Introduction
Though landlocked, Kazakhstan’s strategic location enables it to be a transit conduit, and this is a critical aspect of its geopolitical significance. This central position in the heart of Eurasia, coupled with its abundant natural resources, further enhances Kazakhstan’s prominence. The country’s rich resources, including oil, gas, and minerals, not only attract the attention of major international powers, such as the United States, Russia, China, the European Union, Turkey, India, and Iran, but also underline its potential as a critical player in the global economy. Kazakhstan’s geopolitical and geo-economic landscape underscores the importance of its foreign policy trajectories.
Following its independence in the early 1990s, Kazakhstan faced an economic crisis due to a decline in industrial output and hyperinflation. These circumstances necessitated a strategic approach to foreign policy formulation primarily based on economic diversification. Under the leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev, its first President, Kazakhstan demonstrated strategic foresight by making decisive choices, including accelerating the growth of its energy industry and maintaining a balance between the strategic influence of China, its historical ties to Russia, and its engagement with the West. Furthermore, the impact of Kazakhstan’s multifaceted approach on its decision-making and its ability to overcome challenges is evident in its proactive choices, including strengthening security and economic relations with Iran, a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India and signing a ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’ with Turkey.
Under the Nazarbayev administration, Kazakhstan developed a pragmatic and balanced foreign policy called ‘Multivector’. This approach, designed to safeguard its negotiating position and prevent any single country from exerting excessive influence over its resources, has been a critical driver of Kazakhstan’s steady rise as a regional power over the past 32 years of independence. The ‘Multivector’ policy has enabled the country to navigate the intricacies of international relations, ensuring its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Formulation of Kazakhstan’s Multivector Foreign Policy
The formulation of Kazakhstan's foreign policy was primarily driven and augmented by the immediate evolution of the global and regional geopolitical environment due to disintegration of Soviet Union. In 1992, President Nazarbayev outlined his vision for foreign policy in his statement, ‘Strategy of the Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State’.[i] In addition to pursuing its foreign policy objectives, Nazarbayev concentrated on a multipronged strategy, particularly for Kazakhstan’s security and economic growth.
Implementing a multivector foreign policy and engaging in multilateral diplomacy were outlined in ‘The 1995 Concept of Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy’.[ii] This approach called for diversifying international relations, addressing the country’s immediate needs and pursuing plans for regional integration. In shaping Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy, ties with Russia and China were strengthened. Significantly, during the period, Kazakhstan also deepened its ties with the West, a relationship that has been significant for the country’s economic development.
After the 9/11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy further underwent significant changes. These events reshaped the global geopolitical landscape, necessitating Kazakhstan to reevaluate its regional role and interests. The revised foreign policy concept, approved in 2005 during the tenure of then-Foreign Minister Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, now President, directly responded to these new challenges.[iii] One of the significant issues was safeguarding Kazakhstan’s interests as a regional leader at a time when the country’s development priorities still required a focus on economics before politics, a principle that the foreign policy strategy began to adhere to.
In 2014, Kazakhstan adopted the ‘Foreign Policy Concept for 2014-2020’, introducing the concept of a ‘proactive foreign policy’. The principles outlined in the “Strategy Kazakhstan-2050” during President Nazarbayev’s speech to the Kazakh people were the foundation for developing this concept. This concept continues the core beliefs of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy’s goals, objectives, methods, priorities, and duties based on its multivector policy.[iv]
Power Transition and Its Impact
Before initiating a power transition, President Nazarbayev began implementing constitutional reforms to limit some of the President’s power. In July 2018, the Law ‘On the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ came into effect, granting the President, Nazarbayev, the position of lifelong Chairman of the Security Council.[v] The transition of power in Kazakhstan, a significant event in the country's political landscape, unfolded in March 2019 when President Nazarbayev announced his resignation. He handed over the presidency to then-Senate Chairperson Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
In March 2020, President Tokayev proposed another foreign policy concept for the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020–2030, but it had only minimal changes.[vi] This concept was ratified during the tenure of Kazakhstan’s former President Nazarbayev as the Security Council Chairperson and outlined the principles underpinning Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy, including multilateralism, pragmatism and proactivity. These principles continue to serve as a comprehensive guide for the country’s strategic direction, reflecting Kazakhstan’s vision and priorities.
In January 2022, Kazakhstan faced its most severe domestic crisis since gaining independence. What started as public protests against energy prices quickly spiralled into widespread rioting. In the face of this crisis, President Tokayev took decisive action by seeking assistance from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).[vii] The January 2022 event challenged the country’s internal stability and marked a shift in Kazakhstan’s international relations. It also marked the culmination of a complex power transfer process with the dismissal of President Nazarbayev as Security Council Chairperson in response to the unrest.
The protests in January 2022 and the Russia-Ukraine crisis placed Kazakhstan in a difficult position, necessitating a significant policy change and extreme caution on both the domestic and international fronts. President Tokayev announced in April 2023 the need to revise Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Concept for 2020–2030.[viii] This revision, he emphasised, is crucial in ensuring that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy remains effective and adaptive in the evolving geopolitical landscape. Subsequently, during an interview in January 2024, President Tokayev underscored the resilience of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.[ix] He emphasised that the nation's foreign policy will be guided by national interests and strategic tasks. He also stated that domestic stability in Kazakhstan has been globally recognised, with the growing interest in Central Asia and the increasing demand for the C5+ dialogue platform.
Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Reiteration of Multivector Foreign Policy
Despite the significant internal unrest it had experienced in January 2022, Kazakhstan’s response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict was marked by a commitment to reiterating its multivector foreign policy trajectories. Kazakhstan’s deepening economic ties with China, engaging in political dialogue with the United States, and expanding trade and connectivity with Europe demonstrate its ability to navigate complex geopolitical situations. More importantly, Kazakhstan’s fostering cultural exchanges with Turkiye, focusing on regional integration, actively participating in different peace processes and multilateral organisations, strengthening the ties with India and Iran, and reaching out to countries including Qatar and Singapore, all reflect the strategic nature of its Multivector foreign policy trajectories.
Calculated Response to Russia
Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Kazakhstan has pursued a two-pronged strategy towards the Russian Federation. Kazakhstan’s objective has been to lessen the challenges it could face due to the crisis in the background of its relations with Moscow. The influence of Russia on Kazakhstan can be exemplified by Russia’s support for Tokayev during the January 2022 crisis in Kazakhstan. This external influence has undoubtedly shaped Kazakhstan’s approach, as evidenced by its voting patterns during the major United Nations Security Council’s resolutions on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, where Kazakhstan mostly abstained. After the Russia-Ukraine crisis, President Tokayev also visited Moscow on various occasions, including to attend the Victory Parade.
In January 2024, during an interview, he reiterated that Russia is a key ally and strategic partner for Kazakhstan, with a robust foundation of interstate relations built over the past 30 years, as evidenced by over 300 agreements in various fields.[x] As Russia’s crucial transit and economic partner, Kazakhstan has seen a significant increase in importance, particularly in circumventing Western sanctions. This strategic role has boosted Kazakhstan’s exports to Russia in 2022 and underscored the country's growing influence. Customs and trade facilitations established through the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) have been instrumental in facilitating this growth.
However, in June 2022, at the plenary session of the 25th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), President Tokayev refused to recognise the self-proclaimed independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, collectively known as Donbas, as independent states. He added that Kazakhstan does not recognise Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia, and the same applies to Donetsk and Luhansk.[xi] This refusal demonstrates Kazakhstan’s commitment to a balanced regional approach. President Tokayev also clarified Kazakhstan’s position during the EAEU forum in May 2023 in Moscow, stating that the country rejects using existing cooperation platforms—such as the CSTO and the EAEU—as tools to further political integration. These strategic decisions allow Kazakhstan to maintain some diplomatic space during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, while preserving its crucial economic and political ties and diversifying its interests with other countries.[xii]
Deepening Economic Ties with China
The strategic importance of China's role in Kazakhstan's foreign policy cannot be overstated. The Russia-Ukraine crisis and the subsequent sanctions on Russia have amplified China's reliance on Kazakhstan as a partner to secure trade connectivity to the West. President Tokayev also sees China as a valuable ally for trade and investment, underscoring the strategic nature of this relationship.
During an interview in January 2024, President Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan and China maintain active relations based on friendship, good neighbourliness, and a long-standing strategic partnership that includes economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, and political dialogue.[xv] He underscored the strategic geographical position of Kazakhstan, situated between the East and West and sharing a border with China. This unique location presents extensive prospects for the transit of Chinese goods in various directions, highlighting the country's significance in the global geopolitical landscape and its potential for economic development.
For Kazakhstan, China’s connection is a valuable counterbalance to contact with Russia. However, concerns about Chinese immigrants, China’s economic hegemony over Kazakhstan, and the potential fall of Kazakhstan into the Chinese debt trap are on the rise. These worries have led to protests in various Kazakhstani cities, particularly in response to the oppression of Uighurs in Xinjiang. This issue and the water dispute over rivers between China and Kazakhstan are significant points of contention. As an upper riparian state, China has established its dominance by using a disproportionately higher percentage of the water resources from the two main rivers—the Irtysh and Ili rivers—that flow from Chinese Xinjiang into Kazakhstan.
Engaging with the United States’s Renewed Interest
The relationship between the United States and Kazakhstan has gained importance in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and as tensions continue, both countries have engaged on account of the geopolitical implications of the situation. In 2023, there was a renewed push for US involvement, partly in response to the more coordinated strategies being adopted by Central Asian countries. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Kazakhstan in March 2023, where he participated in the C5+1 Foreign Ministerial meeting in Astana and engaged in bilateral discussions, was evidence of this move.[xvi]
The First C5+1 Summit between the US and Central Asian republics held at the Presidential level in September 2023 in New York marked a significant step in increased US involvement. Leaders from Central Asia were able to advocate for more US support for the region as a result of this dialogue. Moreover, President Biden’s commitment to utilise the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) to promote US investment in the Middle Corridor and contribute to its development was promising. As Kazakhstan continues to play a pivotal role in the Eurasian region, its partnership with the United States will likely grow significantly, shaping the dynamics of the broader geopolitical landscape in the aftermath of the crisis.
Expanding Trade and Connectivity with the European Union
After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the European Union’s strategic interest in Central Asia has steadily grown, with Kazakhstan emerging as a critical link for alternative routes. The EU countries are focusing more on new potential in logistics and transportation in partnership with Kazakhstan. The European Union’s involvement in developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) can enhance trade between the European Union, China, and Central Asia.[xvii] The economic ties between the European Union and Kazakhstan are strengthening, with the trade turnover showing a consistent upward trend. The trade volume between the European Union and Kazakhstan was US$41.9 billion in 2022, demonstrating the importance of this partnership. In January–September 2023, it surged to a notable US$30.5 billion. The foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows from the European Union also witnessed a significant boost, reaching US$5.2 billion in the first quarter of 2023.[xviii]
Earlier, Kazakhstan has become the first nation in the region to sign an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in December 2015. This has been followed by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Partnership in Raw Materials, Batteries, and Renewable Hydrogen in May 2023, further solidifying the European Union-Kazakhstan relationship.[xix] These developments underscore the strategic importance of Kazakhstan in the European Union’s Central Asia policy.
In line with the European Union’s energy diversification and decarbonisation objectives, Kazakhstan has proven its dependability by supplying uranium and oil, which enhance energy security and support the nuclear energy industry. In November 2022, French President Macron hosted President Tokayev and articulated France’s aim to deepen its ties with the region. Macron’s strategic goal is to assist Kazakhstan in expanding its international connections, a key element of France’s broader initiative to bolster European and French influence in the country.[xx] France is particularly keen on increasing the presence of French companies in sectors such as energy, gas, oil, power, uranium, and defence, focusing on Kazakhstan’s potential nuclear power plant. This is significant as France wants to diversify its uranium sources by deepening ties with Kazakhstan, focusing on energy security.
President Macron’s visit to Kazakhstan in early November 2023 yielded tangible results. French company Total Eren signed a joint venture deal with Kazakhstan's ‘Samruk-Kazyna’ JSC and NC ‘KazMunayGas’ JSC to develop wind power plants with a gigawatt capacity.[xxi] This is a significant step towards realising the potential of renewable energy in Kazakhstan and further strengthening the economic ties between the two countries.
President Tokayev’s state visit to Berlin in late September 2023 was followed by the First Summit under the C5+Germany structure.[xxii] During the visit, Tokayev committed to Germany’s increasing imports of Kazakh oil and expanding cooperation in supplying vital raw materials for the ongoing energy transition. In return, Berlin pledged its support for constructing the Middle Corridor, a transport network linking Kazakhstan and Europe via the Caspian Sea. These outcomes signify strengthening European Union-Kazakhstan relations and the partnership’s mutual benefits, especially after the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Fostering Turkic Integration
Kazakhstan has been committed to strengthening cooperation among Turkic-speaking countries since Nazarbayev proposed the Turkic Council in 2006.[xxiii] Before that, Kazakhstan was pivotal in establishing the Interparliamentary Assembly of Turkic Countries (TurkPA). Kazakhstan was also among the nations that supported the creation of the International Organisation of Turkic Culture in the early 1990s.
Kazakhstan’s pivotal role in the unification of Turkic peoples continues to evolve. Currently, Kazakhstan holds the chairmanship of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). Astana hosted the tenth anniversary Summit of the OTS in November 2023, where it’s attended by Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. President Tokayev presented the eight pillars guiding Kazakhstan’s presidency: traditions, unification, reforms, knowledge, trust, investment, mediation, and energy. He also underscored the importance of a green-financing market.[xxiv]
During the Summit, OTS member countries supported the initiative to designate Astana as the financial centre of the Turkic world and on its part, Kazakhstan proposes to establish a Turkic Investment Fund (TIF) to attract investments and harness the economic potential of its Member States. The foundation agreement for the Turkic Investment Fund (TIF) was signed during the OTS summit in Ankara in March 2023. With an initial capital of $500 million, the joint investment fund will promote development and fortify economic cooperation among Turkic-speaking nations.[xxv]
Enriching Strategic Partnership with India
India is one of the most important political and commercial partners of Kazakhstan in the region. India’s principal trading partner in Central Asia is also Kazakhstan.[xxvi] The bilateral relations between the two nations have significantly improved during the last few years. The 2009 agreement on strategic cooperation between Kazakhstan and India was essential in fostering diplomatic relations to benefit regional development.[xxvii] Their shared interests in economic growth and stability in the region have been one of the critical factors influencing relations between Kazakhstan and India.
In 2022, the total bilateral trade between the two countries amounted to US$2.45 billion. India and Kazakhstan have a civil nuclear agreement under which India gets around 80% of its uranium needs from Kazakhstan.[xxviii] In order to improve defence cooperation and interoperability, the two nations also participate in the joint military exercise KAZIND.[xxix] Discussions are underway between Indian businesses and Kazakhstan’s defence industry regarding the co-development and co-production of defence products. There is also evidence of an expanding partnership in space cooperation. Additionally, both nations are exploring the prospect of working together to construct next-generation satellites.
India and Kazakhstan are in sync in their efforts to explore alternative routes that can enhance connectivity between Central and South Asia. India’s 10-year deal to operate Chabahar Port is a significant leap in this context. This landmark agreement can potentially reshape regional connectivity, marking a pivotal moment in the region’s geopolitical landscape.
Strengthening Ties with Iran
As a strategic partner in the Persian Gulf, Kazakhstan has actively fostered growth in trade with Iran. The trade value between the two nations surged by about 20% in 2022, reaching US$528 million.[xxx] Kazakhstan’s ambition to boost exports to Iran is a strategic manoeuvre aimed at diversifying and strengthening its trade and economic partners. Iran is also one of Kazakhstan’s most accessible and closest gateways to South and Southeast Asia. Therefore, establishing international transportation corridors is a topic of immense potential. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Chabahar Port are significant projects for Kazakhstan in this direction. The Kazakhstan—Turkmenistan—Iran operational rail line holds particular promise as it paves the way for enhanced trade between these nations.
In 2023, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev met with the late Ebrahim Raisi, the former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the sidelines of the 78th UN General Assembly session.[xxxi] During the meeting, Tokayev emphasised the significance of Kazakhstan as a strategic partner in the Caspian Sea region and as a means of bolstering bilateral relations with Iran.
Active Participation in the Peace Process and Multilateral Organisations
Kazakhstan’s commitment to global peace and security is exemplified by its engagement in peacebuilding efforts beyond its immediate region, including the Astana Peace Processes. Since 2017, Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, has provided a platform for negotiations to resolve the Syrian conflict. Kazakhstan has hosted multiple peace talks. The 21st round of High-Level Meetings on Syria within the framework of the Astana format was held on 24-25 January 2024 in Astana. [xxxii]
In May 2024, Kazakhstan’s hosting of the negotiations between the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia further underscored its commitment to peace in the region and beyond.[xxxiii] They have significantly contributed to broader international efforts to end the conflict, showcasing Kazakhstan’s pivotal role in facilitating dialogue and finding a political solution to the crisis.
In 1992, President Nazarbayev proposed the Concept of Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). This unique initiative has since played a significant role in fostering a culture of trust and cooperation in Asia.[xxxiv] Over the past three decades, CICA has become a forum for diverse exchanges between Asian country leaders, officials, and stakeholders. Kazakhstan’s historical role in advocating for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and its steadfast support for initiatives to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation are of paramount importance. A significant milestone was when in 1994, Kazakhstan ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). By 1995, all of Kazakhstan’s nuclear warheads and components had been successfully removed or relocated to Russia, marking a historic moment in global disarmament efforts.[xxxv]
In 2024, Kazakhstan assumes the chairmanship of several international organisations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the OTS, the CICA, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Islamic Organization for Food Security (IOFS), and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). This demonstrates the importance of Kazakhstan’s diplomacy, which plays a crucial role in the evolving geopolitical landscape and underlines the country’s strategic importance.
Exploring New Avenues of Its Interest
In February 2024, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev visited Qatar, indicating a growing desire to strengthen bilateral relations with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Several significant business deals were signed during the visit, totalling almost US$18 billion—more than half of the foreign direct investments Kazakhstan attracted in 2022.[xxxvi] These deals included agreements by UCC Holding, a division of Power International Holding in Qatar, and QazaqGas in Kazakhstan to build a power plant, two gas supply lines, and four natural gas stations. These projects are expected to significantly boost Kazakhstan’s energy sector and contribute to its economic growth.
In May 2024, President Tokayev visited Singapore. It was the President of Kazakhstan’s first-ever state visit to Singapore.[xxxvii] During the visit, both nations inked six government-to-government agreements covering intellectual property rights protection, higher education, economic cooperation, legal collaboration, security cooperation, and standards. Furthermore, both countries have planned a commerce and transit corridor between Eurasia and ASEAN, which is expected to boost trade and economic ties between the two regions significantly. Kazakhstan in Central Asia and Singapore in Southeast Asia are the primary transit centres in their respective regions. These visits indicate that Kazakhstan is exploring new avenues for multifaceted and balanced foreign policy, particularly in light of the shifting geopolitical landscape.
Conclusion
Kazakhstan's 'Multivector' foreign policy demonstrates the country's adaptability in navigating the complexities of the region's changing geopolitical landscape. It aims to foster stable and equitable relations with other countries and also to enhance engagement with different countries simultaneously. By balancing relations with China and Russia while fostering closer ties with the West, Kazakhstan is expanding its influence in Central Asia and striving to enhance its international standing.
Kazakhstan's 'Multivector' foreign policy is about diversifying its energy partners, which is critical to its resilience in geopolitical challenges. Due to the impact of sanctions on trade routes passing via Russia, Kazakhstan is seeing a rise in demand for alternate routes. The country is also reaping the benefits of the intense competition among global powers, as evidenced by their investments and search for alternative connectivity routes. However, Kazakhstan could face significant challenges if it becomes a secondary sanctions target. The country's ability to navigate these challenges, especially amid escalating tensions between the West and Russia, is of great interest.
*****
*Dr. Punit Gaur is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs
The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Qazaqastan Tarihy, “Strategy of establishment and development of Kazakhstan as a sovereign state”, September 25, 2023, https://e-history.kz/en/history-of-kazakhstan/show/9687. Accessed 02 June 2024.
[ii] Mamedov A.V. Foreign policy of Kazakhstan: clarifying priorities // Bulletin of the Russian Peoples' Friendship University. Series: Political science. 2024. T. 26. No. 1. P. 121–130. https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-1438-2024-26-1-121-130. Accessed 09 June 2024.
[iii] Kurmanguzhin R., Chebotarev A. (2023). Diplomacy of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Evolution of Foreign Policy Concepts. World Economics and International Relations 67(7), pp.74-84 DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2023-67-7-74-84. Accessed 28 June 2024.
[iv] Ibid
[v] Bohr A. et al. (2019), “Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition”, Chatham House Report, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-11-27-Kazakhstan-Tested-By-Transition.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2024
[vi] Official website of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “On the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020-2030”, March 9, 2020, https://www.akorda.kz/en/legal_acts/decrees/on-the-concept-of-the-foreign-policy-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-for-2020-2030. Accessed 11 June 2024
[vii] Kriener, F., & Brassat, L. (2023). Quashing protests abroad: The CSTO’s intervention in Kazakhstan*. Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, 10(2), 271–298. https://doi.org/10.1080/20531702.2023.2266913. Accessed 12 June 2024.
[viii] Burc Eruygur (2023), “Kazakh president says country's foreign policy strategy must be ‘updated’”, April 19, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/kazakh-president-says-country-s-foreign-policy-strategy-must-be-updated-/2876595. Accessed 11 June 2024.
[ix] The Astana Times, “Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Navigates Eurasia's Changing Geopolitics in 2023” December 30, 2023, https://astanatimes.com/2023/12/kazakhstans-foreign-policy-navigates-eurasias-changing-geopolitics-in-2023/. Accessed 24 June 2024.
[x] The Astana Times, “President Tokayev: Kazakhstan Continues Constructive, Balanced Foreign Policy Considering National Interests”, January 3, 2024, https://astanatimes.com/2024/01/president-tokayev-kazakhstan-continues-constructive-balanced-foreign-policy-considering-national-interests/. Accessed 23 June 2024
[xi] Caspian News, “President Tokayev Says Kazakhstan Will Not Recognize Donetsk, Lugansk as Independent States”, June 20, 2022, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/president-tokayev-says-kazakhstan-will-not-recognize-donetsk-lugansk-as-independent-states-2022-6-20-0/. Accessed 11 June 2024.
[xii] Elvira A. (2023), “Who Benefits From the Eurasian Economic Union?” The Diplomat, June 12, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/who-benefits-from-the-eurasian-economic-union/. Accessed 09 June 2024.
[xiii] The Astana Times, “Kazakh Experts Reflect on Tokayev's Packed Visit to China” October 20, 2023, https://astanatimes.com/2023/10/kazakh-experts-reflect-on-tokayevs-packed-visit-to-china/. Accessed 18 June 2024.
[xiv] News Central Asia, “Kazakhstan Becomes Largest Transit Hub Between China and Europe”, November 7, 2023, https://www.newscentralasia.net/2023/11/07/kazakhstan-becomes-largest-transit-hub-between-china-and-europe/. Accessed 10 June 2024.
[xv] The Times of Central Asia, “Kazakhstan President Tokayev: As a progressive nation, we should look only forward”, January 4, 2024, https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-president-tokayev-as-a-progressive-nation-we-should-look-only-forward/. Accessed 12 June 2024.
[xvi] Toghrul Ali (2023), “Secretary Blinken Concludes Central Asia Trip” Caspian Policy Centre, March 3, 2023, https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/security-and-politics-program-spp/secretary-blinken-concludes-central-asia-trip. Accessed 16 June 2024.
[xvii] Punit Gaur (2023), “Significance of the Middle Corridor in Changing Geopolitical Landscape”, ICWA, November 14, 2023, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10186&lid=6497. Accessed 19 June 2024.
[xviii] European Commission (2024), "Kazakhstan: EU trade relations with Kazakhstan. Facts, figures and latest developments", https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/kazakhstan_en. Accessed 02 June 2024.
[xix] International Energy Agency, "Kazakhstan-EU Strategic Partnership on Raw Materials", December 11, 2023, https://www.iea.org/policies/17664-kazakhstan-eu-strategic-partnership-on-raw-materials. Accessed 21 June 2024.
[xx] France 24, "Macron receives his Kazakh counterpart, Kassym-Jomart Tokaïev, at the Élysée", November 30, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20221130-macron-courts-central-asian-strongmen-in-quest-to-boost-influence. Accessed 09 June 2024.
[xxi] The Astana Times, “Strategic Partnership, Energy Security: Macron’s Visit to Kazakhstan Redefines Bilateral Ties”, November 3, 2023, https://astanatimes.com/2023/11/strategic-partnership-energy-security-macrons-visit-to-kazakhstan-redefines-bilateral-ties/. Accessed 26 June 2024.
[xxii] Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “The President of Kazakhstan participates in the meeting of the Heads of Central Asian states with the President of Germany”, September 29, 2023, https://www.akorda.kz/en/the-president-of-kazakhstan-participates-in-the-meeting-of-the-heads-of-central-asian-states-with-the-president-of-germany-2985832. Accessed 25 June 2024
[xxiii] Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “The 10th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States was held in Astana”, November 3, 2023, https://www.akorda.kz/en/2-310422. Accessed 12 June 2024.
[xxiv] Ibid.
[xxv] Daily Sabah, “Turkic states' joint investment fund to debut with $500M Capital”, May 19, 2024, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkic-states-joint-investment-fund-to-debut-with-500m-capital. Accessed 15 June 2024.
[xxvi] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India - Kazakhstan Relations: Bilateral Brief”, September 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Unclassified_bilateral_brief_Sept-2023.pdf. Accessed 11 June 2024.
[xxvii] Ibid
[xxviii] The Week, “India, Kazakhstan to renew uranium supply contract for 2020-24”, November 18, 2019, https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2019/11/18/india-kazakhstan-to-renew-uranium-supply-contract-for-2020-24.html. Accessed 14 June 2024.
[xxix] PIB, “Indian Army and Air Force Contingent Departs for India-Kazakhstan Joint Military Exercise KAZIND-2023” October 29, 2023, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1972735. Accessed 15 June 2024.
[xxx] The Astana Times, “Free Trade Deal Inked Between EAEU and Iran to Unlock Prospects for Kazakhstan”, December 27, 2023, https://astanatimes.com/2023/12/free-trade-deal-inked-between-eaeu-and-iran-to-unlock-prospects-for-kazakhstan/. Accessed 08 June 2024.
[xxxi] Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Head of State met with Ebrahim Raisi, President of Iran”, September 19, 2023, https://www.akorda.kz/en/1-1981944. Accessed 10 June 2024.
[xxxii] Bianet, "Turkey, Russia, and Iran issue a joint statement on 'Syria' in Astana", January 26, 2024, https://bianet.org/haber/turkey-russia-and-iran-issue-a-joint-statement-on-syria-in-astana-291069. Accessed 15 June 2024.
[xxxiii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, “Press release”, May 11, 2024, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2024/05/11/Press_Release_KZ/12640. Accessed 21 June 2024.
[xxxiv] Punit Gaur (2024), “CICA: Towards a New Paradigm for Peace, Security and Stability in Asia”, February 20, 2024, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=10538&lid=6708. Accessed 17 June 2024.
[xxxv] Council on Strategic Risks, "Lessons from Kazakhstan for 2024: On the Front Lines of Nuclear and Biological Risks" January 2024, https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/01/30/lessons-from-kazakhstan-for-2024/. Accessed 09 June 2024.
[xxxvi] The Astana Times, “Kazakh President’s Visit to Qatar Reflects Multi-Vector Policy, Fosters Ties Between Central Asia and Gulf Countries”, February 19, 2024, https://astanatimes.com/2024/02/kazakh-presidents-visit-to-qatar-reflects-multi-vector-policy-fosters-ties-between-central-asia-and-gulf-countries/. Accessed 15 June 2024.
[xxxvii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, “State Visit of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, His Excellency Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, 22 to 24 May 2024”, May 23, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2024/05/State-Visit-of-President-of-the-Republic-of-Kazakhstan. Accessed 11 June 2024.