Teshu Singh: Everyone to kindly take their seats and put their mobile phones on silent mode. Good evening, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome you all for a Panel Discussion on Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: Cooperative Way Forward? The panel discussion will be chaired by Ambassador Ashok Kantha, Distinguished Fellow at VIF, and former Ambassador of India to China. To begin with, may I request Madam Nutan Mahawar Kapoor, Additional Secretary, Indian Council of World Affairs, to kindly make her remarks.
Nutan Mahawar Kapoor: Thank you, Teshu. Distinguished experts, students, and friends, the South China Sea is a historically contested region, with many countries claiming sovereignty over its parts. The contestation is between China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia. It involves delineating the waters as well as territory. China claims more than 90% of the region, and its claims are represented by the U-shaped Nine-Dash Line.
China has steadily stepped up its activities in the South China Sea and shown aggressive postures. The region has become a geopolitical theater with rising tensions between countries. These tensions have in turn drawn the attention of the US and other countries in and outside the region, thereby making the security situation volatile.
Good neighborliness, regionalism, and rule of law are fundamental principles of IR, as you all know as students of IR. All these principles are not only applicable to the South China Sea dispute, but also show the way forward towards its peaceful resolution.
Pursuit of good neighborliness is important to ensure a secure environment for a country's growth and reaching its potential. A difficult neighborhood is a liability both in terms of security and development, while a peaceful periphery is an asset. Neighbors understand each other more than anyone else. After all, life existed and communities lived together even before present-day boundaries and states were formed. The principle of good neighborliness, therefore, involves cooperation of neighboring states to achieve common goals.
Regionalism is the expression of a common identity and purpose to shape collective action to meet common challenges. Regionalism is premised on the thought that countries of a region best understand the issues and problems of the region and are best equipped to resolve them. Based on the principle of regionalism, in this case of Southeast Asia, regional collective action takes primacy over recourse to extra-regional assistance intervention.
Respect for international law is a fundamental tenet that ensures certainty and predictability in state behavior and order and stability in interstate relations.
These basic IR principles that I just highlighted have, however, been disregarded by China.
Efforts to work with China towards establishing a code of conduct have not worked so far, though the negotiations between China and Southeast Asia have been going on for a fairly long period, but it is unclear when these would be concluded.
Given the fact that China has thus far been reticent in negotiating a code of conduct with the other claimants and its dismissal of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling, doubts remain whether China will be willing to sign a legally binding agreement anytime soon. Should that hurdle be overcome somehow, further concerns in any case remain about implementation. Will there be, for instance, an effective mechanism to monitor and enforce any violation?
An alternate framework for an understanding on the South China Sea dispute that is premised on and strengthens the founding principles of ASEAN and upholds the rule of law could be considered among the Southeast Asian claimants. An ASEAN code of conduct on the South China Sea would be welcome.
Perhaps the current Malaysian chairmanship and the recent positive dynamics in Vietnam-Philippines ties, which have just held their first joint maritime exercise, and in Malaysia-Vietnam ties, which have just concluded a comprehensive strategic partnership, will provide the necessary impetus in this regard.
While South China Sea is a dispute among neighboring countries of ASEAN and China, events in the region impact India as Southeast Asia falls in its extended neighborhood. In the context of our Act-East Policy and the Indo-Pacific vision, tensions in the disputed region routinely come up in diplomatic and academic discussions with our friends from the region.
Over 55% of India's trade passes through the South China Sea. India undertakes various activities with littoral states of the South China Sea, including cooperation in oil and gas sector, maritime exercises, and HADR cooperation.
Being a key country of the Indo-Pacific, we have an abiding interest in maintaining good order at sea and enhancing regional and global peace and security. India's Indo-Pacific vision stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces all in a common perspective pursuit of progress and prosperity.
Importantly, India's Indo-Pacific policy is premised on the centrality of ASEAN. Even before coining of the term Indo-Pacific, India's approach towards the Eastern Asian region has been based on its engagement with ASEAN and its mechanisms, such as the CSCAP, ARF, ADMM+, East Asian Summit, etc.
India believes that the destiny of Southeast Asian nations should be decided by them and not dictated by others.
The South China Sea is a complex issue. It is essential to send out a message to the countries of the region on exercising restraint and not resorting to provocations to maintain calm and lower tensions. It is also important to send out a message on the importance of upholding international law, especially UNCLOS, in the face of the challenge to the rule-based international order that the situation represents, which India, for instance, has consistently done.
That said, it is also important to say that while openness of sea lanes of communication is a sacrosanct principle, freedom of navigation does not hold without qualification, such as cooperative maritime domain awareness frameworks to maintain good order and tranquility at sea.
Our panel discussion today is intended to explore a cooperative way forward on the South China Sea issue. Of course, while being deeply cognizant of the rising tensions in the region, as seen in frequent clashes between vessels and skirmishes between uniformed personnel in the South China Sea amidst sharpening US-China rivalry.
There is a real danger of tensions in the region spreading to the other incendiary situation in Indo-Pacific, that is the Taiwan Strait, and to other areas in the region where territorial or maritime boundaries are undefined, like East China Sea or Gulf of Thailand, and also to other unstable points on China's periphery. Unfortunately, the world today is ridden with conflicts and polarization, and we have to try to find the way forward in this backdrop.
As for India, to serve its interests, as well as shared objectives, and to further strengthen its traditionally friendly relations with the countries of the region, it is developing ties with them across sectors, including defense, security, and military-to-military.
I look forward to an engaging and lively discussion. I wish the panelists all the best, and thank you for your patience.
Teshu Singh: Thank you, ma'am. May I request Ambassador Ashok Kantha to kindly give his remarks and conduct the proceedings.
Ashok Kantha: Thank you, Nutan. Thank you, Teshu. Thanks for inviting me to chair this Panel Discussion on Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: Cooperative Way Forward? We have a very strong panel, and I'm sure they'll explore the nature of rising tensions that Nutan referred to in our opening remarks, and also explore whether there's indeed a possibility of a cooperative way out of the present situation.
Let me kick off the discussions with four observations on the situation in the South China Sea, where we stand, and why we stand here, and if it's possible to find a constructive way out. First point I would like to make is that we should not look at the South China Sea in isolation. It's part of a larger Chinese agenda of claiming territory on basis of its perceived historical narrative. In a way, South China Sea is Exhibit A in China's grey zone warfare, which involves taking coercive and incremental measures to change facts on the ground while staying under the threshold of an outright military conflict.
China has deployed the same playbook elsewhere, including in the Taiwan Strait, in its China Sea, along India-China borders, and along its borders with Bhutan, but perhaps it has been more successful when it comes to the South China Sea. You'll all recall that between December 2013 and early 2015, China undertook a reclamation on an unprecedented scale in the South China Sea, what it calls Tonansha and Xisha. It reclaimed 3,200 acres of territory in seven features as compared to 50 acres reclaimed by other countries. The number has changed recently because Vietnam has become more proactive. And it has built up a civil and military infrastructure there.
There was a commitment given by President Xi Jinping during his visit to Washington, D.C. in September 2015, when he joined press conference with President Barack Obama in the White House. He stated that China does not intend to undertake militarization of its Spratly or Nansha. But facts are different, beginning in 2016 China has developed four airfields in Spratly and Paracels which can take the largest aircraft in PLA Air Force inventory and it has all kinds of military hardware to back up its presence.
This was in violation not only of the public commitment made by President Xi, but also against a very explicit award given by International Court of Arbitration in The Hague in July 2016 and you will recall that in that matter brought up by the Philippines there was a categorical conclusion that there was no legal basis for China to claim so called historic rights to resources within the sea areas encompassed by the Nine-Dash Line and that there was no evidence that China had exercised exclusive control over waters or the resources in that area. It was quite categorical. China rejected it, didn't accept it and went ahead with what I referred to.
Looking ahead one may expect China will continue the same policy, call it grey zone warfare, call it salami slicing, what you like. It is using non-military means like coast guard, fishing vessels, Maritime Militia avoiding deployment of PLA Navy, but nevertheless making gains and the US response by way of freedom of navigation operations, US FONOPs have not been effective at all and in fact with President Trump starting his second term yesterday we don't know whether there will be that kind of commitment in future.
Second point I would like to make, which we need to keep reminding ourselves all the time that South China Sea is not a distant theatre for us. South China Sea is part of not only our civilization footprint, but we have very vital contemporary stakes in that area. As Nutan mentioned and this number was given in Parliament in response to a question, 55% of India's trade passes through South China Sea and the Malacca Strait and these waterways are vital conduit for movement of Indian Navy so there is no way we can afford to let South China Sea become a Chinese lake dominated by a particular country. That will not be in our interest at all.
Our position has evolved, but in a somewhat hesitant manner, we started sort of referring to what Nutan said, respect for freedom of navigation, and the award given by international court arbitration should be respected. But it was only in a joint statement at the Foreign Minister's level on 29 June, 2023 that we, for the first time, categorically came out in support of the award given by the tribunal international court of arbitration in The Hague, and we supported the Philippines' position.
Third point I would like to make, and this is as a former border negotiator with China, that China has done in South China Sea something which is, it does very often in its border negotiations, that is keeping its claims deliberately vague and maintaining strategic ambiguity. Chinese have refrained from clarifying whether their claims, as represented by the Nine-Dash Line, are limited to specific land features and adjacent waters, or whether they're making a historic claim to the entire maritime space encompassed by Nine-Dash Line. Actually, UNCLOS doesn't provide for the latter. It only talks about land features and adjacent waters.
The Chinese foreign office sticks by and large to the UNCLOS definition, but the military, their oil companies, their local authorities, and their passport goes by claiming the entire area encompassed by Nine-Dash Line. So in their passport, they're showing that. In their maps, they're showing Nine-Dash Line with features used to denote international boundary. So if there's ambiguity, this is there, which is being maintained.
Final point I would like to make, and this is in response to a question that has been posed to the panel, and I'll be quite categorical in my response, that prospects for a way forward through cooperative arrangements are very dim, whether under so-called Code of Conduct or through an ASEAN Code of Conduct that Nutan referred to. Prior to the 2016 award of international court arbitration, China had not shown much interest in pursuing code of conduct. Negotiations started way back in 2002, when Declaration of Conduct, DOC, was agreed upon.
Since then, they have pretended to be more interested. There's a common text, which has apparently been agreed upon. There's a framework of the Code of Conduct. But a whole lot of issues remain to be sorted out, including what Nutan referred to, what will be restrained? What is self-restraint? What area are you talking about? How do you carry out co-development, joint development, which is a favored tool of China? In fact, they keep suggesting that let's have joint development, but within EEZ of other countries. Most recently, during visit of President of Indonesia to China, November last year. In fact, the joint statement which was issued, surprisingly, there is a reference to two sides having reached common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims of maritime territories.
Now, if that's indeed the case, and this is a formal written document, that refers to Natuna Sea, which Indonesia has always said is not covered under Nine-Dash Line. So we have a situation which is both sensitive, but where developments have taken in a relentless manner, where China has managed to achieve its objectives through a coercive policy, to which others do not have an effective response. I'm afraid that will continue for foreseeable future.
With these opening remarks, let me invite our panel to make their comments, beginning with Professor Srikanth Kondapalli, an eminent expert on China, who is professor in the Center for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies. Over to you, Srikanth.
Srikanth Kondapalli: Thank you very much. Ambassador Kantha. Let me also thank the ICWA, Mrs. Mahawar and Dr. Teshu Singh. Good afternoon to all of you. I have two sections of my intervention. One is, what is the status right now in South China Sea, and what does that mean for India?
As far as the status is concerned, the last three years, 2022, '23, '24, has been really tough in terms of the number of incidents that happened in February 2023, August 2023, October, November, December. And then January 12, 2024, March 5, March 23, August 23, 2024, April 30, 2024, there are a number of incidents and some of these incidents had about 135 vessels participating, so these are not really small, but quite medium size kind of skirmishes, but basically water cannon or similar incidents, but in 1988 about 64 Vietnamese were killed in a skirmish at that time, in '74 there was the occupation of Vietnamese held islands by the Chinese, and in '88 the Scarborough Shoal incident.
So there were incidents and many of these have also led to a lot of demonstrations, especially in Vietnam and Philippines, when the Hai Yang Shi You incident happened some eight years ago, when the Chinese put up a rig in that region there was a demonstration in South Vietnam that led to killing of five Chinese in those demonstrations. So number one the South China Sea reflects an escalation in conflict in terms of the contesting parties. There are four ASEAN countries and of course China and Taiwan, Taiwan has been relatively silent although it claims the Itu Aba Island, which is one of the best islands in the whole of the region, nine are occupied by China about 45 occupied by Vietnam.
These nine as Ambassador Kantha mentioned has about 3,200 acres of built-up area and that included the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile batteries, naval vessels and other systems, basically they intend to create what Chiang Kai-shek did in 1931 to 1934 of building blocks so that the whole area is under the Chinese control, so this is going back to the 1930s tactics in the encirclement campaign that Chiang Kai-shek fought against the Communist Party. So today Communist Party wants to bring in a system where nobody can transit through that area. So it includes air defense, it includes naval presence and that is the key problem for the whole issue of South China Sea because China, Vietnam, Malaysia, they consider the South China Sea as a territorial sea, not a universal sea, high seas, where anybody can pass through under the unclosed provisions.
So there is a structural problem here in terms of the freedom of navigation. And that's one of the basic points that India has been mentioning as freedom of navigation, because last year there is $3.8 trillion of goods and services passing through that region, previously about $5 trillion, now reduced to about $3.8 trillion, partly due to pandemic and other reasons. So in other words, this is one key problem. Territorial sea, as both China, Malaysia, Vietnam insist on, that is problematic for not just the contestants, but also for the non-contestants or non-regional powers like India, Australia, Japan, South Korea. South Korea has no position on South China Sea, but still dependent heavily on energy passing through, even though South Korea has announced an Indo-Pacific strategy about one and a half years ago.
As far as the dispute is concerned, China follows a twin-track policy, that is they will negotiate only with the contestants, that is Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, the four ASEAN countries. But even with this, we have not seen a regular consultation mechanism. We have had the Declaration of Conduct in 2002, which was implemented since 2011, but DOC has no provisions regarding if a country X occupies some reefs. This is not for any discussion between the parties concerned. So the Declaration of Conduct doesn't have the teeth for addressing the issues in the South China Sea.
In 2018, the Code of Conduct draft has been circulated and Code of Conduct will not have any extra regional powers who are actually dependent on South China Sea for transit. As Mrs. Mahawar mentioned, there is 55% of Indian trade, 78% of Japanese trade, and nearly 90% of Korean trade passing through this region. So there is a huge problem. And about $1 trillion of American trade passing through, out of $5 trillion before, now $3.8 trillion.
So extra regional powers are also involved in terms of their prosperity passing through this region, and so they have stakes. If the Chinese have mentioned Malacca dilemma, equally, everybody has a dilemma in terms of the South China Sea because of the lack of transit or the restrictions. Lack of transit has not been very explicit, but we saw in 2009, INS Airavat was asked to leave the region, even though Indian Navy was silent on this matter, but the Financial Times and others have reported about that incident. We also had the Chinese Defense Minister at the time, Chi Haotian, mentioning to the Shangri-La Dialogue that they will cut the cables of these rigs which are placed.
As you know, ONGC has two rigs in 128 block and 129 block, but 128 block, they hit a hard rock, so 129 is producing oil, and this is extensively used in Vietnam. However, due to the coercive diplomatic statements that China made, the ONGC has given up most of its shares to Russian Rosneft in the South China Seas. So today, ONGC, or OVL, has just about 26% of its shares, which used to be higher before, and because Russia plays a balancer role in the region, although it is more pro-China in terms of the South China Sea. When you look at the joint exercises that Russia conducted along with China, Chinese Navy in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, because of the India-Russia relations, we have kind of an arrangement on the Rosneft in this region.
So the Code of Conduct has not been implemented so far because there is no consensus. Code of Conduct is to promote friendly, harmonious, and peaceful environment, and peace and stability. There is a single draft COC negotiating text, which was circulated, but they have huge concerns about the non-implementation or non-enforcement of the Code of Conduct because the Declaration of Conduct has not been enforced, and that resulted in a lot of heartburn in the region. So that is the current status.
So China is not going to negotiate with the non-contestants in the region, including Thailand or other countries. On the other hand, what China did was, in 2010, when Mrs. Kaur, the Minister of State for External Affairs, made a statement suggesting that the region is important and freedom of navigation is to be upheld. This is the first time India intervened in the South China Sea. Later, Antony, the Defense Minister, made a statement in the parliament saying that we are not a part of the dispute in the South China Sea, and the dispute has to be resolved in a bilateral fashion. But thirdly, he mentioned about the freedom of navigation, which is essential for the Indian trade to pass through.
And after the Permanent Code of Arbitration ruling in July 2016, we sent four ships, INS Kulish, INS Jyoti, and two others, to the region to observe what the position of China would be in terms of the arbitration, post-arbitration ruling. So since then, India has done bilateral, unilateral, and multilateral exercises. But when Obama and Modi joint statement was issued in terms of Indian Ocean as well as South China Sea, we have not been able to implement the South China Sea portion of that agreement in way back some 10 years ago.
So in other words, we have been reluctant to play any bigger role in South China Sea, partly with our assessment that Indian Ocean is primary attention of the Indian Navy. South China Sea and Persian Gulf are the secondary focal areas of the Indian Navy. So with that provision, we have been reluctant to intervene in the South China Sea in any major military way or otherwise. But essentially, it was rule of law, peace and stability, US FONOPs. Those are the main features of the Indian policy in this direction.
So does that result in any cooperative way of resolving the dispute? I agree with the Chair. We are not in a situation right now because China's position is kind of unilateral, overall unilateral in the South China Sea. And there was an agreement between Dr. Manmohan Singh and Hu Jintao for exploitation of oil and gas. There are 12 blocks that CNOOC, China Natural Offshore Oil Company, was drilling in the South China Sea and they offered a well for us. But it did not really click and we could not really exploit any.
On the other hand, the ONGC was in trouble, OVL was in trouble in terms of the vacating of those blocks. So in other words, we lost the position in South China Sea in terms of any joint exploitation, which is one of the principles that Deng Xiaoping mentioned. In 1989, he said sovereignty is mine, postpone the dispute, jointly exploit resources. Xi Jinping came and reversed all of these. Sovereignty is mine, of course. Instead of postponing the dispute, resolve it right now through the militarization process. And that's what has happened in the last 12 years of Xi Jinping's tenure.
And finally, joint exploitation has never happened. There is only joint cooperation on the seismic reading, etc., tsunami and other things. So we have not seen between China and ASEAN countries, concerned ASEAN countries, any cooperative mechanism. There is some tactical level cooperation, but no major cooperation. In other words, India would also face issues in terms of a cooperative way of resolving issues in South China Sea.
So where do we go from here? I think India needs to mobilize the non-contestants as well as the contestants in the region. ASEAN used to be 9:1. Only one country used to support China in 2010. Today, nine countries are supporting China. Only one country, Philippines, is opposing China. So a dramatic change of the geopolitical situation in South China Sea, and hence India needs to act along with the contestants as well as those who are dependent on the South China Sea. We need to organize. If not, term this as a Malacca dilemma as the Chinese have done, because half of our trade is passing through and it is important for us to act in the South China Sea. Thank you.
Ashok Kantha: Thank you, Shrikant, for those remarks. Let me now move to Dr. Lucio. He's joining online from Singapore, I believe. Over to you.
Lucio III Pitlo: Thank you again for the kind invitation. It's a great pleasure to share my views with such a distinguished panel of experts. So, my short remarks will try to look on Philippines and the China dynamics in relation to the South China Sea and I will look into some points. One is the, of course, the danger with action reaction dynamic between the two contestants in the South China Sea, the role of external factors and also the impact of local politics, domestic politics in the Philippines, how it affects the country’s maritime policy and then probably look at some efforts to deescalate the situation.
So tensions in the South China Sea, especially last year between Manila and Beijing have been simmering to say the least. Last year we saw one of the most violent sea clashes between the two sides, the use of water cannons, dangerous and risky maneuvers, especially on the part of Chinese coast guard and also of course the presence of China's huge coast guard ship getting close to Philippines coast. Among a litany of clashes, one of which led to an actual physical altercation wherein a Filipino sailor lost his thumb.
So the mutual distrust in fueling this unhealthy dynamic and both sides are trying to prevent the other from perceived attempts to alter the status quo sensing that it is not getting much support from ASEAN, including from fellow claimant coastal states, Manila is falling back on its US alliance expanding its ties with Japan and other partners, including India as well as countries like Korea, Australia and countries as far as Europe.
With India, for instance, Philippines is the first foreign buyer BrahMos missiles. Last year there was also a bilateral maritime exercise between the two sides and just last month the inaugural maritime dialogue between Philippines and India. The Philippines also opened its territory, its waters, and its airspace for military access, drills, even joint sails with US and other partners, including arms deployment by the US.
This development inadvertently brings Chinese vessels and aircraft closer to their American rivals and this raises the specter of accidents and demanding stronger crisis management mechanisms. Maritime exercises and sails by the Philippines and its allies and partners in choppy waters are met by similar Chinese drills. For example, last week the first maritime cooperative activity between the Philippines and the US, wherein US dispatched an aircraft carrier was met by China undertaking its own drills. Both activities happened in the South China Sea.
So notwithstanding the efforts to de-escalate and prevent conflict, Chinese ship presence in the Philippines' western Exclusive Economic Zone surged, intimidating local fishermen and straining the capacity of the Philippine Coast Guard to respond. China's Coast Guard ship, the monster ship with boat number 5901, is getting closer and closer to the coast of Zambales, a front-line maritime province in Western Luzon, the main island of the country, facing the South China Sea.
Chinese measures also escalate from gray zone to actual use of force, moving from swarming and lasers to ramming in water cannons, all along weathering reputational costs. To compensate for its capacity shortfall and huge power disparities vis-a-vis its big neighbor dispute and Manila increased US military footprint and allowed its longtime treaty ally to deploy a sophisticated mid-range missile system in orderly zone close to Taiwan. These steps by the Philippines have yet to deter Chinese actions in the flashpoint. In fact, these actions did not pass unanswered by China, from China's first ICBM test in the last 44 years, likely in response to the indefinite stationing of a typhoon mid-range capability in northern Luzon, to normalizing the use of water cannon against Philippine civilian and government ships, to the increasing presence of Chinese Coast Guard monster vessels closer to Philippine coast.
So while China's image as an intruder and as a bully was hyped, Philippine actions also fueled questions about agency and proportionality. Underwhelming diplomacy failed to arrest the deteriorating bilateral ties. A series of clashes raised the urgency of the escalation. For the first time last year, three meetings were held under the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism Platform. The 9th BCM was hosted by Manila in July, I mean, the 8th BCM was held in July, and the 9th BCM was held in Beijing in September. Both helped defuse crisis in Second Thomas and Sabina Shoals, respectively. BCM was a vice-ministerial dialogue platform established in 2016.
But while BCM in the past Duterte government where relations with China were friendly and cordial, BCM then was moving towards exploring practical cooperation, including a possible joint offshore petroleum development. But BCM, under the present Marcos Jr. administration, has been preoccupied with firefighting, dialing down tensions after heated clashes. In contrast, Beijing and Washington have been improving military dialogue and communications.
The same cannot be said about Beijing and Manila. This dart of security talks is risky. Manila was a no-show at the 19th Western Pacific Naval Symposium held in Qingdao last April. It also snubbed the Xiangshan Forum of Beijing last September. In contrast, US, Japan, and many ASEAN countries, among others, were present in these gatherings. It remains to be seen whether a joint Coast Guard committee would be restored. A proposal for direct hotlines between the foreign ministries and the presidential offices of both sides was also pitched.
Last week, the 10th Bilateral Consultative Mechanism Meeting was held in Xiamen, and both sides expressed interest to keep their commitment on an arrangement reached last July over Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal. The second point about domestic politics. Regrettably, domestic politics is also complicating Philippine diplomacy. This is especially so as the past and incumbent presidents, Duterte and Marcos Jr., are quarreling. So past deals with China entered by the previous Duterte administration, including a so-called gentlemen's agreement to keep the status quo in the flashpoint were vilified for allegedly jeopardizing the country's position.
Duterte was criticized for allegedly downplaying a 2016 arbitration award favorable to Manila in return for economic concessions. The current Marcos government is projecting that it is better at securing the country's interests in the hotspot. To his credit, Duterte got Filipino fishermen renewed access to Scarborough. He also upgraded infrastructure in the Spratlys and invested in modernizing the country's military and Coast Guard without needlessly antagonizing China. The purchase of BrahMos missile happened under his watch.
At present, Marcos, while getting much praise, is in a tight spot. China is intensifying its presence in the Philippines' Western Asia, interfering with resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal before the agreement last July, and challenging Philippine patrols in Scarborough Shoal. As mentioned, China's monster Coast Guard ship also faced off with Philippine Coast Guard's largest vessel BRP Teresa Magbanwa in Sabina Shoal, another flashpoint. And the latter, the Philippine Coast Guard ship, was forced to vacate the contested feature after being rammed and sustaining damage from a CCG ship.
Yet again, for all of this noise and posturing, both sides are also seeking de-escalation. A provisional arrangement for Philippine troop rotation and supply was reached last July, and based on last week's agreement, both sides are committed to sustaining this arrangement. And in Sabina Shoal, of course, both sides are also looking at ways to expand the coverage of this understanding to include other areas of the West Philippine Sea, or other contested areas in the South China Sea. So to expand it beyond the Second Thomas Shoal, to include other reef flashpoints, in particular Sabina Shoal and Scarborough Shoal.
So in Sabina, the Philippines may want a guarantee that China will not build structures or control the feature, similar to what it did in Scarborough after a tense standoff in 2012. Sabina lies between Palawan and Second Thomas Shoal, and a rival claimant that controls it can interdict resupply efforts to Filipino Marines stationed in BRP Sierra Madre in Second Tomas. Chinese control of Sabina is unacceptable to Manila, as this feature is very close to Palawan, the country's main western island facing the South China Sea.
Manila worries that the dumping of dead or damaged corals in Sabina, which was reported last May, portends possible Chinese interest in occupying the low-lying feature. The Philippines may want China to accept the constant presence of its Coast Guard vessel in Sabina, with the understanding that Manila will not ground a ship, similar to what it did in Second Tomas in 1999, or build a permanent structure in the Shoal. China has not built any structure in Scarborough, despite having near constant presence in the feature since 2012.
In Scarborough Shoal, Manila wants its local fishermen to have unhampered access inside the lagoon, where there are more fish. It may be open to discussing possible joint fisheries management with China, including an agreement on closed fishing season, catch limits, and marine species prohibited from being captured. The 2016 arbitration ruling acknowledged that the Shoal is a traditional fishing ground for Filipino, Chinese, and Vietnamese fishers, and this can provide a pretext for such fisheries cooperation. The past government under Duterte considered declaring it a marine sanctuary.
Manila also wants to resume or keep its government presence in Scarborough through sea and air patrols, and also wants to continue delivering provisions such as food and fuel to its fishermen operating in the area. The maritime rule has become a staple subject of local media in the Philippines. It has a higher issue salience compared to other coastal states like Indonesia, Malaysia, or Brunei. Unlike China or Vietnam, the Philippine government does not have control over its mass media, as the more popular outlets are privately owned.
The domestic media is expected to keep a watchful eye on the choppy waters and expose any inaction or lapses by the government in defending Philippine interests in the hotspot. However, demands for transparency to ensure that the country's interests are not being compromised have to be tamed, as most diplomatic negotiations are done discreetly outside the public limelight. Therefore, the trust in the leadership to deal with Beijing is very important.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Philippines-China diplomatic relations. While growing maritime tensions loom large, it will be a pity to make the issue the centerpiece of that milestone. This goes against the interests and aspirations of the peoples and economies of both sides. The low trust between the two sides continue to plague bilateral relations, but the leadership of both countries have to rise to the occasion, invest in diplomacy, handle differences well, and avoid conflict.
Thank you again, and I look forward to the discussion.
Ashok Kantha: Thank you very much. I'm sure there'll be a lot of questions flowing from your presentation. I'll now invite Dr. Rahul Mishra, Associate Professor, Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, JNU.
Rahul Mishra: Thank you, Ambassador Kantha. Let me begin by thanking the Indian Council of World Affairs for this opportunity, particularly Madam Mahawar, the Additional Secretary, Dr. Teshu Singh, and Dr. Nivedita Ray, the Director of Research. I'm very pleased to be back among friends and former colleagues, including from IDSA. I think much ground has already been covered in terms of what's latest in the South China Sea, what has China done so far, what is Philippines doing, and what actions and counteractions have been taking place.
So going by the concept note, what is left for me is a set of questions on what other claimant states are doing, what is ASEAN's role in this, and whether there is a cooperative way forward. So as all of us know that from the Southeast Asian region, from Southeast Asia, you have Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam as the four claimant states. Now, if we look at the approaches and responses of these Southeast Asian countries, even though their perceptions and their understanding of the South China Sea demonstrate some similarity, their reaction, their response, and their actions at the government level are quite different. It presents a diverse range of perspectives.
So it is in many ways like a Malaysian or an Indonesian layer cake, one part under the overarching framework of ASEAN, but has divergent approaches. And I'll start with the softest approach, which is Brunei. For the past four and a half decades, Brunei has remained very quiet on the South China Sea front. There's been practically no formal statement on the South China Sea directly targeting China with regards to the South China Sea dispute. You would notice that Brunei's responses at all times in alignment with the ASEAN and only through the ASEAN mechanism. So much so that Brunei is called the silent claimant in the South China Sea dispute. And this is a policy that is likely to continue in times to come.
So I don't see Brunei going to make any major changes in its policy, partly because it is dependent on China for trade and also its own self-perceived understanding, which is of course a reality that it's a very small state. It's actually, I think almost as big as NCR. So a state of that size, a country of that size, I don't think would go belligerent in claiming its rights, the EEZ and territorial rights in the South China Sea. So that's the first country you have in, from the Southeast Asian region.
The other claimant is Malaysia, which has had a consistent approach, even though leaders have at times contradicted their approach. The government policy, you have somebody like Mahathir who ruled for 18 plus years, has often targeted China, but only to cater to domestic constituency. No major changes in Malaysia's approach on South China Sea during all these years of Mahathir government.
Anwar has also been, I would say, flippant because he's made mistakes, which were immediately corrected by Vismaputra. So there's not been major change there as well. And if you look at Malaysia's approach to South China Sea, it is based on three pillars. The first is to claim its sovereignty and EEZ rights in public sphere. Whenever there are any encroachments or violations of the Chinese PLA or Malaysia intruding into these waters, they'll make a public statement, but also in most of the cases, siding with or resonating with other Southeast Asian countries. Whenever they gave a statement on violation, for example, in Luxor or the coast of Sabah province, you'd notice that their response is very emotional. It is never very hard-headed and strategic or even tactical.
So it comes with the feeling that, look, we are such good friends to you. We have such good trade and other ties. So why intruding into our territory? So Malaysian approach, first in public statements, they would assert their rights. Second, try and dehyphenate economic and trade and diaspora ties from the South China Sea dispute. And they do it all the time. I mean, Anwar's statements over and again have, I think, here also at the Sapru House lecture, he mentioned that in an indirect way.
The third is to go with the COC, the Code of Conduct on South China Sea, taking a multilateral approach. If you take a good look at what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense in Malaysia have been doing, their focus is more on Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 rather than on Pillar 1, that is asserting their claims. But there are two new pillars or elements emerging under Anwar Ibrahim's prime ministership. The first is the Malaysian elite has increasingly started seeing the South China Sea dispute as an extension of the US-China contestation, which is, of course, driven by other factors. And I'll come to that later.
The understanding is that the same US, which talks about the rules-based order, is actually not following it in other parts of the world. And Malaysia, being an Islamic country, is in many ways justified in saying that. So the perception from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Malaysian elite is that American intervention in South China Sea or American interest in South China Sea is driven by its rivalry with China. And it is therefore an extension of those tensions that are happening at the superpower levels. They don't have honest and direct interest. The engagement is selective and it is also in many ways partial.
The second element that is emerging under Anwar is a very strong anti-West sentiment. And I think he has said it over and again that the rules-based order that the West led by the US keeps talking about whose rules are these and why should we follow these rules if these rules are selective. So his anti-Western narrative, especially in the context of the Middle East conflict, is targeted towards the domestic constituency, but has extended to foreign policy domain and which has led to a new kind of a caucus. It's not the right word in Malaysia, but yes, a group emerging which says that perhaps it is time for Malaysia to understand and that it has to look at China in a different way for three reasons.
One, China is beneficial for economic reasons. They are heavily dependent on China. Second, China is not seen as anti-Islam, at least historically. So that caters to political parties like PAS and the fundamentalists. And third, it is a giant economic neighbor. You cannot wish it away. You have to live with it. Now you decide how you want to manage all things.
So the popular perception or the predominant perception in Malaysia is that Malaysia must do more to manage its ties with China and not let the situation get out of hand. Even if it means a sort of compromise on the South China Sea dispute, that's okay. And I think Anwar's interview the day before yesterday with the Financial Times gives us a lot of insights as to what the leadership is thinking and where the US-China contestation is heading for their mind. And I have three quotes and I thought maybe it would interest all of us.
So first, and “the US has lost ground to China and Southeast Asia because of its lack of engagement. And Anwar has termed it as selective engagement.” The second, there is a trust deficit between emerging economies and big powers, and big powers have not followed the grand rules of international law. And by this, he's not only targeting the American action in Palestine, supporting Israel, but also indirectly telling that South China Sea dispute and this whole debate, the discourse on rules-based international order perhaps is a little misplaced.
The third is in Southeast Asia, the West has delivered endless lectures on democracy and rule of law, but has delivered very little when it comes to things on the ground. Nothing has been done to assist the region and the engagement is only in trade and investment, which basically means that they are only trying to exploit the supply chains that you have in the region.
So what all of this has done is despite all these aggression and interventions, and if you talk to a Sabah, the states, provinces of Sabah and Sarawak, they are quite disappointed with what is happening off the coast of these two provinces. But overall understanding is that this government policy has helped China in its image management. And therefore, I think there was this recent power index where Malaysia was seen as closest to China, and Philippines I thought was far best. So you see this delicate balance that you have in Southeast Asia.
The third country is Vietnam, which again is very delicately positioned. They have huge economic interdependence on China, but at the same time, they are quite vocal on the South China sea front. They have party to party linkages as well. And I believe Vietnam at this moment is really caught in that tug of war, the virtual tug of war between the US and China. And there are interesting instances. For instance, whenever there is a high level, a top-level visit by a Vietnamese leader or from the American side, it is closely followed by a visit by the Chinese leader or engagement or meeting with the Chinese leader of the same order.
So this is a pattern that is emerging. And Vietnam feels compelled to oblige China on these high-level engagements. The recent upgrade of their relationship to three plus three level was also to give a signal that Vietnam is not that close to the US despite their strategic partnership agreement. And perhaps they are also sort of the popular narrative there is hedging. They are also hedging and they are not trying to balance China.
So Vietnam, very much like Malaysia, domestically depends on China for economic growth and development, and also for their party to party relations and stability, because every time the American Freedom House report comes, they see Vietnam as an authoritarian state, which doesn't go very well with the single party government that they have.
Now, Vietnam is slightly different from Malaysia in the sense that while all of this is happening, they have not given up or they are not willing to give away their claims on South China Sea. And they seem to be following the Chinese strategy in their own little ways, which is that in the meantime, like from now to the time when COC is implemented, a binding code of conduct is implemented. Do as much island reclamation as possible, do as much illegal fishing as possible, following the Chinese strategy. And at the same time, keep the conflict level low. So keep it to such a low level that there is minimal, low scale military or Coast Guard engagement.
Now, all of this is in complete contrast with the Philippines, and my co-panelist has already spoken about the Philippines. I would just highlight three major developments on the Filipino front, the three pillars that they have, which has evolved over the past few months, I would say. First, building their military capabilities. I think past 18 months to two years have been really remarkable for the Philippines in terms of building their defense and naval capabilities, trying to become more self-reliant.
The second is have as many strategic and military partners as possible. So diversify, go beyond the alliance mechanism. And that is where India has a very strong role to play, and so has Japan, the European Union countries, Australia and US have always been there. The third is reaching out to multilateral forums. For instance, the International Court of Justice of the United Nations, and also ASEAN. But my reading of these multilateral Filipino engagement with these multilateral forums is not for any legal purposes. I mean, even if an ICJ 2.0 happens, that is not going to give Philippines anything.
So the idea is to shame China at international forums, and accrue some diplomatic gains out of it. This leaves us in a, I mean, the situation, as I said, is a layer cake situation. What makes this whole thing interesting is how Indonesia is being dragged into the South China Sea dispute. Indonesia is not a claimant state. And it is getting dragged because China claims to its Nine Dash Line or Ten-Dash Line claims parts of Natuna Island EEZ, which has made Indonesia not only very upset, but they've also termed it uncalled for and unjust.
My sense is that as Indonesia keeps getting dragged into the dispute, what will happen is it will mobilize ASEAN towards a resolution, or at least confronting China. And also, I think within the ASEAN region, within the ASEAN member countries, greater coordination. And this is something that one of the track of three powers, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore only can do this. Now, what does all of this lead, I mean, what does all of this mean to ASEAN? Where does this lead us to?
ASEAN has a good old approach of, or a policy of Code of Conduct and multilateral negotiations that has not yielded anything substantial for us. It is just a paper tiger, as Mao would call it. I mean, there's nothing on the ground and there is no likely possibility that COC will materialize. So I think part of the problem is that five of the ASEAN member countries have no stakes there. They are not claimant states. So Singapore is the only non-claimant country that has a voice that has a say on the South China Sea dispute. And this leads us to this question, whether ASEAN is in a position to find a solution or offer a solution.
I think COC for now is only a stopgap arrangement to avoid conflicts, to avoid any accidental war, if you will, or escalation. And in the meantime, I think what ASEAN is perhaps looking for is a greater willingness on part of China to sit across the table and find a common solution, even though it is not going to be very favorable to other ASEAN countries, the Southeast Asian countries. That I think is the only way possible.
So to answer the question, whether a cooperative way is possible, I think cooperation is possible only amongst the ASEAN countries, the Southeast Asian countries. I don't see any possibility of China and Southeast Asia shaking hands on this. The other development that is taking place is a number of bilateral arrangements between Philippines and Vietnam, for example, or between Malaysia and Vietnam recently. So new bilateral arrangements on the maritime front emerging, which is basically to arrest, to cap China's intrusions in territorial waters and EEZs of the South China Sea. And that, I think, gives a ray of hope for the small powers in the region to deal with China, which is, of course, so aggressive.
So I'll stop there. Thank you.
Ashok Kantha: Sure, Rahul. So, Teshu, how much time do we have? 15 minutes? Sure. Okay, then floor is open for questions. We'll club maybe three questions and then ask a panelist to respond. So please identify yourself. If possible, pose your question to a particular panelist. Okay. Sarabjeet, you want to start here?
Sarabjeet Parmar: Thank you, Ambassador. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. And for Mr. Pitlo, I'm Captain Parmar. I'm a retired Indian naval officer, distinguished fellow with the Council for Strategic and Defense Research and the United Service Institution. I have a couple of quick comments and views would be welcome. In December last year, China submitted its base points for the Scarborough Shoal. And if you remember the submission made earlier by China, where the base points were given by Latlong, and then it said the rest would be intimated much later. That was many years ago. This is the first time after that submission that China has given base points. And for the first time, it has included an island or an area in the South China Sea.
Now this has a couple of ramifications. One is that it is a disputed territory. Therefore, the recognition of those baselines, which are under the spirit of UNCLOS based on recognition of sovereignty can be contested, but nevertheless, it has submitted it, which means that it is going to push forward its sovereignty claims of the four-shoals claim, which Ambassador Kantha mentioned earlier.
The second one is ADIZ. Now, as per the acceptable definition of air defense identification zones, it has to emanate from land. You can't just declare an ADIZ in the middle of nowhere. So, if you declare your base points, which means you are declaring a territorial sea thereafter and your national airspace ends where your territorials be. You have in a way opened the doors. China hasn't opened the doors for instituting an ADIZ in the middle of the South China Sea, which if you remember, it had said certain time back. Now, this is a very quiet affair that nobody has looked at, but it has ramifications in the future and also for other islands. So, that's one issue.
The other issue is the action of China. Now If you look at the definition of acts of aggression, which is given in the UN Charter, it's a very grey zone, grey sort of a definition. And the act of China, which resulted in the loss of a finger of a Filipino sailor last year could be considered an act of aggression, which actually opens the door for nations and especially Philippines to act in self-defense. But the flip side to that is the moment you do that, you have opened the door for China to act in self-defense itself. And this is something that I feel China has been waiting for a long time, force a position on to or a nation to react in a way and then it acts in self-defense.
And if you remember the statement in, I think, the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue, where the Defense Minister clearly stated about militarization of islands, where he said that given the presence of adversarial ships, which obviously meant US FONOPs on all, we have the right to militarize our sovereignty or our territory. So this is not only going to increase the tension more, perhaps it's also going to increase the instability and Professor Kondapalli rightfully pointed out about China quizzing ships going.
In fact, the recent incident was an Indian naval Coast Guard ship on way back from Japan was also quizzed. So these issues and instances I think they're only going to increase. And my last point here is on the Code of Conduct.
Now, if the ASEAN nations want actually to have a Code of Conduct, then there, the problem is not only with China, there is a dispute between other ASEAN nations. You have between Vietnam, Philippines, you have between Malaysia, Vietnam. So wouldn't it be a better idea if the ASEAN nations on the South China Sea dispute resolve their issues amicably and then take the onus on to China?
I'm not sure how much pressure it would put on to China, because then it will leave China to deal with individual nations, which actually I think is something it wants. But if ASEAN backs these nations and say that, all right, these nations have settled their disputes in this particular territory now belongs to nation A, B and C, it gives a legitimate right for those nations to actually lay claim to sovereignty and establish their maritime zones and therefore their air defense identification zone in consonance with international law. But this is something that needs a deeper look. It actually needs to look at many, many issues. And I'll pause here. Thank you.
Ashok Kantha: Okay. We'll take a couple of the questions. Yeah, please go ahead. Please identify yourself.
Varshitha Eddula: Good evening, everyone. My name is Varshita. So my question is to Mishra sir. You mentioned that West has done very little on the ground. But should Europe consider South China Sea problems as their problems or world problems? And my question to Ambassador sir, should India sense an opportunity in the South China Sea and engage bilaterally for military partnerships? And to Kondapalli sir, is it possible to de-link economically from China so we can bring it to the negotiating table? Thank you.
Ashok Kantha: Now, we'll request the panellists to respond. And we'll start with Dr. Lucio. Decide which question you'd like to respond.
Lucio III Pitlo: Yeah. Thank you for the comments of the good Admiral. I'll probably reply to the point about the China declaring baselines around Scarborough Shoal and the point about ASEAN claimant states coming together to increase their bargaining position relative to China.
On the first one about the China's last month declaration of base points around Scarborough Shoal, some in the Philippines, I think some in other countries also have mixed views, interesting views on this. Because as we all know, China's Nine or Ten-Dash Line is quite ambiguous. We don't know whether it's a claim to everything within those dashes or a claim on a group of a chain of rocks and reefs. And then from there, claim for extended maritime entitlements, which is the case for the four shoals.
So after the 26th Arbitration Award, we have seen, at least from Manila's view, China using this new concoction called the four shoals, which means that these four island chains in the South China Sea, including the Spratlys, which they call the Nanshoals, are islands and therefore they are entitled to territorial sea and extended maritime entitlements like EEZ and continental shelf. So it's very interesting for China to draw baselines in Scarborough Shoal because it may mean that they are tempering their claims. Because the Scarborough Shoal is a high tide elevation for a rock. The most that it can be entitled is a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. As a rock or an HTE, it cannot be entitled to EEZ or continental shelf. This is the same position as that of the Philippines.
And so China's baselines declaration was actually a response to the Philippines' passage of its maritime zones law, which included Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippines' maritime zones. The waters around Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines consider as territorial sea. So by China declaring the same baselines around it, it seems that they agree on this. So some in the Philippines see this as actually a win for the Philippines in a way.
Now, the second point about, in a perfect world, I think ASEAN claimant states, the four, possibly including Indonesia, if they can come together to increase, to have a sense of a baseline, a common position amongst themselves in relation to the South China Sea before they deal with China, this is the perfect scenario. But as we all know, among ASEAN countries, this is also difficult. But as pointed out by the good Admiral in recent years, we have also seen countries, liberal states in the South China Sea, trying to delimit their EEZs. Philippines and Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia.
So I think these are baby steps. Now, these steps should be encouraged because it can help enhance the trust and confidence between the core frontline claimant states. And by doing so, this may provide a basis for a common position that will put China in a difficult spot because all of these demarcations are based in UNCLOS. They are not based on some historic rights that are already invalidated by UNCLOS and by the 2016 arbitrational law. Thank you.
Srikanth Kondapalli: Thank you for those questions. When you want to join the ASEAN as a dialogue partner, you have to sign two things. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and nuclear weapon free zone. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation would mean you have to have the first cooperative way of dealing with issues, which has not been done. China joined the ASEAN as a Dialogue Partner in '92 and then subsequently ARF in '96. And so it is by definition accepts the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and is not supposed to militarize, but it has militarized. So you have a situation there on the fundamental aspect of ASEAN's links with China. So that is where the key problem is in terms of China’s association with the ASEAN.
The second aspect is that last year, China's ASEAN trade was about $930 billion, the largest trading partner for China with EU $560 billion, with Japan some $220 billion, with South Korea some $200 billion. So ASEAN is the largest trading partner for China in $930 billion. So you would expect if you go and we studied Robert Keoghan, Joseph Nye, if you have economic interdependence between A and B, the A will not fight B, B will not fight A because of this economic interdependence, so much of economic interdependence that they have between the two sides. There is an FTA from 2010 between China and ASEAN.
And this has been also upgraded in various ASEAN plus one format. So we would expect more cooperation, but that's also not happening. Economic interdependence is not leading to reduction in conflict. And then there is Alexander Wendt's constructivism, community building. So ASEAN decided they will have a community, an economic community, a cultural community, a security community. But even that is not leading to cooperative ways.
So we are actually in a dilemma in terms of application of all of these to the ground reality. The problem here is sovereignty is mine. They have already declared China. China has already declared in 1989 that the whole of South China Sea is mine, South China Sea is 3.4 million square kilometers. India is 3.2 million square kilometers. You see how big it is, South China Sea, and they want 90% of the whole of that. And no international actor is doing anything. Look at the FONOPs of the US. The US is not going within the 12 nautical miles. It is stopping at 12 nautical miles.
So tactically, they are legitimizing the Chinese claims over these islands or reefs. So there is actually a problem here in terms of unilateral Chinese approach towards the South China Sea. And we are discussing about how these can be leading to a cooperative manner. One other method is CBMs, confidence building measures. So DOC, COC has provisions related to CBMs, various measures that have been identified in these documents. But none of these were implemented again. And you are free to go and occupy any reef that you want to and build up the infrastructure, dual infrastructure.
So what can India do? So management is not possible because China is not allowing any non-contestant in that area. Dual track approach means that it will not allow anybody to enter into the South China Sea. So what India should do is what it decided in Quad meeting on IUU, illegal fishing. Last year, China captured 236 million tons of fish. 36% of that came from the Indo-Pacific, including when you say Indo-Pacific, there are four areas, South China Sea, Bay of Bengal, West Pacific and Western Indian Ocean.
So from this region, China captured 80 million tons of fish, quite a big amount. So that means that we need to actually intensify the IUU as part of the Quad, number one. Number two, we need to have counter-piracy operations in South China Sea. According to the IMO, International Maritime Organization, 50% of global piracy incidents are happening now in Southeast Asia, in South China Sea. If China can send naval contingencies to the Gulf of Aden from 2008 till now, 46 of them. Why can't Indian Navy send contingencies to the South China Sea?
On a regular basis, they send two to three ships every year. Why can't Indian Navy do with Andaman Nicobar Joint Command as the base? It could send across these for counter-piracy operations. The third thing that India should do in this is capacity build up. It was mentioned by Lucio about the BrahMos and when Indonesian President is coming next week, we're going to sign an agreement on BrahMos as well with Indonesia. Vietnam is still pending, other countries as well.
Capacity build up not just in hardware, but also in terms of training, exercises, a whole host of other things. Of course, all the 10 ASEAN put together, they are no match to China in militarily, politically, economically or any other terms. Within ASEAN, there are actually difficulties. Look at the ASEAN response on Myanmar. They were not really been able to succeed. So, it's a divided house which needs outside capacity build up. So, I stop here.
Rahul Mishra: I want to start with Commander Parmar’s question. Intra-ASEAN bilateral dispute settlement, I believe is not possible and not practical also for a number of reasons. I think the first one is it would open Pandora's box because the moment you start talking about bilateral settlement, China would chip in. After Pedra Branca dispute settlement between Singapore and Malaysia, these possibilities were raised by policy makers from Singapore, but they subsided primarily because of this reason. And China also, I think back in the past, they tried to do a bilateral joint management of resources with Philippines and with Malaysia, but that was not taken kindly by ASEAN and other stakeholders, that is the US.
So, I think that's really not possible considering China's role there. And the same applies to joint management of the South China Sea. If you are going to talk about joint management of South China Sea, you have to willy-nilly engage China. And then how do you go about it? So, the illegal fishing that is happening in the region will become legal, right? I mean, because China will have direct stakes there, direct involvement there. At the moment, countries are not talking bilaterally about the South China Sea dispute, at least not at that level. But if you have a joint mechanism that will make things difficult, then ASEAN countries will be at the receiving end.
The question of whether the West has done very little or too much is not my point. It's something that Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has said. I thought as a scholar on Southeast Asian studies, it's my responsibility to present facts as they are, rather than trying to curry flavor it. So, Malaysia feels that the West has not done enough. And that is also kind of verified by Professor Kondapalli, saying that even the American FONOPs operations are limited and very restrained in terms of their operations.
The problem that you see in South China Sea from the Southeast Asian angle is that unlike the Philippines, no other country is in any alliance partnership with the US or any of the Western countries. And they need credible deterrence, which they don't have. So, if they want to stand up to China, they would need a superpower or a middle power, rising powers like India and Japan, Australia, to support them, which is not happening. It's just practically impossible for any of these middle powers and rising powers to do it. And America is not interested. With Trump 2.0, we don't even know whether he would come for ASEAN Summit or East Asia Summit.
So, there is a lot of anxiety about America's commitment to the region. Other than FONOPs, there is really not much on supply chain, benefiting from supply chains. There's not much. And that's why this concern that perhaps the West, that is the US, is not interested. Economic engagement, Joseph Nye, Keohane and Nye, I think Southeast Asian countries, tried and tested a blend of Alexander Wendt and the ideas coming from Keohane and Nye. But that debate, I thought, is already settled for good in favor of Mearsheimer, who said that China has benefited from the rules-based order by getting socialized, but it has not contributed anything to the international system. And South China Sea is not an exception there. Over to you.
Ashok Kantha: Well, we had very good discussions. Unfortunately, we're running out of time. So, if you permit, I'll take a few minutes just to sort of pick up threads from discussion, especially with regard to what position India needs to take on this issue. I think the first point is that we need to project our stakes in the South China Sea. That's something we have been very hesitant, very shy about. If China can claim South China Sea on the basis of its so-called historic claim, you're not claiming it, but it has been part of the industry.
We have a very strong, I'm not going to specifics, very strong interest. And this is not just limited to civilizational links but also to the, current period, very strong links. So, projecting our engagement in terms of what like Nutan said about trade that passes through, our vital stakes, I think that's very important. We should do it in a far more assertive manner. And this has a related issue that I think Srikanth referred to. COC is being discussed between China and ASEAN countries, but it will impact so-called extra-regional countries who have very vital stakes there.
If China's sway, in fact, they would like to sort of very seriously undermine involvement of countries like India or even USA in South China Sea, will it be in our interest? I think this dialogue has to be carried out with concerned ASEAN countries. COC is not only about you. We have in the past made the mistake of taking the position that South China Sea issue will be settled among the countries concerned. Don't think that's the correct position. You need to walk away from that because it affects us. It affects countries with very vital stakes in South China Sea.
Second point or third point is that I already referred to the fact that our position is being tweaked, but it's being done in a very sort of gradual manner. I think we took a major step during joint statement with the Philippines in July 2023 when we lent support explicitly to 2016 award of international court of arbitration. We need to make it more routine that China’s claims are illegal, unlawful. Many countries have taken that, that Chinese claims are without basis because it has implications for our own boundary talks with China.
Third point, again, building on what has been discussed earlier, and what Dr. Lucio also said, capacity building. I was High Commissioner in Malaysia in 2007-'09. I was recalling the conversation with Rahul that Malaysians were so keen to collaborate with us on training for Sukhoi 30 MKM aircraft. We not only provided training in India, but we had an Indian Air Force training contingent based on a Malaysian Air Force base for two years. In fact, they wanted to carry it forward. So there is interest, there is desire. It doesn't have to be China-centric, but that needs more sort of bandwidth, more capacity on our side. We should do it. It's an area of great interest to us.
ADIZ was referred to, we shouldn't be caught napping once again, as was the case with the ADIZ in East Asia Sea. With the exception of the USA saying that the fighter aircraft will not sort of abide by ADIZ, everyone fell in line, actually. That shouldn't happen. I think we need more advanced messaging to China that ADIZ in South China Sea will not be a legal proposition. We will not abide by it. China is not going to shoot down aircraft of countries like India if we don't abide by ADIZ. But this messaging has to be done in advance rather than waiting for China. They have always kept open the option officially of announcing ADIZ. Should we give a response officially?
Finally, a point which was made by Shrikant earlier, our presence in South China Sea in different ways. We have stayed on certain exploration blocks of Vietnam, even though they are non-productive, to make a point, maybe 26%. I think we need to continue that, that we will not be bullied. China cannot. China also has its own limitations, how far they can go to bully a country like India. We are not sort of a pushover. So maintaining our presence on the ground in whatever we can is important. And finally, engaging with China itself.
I think it's important to convey to China in our strategic dialogue that their position causes deep concern among countries like India. South China Sea is a region of great strategic importance to us. You can't just claim it as your waters on the basis of historic rights which have been rejected by international court of arbitration. They will not accept our position. But engaging with them in some dialogue as a negotiator, I can tell you that creating pressure points is sometimes very important in negotiations. And we should do that in case of South China Sea.
I'll conclude here. Thank you very much, Nutan. Thank you, Teshu, for giving us this opportunity to have this frank dialogue, if I may say so, that we all benefited from it. Thank you.
Teshu Singh: Thank you, sir. I thank all the participants and speaker for the panel discussion. I thank the Additional Secretary, ICWA, Director Research, the IT team, Research Faculty, and the entire staff of ICWA for their support. To know more about ICWA's research work, events and outreach program, do visit our ICWA website and do follow us on social media handles on X, LinkedIn, YouTube, and Facebook. May I now invite everyone to join us for tea. Thank you.
Lucio III Pitlo: Thank you again and more power to ICWA.
Ashok Kantha: Thank you very much. Really appreciate you joining. We can't invite you to join us for tea, but you can take it in check.
Lucio III Pitlo: Looking forward to toast, tea in person soon. Thank you so much. Thank you.
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