Gurjar, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
References:
[1]Kremlin, “News conference following Russian-French talks”, February 8, 2022. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67735 (Accessed on February 15, 2022)
[2]Mahaut de Fougières, “French Military in the Sahel: An Unwinnable (Dis)Engagement?”, Institut Montaigne, June 23, 2021. Available at: https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/french-military-sahel-unwinnable-disengagement (Accessed on February 15, 20212) ;Katrin Gänsler, “Mali: French military operations face growing resistance”, Deutsche Welle, January 22, 2021. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/mali-french-military-operations-face-growing-resistance/a-56309457 (Accessed on February 15, 20220).
[3]Al Jazeera, “West Africa bloc ECOWAS hits Mali with sanctions after poll delay”, January 9, 2022. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/9/west-africa-bloc-ecowas-hits-mali-with-sanctions-after-poll-delay (Accessed on February 15, 2022).
[4]Jared Thompson, Catrina Doxsee, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Tracking the Arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali”, CSIS, February 2, 2022. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali (Accessed on February 15, 2022).
[5] Ibid
[6]France 24, “Mali denies deployment of Russian mercenaries from Wagner Group”, December 25, 2021. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20211225-mali-denies-deployment-of-russian-mercenaries-from-wagner-group (Accessed on February 15, 2022).
[7]UN OHCHR, “CAR: Russian Wagner Group harassing and intimidating civilians – UN experts”, October 27, 2021. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27717&LangID=E (Accessed on February 15, 2021).
[8] Kremlin, “News conference following Russian-French talks”, February 8, 2022. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67735 (Accessed on February 15, 2022).
[9] Ibid
[10]Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, “Statement on the Deployment of the Wagner Group in Mali”, December 23, 2021. Available at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/mali/news/article/statement-on-the-deployment-of-the-wagner-group-in-mali-23-dec-2021 (Accessed on February 15, 2022).
[11] Ibid
[12] US Department of State, “Potential Deployment of the Wagner Group in Mali”, December 15, 2021. Available at: https://www.state.gov/potential-deployment-of-the-wagner-group-in-mali/ (Accessed on February 15, 2022).
[13] Ibid