In the evolving geopolitical situation, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has affected the international system wherein the possibility of aggressive confrontations between countries has increased. The conflict has had spillover effects in the Indo-Pacific region as well, with many countries viewing China as a power which can initiate an aggressive conflict. This view along with China’s assertive posture in the region including its claims in the South China Sea, East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the Philippine Strait has raised security concerns among the countries here.
China’s assertive use of its economic might and military coercion in the Indo-Pacific region, by advancing unlawful maritime claims, threatening maritime shipping lanes and advancing its military capabilities has impacted the defence outlook of nations in the region. The primary focus is on the need to become self-reliant in terms of maintaining security of their sovereign boundaries. The countries in the region have responded by taking some measures such as strengthening alliances and partnerships, increasing stock of arms, and developing policies of joint deterrence.
This paper will focus on the defence strategies of the three major allies of the US- Japan, the Philippines and Australia, that have come up in the background of the increasing Chinese aggression in the region. It will also examine the terms under which the US collaborates with these countries.
Responses from Japan, the Philippines and Australia
China’s aggression in the region has attracted responses from the regional powers. This section will look at the responses from the three allies of the US in the region – Japan, the Philippines and Australia.
Japan
Japan’s defence posture is evolving from a defensive to offensive posture in recent years as indicated in their National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy and Defense Build-Up Program of December 2022 by the Kishida government along with an announcement of an increase of defence expenditure by 2 per cent from the current level in the next five years till 2027. It is indicative of the country’s interest towards developing its defence infrastructure. The NSS underlines the “security environment and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region” that lists China, North Korea and Russia’s “intensified military activities” that could affect Japan’s national security as the motive behind adopting the strategy.[i]
Japan presents its stance of modernising its military, including its maritime and air force in the backdrop of China's “intensifying attempts to unilaterally change the status quo” of the region and China’s strategy of “taking advantage of other countries’ dependence on China to exert economic pressure on other countries”. The ongoing military activities of China around Taiwan both in air and in maritime spaces that include the launch of several ballistic missiles pose a threat to Japan as they may enter Japan’s sovereign spaces. The joint military activities by Russia and China in the region of the Sea of Okhotsk also pose a concern for its neighbours. [ii]
The Defense Build-Up Program aims to “reinforce” the “stand-off defence capabilities” and the “integrated air and defence capabilities” of Japan to enhance the self-capabilities along with focusing on Flexible Deterrent Options with the US, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) members or other powers such as Canada and the European Union.[iii] Aiming to enhance its self-defence forces, Japan seeks to continue development of its missiles for better counter-strike capabilities and further promote the transfer of defence equipment and technology with allies for developing security cooperation. This would act as a mutual relationship between countries to serve as a base for partnership.
The NSS focused on six elements of “comprehensive national power” upon which the goals of three desired capabilities – defence, technology and intelligence – revolved around China's rising threat. To counter this threat, Japan seeks to advance its alliance with the US by cooperation in “diplomacy, defence and economy”. Further, Japan plans to strengthen its ties with “like-minded” neighbours such as India and Australia through QUAD, focusing on improving bilateral training and exercises, joint development of defence equipment and transfer of defence equipment and technology. [iv]
There is a desire to become “self-reliant” by diversifying Japan’s defence capabilities and ties with other countries and regions. This can be observed through the deals that it has made in the recent past. In January 2023, Japan along with Italy and the UK announced plans to merge their fighter jet development programs. Japan has also signed a contract of 380 billion yen ($2.8 billion) with the country’s largest defence exporter Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for mass producing long-range missiles by 2026.
Along with developing its own defence capabilities, Japan also seeks to advance its security infrastructure by collaborating with the US. The strategy of Joint Deterrence as outlined in the NSS document implies the use of the deterrent power of the US to counter the threat of China in the region. This allows the US to counter China by making a presence in the region through Japan’s geographical location. The provision of giving the US, the authority over re-aligning their forces across Japan’s coastlines along with Japan’s Marine Corps Air Station in Futenma serves the US’ interests. Joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations are of mutual interest to address common challenges.
The Philippines
The Philippines in its National Defense Strategy 2018–2022 has placed challenges to the “territorial integrity and maritime domain” as the topmost factors of consideration.[v] The document talks of two flashpoints: the West Philippine Sea, which is a part of the larger South China Sea, and the creation of artificial islands by China in several areas of the South China Sea, which could probably be used as military bases, as the major security concerns to the Philippines' territorial integrity and sovereignty. Another flashpoint as described in the document is the case of overlapping claims by Taiwan, China and Japan in the Northeast Sea in the region of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
The Philippines uses two strategic ideas to further its goals of national security – Self-Reliance Defense Posture and Joint Deterrence.[vi] The National Defense Strategy focuses on the self-reliant defence posture. In this effort, the Philippines Aerospace Limited has signed a deal with India for US $374.96 in January 2022, for procuring BrahMos cruise missiles for the Philippines mariners. The Philippines also seeks to gain support from the major powers in the region against Chinese aggression. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement shortly after AUKUS Summit in March 2023, in which it welcomed AUKUS as “significant partnerships or arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region”, which collectively "support our pursuit of deeper regional cooperation and sustained economic vitality and resilience". The Philippines has called the deal "essential to our national development and to the security of the region".[vii]
The second strategic idea is Joint Deterrence through its security relations with the US to counter the threat of China by allowing the stationing of the US troops in the Philippines.[viii] Both the US and the Philippines have their respective national interests that bring them together to commit to the goal of a free and open navigation in the South China Sea.
The US is the only “treaty ally” of the Philippines and its major security partner. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which was revised in 2015 as Enhanced Defense Cooperation Treaty (EDCA), advances the MDT for boosting defence relations through cooperation in “interoperability, capacity building, maritime security and maritime domain awareness”.[ix] In February 2023, the Philippines announced it will provide the US forces access to four additional military bases leading the count to nine from five. In May 2023, Secretary of Defense Llyod James Austin of the US and Presidential Advisor Carlito Galvez of the Philipinnes signed the Bilateral Defense Guidelines to cooperate on the vision of an “open and free Indo-Pacific region”.[x] The guidelines form the basis for cooperation anywhere in the region of the South China Sea in case of an armed attack on any of the public vessels, aircrafts or armed forces of Philippines. Further, there are reports of a full-time defence attaché of the US to be stationed in Manila.
Australia
The relationship between China and Australia has shown a downward trend. China’s increased aggression in the South China Sea, growing engagements with Pacific Island Nations and bilateral tensions in the Australia-China relations have raised security concerns. Australia’s Defense Strategic Review, 2023 states that: “China’s assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea threatens the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific in a way that adversely impacts Australia’s national interests.”[xi] It establishes that Australia can pursue its national interests in the region of the Indo-Pacific by exercising “coercive” power. Australia has to therefore, invest in the “pillars of national strength”, i.e., by making the Australian Defense Force more capable and stronger. The policy directs the government to take special notice to improve the capacity of “border security, law enforcement and intelligence”.[xii]
The AUKUS deal between UK, US and Australia comes under this backdrop of the Australian government requirement to buy submarines capable of operating far from home bases in order to act as a deterrent and as an assault capability in the event of a crisis. The deal was criticised by China and caused some tensions in the bilateral relations of Australia and China. Australia, in March 2023, announced that it will buy long-range missiles from the US to further its long air-strike capabilities.
The US is Australia’s biggest security ally and it supports the former's extensive involvement in the economic and security concerns of the region, which has been and remains crucial to the Indo-Pacific region's peace and development. Many of Australia's allies like Japan, South Korea, etc. support the US' extensive involvement in the region that maintains regional stability. The US alliance with Australia promotes Australia's international objectives and advances the interests of both nations. Australia seeks to gain self-reliance in national strength. The US, on the other hand, seeks to have a strong hold in the region to counter China’s maritime presence by collaborating with Australia. Therefore, the national interests of both the countries converge.
Conclusion
It can be seen that the countries in the region, despite seeking China’s support for their economic engagement, are wary and opposed to China’s claims over the South China Sea both for economic and for security reasons. Therefore, the countries are advancing their military capabilities as a response to China’s aggressive posture in the region.
Along with Joint Deterrence through seeking alliance with the US, there is a clear desire for being self-reliant for security which can be observed among the countries. They seek to engage with the US as a security partner, which also allows the US to continue to deepen its engagements with its allies while maintaining its military presence in the region.
The strategies adopted by the countries for modernising their military and cooperating with the US for Joint Deterrence are intended to bring stability in the region by maintaining the balance of power. The recent decision of the US towards opening an office of NATO in Japan shows the US interest in the region and other European powers in the Indo-Pacific. Regional and global responses to Chinese aggressive posture in the Indo-Pacific are acquiring a gradual momentum. How the behavior of regional countries in the Indo-Pacific pans out in the backdrop of intensifying US-China rivalry remains to be seen.
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*Elina Ghosh, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views are of the author.
Endnotes
[i] Ministry of Japan. “National Security Strategy of Japan”, 2022. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (Accessed on June 8, 2023)
[ii] Ministry of Japan. “National Defense Strategy of Japan”, 2022. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/content/000120033.pdf (Accessed on June 8, 2023)
[iii] Ministry of Japan. “Defense Build-Up Program”, 2022. https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/plan/pdf/program_en.pdf (Accessed on June 9, 2023)
[iv] Ministry of Japan. “National Security Strategy of Japan”, 2022. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (Accessed on June 8, 2023)
[v] Department of National Defense, Republic of Philippines. “National Defense Strategy 2018–2022”, November 2018. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2018/philippines-national-defense-strategy_2018-2022_201811.pdf (Accessed on June 12, 2023)
[vi] ibid
[vii] ibid
[viii] ibid
[ix] ibid
[x] US Department of Defense. “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines”, May 2023. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3383607/fact-sheet-us-philippines-bilateral-defense-guidelines/ (Accessed on June 12, 2023)
[xi] Australian Government. “National Defense: Defense Strategic Review”, April 23, 2023. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review (Accessed on June 26, 2023)
[xii] ibid