Indian Council of World Affairs

Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you for inviting me to be with such a seemingly wonderful group of young scholars. It’s a full house. Today certainly reminds me of coming to ICWA 50 years ago, it was in 1974. So, it tells you my age, that as a young student coming home, so this was a kind of hub for studies of International Relations, the School of International Studies was still here. And not just in Delhi, or in India, but from across the world, the Sapru House is really where much of the discourse on global affairs took place. If you see the plaques outside it tells you a bit of the history of this place. But I believe you have got a history done. So I would strongly urge all of you to read it.

Second, I am also very envious of all the younger scholars here, because really you have a great moment to be doing international affairs. And also the fact that you are Indians and doing international affairs and that's a huge change, because if we go to the 1970s, when I came here, it was not a happy prospect, India was steadily being marginalized in the world affairs, and we were really falling off the radar in multiple ways. So today, to be able to do International Relations as part of rising India, I think that gives you the kind of opportunities to do more exciting things than the kinds of opportunities we've had. So I think it's really a great moment to be doing International Relations for all of you. And I'm sure you're going to talk about all the issues, Ambassador has laid out a whole lot of issues that are in the world and in India. What I thought I will do is really to stay with some broader themes which  will inform your debate, rather than going into the specific details of any one of the multiple trends. All of them are important that Ambassador has laid out.

So first, I wanted to say a few things about the structure of International Relations. The very fact that you're talking about a multipolar world, you really, you're talking about power, and power, I mean of course it's central, but for a long time that's not the way India thought about the world. If you go back to the early period of Independence, the Asian Relations Conference, in fact, we came out of the interwar period, saying power politics was bad, that like all newly formed countries, I mean you think, you know sweeping big ideas, you feel very good about them and those big ideas will carry the day. The fact was that power politics, the questions of power kept coming at India, I think it was generally a struggle to come to terms with how do you deal with with the power distribution in the world, and those problems are never going to disappear. So therefore, studying multiple powers is also about studying about the nature of the distribution of power in the international system, and how that affects International Relations as a whole. What kind of options, challenges that it presents to India. So, therefore the distribution of power is a central question in the international system. And I think today we are at a very critical phase, as the Ambassador pointed out.

The second thing here is if you make a mistake about reading the distribution of power. You can make terrible mistakes, if you go wrong in how to judge where the power distribution is, you could make decisions which are costly, I mean this is not somebody being stupid or clever but the fact is the choices you make, especially when great power relations are changing would have long term consequences. While you can make big mistakes in domestic politics, but you know somebody will reverse it, the Supreme Court will change it or the next election will come and you know, so there is actually inbuilt room because it's your own Constitution, it's your own politics, it's your own Courts, your own -- how the political leaders will compromise with each other. But international politics, you don't have that opportunity, the mistakes made are difficult to undo.

I'll just give you I mean, one example. If you go back to Second World War in the middle of the 20th century, the big shifts that were taking place in the power distribution, it was still a fight among the European powers. Soviet Union was slightly outside, the United States was across the ocean, the breakdown of the European system a second time and the judgments that the colonial leaders had to make, of how is this going to play out, what does it do for the anti-Colonial, our freedom struggle which had gained ground in the interwar period. If you look at India's own national movement, it got split into three ways of understanding the world. The left, the Communist parties were very strong in the interwar period. First, they said this is not -- this is an interim period where we have nothing to do with this War. But when Germany attacked Soviet Union, the Communists came out fully supporting the war effort and fully backed the British Government, because they said fighting fascism is the bigger danger, is the bigger priority than throwing Colonialism out, that could be dealt later.

Second, you had Subash Chandra Bose, who said I’ll collaborate with Nazis or Germans or Japanese, it doesn't really matter. For me, my priority is to fight the British Colonialists. The Congress Party took a third line, which was we're against fascism. We are for Independence, but we're not going to support any War effort. So 1939, the Congress resolution approved, you know saying we were not fully consulted, we want timeline for independence, what are the reasons given.

So, when the Congress Party that opted out of the War, we had the Left switch from one side to the other. And Subash Chandra Bose aligned with one part. So what is the net result? I mean, it's not to sit on judgment of any of those groups, but as a result what happened? Two million Indian soldiers in the War, India's contribution to the Second World War is immense. But yet you had no say in its outcomes. Today, we keep saying Security Council, Security Council, Security Council, but the fact is China was in the middle of civil war, they of course, Chiang Kai Shek, they fully supported because the aims of the allies and China were the same, I mean both are fighting Japan in Asia. So therefore, Chinese got into the Security Council with much less contribution, while India which actually contributed to the War was kept out.

And, then, we also lost control of the terms of partition that took place, because the Muslim League supported Second World War, the Congress opposed it. So therefore, it's again, I mean these are historical issues, I would strongly urge because we normally don't teach this to ourselves, the choices that were made at that time, so the Congress Party, the mainstream national movement lost control over the terms of partition, and how that played out. And then you got into all kinds of troubles. So it's only to illustrate that judging how great power relations work out, that if you're clear Germany was winning, okay, you take a particular position, it plays out, or you thought Japan is going to be the new Asian great power so you can take that position. But you make the judgment, there are costs, if one of them loses. So I think that's why it's not just about deciding who's good or bad, it's also about how does the power distribution work itself or who is going to win, who's going to lose, so those become primary and if we make a mistake in making choices on wrong judgments, then the cost of -- you know we are still struggling to undo some of the things on partition or some of the choices that happened at the time. So therefore, the need to think about power constantly and engage with it, and make informed judgments about how we deal with the distribution of power. So, that is one of the central elements of statecraft historically, and that that will be there.

The second thing about the structure I wanted to talk about was really, so today we talk about India becoming sixth or fifth largest on the way to becoming the third largest economy. But what much of this debate doesn't tell you is we were already the sixth largest in 1950. We were the six largest in 1950. But the assumption how we defined ourselves as a weak third world country, rather than the sixth largest economy, that you were already there, and you're not in the Security Council, but you are in the World Bank, IMF, all the major, you're already in the UN. You're a member of the San Francisco treaty. It was not as if India was nobody. But the fact was you defined yourself in a way that what power did you have was not fully understood or deployed effectively. And I think it took us 75 years to get back to where we were. So welcome, but I think the fact is, we need to think of what -- how we declined, this again is not what a lot of people use, but India was on a path of relative economic decline. It's not that we didn't make progress, a lot of good things were done in the 50s, 60s, 70s, but the fact is, Southeast Asians were making bigger progress. Institutions were making bigger progress, Gulf countries are making bigger progress. But the fact is, some of the political economic choices that we made, is, again, not with judgment, but the choices we make at any given point of time have consequences to where you stand in the world. And those choices actually saw India go down, it's only from 1991 onwards, that you see India's relative rise begins, and that you crawl back to the sixth position, and you're probably reasonably well placed to get to the the third largest. So that's where we are. So that's what of course, today makes it much more special, much more challenging, as well as demanding for all of you, as you enter the study of International Relations and the purpose we are here.

So, that brings me to broadly, you know let me point to three dangers that you got to guard against while you are in this exciting moment. What are the three dangers that you need to guard against - One is triumphalism that we've already arrived. We've taken 75 years to get back to the flip button nevertheless, but you say that you've done your job, you're already there I think that will be a fundamental mistake, because history has seen so many countries that they thought they’ve arrived and face problems pretty quickly. I mean, we'll come back to China question already. Two years ago, it looked like China is going to take over the world, today it doesn't look like getting anywhere nearby. So therefore, triumphalism in the sense we are the greatest, even if you are I mean, I would say you've got to temper it down and constantly see the challenges ahead and how we manage this carefully, rather than just beating drum for ourselves that somehow we have arrived, because the Chinese case actually is a classic example, in our own life, in our own last one decade. The assumptions I mean, all you had to read is Global Times, The Chinese Communist Party, trashing everyone, you know the Chinese century has begun, but the fact is it didn't, it still hasn't and it's nothing guaranteed at this point that it will actually work out.

The other aspect linked to triumphalism is the focus, when we say India has risen, it's really on the aggregate GDP. Aggregate GDP, yes, we are 3.5 trillion, we'll get to 5 trillion in the next 3-4 years. But what's your per capita, $2500. Bangladesh is slightly ahead, eventually we'll get past them, but the fact is as a collective you are capable of being a major power, but as an individual per captia you are a developing country. So the tasks of any state in India would remain for a long time. How do you leverage the size which gives you interesting possibilities to improve the lives of your own people that is if you can’t – forget that for a moment because in the end as a democracy your final legitimacy does not rest on other countries clapping for you, but on your own internal legitimacy. So therefore and even otherwise, that when the rest of the world has reached levels of income of development, levels of prosperity, so bringing that prosperity back, so don't ever forget when you talk about aggregate GDP, don't forget the per capita GDP, you see the Chinese have broadly crossed that mark, they used to be in the same problem, today they are $10,000 plus, so they crossed certain levels. But size gives you advantages, say at $2,000 per capita you can do a moon mission. But Singapore, as Ambassador said, with $70,000 per capita you can't do a moon program, so size matters. So aggregate capabilities give you the capacity to shape outside world. But the objective of that must be to improve the lives of your own people, if you don’t bring prosperity, if you don't bring better lives to your own people, or all the talk about great powers is really meaningless, because in the end the story is about how do you lift your own people and create, because every notch you raise the capabilities of your own people, then your capacity to shape the world will continue to grow. So this is not something a relevant task but the fact is, you've got to lift your own up, the more you do the greater your impact on the world, because the size keeps giving you that. So think of India at $5,000 per capita, which will be down the road soon, you'll be there, but the danger is you can get even more arrogant or stupid like the Chinese did or you could use that to strengthen yourself more fundamentally, and lift your own people up.

The second challenge will be, as India rises in the international system, is the tension between ideology and pragmatism, that you can frame it as values vs. interests or the question is how do you produce a balance. If it's all about power and no principle, you're just, it’s a cynical state with a lot of power military, economic, but it's of no consequence to the world. But if you're all ideology and no power, if you have all ideology and no power, it’s really you are an impotent, I mean it doesn't make a difference to the world. So you can say, look, we're the most virtuous, I mean somewhere in the 50s, we were saying all the right things about disarmament, decolonization, peace and peaceful coexistence, all that stuff. But you know, your impact is very limited, because without power, principles don't have an effect. But power without principle is again meaningless, because it doesn't achieve anything, you are just there, you can occupy other people's territories, you can grab here and there, but it means nothing. So when you think of the world I mean I think for a country like India I think we need to build that balance. That's one part.

The second part is really, you can't let ideology overrun practical policies. We hear, for example, what we've learned in the last 75 years, that sweeping ideas about see religious solidarity, ethnic solidarity, regional solidarity, every one of those big ideas pan Islamism, pan Asianism, pan Arabism or pan Africanism, everyone of them ran into the nation state problem, like Islamic Republic of Iran if you go back to the founding principles, we are talking about 1978-79, they say their foreign policy is about promoting Islam, but they can't get along with their own neighbors.

So this notion, somehow, you can sweep differences under the carpet by constructing a supranational identity as a way of bringing solidarity. It doesn't work. Asian Relations Conference took place here. Even now 75 years later, India and China don't know how long is the border, we say 4000 Kilometers and Chinese say 2000. We don't agree on where the border is. So, barely claiming an ideological affinity, or a solidarity does not resolve problems. So if we don't resolve the problems, if you don't have the pragmatic way of dealing with it, simply proclaiming, there’s Non-Aligned Movement, but there's no Asian unity, Arab unity, every one of them has run into problems, because there are limits to how far, because every one of them has to deal with each nation's own interests, nations own challenges. I mean, if you just had to look at the history of Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Soviet Union, how did it struggle to reconcile ideology with national interest. Chinese Communist Party same thing, Iranian revolution same thing, same thing you can say about India as well, the kind of ideas the Indian National Movement which was led by lawyers, all liberal internationalists at that time and the sense of what they thought the world ought to be and how the world was, that gap and how does India look after itself, so the tensions, so that doesn't mean you become cynical and are for only self interest or for only power, but you've got to have the balance between pragmatism as well as some higher principles for which you must stand.

The third aspect I think is really nationalism, or internationalism. How do you balance these two elements? Just remember the pandemic, only recently, we announced we want to give vaccines to the other developing countries. The moment you started saying you had a second wave. The same people who were praising the Government of India said, hey, what are you doing, why are you sending vaccines out? We need it more than giving it to somebody else. So, this notion what seemingly sensible idea but then you have to struggle to say, look you’ll have to do both, you’ll have to give vaccines to your own people but once your production is ramped up you're going to give it to others. So that problem of reconciling nationalism and internationalism is again a continuous challenge for emerging countries like India or China for example. But how do you produce that balance, because mainly, you know you can be small country and be purely nationalist, but if you're a large country with aspirations to shape and contribute to the world order, you've got to be a lot more you know mindful of the world, at the same time not forgetting your own natonal interests and national considerations. So, I think balancing them becomes very, very important. And here I would certainly warn against hyper nationalism which will make it worse. Nationalism is bad enough, but hyper nationalism tends to then blind you to the problems, and your capacity to deal with the rest of the world begins to decline. This is exactly what's happened to China, the hyper nationalism, the wolf warrior diplomacy, the sense that you could,you know -- Japan doesn't matter, India doesn't matter, Vietnam doesn't matter. So, what is the consequences of that, and you thought West is in decline, America is finished. So it took the genius of Xi Jinping to turn the pacifist Japan to rearmament, a neutral India into a friend of the United States. It took Xi Jinping to turn Vietnam, a fellow communist country, to sign a strategic partnership agreement with the United States. And the Philippines that seem to be going the Chinese way is turned around. So this notion that you have every right, you know everything, it is your interest that matters, even when you have the power, China had the power differential vis-a-vis its neighbors. For example, vis-a-vis India five times bigger GDP, Japan four times GDP, defense spending five times larger than India and Japan. But yet, if you push other people too hard they will fight back. That's why coalitions have emerged in Asia today to deal with the Chinese power. So therefore, hyper nationalism actually is counterproductive, its got to be managed whether through the regionalism idea, through multilateralism, through coalitions that tempering nationalism, hyper nationalism and being able to get along with others, building coalitions, building partnerships, becomes so important. So I would say these three challenges - triumphalism, but that doesn’t mean you'll be pessimistic, so you've got to be objective. These are my capabilities, these are my possibilities, and how do I -- best way to achieve them? And then the question of ideology, how to temper ideology, power and principles, and then nationalism and internationalism. So these are the three broad tensions that in any rising power, we'll have to deal with it.

So I'll just conclude with just a couple of thoughts. I mean as you look ahead, I think many issues Ambassador pointed out, that the capacity to make rules, which is what differentiates big powers, major powers from the rest, and the challenge with the size gives you that capability today, whether it's climate change, whether it is cryptocurrencies, whether it is a digital public infrastructure, you need the capacity to operate on a cross cutting domain. And I think much of IR we grew up with, when I did my PhD I did on nuclear issues, which was not mainstream at the time, or later, that issue became quite central. But today, the question of technology, question of externalities like climate change, the capacity to deal with those issues and integrating these multiple dimensions of statecraft is one of the great challenges as we grow bigger and bigger, that you need to create rules, you need to negotiate with others in drafting those rules, which would require your ability to integrate, understand first, integrate the imperatives of different domains. So what was that, when I was doing nuclear was a boutique subject, I mean it didn't really you know, nobody else was doing it. So I got my breaks, but the fact is today cyber is not a cute boutique subject, it is central. So those of you who read basic stuff, I mean it's not just political science and theories there, but you also got to -- those who do integrate, how does Indian economy, so it's not just again a foreign policy problem, because there's nothing purely foreign policy, because what you do with low technological industries, how you build a semiconductor plant, that is not a foreign policy problem, you've got to get your industry in, because historically we were state centric, private sector was not a player, but today, your private sector is a bigger player, now how to bring them in into understanding this cross cutting issue regarding the trade and commerce. It's not just a Foreign Office, there's a Commerce Ministry there, Indian industry, how do you reconcile these multiple interests at home with the interests, with the changing world, after all you're in a world where globalization has taken a backseat. So how does India negotiate its position by integrating these new challenges externally, as well as new possibilities internally?

So these I think, are the emerging challenges. And I think as you turn, the opportunities are exciting, unlike us, I mean we used to take notes on cards here. So your productivity tools are wonderful, that you can do a lot more lot quickly, lot easily and that allows you to focus more on thinking and reflecting and doing things in the world. And as India becomes a major power, it needs a lot more people who can actually contribute to the discourse. There's a lot of interest today, I know it's not informed perhaps but the fact is there is global interest. But tomorrow if you're negotiating a cybernetic negotiation you need enough people to raise issues to debate within ourselves. So, therefore, I think you need a larger cadre of more informed people, and people who can teach others, create the next generation to deal with a more complex world, a complex world in which India has actually a role to play unlike in the last century that, I think is, what I think your great opportunity. So let me wish you all the best and good luck with this seminar. And thank you Ambassador again for inviting me.

*****