In the recently concluded elections for the European Parliament (EP), the far-right parties have made significant gains in vote percentage and seats. In Germany and France, the far-right parties have jolted the mainstream liberal, socialist and centrist parties, while in Italy, Georgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy emerged as the largest party with 24 seats, significantly boosting her position in domestic as well as EU politics. Such has been the impact of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France (winning 30 of France’s 81 seats in the EP) that President Macron had to dissolve the National Assembly and call for snap elections.[i] In the first round of the election which took place on 30th June, the National Rally has emerged as the largest party with 33.15 % of the votes. It is expected to win anything between 230 and 280 seats (289 seat is required for an absolute majority) in the second round of voting which is scheduled to take place on 7th July. Although the NR is expected to fall short of majority, its performance in the election will have a long-term impact on the French and European politics. In Germany, the far-right and extremist Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second (with 16% votes and 15 seats) in the elections to the European Parliament despite being hit by a string of scandals involving espionage for China[ii], having close links with Russia, and having a sympathetic attitude towards Hitler’s Waffen-SS.[iii] Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) came in third.
This issue brief looks at the far-right’s plan for Europe on some of the critical issues faced by the European Union, such as security, migration, climate change and EU enlargement and is not an account of the performance of these far-right parties which has its own nuances. Despite winning in some of the major countries, the far-right parties are still miles away from the majority and not in a position to propel decision making in the EU. The mainstream centrists, socialists and liberals still dominate the EP. Besides, the right-wing is not ideologically united on many issues being faced by Europe, and these divisions have prevented them from becoming one super-group in the European Parliament.
The Emergence of the Far-Right Parties in Europe
Although far-right political parties have always existed, they constitute Europe’s most influential political movement today. The recent performance of some of these parties has reinforced this view that Europe is, slowly but steadily, headed towards the far-right of the political spectrum, as shown by the mainstreaming of these parties in countries like Italy, Hungary, France, Germany, Spain, Austria and the Netherlands.[iv]
Although many scholars have widely analysed the rise of right-wing populism in Europe, they have not yet reached a consensus as to what exactly constitutes a far-right. This could be one reason that after a long period of slumber in European politics the far-right has gained momentum only in recent years.[v] Today, with the rise of these parties, the ideas of excessive nationalism, authoritarianism, protectionism and the politics of exclusion, which were once discarded, are slowly gaining ground.[vi]
Once isolated and on the periphery of the political spectrum, the far-right parties, in recent years, have emerged as principal opposition parties and, in some cases, have joined coalition governments with mainstream right-wing and centrist parties.[vii] There are many drivers responsible for this shift in European politics. Some of them are illegal migration, rising Euroscepticism, frustration with the mainstream political parties and their leaders for financial mismanagement and economic fallout of the war in Ukraine.
The economic and social factors, such as the worsening economic conditions and the cultural fears arising out of illegal immigration across Europe, have combined with the political factors, like the prevalent disunity of the mainstream left-wing opposition parties and the mismanagement of the economy by the neo-liberal centre-right parties, to facilitate the mainstreaming of the far-right parties.[viii] The political mainstreaming and normalisation of these far-right parties owes to a two-way process: first, the centre-right, liberal and other mainstream parties increasingly adopting far-right stances on issues such as migration and climate change, and second, the far-right parties moderating and softening their views on issues that could harm them in the election to increase their acceptability.[ix]
How is the Far-right organised inside the European Parliament?
Although candidates fight the election based on the symbols of their respective parties, they identify themselves with one of the existing seven groups in the European Parliament once they win an election to become a Member of the European Parliament (MEP). Thus, MEPs are not organised by their respective nationalities but by their political affiliations in the European Parliament.
These seven groups are the centrist European People’s Party (EPP), the centre-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the liberal Renew Europe, the climate-anxious Greens or the European Free Alliance (EFA), the right-wing conservative and populist European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) and the Left Group.
The members of the right-wing populist and far-right parties generally identify with either the Conservative and Reformists (ECR) group or the Identity and Democracy (ID) group. The ECR, which proclaims itself as the centre-right, unites right-wing and conservative populist parties from the EU member countries, such as Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, the Polish Law & Justice Party and the United Poland, the Swedish Vox, the Alliance Germany and the Finns Party from Finland. With 83 seats in the EP the ECR is the third largest group and accordingly Meloni, a key leader of the group, wants this number to reflect in the allocation of top positions in the EU.
Identity and Democracy is a group of the far-right and populist parties in the European Parliament. It includes parties such as the National Rally of France, Lega of Italy, the Freedom Party of Austria, Vlaams Belang of Sweden, the Conservatives People’s Party of Estonia, the Danish People’s Party of Denmark, the Freedom and Direct Democracy of Czechia and the Party for Freedom of the Netherlands. The ID group is the fifth largest group in the EP with 58 MEPs on its side. Given the extreme stances the group often takes, the mainstream groups avoid making any compromises and reject negotiating with them.
Besides, there are other right-wing populists and far-right parties, such as the AfD of Germany, Fidesz of Hungary and the Polish Confederation, who have not joined any group in the EP. The AfD used to be a member of the ID, which was evicted from the group in May this year. The Fidesz, led by Hungary’s Victor Orban, was a member of the EPP and decided to walk out of the group in 2021.
Despite many common agendas, like opposition to immigrants and strict climate action, the European far-right movement is not a united front.[x] These far-right parties sometimes have very different and contradictory views on some of the fundamental issues Europe is facing today.[xi] The most critical among them is the war in Ukraine, the security and defence of Europe, and EU reforms and expansion, which will be explored in the next section of this paper.
Thus, there are at least two faces of the far-right in Europe and two visions for the continent. It would be wrong to put all the groups in one category and analyse them as a single entity. Ideally, the ECR and the ID, should be studied together to highlight the nuances of the European far-right movement accurately. However, this paper will only look at the ideas and programmes of the Identity and Democracy group, as they are the ones who are more radical in approach with and are hard to deal with.
Identity and Democracy and Their Vision for Europe
Although the right-wing camp in the European Union is divided into two, the ECR and the ID, and some other parties are not members of either of the two, it is Identity and Democracy, which is the EU’s most right-wing and populist far-right group known for its hard Euroscepticism, tough stance on immigration and climate change delayism.
Unlike the other groups in the EP, the ID group did not release any manifesto or a priority list that could articulate their vision for Europe in one single document. Similarly, they also did not have a lead candidate for the President of the European Commission, like other groups, who could present a clear vision of the group on different platforms.
The Identity and Democracy group succeeded the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group, which remained active in the European Parliament from 2015 to 2019. The ENF also united far-right populist parties, such as France’s National Front (now the National Rally), the Italian Lega, the Dutch Party for Freedom and the Vlaams Belang of Sweden.
In 2019, the ENF was transformed into the Identity and Democracy group, which again united Eurosceptics with the agenda of decentralising the EU by weakening the EU bureaucracy and strengthening the sovereignty of the EU member states.[xii] In a debate before the 2024 EP elections, Anders Vistesen, an MEP of the ID groups, said that “Brussels has become a swamp. A swamp where unelected bureaucrats are going to utilise their vision of a European federalised superstate. And we have to stop that. That is why our campaign promise today is that we will begin by firing 10,000 bureaucrats in Brussels.” Of course, the ID group, with only 58 MEPs, is not in a position to do that.
This section will explore the ID’s agenda on four key issues: 1. Migration 2. Climate change 3. The EU reforms and enlargement and 4. Security and defence of Europe while also exploring the key points of convergence and divergences among the right-wing conservatives and far-right groups.
On the question of migration, the right-wing conservatives and the far-right parties have a similar demand: stop illegal migration, strengthen and reinforce the sovereignty of the European borders. Thus, for the Identity and Democracy group as well as the European Conservatives and Reformists, fortifying the European borders and halting immigration, along with reinforcement of national identities, are the needs of the hour to prevent uncontrolled migration. Building on this, the ID group has also opposed the possibility of Turkey, a non-European country, joining the European Union.[xiii] The member parties of the ID group, all anti-immigrants, have been able to successfully challenge the immigration debates in their respective countries in particular and in the EU in general. These parties have capitalised on the cultural, economic and security fears associated with large-scale immigration, especially from Arab and African countries, and have even forced the mainstream parties to adopt tough narratives on immigration for the fear of losing votes.[xiv]
There is another domain where these parties are more united than divided: the EU’s actions on climate change, where the parties are advocating energy autonomy along with pragmatic and localised climate strategies rather than fancy commitments. The poor performance of the Greens and the rise of the right-wing parties will have a twofold impact on the EU’s climate agenda. First, weaker Greens would not be in a position to negotiate and push for strict mitigation and adaptation policies. Secondly, the far-right parties could disrupt the implementation of controversial EU policies on climate change, such as the Green Deal, the Natural Restoration Law and the Critical Raw Materials Act.[xv]
The Green Deal, “a package of policy initiatives that aim to set the EU on the path of green transition, with the ultimate goal of reaching climate neutrality by 2050,”[xvi] has been particularly opposed by the far-right parties. The Identity and Democracy group has criticised the Green Deal, a result of “extreme green fanaticism,” as entirely unrealistic, with the target goals unachievable within the time frame.[xvii] The ID, instead, proposes a “realistic assessment and greater flexibility in target implementation” to “protect the European agricultural and industrial supply chains” and reduce the “reliance on non-EU countries for the production and consumption of basic goods.”[xviii] As the far-right parties gain more influence and say inside the European Parliament, mainstream parties, such as the centre-right EPP, are expected to embrace certain parts of the far-right climate delayism. The EPP has already rejected a ban policy on combustion engines in its manifesto.[xix]
The right-wing camp-comprising the conservatives, far-right and even extreme right- have always failed to reach a common ground on relationship with Russia. However, the differences are not limited to Russia only and extend to other dimensions of foreign policy such as the Euro-Atlantic alliance, relations with China and the expansion of the European Union. The ECR group considers enlargement “a key instrument for Europe’s stability and prosperity.” It has welcomed the future EU accession of Ukraine and Moldova and the granting of candidate status to Georgia.[xx] The ECR leaders support the existence of the EU but are in favour of greater autonomy and sovereignty for the member states while opposing further centralisation of the bloc. The Identity and Democracy group, on the other hand, is home to known Eurosceptics such as Le Pen and Geert Wilders, who have opposed any attempt to expand the bloc. The members of the ID group are not at all compatible with the idea of the European Union, at least in its current form of existence, and vehemently oppose any kind of treaty change that could further empower the EU.[xxi]
However, there has been a growing trend of softening the hardline Euroscepticism in favour of reforming the bloc from the inside. Geert Wilders, whose party now rules the Netherlands in a coalition, had dropped his pledge to conduct a Brexit-like referendum called Nexit when elections to the European Parliament approached.[xxii] On the same lines, Marine Le Pen, who once hailed Brexit as a freedom movement, has now officially abandoned her call for Frexit and the revival of the French franc.[xxiii] The National Rally has also backtracked on certain other promises, such as withdrawing from NATO’s strategic military command, a poll promise of Le Pen’s 2022 presidential campaign.[xxiv]
However, when it comes to reforms and internal expansion of the EU, the two factions stand together on opposing greater power to the European Commission and also jointly oppose any dilution of the veto powers of the Member States that could convert the EU into a European superstate.
The far-right groups are divided when it comes to the security and defence of Europe, especially in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. On the question of the Ukraine War, the ECR remains strongly pro-Ukraine and has advocated aid, weapons, financial support for Ukraine and tough sanctions on Russia. The Identity and Democracy group, on the other hand, though it has advocated for Ukraine’s sovereignty, has not been a vocal critique of Russia, and often, the parties inside the ID have been accused of having close ties with Russia. Thus, geostrategic issues remain a critical point of fissure among the parties on the right and the far-right of the European political spectrum. From a clear transatlantic orientation and support for Ukraine to a fundamental opposition and even an anti-western stance the right-wing camp stands divided and fragmented. This division is easily reflected in the voting behaviour of these parties in the European Parliament.
Conclusion
Despite the media hype and public noise, the fact remains that the far-right parties are divided among their approaches on various issues, and hence they have not been able to directly impact the policy choices of the EU. Even in the recently concluded elections, the far-right parties fell short of their expected gains, and although they performed well in countries like France and Germany, their gain was not a universal trend in Europe.
A direct far-right impact on the functioning of the European Parliament could be possible only if all the right-wing populists and far-right parties decide to form one supergroup — a possibility that seems distant as these parties remain divided ideologically. The only possibility here is that these parties may achieve some occasional collaboration on issues of common interest, such as migration and climate change, and influence policymaking in Brussels.
As far as the Identity and Democracy group is concerned, its final tally in a 720-member European Parliament is only 58. Thus, the group is not in a position to singlehandedly influence the policy decisions in Brussels. On the other hand, the grand alliance of the other centrist, socialist and liberal parties still enjoy a majority in the parliament. Overall, the European Parliament will not see any radical change of path, and more or less, the earlier policies will continue. But one thing can be said with certainty: as the far-right parties get more recognition and acceptance, this will impact the political dynamics and functioning of the mainstream centrist and conservative parties, who have already made some course corrections on issues such as climate change and migration to retain their voters.
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*Aman Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] France 24. “Macron says he called snap elections to prevent rise of far right in 2027 presidential vote,” June 12, 2024 France 24, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240612-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-france-s-macron-unveils-battle-plan-for-snap-elections (Accessed June 23, 2024).
[ii] Kate Connolly. “AfD politician’s aide arrested on suspicion of spying for China,” The Guardian, April 23, 2024 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/23/afd-politician-employee-arrested-germany-on-suspicion-of-spying-for-china#:~:text=A%20close%20adviser%20to%20a,to%20have%20come%20to%20light. (Accessed June 23, 2024).
[iii] Nette Nostlinger. “German conservatives first, far right AfD second in EU elections,” Politico, June 09, 2024 https://www.politico.eu/article/conservatives-finish-first-germany-eu-election-early-projection-cdu-csu/ (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[iv] John Henley. “How Europe’s far-right is marching steadily into the mainstream,” The Guardian, June 30, 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/30/far-right-on-the-march-europe-growing-taste-for-control-and-order (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[v] Britta Peterson. “The brown chameleon: Europe’s populism crisis and the re-emergence of the far right,” Observer Research Foundation, February 22, 2018 https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-brown-chameleon-europe-s-populism-crisis-and-the-re-emergence-of-the-far-right (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] Efi Koutosokosta. “Why the far-right is increasingly getting into power across Europe,” Euronews, June 19, 2023 https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/06/19/why-the-far-right-is-increasingly-getting-into-power-across-europe (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[viii] AS Prem. “The creeping ascent of the Far-Right in mainstream European politics and how to stop it,” London School of Economic, February 06, 2024 https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lseupr/2024/02/06/the-creeping-ascent-of-the-far-right-in-mainstream-european-politics-and-how-to-stop-it/ (Accessed June 20, 2024)
[ix] John Henley. “How Europe’s far-right is marching steadily into the mainstream,” The Guardian, June 30, 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/30/far-right-on-the-march-europe-growing-taste-for-control-and-order (Accessed June 20, 2024)
[x]Marion Dupont. ”How the far right envisions Europe,” Le Monde, June 8, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2024/06/08/how-the-far-right-envisions-europe_6674195_23.html (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[xi] Madhur Sharma. “Europe’s shift to far-right is just the half story. How to read EU election results,” Firstpost, June 18, 2024 https://www.firstpost.com/world/europe-shift-to-far-right-is-just-half-the-story-how-to-read-eu-election-results-13783627.html (Accessed June 22, 2024)
[xii] Reuters. “France’s Le Pen unveils new far-right European Parliament group,” Reuters, June 13, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-jobs-lepen-idUKKCN1TE1IO/ (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[xiii] ID. “Identity”, The Identity and Democracy” https://www.idgroup.eu/identity (Accessed 23 June 2024).
[xiv] Armida van Riji. “How will gains by the far-right affect the European Parliament and EU?” Chatham House, June 11, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/06/how-will-gains-far-right-affect-european-parliament-and-eu (Accessed June 23, 2024).
[xv] Armida van Riji. “How will gains by the far-right affect the European Parliament and EU?” Chatham House, June 11, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/06/how-will-gains-far-right-affect-european-parliament-and-eu (Accessed June 23, 2024).
[xvi] EC. “European Green Deal,” European Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/ (Accessed June 23, 2024).
[xvii] Marco Zanni. “Green Deal: Wrong targets and no results,” Identity and Democracy, July 12, 2023 https://www.idgroup.eu/green_deal_zanni (Accessed June 23, 2024).
[xviii] Ibid.
[xix] Sean Goulding Carrol. “EPP group vows to revise combustion engine ban ‘as soon as possible,’” Euractive, January 23, 2024 https://www.euractiv.com/section/transport/news/epp-group-vows-to-revise-combustion-engine-ban-as-soon-as-possible/ (Accessed June 23, 2024).
[xx]ECR. “Enlargement policy: key for stability and prosperity,” European Conservative and Reformists, November 08, 2023 https://ecrgroup.eu/article/enlargement_policy_key_for_stability_and_prosperity (Accessed June 20, 2024).
[xxi] ibid
[xxii] Cagan Koc. “Wilders drops pledge to leave EU ahead of European elections,” Bloomberg, April 5, 2024 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-05/wilders-drops-pledge-to-leave-eu-ahead-of-european-elections (Accessed June 23, 2024).
[xxiii] John Lichfield. “Is Macron’s gamble France’s Brexit moment,” Politico, June 13, 2024 https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen-france-brexit-moment-elections-ursula-von-der-leyen-electorate/ (Accessed June 23, 2024).
[xxiv] Nicholas Garriga and Elise Morton. “Far-right leader Bardella backpedals on taking France out of NATO strategic military command,” AP, June 19, 2024 https://apnews.com/article/france-election-jordan-bardella-nato-37ddf1a661df6d10441d33dcad6c3bf4 (Accessed June 23, 2024).