Indian Council of World Affairs

Over time, there has been a proliferation of Confucius Institutes worldwide. China has used the Confucius Institutes as a tool for its foreign policy and diplomacy. According to the Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2023, there are 496 Confucius Institutes spread across 160 countries.[i] Their global distribution spans Europe (183), the Americas (84), Asia (143), Africa (67), Oceania (19), and South Asia (14).[ii] These institutes aim to teach the Chinese language, promote educational and cultural exchanges, and improve global understanding of China under the tenets of equality, friendly consultation, mutual respect, and mutual benefit.[iii] On a comparative note, despite being geographically close to China, the South Asian region has fewer Confucius Institutes. The paper examines China’s strategic interests, fuelling scepticism about the presence of Confucius Institutes in South Asia. 

Operational Concerns 

Confucius Institutes operate differently from other institutions. They are established through partnerships between local institutions, Chinese universities, and government agencies.[iv] Until July 2020, the Hanban (Office of Chinese Language Council International) managed these institutes, providing funding and resources while host universities contributed classrooms and office space.[v] Following this, Hanban was rebranded as the Center for Language Exchange and Cooperation (CLEC), and the Chinese International Education Foundation (CIEF), a new non-profit organisation under CLEC, was created to oversee the institutes.[vi] The policy of embedding Confucius Institutes within universities and using a dual directorship system, one director from the host university and another appointed by the Chinese counterpart, raises concerns about academic freedom, potentially aligning host universities with Chinese political agendas.[vii] This modus operandi is unique to Confucius Institutes compared to counterparts like the Alliance Française of France, the Goethe-Institut of Germany, the British Council of the UK, and the Instituto Cervantes of Spain.[viii]

Influence of Confucius Institutes in South Asia 

China’s growing economic engagement with South Asian countries is well-documented; however, the strategic use of language and culture in leveraging its ‘Soft Power’ in the region often escapes scrutiny. At the forefront of China’s cultural diplomacy are the Confucius Institutes, the most visible elements of its soft power strategy not only in South Asia but globally. 

In South Asia, where 14 Confucius Institutes operate across six countries (five in Pakistan, two each in India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and one in Afghanistan),[ix] they are often viewed as extensions of China’s foreign policy. By leveraging cultural diplomacy, China seeks to influence the political landscapes of these nations. Beyond their educational objectives, Confucius Institutes are perceived as gateways to scholarships and employment opportunities linked to Chinese-led projects, subtly embedding Chinese influence across various sectors. 

For instance, in Nepal, two Confucius Institutes have trained over 50,000 Chinese-language professionals, facilitating academic and political exchanges with China.[x] However, concerns about the selection process for students and scholars—allegedly influenced by both Nepali politicians and Chinese officials—raise questions about academic independence.[xi] When 57 Nepali journalists underwent Chinese language training organised by the Confucius Institute, concerns about China’s influence in Nepal’s media landscape intensified.[xii]

In the case of Pakistan, the role of Confucius Institutes, apart from their educational activities, is closely tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). These institutes often organise conferences and seminars promoting CPEC, carefully avoiding any criticism. This reflects China’s tight control over its narrative in Pakistan. Despite local resistance to the growing prominence of Mandarin and concerns about cultural erosion, the Pakistani government’s continued support underscores China’s strong influence.[xiii]

In Sri Lanka, Confucius Institutes are linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), though they have not been without controversy.[xiv] Incidents such as omitting Tamil from a Chinese-donated plaque and using Mandarin on public signage have sparked fears of cultural imposition, raising questions about the broader implications of China’s soft power in the region.[xv]

In Afghanistan, the role of the Confucius Institute at Kabul University has expanded significantly since the Taliban returned to power in 2021.[xvi] China’s deepening engagement with the Taliban, including cultural exchanges and infrastructure development, highlights the Institute’s role as a conduit for China’s strategic objectives.[xvii] The Taliban’s selective endorsement of Chinese cultural events over local traditions further illustrates the geopolitical motivations behind these institutes.[xviii]

While Confucius Institutes in South Asia are fewer in number compared to other regions, their presence reflects China’s ambitions in asserting cultural dominance. The region’s deep-rooted cultural inter-connections, particularly through Buddhism, and the strong influence of Indian culture create a complex environment for Chinese cultural initiatives to thrive. According to some analysts, the absence of a significant Chinese diaspora and the shared cultural heritage in South Asia diminish the potency of Chinese cultural tools, making it difficult for China to fully realise its soft power ambitions in the region.[xix]

Conclusion

The dual role of Confucius Institutes as both educational and political tools in South Asia exemplifies the intricate balance China seeks to maintain between cultural diplomacy and strategic influence. Although these institutes offer cultural exchange opportunities, their impact on sovereignty and academic freedom in the region demands scrutiny. As South Asia continues to navigate its relationship with China, the role of Confucius Institutes will remain a critical analysis point in understanding the broader implications of China’s soft power strategy.

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*Shivam Kumar, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Chinese International Educational Foundation. (2023, December 31). Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2023. Chinese International Educational Foundation. Retrieved September 02, 2024, from https://ci.cn/en/qkylxq?file=/profile/upload/2024/07/03/471606610_20240703165613A988.pdf

[ii] Ibid

[iii] Chinese International Educational Foundation. (n.d.). 孔子学院. 中国国际中文教育基金会. Retrieved September 5, 2024, from https://www.cief.org.cn/kzxy

[iv] Peterson, R., Yan, F., & Oxnevad, I. (2022, June). After Confucius institutes China’s enduring influence on American higher education. National Association of Scholars. Retrieved August 25, 2024, from https://www.nas.org/storage/app/media/Reports/After%20Confucius%20Institutes/After_Confucius_Institutes_NAS.pdf

[v] Ibid

[vi] Ibid

[vii] Pamment, J. (2019, June 6). StratCom. StratCom | NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga, Latvia. Retrieved September 1, 2024, from https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/hybrid-threats-confucius-institutes/88

[viii] Ibid

[ix] Confucius Institute. (n.d.). Confucius Institute. Retrieved September 5, 2024, from https://ci.cn/en/qqwl

[x] huaxia. (2023, August 10). Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University produces 50,000 Chinese-language professionals for Nepal. Xinhua. https://english.news.cn/asiapacific/20230711/59c8127b70c94095a81e076f5c4b7954/c.html

[xi] Palit, P. S. (2022, February). China's 'Influence Operations' in Academia, Confucius Institutes and Soft Power: Strategic Responses of India, Bangladesh. Sandia National Laboratories. Retrieved September 1, 2024, from https://www.sandia.gov/app/uploads/sites/148/2022/02/SAND2022-1249O.pdf

[xii] Anand, A. (2024, June 27). Aggressive Chinese Attempt to Infiltrate Nepal’s Media. News18. https://www.news18.com/opinion/global-watch-aggressive-chinese-attempt-to-infiltrate-nepals-media-8945198.html

[xiii] Observer Research Foundation. (2020, May 13). The Tsinghua of economic development in Pakistan. Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved August 15, 2024, from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-tsinghua-of-economic-development-in-pakistan-66037

[xiv] China-funded Confucius Institutes meet in Colombo with an eye on the future. (2018, June 28). Lanka Web. Retrieved August 22, 2024, from https://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2018/06/28/china-funded-confucius-institutes-meet-in-colombo-with-an-eye-on-the-future/

[xv] Major language controversy as Chinese Mandarin replaces Tamil in Sri Lankan sign boards. (2021, May 28). Sambad English. https://sambadenglish.com/major-language-controversy-as-chinese-mandarin-replaces-tamil-in-sri-lankan-sign-boards/

[xvi] huaxia. (2024, March 22). China-sponsored scholarships benefit Afghan college students. Xinhua. Retrieved August 28, 2024, from https://english.news.cn/20240322/93c12befeb454bc49aa02967d9fc769c/c.html

[xvii] Nawaz, A. (2022, August 3). China funded Auditorium inaugurated at Kabul University. The Diplomatic Insight. https://thediplomaticinsight.com/china-funded-auditorium-inaugurated-at-kabul-university/

[xviii] Ali, R. (2024, April 22). Between Marginalization Politics and Realpolitik: The Taliban Ban Nawruz, Celebrate Chinese New Year | Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies. Shiv Nadar University. Retrieved September 5, 2024, from https://snu.edu.in/centres/centre-of-excellence-for-himalayan-studies/research/between-marginalization-politics-and-realpolitik-the-taliban-ban-nawruz-celebrate-chinese-new-year/

[xix] Palit, P. S. (2017). Analysing China's Soft Power Strategy and Comparative Indian Initiatives (First ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. https://doi.org/10.4135/9789353280246