April 12, 2022, marks the tenth anniversary of Kim Jong-un's rule in North Korea. Kim was only 27 years old when he assumed power in the world's most isolated country following the untimely death of his father, Kim Jong-il. Having known very little about Kim's whereabouts, on account of his young age and lack of experience in state affairs, it was widely expected that the third-generation power succession of the Kim family would not be easy. Scenarios, including a military coup or even regime collapse in the event of a power struggle among elites, were discussed.[1]Based on Kim's education in the West, many North Korean observers believed that he would undertake liberal reforms and open North Korea.[2]A decade after, though credible information about Kim or his country is still hard to come by, it has become clear that the speculations proved to be nothing but wishful thinking.
A decade of Kim's rule in North Korea has been eventful, to say the least, having stayed on top in the global media now and then. Despite multiple vicissitudes, Kim managed to consolidate power and established himself as a strong dictator. Observers no longer talk about regime instability or collapse, which were the dominant narratives at the time of Kim's succession, even despite North Korea's recent economic difficulty in the face of pandemic and crippling sanctions. Over the course, Kim's international image has also been transformed from an amateur strong man to a skilful leader.[3] He also brought about changes in the political system, attempted to reform the economy and improved North Korea's international status by completing the 'state nuclear force'.
The evolution of Kim's governance strategy can be understood in three different phases. During the first phase, which lasted until 2017, the emphasis was on consolidating power and the byungjin line- simultaneous nuclear and economic advancement.[4] After achieving absolute authority and the completion of the 'state nuclear force' in 2017, Pyongyang diverted its full attention to economic development. This period (2018-2019) also witnessed the diplomatic opening of North Korea in an effort Pyongyang to stabilise the external environment by improving relations with the United States (US), South Korea, and China. This phase witnessed unprecedented diplomatic momentum, including the historic Summits between Kim and President Donald Trump. Though the Summit helped ease the security tension in the Korean Peninsula, it failed to make any breakthrough on the nuclear issue. As the diplomatic approach failed and the economy worsened further because of the triple whammy- pandemic, sanctions and natural disasters, since 2020, North Korea began reversing the reform measures that it undertook previously. The ideologically driven governance narrative of 'self-reliance' and state centrism at the eighth party congress in January 2021 appeared to be the beginning of a new phase of Kim's rule in North Korea. The return of tight social and ideological control is indicative of Kim's effort to tighten the system to deter potential domestic instability in the wake of economic uncertainty.
Power Consolidation and the Byungjin Policy
As mentioned, the power succession and consolidation of political authority have been the main focus of the first phase of Kim's rule. Unlike his father and grandfather, Kim Il-sung, founder of North Korea, Kim Jong-un had a weak power base during the leadership transition. While Kim Il-sung used the legacy of his anti-colonial and revolutionary struggle to justify his right to rule the country, Kim Jong-il had three decades to build his power base before taking control following his father's death in 1994. Kim Jong-un had only just three years to prepare following the announcement of his succession in 2009.[5]
Kim Jong-un legitimised his accession to power, building on the Kim family legacy. However, to consolidate power, Kim chose a path of restructuring the existing system. In this regard, the first order of business was to reshuffle the political and military apparatus by replacing officials appointed by his father with people who are loyal to him. He also brutally eliminated potential rivals, including his uncle and half-brother. The 7th Party Congress of the Workers Party of Korea (KWP) in 2016 was the moment that declared Kim's absolute authority in North Korea. By the time of the party congress, among the eight most powerful individuals who escorted Kim Jong-Il's hearse in 2011, except Kim Jong-un had either been purged or executed.[6] Since 2016, there have been no reports about the purging of high-ranking North Korean officials indicating Kim's consolidation of power.[7]
During the 7th Party Congress, Kim Jong-un also took the leadership title as the Chairman of the WPK. The change in title, though was not a reflection of a change in Kim's status as the top man in North Korea, was rather a correction to the hastily created position of 'First Secretary' at the time of his accession. During the 8th Congress of the Workers Party in January 2021, Kim was elevated to the post of General Secretary of WKP, a title his father was holding at the time of his death. This move was significant considering that in 2012, Kim himself declared his father as the 'eternal general secretary'.
The decision to hold the 7th Party Congress, after a gap of thirty-six years in itself, was a very noteworthy development. It gave the impression that the governance system in North Korea 'returned to normal'. Under Kim, the Workers Party restored its lost prestige as the main instrument of power and governance with the regularisation of its plenums and conferences, displacing the military's overwhelming role in national affairs during his father's reign. Restoration of the party institutions also reflects changes in policymaking under Kim Jong-un.[8]
Kim also adopted a very different leadership style compared to his father. During the initial days in power, Kim's public persona was built on the images of his grandfather. However, once he consolidated power, Kim went on to construct his brand of leadership style featuring pragmatism, transparency and institutionalisation. An essential feature of Kim's pragmatic approach to leadership has been the reduction of ideological elements in his public speeches and the emphasis on results. Distancing himself from the dogmatic style embraced by his father and demystifying the Kim family, Kim presented himself as a leader to whom people can easily relate. Kim's address to party workers in March 2019 is an example where he attempts to stay in tune with the transformations underway in North Korean society that is now much more informed about the world. Kim said, "if you mystify the revolutionary activities and appearance of the leader in an effort to emphasise his greatness, you will end up shielding the truth."[9]Attempts to bring reform measures to revitalise the economy have also indicated his pragmatic approach to leadership.
Kim's recognition of failure and attempts to point out problems through public media rather than concealing it has to be seen as an approach to transparency in an otherwise opaque North Korean system.[10] The regularisation of the Party Congress and its various leadership meeting has also been another feature of Kim's rule, giving the impression of decision making as a collective process. The delegation of field inspection activities with Kim focusing on economic activities and other senior leaders attending to military, diplomacy and party activities has also been another important feature of leadership institutionalisation through delegation under Kim's era.[11]
Soon after assuming power Kim said to the North Korean public that they "will never have to tighten their belt again", indicating his priority for economic development.[12] A year after assuming power, Kim Jong-un announced the byungjin policy, or the "simultaneous development" of the economy and the nuclear program. Kim initiated economic development programme that can broadly be understood as "reform without opening' under the banner of "our style of economic management system," in May 2014.[13] The initiative not only recognised spontaneously emerging markets but also took measures to decentralise agriculture.[14] To further the economic reform, in July 2014, Pyongyang brought out a law known as the "socialist system of responsible business operation" that guarantee maximum autonomy to factories and companies and makes them take responsibility for themselves. The law meant to reform the previous planning and control method to an autonomous, market-oriented method.[15] Another crucial means Kim attempted to boost economic growth was by building around 20 economic development zones after introducing the Economic Development Zone Law and setting up the Nation Economic Development Committee- a central institution in charge of economic development zone in 2013.[16]
According to South Korea's central bank, North Korea has recorded an average of 2per cent annual economic growth from 2012. In 2016, economic growth reached 3.9 per cent, the highest in the last seventeen years.[17] The momentum in economic growth has also been reflected in everyday North Korean life with more cars on the streets, a new wave of consumerism and a construction boom, not only in Pyongyang but also in provincial cities and countryside.[18]
Economy and military affairs were given equal emphasis under the byungjin policy; however, the significant accomplishment of Kim Jong-un has been the advancement of Pyongyang's nuclear and missile weapon programme. Under his reign, Pyongyang acquired credible fission and fusion technology and advanced its ability to deliver nuclear arsenals at all ranges using multiple platforms.[19] North Korea conducted four out of its six nuclear tests under Kim's watch. While the first two trials were weapons that were in the preliminary stages of development, under Kim, Pyongyang advanced its nuclear weapons capability by testing a miniaturised lightweight nuclear weapon, a 'hydrogen bomb', and 'nuclear warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), respectively. While there is a consensus among international observers about the significant advancement of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities in recent years and the size of its nuclear arsenal is a matter of dispute. According to a 2018 US intelligence estimate, Pyongyang possesses anything between twenty and sixty assembled nuclear bombs and has enough fissile material—the core component of nuclear weapons for sixty-five bombs.[20]Kim also oversaw the advancement of North Korea's missile capability by conducting more than 125 missile tests, far exceeding the number of trials conducted by his predecessors. In November 2017, Pyongyang demonstrated its capability to carry a large nuclear warhead that could reach anywhere on the US mainland by successfully testing the Hwasong-15 ballistic missile.[21]
On the diplomatic front, in the first six years of Kim's rule, North Korea adopted a strict isolationist approach. North Korea's diplomatic isolation featured Kim's abstinence from travelling overseas and refusing to meet foreign delegations. The visit to China in March 2018 was Kim's first foreign trip since he assumed power in 2012. Apart from the worsening of relations with the US and South Korea, the first half of Kim's rule also saw the deterioration of Pyongyang's relations with China, its ally and economic benefactor. At the 7th Party Congress Kim in his work report criticised China and its push for reform in North Korea. Kim said, “despite the filthy wind of bourgeois liberty and ‘reform’ and ‘openness’ blowing in our neighborhood, we let the spirit of military-first rifles fly and advanced according to the path of socialism that we had chosen.”[22] The relations between the two countries further deteriorated in wake of North Korea’s 6th nuclear test and frequent missile launches in 2017. In response to Chinese official media’s criticism of the North Korea nuclear programme, KCNA stated that Pyongyang “ will never beg for the ally's friendship”. It further warned that “China had better ponder over the grave consequences to be entailed by its reckless act of chopping down the pillar of the DPRK-China relations”.[23]
Second Phase: Economy First and the Diplomatic Opening
In January 2018, in his New Year message, Kim announced the conclusion of the byungjin policy with the completion of the state nuclear force and a rebalanced the national strategy focusing solely on economic development.[24]Symbolically, the change in overall national strategy has been reflected in the abolition of songun (military-first) ideology of Kim Jong-il from the North Korean constitution and WPK covenants. Instead, Kim mooted the concept "people first" to represent the ideological slogan of his rule.[25] This shift in national strategy has also been apparent in the reprioritisation of resource allocation. For instance, Pyongyang closed down many of its military training sites and was instead focused on constructing large international tourist resorts.[26]
Shift to economic development in the national strategy in 2018 was also accompanied by diplomatic overturn aimed to stabilise the external environment that witnessed very high tension in 2017 following North Korea's nuclear and frequent missile tests. Through diplomatic overturn, Kim also sought to get sanction relaxation and external aid and investment to support his economic development mission. To aid the diplomatic opening process, Kim announced a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests in April 2018. The economic logic underpinned in Kim's diplomatic posturing was very clear when the North Korean Foreign Minister said in the 2018 ASEAN Regional Forum that his country "needs a peaceful environment on and around the Korean Peninsula now more than ever". [27]
Taking advantage of the opening offered by the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, Kim initiated a diplomatic charm offensive leading to multiple Summit meetings with leaders of the US, South Korea, China and Russia. It is interesting to note that before beginning his engagement with the US, Kim made sure to patch up relations with Beijing to enhance his leverage with Washington and take advantage of the growing strategic competition between the two. Through the historic meeting with President Donald Trump in Singapore, Kim achieved something that his grandfather and father had tried and failed in the past helped to boost his image both at home and abroad. However, stalling of the nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang after the failure to reach a deal in the Hanoi Summit in February 2019, Kim slowly moved back to his foreign policy approach of confrontation towards the US and South Korea. The diplomatic momentum of 2018 and the churning geopolitical underway in East Asia helped reset the once estranged relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing.
Despite Kim's all-out emphasis, the economy has further deteriorated over the last three years due to the combined effects of economic sanctions, pandemic, and natural disasters. According to the South Korean Central Bank, the North Korean economy contracted a whopping 4.5% in 2020, the sharpest fall in growth since the famine in the 1990s.[28] Contraction in the North Korean economy has also been reflected in the significant reduction of its international trade. North Korea's international trade shrunk from $5.55 billion in 2017 to $2.84 billion in 2018. Though the trade witnessed some improvement in 2019, recording $3.25 billion in 2019; however, it plummeted to $860 million in 2020. As North Korea conducts the bulk of its trade with China, the closing of the border following the COVID outbreak in Wuhan in January 2020 has been the main reason for the trade contraction. However, the stringent sanctions implemented since 2016 have also adversely affected North Korean economic activities, including trade.[29]
Unprecedented in North Korean history, Kim himself admitted the failure of the economic programme and urged the North Korean citizens to tighten the belt to survive the economic hardship that the country is going through. At the party's Central Committee meeting in August 2020, Kim said, "the growth goals set for the national economy have been severely delayed, and the lives of the people have not been slightly improved as a result".[30]During his speech at the 8thParty Congress in January 2021, Kim once again acknowledged that growth targets were not met and that "serious mistakes" were made in managing the economy.[31]
Return to Juche: Third Phase of Kim's Rule
During the 8th Party Congress in July 2021, Kim unveiled a new national strategy. On the one hand, it reintroduced the byungjin line that Kim adopted during his early years in power to advance the economy and nuclear and missile programme simultaneously. On the other hand, it also marked the return of the old-fashioned state-socialist approach. In this regard, the emphasis has been to enhance the "level of ideological awareness" and eradicate "the non-socialist and anti-socialist practices".[32] For instance, on unveiling the new rural development policy, Kim said, "the major task of rural development strategy at present is to transform all the agricultural workers into revolutionary agricultural workers. He further reiterated that it is "of paramount importance to put priority efforts into transforming the thought of agricultural workers and enhancing their political awareness".[33] Providing ideological and political incentives to increase production under the new policy contradicts Kim's previous approach of improving productivity through market incentives.
The new economic policy that was adopted at the 8th Party Congress is focused on achieving self-reliance and the recentralisation of the economy.[34] In doing so, Kim reversed the reform measures undertaken six years ago and attempted to reconfigure the state's relationship with private entrepreneurs by controlling the market activities. It has also been prioritising rural development for "solving the food, clothing and housing problem for the people," indicating a worsening economic situation in the countryside.[35]
The reorientation of the national strategy has also been accompanied by a series of high-level personnel reshuffles and frequent party leadership meetings.[36] In an attempt to strengthen control over the party and state apparatus, Kim created the Department of Rule Investigation and the Department of Justice to suppress internal discontent and social unrest.[37]The third phase of Kim's rule also has witnessed a strong emphasis on ideological education and increased social control. For instance, according to the 'Reactionary Ideology Culture Rejection Act' adopted in December 2020, punishments were strengthened up to 15 years of correctional labour for just watching South Korean videos and the death penalty for distributing them.[38] The new law has prompted an extensive crackdown of foreign content and influence in North Korea.[39] Since the beginning of the pandemic, not only that Pyongyang has closed its borders with China but also began strengthening its border control measures with the addition of a second fence and new electronic monitoring systems , especially to clamp down on illegal smuggling.[40]
In the new national strategy, Kim once again prioritised the advancement of military capability. In this regard, at the 8th Party Congress of the WPK, Kim Jong-un emphasised the development of a fleet of hypersonic glide vehicles, solid-fuel engines for underwater and land-use, intercontinental ballistic rockets, nuclear submarines and underwater strategic nuclear weapons, and military satellites in the near future.[41] Since mid-2021, North Korea also began missile testing, starting with cruise missiles. In January 2022, North Korea conducted more than ten missile tests, including an intermediate ballistic missile, effectively ending its self-imposed moratorium in April 2018.
Having failed to improve relations with the US, Kim appears to be taking a strong stand towards Washington after President Joe Biden assumed office. At the 8th Party Congress indicating his scepticism about the new Biden administration, Kim said "Whoever takes power in the US, its entity and the real intention of its policy toward the DPRK would never change."[42] Kim also laid out his condition for making any breakthrough by stating that "the key to establishing a new DPRK-US relationship lies in the US withdrawal of its hostile policy toward the DPRK."[43] The North Korean interpretation of the US hostile broadly means US sanctions, US-ROK military exercises, and the US criticism of the human rights situation in North Korea. Kim's apparent reference to improving traditional relations with socialist countries in the party congress highlights Pyongyang's emphasis on improving ties with Beijing.[44]
Conclusion
Over the last decade, Kim not only consolidated his authority in North Korea but also came out of the shadows of the legacies of his father and grandfather. He has built his legitimacy on the advancement of the nuclear and missile capability of North Korea and the advancing North Korea's status in the world. Having promised to improve the living condition of the people, under the slogan of 'people first' politics, the deteriorating state of the North Korean economy could potentially undermine Kim's legitimacy and social and political stability in North Korea. Pyongyang’s hurried effort to strengthen ideological, social and economic control since 2020 points towards an attempt to ensure political stability in the face of economic hardship.
*****
*Dr. Jojin V. John is Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
[1] Victor Cha, "China’s Newest Province?", New York Times, December 19, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/opinion/will-north-korea-become-chinas-newest-province.html, (Accessed on January 20, 2021)
[2] Bill Powell, "Is Kim Jong Un Preparing to Become North Korea's Economic Reformer?", The Time, April 19, 2012, content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2112567,00.html, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[3]"Kim Jong-un’s Image Shift: From Nuclear Madman to Skillful Leader", New York Times,June 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/world/asia/kim-korea-image.html, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[4]Byungjin policy was announced by Kim Jong-un in 2013 emphasising parallel development of the economy and nuclear weapons. See, Wrobel, Ralph (2021) "Kim Jong-un's Byungjin Policy: Support or obstacle for economic convergence on the Korean peninsula?," Discourses in Social Market Economy 2021-5, OrdnungsPolitisches Portal (OPO), https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/opodis/20215.html, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[5] Patrick McEachern (2019), "Centralizing North Korean Policymaking under Kim Jong Un", Asian Perspective, 43(1): 35-67.
[6] Frank, Ruediger, “The 7th Party Congress in North Korea: A Return to a New Normal” 38 North, May 20, 2016, https://www.38north.org/2016/05/rfrank052016, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[7]Ibid
[8]Seong-chang Cheong (2014), “The Anatomy of Kim Jong Un's Power”, Global Asia, 9(1), https://www.globalasia.org/v9no1/cover/the-anatomy-of-kim-jong-uns-power_seong-chang-cheong, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[9] Quoted in Jong-seok Lee (2021)"The Kim Jong Un Regime: Practical and Sustainable", Global Asia, 16 (3), https://www.globalasia.org/v16no3/cover/the-kim-jong-un-regime-practical-and-sustainable_jong-seok-lee, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[10] Rachel Minyoung Lee, "Kim Jong Un at 10 Years: Evaluating the Regime and Future Prospects", https://www.stimson.org/event/kim-jong-un-at-10-years-evaluating-the-regime-and-future-prospects/, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[11]Ibid
[12] Quoted in Bradley O. Babson, "Will North Korea’s Plans for Foreign Investment Make It a More Prosperous Nation?", 38North, May 2, 2012, "https://www.38north.org/2012/05/bbabson050212/, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[13]Jojin V. John, "North Korea at 70: ‘Reform without Opening’ under Kim Jong-un", ICWA, September 25, 2018, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=2460&lid=1880, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[14] Ibid
[15]Dongho Jo (2021), "Kim Jong Un’s Economic Opening and Reform: Opportunities, Constraints and Prospects", Global Asia, 16 (3), https://www.globalasia.org/v16no3/focus/kim-jong-uns-economic-opening-and-reform-opportunities-constraints-and-prospects_dongho-jo, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[16] “The Background and the Outlook of North Korea's Economic Development Zone, ERINA, April 2015,https://www.erina.or.jp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/pp12311_tssc.pdf, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[17]Rosamond Hutt, "North Korea's economy grew nearly 4% last year - despite sanctions", World Economic Forum, August 31, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/08/north-korea-s-economic-growth-was-at-a-17-year-high-in-2016-so-which-countries-was-it-trading-with/, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[18]Alek Sigley, "Crisps and Coffee Shops: North Korea’s New Consumerism", Diplomat, March 1, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/crisps-and-coffee-shops-north-koreas-new-consumerism/, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[19]Scott Snyder, "How Kim Jong-un Advanced North Korea’s Military in a Decade", December 17, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/north-korea-kim-jong-un-nuclear-decade-ten-years, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[20] "North Korea’s Military Capabilities", CFR, December 22, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-missile-tests-military-capabilities, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[21] Ankit Panda, "The Hwasong-15: The Anatomy of North Korea’s New ICBM", Diplomat, December 6, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/the-hwasong-15-the-anatomy-of-north-koreas-new-icbm/, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[22] Quoted in Rüdiger Frank (2016), "The 7th Party Congress in North Korea: An Analysis of Kim Jong Un’s Report", Japan Focus, 14 (8), https://apjjf.org/2016/14/Frank.html,, (Accessed on February17, 2021)
[23] "N. Korea will never beg for China's friendship: KCNA", Yonhap News, May 3, 2017, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20170503005600315 , (Accessed on February17, 2021)
[24] "Kim Jong Un's 2018 New Year's Address", NCNK, January 1, 2018, https://www.ncnk.org/node/1427, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[25]Jong-seok Lee (2021), "The Kim Jong Un Regime: Practical and Sustainable", Global Asia, 16 (3), https://www.globalasia.org/v16no3/cover/the-kim-jong-un-regime-practical-and-sustainable_jong-seok-lee, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[26] Ibid
[27]Quoted in Ibid
[28] Lee Jeong Ho, "North Korea’s Economy Contracted Most in Two Decades in 2020", Bloomberg, July 30, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-30/north-korea-s-economy-contracted-most-in-two-decades-in-2020, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[29]Lee Yong-soo, "How Kim Jong-un Ran N.Korea's Economy into the Ground", Chosun IlboDecember 16, 2021, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2021/12/16/2021121601276.html, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[30]Quoted in HB Cho, Changes to the National Strategy of the Kim Jong-un Regime and the Limitation of the Strategy of Self-reliance, March 8, 2021, Korea Institute of National Unification, https://www.kinu.or.kr/2021/eng/0308/co21-08e.pdf, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[31]Jonathan Corrado, "North Korea’s New Economic Plan Looks a Lot Like the Old One", Diplomat, January 20, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/north-koreas-new-economic-plan-looks-a-lot-like-the-old-one/, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[32] "N.K. leader urges struggle against non-socialist practices in letter to trade union body", Yonhap News, May 27, 2021, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210527002400325, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[33] "Report on 4th Plenary Meeting of 8th C.C., WPK", KCNA, January 1, 2022, http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.special.getArticlePage.kcmsf, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[34]JoungEun-Lee, "Is the North Korean Economy Under Kim Jong Un in Danger? “Arduous March” in the Age of COVID-19?", 38 North, July 13, 2021https://www.38north.org/2021/07/is-the-north-korean-economy-under-kim-jong-un-in-danger-arduous-march-in-the-age-of-covid-19/, (Accessed on February11, 2021).
[35]Ibid
[36] Rachel Minyoung Lee, "North Korea’s Party Personnel Shuffles: A Reality Check", 38North, July 23, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/07/north-koreas-party-personnel-shuffles-a-reality-check/, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[37]HB Cho, Changes to the National Strategy of the Kim Jong-un Regime and the Limitation of the Strategy of Self-reliance, March 8, 2021, Korea Institute of National Unification, https://www.kinu.or.kr/2021/eng/0308/co21-08e.pdf, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[38]"10 years of Kim Jong-un, where does change go and only the reins of control", Daily NK, March 12, 2021, https://www.dailynk.com/취재파일-김정은-10년-변화는-어디-가고-통제의-고삐/, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[39] Martyn Williams, "North Korea Intensifies War Against Foreign Influence", 38North, November 10, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/11/north-korea-intensifies-war-against-foreign-influence, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[40]"N. Korea to install new surveillance cameras on Sino-NK border", DailyNK, June 26, 2020, https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-install-new-surveillance-cameras-sino-nk-border/ ,(Accessed on February11, 2021)
[41]“Report on 4th Plenary Meeting of 8th C.C., WPK”, RodongShinmun, January 1, 2022, http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2022-01-01-0010, (Accessed on February11, 2021)
[42] Ibid
[43]Ibid
[44]Ibid