Even before Russian President Vladimir Putin could land in Vietnam on June 19 for a state visit, the United States had taken a negative view of this development and the US Embassy, with reference to the situation in Ukraine, which is now in its third year, said that “no country should give Putin a platform to promote his war of aggression and otherwise allow him to normalise his atrocities.”[i] This observation was followed by a visit by the American Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel J. Kritenbrink, to Hanoi between June 21 and 22.[ii]
What is to be noted is that Vietnam, unlike some other Southeast and East Asian countries, has had a measured approach to the Ukrainian crisis and has neither been vocal in its criticism of Russian involvement in the developments in Eastern Europe nor has it come openly in favour of Kyiv, despite being encouraged to do so from various quarters. However, Vietnam has been very conscious of the principal question of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, given that there are challenges in this regard nearer home.
Why was Putin in Vietnam?
The visit by President Putin between 19 and 20 June 2024, came after he visited the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea) in the preceding two days. Given the choice of countries and the timing, both visits are seen as interesting developments. The most obvious observation that has been made is that Russia is breaking free from international isolation and the sanctions regime that the West has imposed on Moscow over the past three years because of the developments in Ukraine.
The visit to Hanoi came at the invitation of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nguyen Phu Trong. Apart from his engagement with the General Secretary, Putin had interacted with President To Lam, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Chairman of the National Assembly Tran Thanh Man.[iii]
Russia was the first country with whom Vietnam signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2001 and this year marks the 25 years of this partnership. Moreover the two countries have enjoyed close ties since the days of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union being one of the closest partners of Vietnam even during the height of the US-Vietnam War.
The two sides inked as many as 11 agreements but not all have been made public.[iv] The areas of cooperation cover spheres like civil nuclear energy, agriculture, tourism, energy and petrol cooperation, education and disease prevention. According to President Lam, the two countries desire “to push up cooperation in defence and security, how to deal with non-traditional security challenges based on international law, for peace and security in the region and the world.”[v]
This aspect of defence cooperation is significant as 80 per cent of Vietnam’s military equipment is of Russian origin, thus making Moscow an integral partner in Hanoi’s security calculus. This partnership has only deepened with time. In a leaked document from the Vietnamese Finance Ministry of March 2023, Hanoi, to modernise its military, had proposed to pay for Russian arms imports via Rusvietpetro, a joint venture between the two that operates in the hydrocarbon sector in Siberia. Such a proposal is significant as it can be a means for Hanoi to circumvent the sanction regime of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).[vi]
Beyond the Visit
What makes the visit important for President Putin is the choice of countries. DPRK, owing to the Western sanction and its own isolation policies, is a natural partner for Moscow, and both Russia and DPRK share a similar antipathy towards the West and the Western-led global order. On the other hand, Hanoi, which has recalibrated its ties with the West and especially with the US over the past few decades, is signalling to its partners that Vietnam will engage with the rest of the world on terms that keep Hanoi’s interests at the forefront. This is of note as one of the primary security concerns of Vietnam stems from the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, where Russian energy companies, like Zarubezhneft, have commercial interests.[vii]
What makes the South China Sea dispute important is that Beijing, with its aggressive posture in these waters, is seen as one of Moscow’s closest partners, especially in the era of sanctions. China is also seen as one of the few partners of Pyongyang, with whom President Putin, during his recent visit has concluded a strategic pact of mutual security assistance and mutual aid in the event of “aggression” from a third party. The Russia-DPRK ‘alliance’ thus marks a geopolitical shift; possibly marking the early days of a trilateral arrangement that would also include China.
In his Vietnam leg of the tour, President Putin was keeping focus on existing bilateral relationship and strengthening the same. Of note was that Vietnam had expressed its desire for Russian defence assistance and also in addressing non-traditional security challenges within the ambit of international law. By reference to such defence cooperation with Russia, Hanoi has also expressed its discomfort with China's aggressive posturing in the disputed South China Sea, without explicitly saying so.
In this context, the preplanned visit of Daniel J. Kritenbrink, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, to Hanoi is to be seen. The US, which has a comprehensive strategic partnership with Vietnam, has been working with this Southeast Asian nation to broaden ties for mutual benefit. Incidentally, Daniel J. Kritenbrink’s visit comes on the 30th anniversary of the US lifting trade embargos on Vietnam in 1994.[viii]
In hosting both the Russian President and a senior American diplomat back-to-back, Hanoi displayed its dexterity in managing its relationship with its external partners, without compromising on issues which are at the core of Vietnam’s national interests nor becoming entangled in the bilateral ties between its external partners.
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*Dr. Sripathi Narayanan, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.
[i] Aniruddha Ghosal, “A U.S. envoy visits Hanoi days after Putin, saying US-Vietnam trust is at ‘all-time high’”, Associated Press, June 22, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/vietnam-us-russia-kritenbrink-cc1873bee97218b50013bfdc3fdc5c10, accessed on June 24, 2024.
[ii] Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink’s Travel to Hanoi, US Department of State, June 2, 2024, https://www.state.gov/assistant-secretary-kritenbrinks-travel-to-hanoi/, accessed on June 24, 2024.
[iii] Full text of Vietnam - Russia Joint Declaration, Vietnam.Vn, June 20, 2024, https://www.vietnam.vn/en/toan-van-tuyen-bo-chung-viet-nam-nga/, accessed on June 24, 2024.
[iv] Khanh Vu and Minh Nguyen, “Visiting Vietnam, Putin seeks new 'security architecture' for Asia”, Reuters, June 21, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-president-putin-arrives-vietnam-state-visit-2024-06-19/, accessed on June 27, 2024.
[v] SD Pradhan, “Putin visits Vietnam: Reflects Vietnam’s growing global stature and confidence in its approach,” Times of India, June 21, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/putin-visits-vietnam-reflects-vietnams-growing-global-stature-and-confidence-in-its-approach/, accessed on June 24, 202.4
[vi] David Hutt, “Russia's Putin in Hanoi: What does Vietnam hope to gain?” Deutsche Welle, June 21, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/russias-putin-in-hanoi-what-does-vietnam-hope-to-gain/a-69438435, accessed on June 24, 2024.
[vii] Aniruddha Ghosal, “Putin signs deals with Vietnam in bid to shore up ties in Asia to offset Moscow’s growing isolation,” Associate Press, June 20, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/vietnam-russia-putin-visit-98891f7ec2565b79e4c255a7d7d2f6ed, accessed on June 24, 2024.
[viii] “30th Anniversary of Lifting of the Trade Embargo,” US Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam, February 7, 2024, https://vn.usembassy.gov/30th-anniversary-of-lifting-of-the-trade-embargo/, accessed on June 24, 2024.