Indian Council of World Affairs

In March 2023, West Asia witnessed a ray of hope for peace and stability when the two rivals and major regional powers - the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran surprisingly announced a Chinese-brokered deal for the restoration of their ties including reopening their embassies.[i] It was expected that after the agreement, both countries would shift their policy of confrontation, leading to proxy wars, to a policy of dialogue for ensuring regional stability. 

The outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war once again highlighted the fragile security architecture of the region. The ongoing war will have deep implications for the engagements of major regional actors including Saudi Arabia and Iran, leading to recalibration in their approach. The event has brought the Palestinian issue to the forefront and has the potential to hamper cooperation between both the parties as envisaged in the deal due to multiple reasons. 

This paper aims to analyze the future of the Saudi-Iran peace deal amid the Israel-Hamas war that has drastically changed the geopolitical environment of the region and tries to highlight the diverging interests of both countries. 

Diverging stand on Israel           

In recent years, unlike Iran, Saudi Arabia had a softer stance toward Israel and was working toward normalizing ties with Israel facilitated by the US.[ii] Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman acknowledging the process stated “Every day we get closer” to signing the agreement.[iii] The Saudi-Israeli agreement would have diminished the importance for Riyadh for establishing peace with Tehran.[iv]

On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran views Israel as a political, ideological, and strategic adversary and frequently employs anti-Israel rhetoric. Days before the Hamas assault, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned Muslim countries seeking to normalize ties with Israel.[v] The war in Gaza forced Saudi to reprioritise the Palestinian issue over its willingness to establish ties with Israel which is in Iran’s strategic interest. 

Houthi Attacks and its Implications 

Days after the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, Houthi rebels in Yemen fired missiles and drones at Israel followed by attacks on ships navigating through the Red Sea. The Houthis stated that the Hamas attack on Israel was “a battle of dignity, pride, and defense”.[vi] The Houthis are an important part of the Iranian Axis that controls most of Yemen's territory which is backed by the Iranian regime. Importantly, Saudi and Iran are involved in a proxy war in Yemen supporting opposite sides[vii] which resulted in the worst humanitarian crisis as stated by the United Nations.[viii] In 2021, the Houthis targeted Saudi oil facilities further solidifying their animosity, and emerged as a serious security threat for the kingdom. 

Under the Peace Agreement, Saudi expected Iran to reduce the threat from Houthis. Being a main supporter and sponsor, Iran could exercise its position to ensure security from Houthi attacks. The Israel-Hamas war has provided a platform for Iranian proxies to intensify their operation in the region which undermines Saudi security and strategic interests. Despite having close ties with Iran, the Houthis enjoy political independence and the extent of Iran’s control over its operation is uncertain which further deteriorates trust between both countries. Recent attacks by the Houthis around the region exacerbated regional tension and can thus emerge as a spoiler for the Saudi-Iran détente. Additionally, the deteriorating security condition due to rising operations by Iranian proxies in the region poses a direct security challenge in the region and may impact the pace of implementation of Saudi crown prince MBS's ambitious “Vision 2030” under which the Kingdom seeks huge foreign investment to finance a range of projects including NEOM.[ix]

China’s position 

The peace deal was the result of increased Chinese influence on both countries, especially economic. Establishing peace between Riyadh and Tehran was in Chinese interest to enhance its influence in the region. However, since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, China remained on the sideline and followed its policy of “Balanced diplomacy” and refrained from taking sides.[x] In the crisis, China's role remained limited to protecting its shipments from the Houthis in the Red Sea.[xi] In such a scenario, it is unlikely that China will use its influence over Iran’s behavior in the region to shape the outcomes of the crisis and make a conducive geopolitical environment for closer Saudi-Iran engagements. With the absence of Chinese effort, the possibility of success of the peace deal and closer engagements as envisaged in the agreement will remain uncertain, also because of the lack of similar initiative on the part of any other major power. 

Conflicting view on Hamas 

The two powers have conflicting viewpoints on Hamas. Hamas is one of the prominent components of Iran’s Axis of Resistance that gets funding and other support from Iran. The Axis primarily works against Israel and promotes the regional interest of Iran. Saudi traditionally holds an aversive stand toward Hamas and supports Fatah in Palestinian issues.[xii] It has ideological differences and back in 2014, the Kingdom had declared “Muslim Brotherhood” as a terrorist organization from which Hamas traces its roots. In 2019, the Saudi regime arrested several members of Hamas signaling its position on the organization.[xiii]

After the October 7 attack, Iran congratulated Hamas for the attack maintaining its denial of any involvement whereas the Saudis stressed cessation of violence without mentioning Hamas. Amidst Israeli attacks, the Iranian support continues which harms the long-term strategic interest of Saudi and increases the influence of Tehran in the region. The prolonged war in Gaza has the potential to create tension between the kingdom and the Islamic Republic endangering the prospect of a Saudi-Iran peace deal. 

Conclusion 

Being the major actors in West Asia, the policy decisions and conduct of both Saudi Arabia and The Islamic Republic of Iran directly impact the stability and security in the region. Their relationship shapes the major events in the region and peace between them can ensure stability. China, with its economic mileage and increased geopolitical stature, facilitated the signing of the Saudi-Iran peace agreement. 

The unprecedented attack by Hamas on Israel resulted in a complex geopolitical crisis that has opened new areas of challenges and stumbling blocks for the success of the Saudi-Iran peace deal. The Iranian-backed militias including Hezbollah and Houthis have increased their operations against Israel and the US in the region making it complicated for Saudi to maintain a balance between the US and Iran. Prolonged tensions in the Red Sea arising due to continuous Houthi attacks can push Saudi Arabia to turn against the Houthis, who owe allegiance to Iran. The volatile security situation that arose after the Hamas attack compelled major geopolitical shifts in the region. The Hamas attack created suspicion against Tehran in the eyes of Riyadh.[xiv] The prevailing situation has the potential to cause trust deficit between both countries directly hampering the prospects of the future of The Saudi-Iran peace deal. The large-scale destruction and the activation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance in the war pose a danger of the Israel-Hamas war spilling in the entire region. The war in Gaza with its deep regional implications would certainly slow down the cooperation as anticipated under the Saudi-Iran peace agreement.

*****

*Md. Shaqib Ali, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] (2023, March 10). Joint Trilateral Statement by the People's Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Retrieved February 8, 2024, from http://se.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw_0/202303/t20230311_11039241.htm

[ii] Menachem, Y. B. (2022, March 7). The Saudi Crown Prince's Messages to Israel and Iran. Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs. https://jcpa.org/the-saudi-crown-princes-messages-to-israel-and-iran/

[iii] WEISSERT, W. (2023, September 20). Saudi crown prince says in rare interview 'every day we get closer' to normalization with Israel. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/saudi-prince-us-politics-fox-a65f1e4c39ee2d83667aa433f59b59c8

[iv]If this war stops Israeli-Saudi normalization, then Iran wins. (2023, October 24). MEPIN. https://mepinanalysis.org/2023/10/if-this-war-stops-israeli-saudi-normalization-then-iran-wins/

[v] Mensah, E. (2023, October 3). Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei Warns Against Normalizing Relations with Israel. BNN Breaking. https://bnnbreaking.com/world/iran/irans-supreme-leader-khamenei-warns-against-normalizing-relations-with-israel/

[vi] Region reacts as Hamas attack on Israel spirals. (2023, October 7). L'Orient Today. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1351804/region-reacts-as-hamas-attack-on-israel-spirals.html

[vii] Kaptan, D. (2021). The Unending War in Yemen. https://doi.org/10.2218/ccj.v2.5414

[viii] Yemen crisis. (n.d.). UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/yemen-crisis

[ix] Nereim, V. (2023, December 25). Hoping for Peace With Houthis, Saudis Keep Low Profile in Red Sea Conflict. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/25/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-yemen-houthis-gaza.html

[x] Latham, A. (2023, November 3). Israel-Hamas war puts China's strategy of 'balanced diplomacy' in the Middle East at risk. The Conversation. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-puts-chinas-strategy-of-balanced-diplomacy-in-the-middle-east-at-risk-216246

[xi] Aboudouh, A. (2024, February 7). Yes, China pressured Iran on Red Sea attacks – but only to protect its own ships. Chatham House. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/02/yes-china-pressured-iran-red-sea-attacks-only-protect-its-own-ships

[xii] Saudi Arabia-Hamas Relations: At a Turning Point? (2023, May 11). INSS. Retrieved February 8, 2024, from https://www.inss.org.il/publication/hamas-saudi-arabia/

[xiii] Yochai, J., & Wright, R. (2014). Riyadh Designates Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/riyadh-designates-brotherhood-terrorist-organization

[xiv] The Iranian and Houthi War against Saudi Arabia. (2021, December 21). CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-and-houthi-war-against-saudi-arabia