Puneet Gaur: A very good afternoon to everyone present here. Before we begin, I request everyone to silence their mobile phone kindly. Esteemed panelists, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to welcome you all to Sapru House for the discussion on the book, The Crossroads: Kashmir - India's Bridge to Xinjiang, authored by Professor K. Warikoo. We have a very distinguished panel to discuss the book. I warmly welcome the Chair of today's book discussion, Ambassador T.C.A. Raghavan sir, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, and former DC ICWA. It is a special privilege to welcome author of the book, Professor K. Warikoo, who was my PhD supervisor in JNU. I extend a warm welcome to the distinguished panelists, Shri Jayadeva Ranade sir, President, Center for China Analysis and Strategy, New Delhi, and Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.
We are grateful to our esteemed panelists for their kind acceptance of our invitation. The program of the event will be as follows. Welcome remarks will be made by Shrimati Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA. It will be followed by remarks by the chair, who will conduct the proceeding subsequently. It will be followed by a brief about the book. Professor K. Warikoo will follow the chair's remarks, followed by intervention by the panelist. Following the intervention, we will have a Q&A session, moderated by the chair.
Now, I request Shrimati Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA, to kindly deliver the welcome remarks. Thank you.
Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Thank you, Puneet, Ambassador Raghavan, distinguished experts, students, and friends. Professor Warikoo's book, The Crossroads: Kashmir – India's Bridge to Xinjiang, deals with trade and connectivity on one hand, and the Anglo-Russian great game and intense machinations for influence on the other.
Trade and connectivity have historically been critical issues in international relations. History has shown that the two have stuck to each other like Velcro, leading to friendly civilizational connect somewhere, and wars, strife, and empire building elsewhere.
An example of the latter category is the great game in Eurasia, along the Silk Route of the previous centuries. The great game was about trade coming to be used as a pretext for, first, political interference, and then gaining political and territorial control. Trade was the raison d'etre of the Great Game. Suspicion, intrigue, duplicity, conspiracies underpin the chess-like moves of the great game players.
I take the example of great game and colonization. World history is, however, replete with examples where trade has led to hostilities, conflicts, empires, and oppression.
We thought that that era was over.
However, in the backdrop of the current geopolitics and global tumult, the reappearance of Great Game 2.0 is being cited, showing that colonial era undercurrents still find sway. Analysts are seeing a reflection of the conflictual aspects of trade and connectivity in the sharpening US-China strategic rivalry, trade and tariff wars, a deadlocked WTO amidst eroding trust, and in China's global initiatives, especially the Belt and Road Initiative. Needless to add, trade conflicts, connectivity calculus, and geopolitics make for a heady mix.
Today's Sino-US rivalry and its manifestation in different theaters of the world and in the overall trend of weaponization of trade is a present-day extension of the colonial era trade wars. We need to acknowledge this and take firm steps to negate these attitudes and tendencies. Drawing advantage from the current geopolitical ferment, we need to craft a new world order, an order which turns history around and incorporates trade as a positive and beneficial force that promotes peace. Can we do it?
It goes without saying that we don't need a Great Game 2.0.
Lessons from the Great Game, from colonization, and from previous centuries do not tell us to downgrade trade in international politics. Instead, they tell us about its significance and immense potential if harnessed the right way. Trade is important. It is a tool for inter-country, inter-regional, and inter-civilizational intercourse. Trade is interdependence in operation. Trade will continue to be a salient feature of the international order in the foreseeable future.
It is critical, however, that the New World Order, about which I just mentioned, should deploy trade as a handmaiden of improved living, a harbinger for prosperity for all, a tool for development, rather than the forerunner of wars and conflict as we see it today, both in the historical and contemporary context. Cooperative, transparent, and trust-based approaches are, of course, a necessary prerequisite.
I think there are UN resolutions linking trade to peace and security. Trade and security linkages exist in WTO too. These need to be revisited.
A word about Kashmir and Xinjiang. The importance of overland connectivity, trade and cross-border community ties is lost on no one. However, geopolitics of the “all-weather” Sino-Pak nexus, since India's independence, have excluded the possibility of a peaceful periphery for India, and Kashmir's relations with Xinjiang remain estranged.
Moreover, China's actions give us no respite. BRI is a reincarnation of a hegemonic outlook along the Silk Road, an attitude seeking to build spheres of influence reminiscent of the great game era, to India's detriment. Only this time, the hegemon is China. CPEC reflects a steep sharpening of the attitudes that were earlier reflected in the establishment of the Karakoram Highway, as also stated in this book, forcing India to take positions on the issue that it has.
Professor Warikoo hails from Kashmir and has dedicated his life to the study of Eurasian, Himalayan, and Central Asian regions. His is a unique perspective. He told me that this book encapsulates 30 years of his work and understanding. I look forward to an engaging discussion on this well-researched book. I wish the panelists all the best. Thank you.
Puneet: Thank you, ma'am. May I now request Chair Ambassador T.C.A. Raghavan, sir, to make his remarks and conduct the proceedings. Thank you, sir.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Well, first of all, good afternoon, everybody. And thank you very much, ICWA, for inviting me. Thank you very much, Nutan, for those opening remarks. Very interesting. And they really set the stage for what I am about to say. May I congratulate Professor Warikoo for not just this book, but also his long years and the great effort he has put in to exploring the history of Kashmir in a wider context, in its Central Asian context and its Trans-Himalayan context. In many ways, this has been a lonely furrow. There are not too many scholars who have invested so much on the study of this particular theme. And his journal, Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, stands out in the existing literature.
So in many ways, this book is a submission of his great amount of research which he has put in and which has been published from time to time. And it opens up many new lines of inquiry. And I hope these lines of inquiry will be followed up. But certainly, I do wish to congratulate Professor Warikoo very warmly for his great dedication. And as I said, it's been a lonely furrow and it's good that we have such a good panel to discuss this. Shri Jayant Ranade, Professor, Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, possibly is one of India's best known China watchers and he has spent many years studying China, both the domestic politics of China, but also China's external posture, these external relations.
And so I think his remarks today with regard to how do we see the Xinjiang-Kashmir interface in today's geopolitical context will be particularly interesting. Dr. Ashok Behuria is one of India's most astute Pakistan watchers for many years and he has studied Pakistan's internal dynamics, India-Pakistan relations, Pakistan occupied Kashmir and numerous other related issues with a great deal of clarity and insight. And certainly I have, through all the years that I dealt with Pakistan, I found his writings always something which you could rely on for providing that extra insight and extra little bit of context, which is otherwise often missing in analyses about Pakistan in India.
I don't want to anticipate what Professor Warikoo will say and what the panelists will say, but I really want to say how much I enjoyed reading this book, which is in large part a historical aspect of the Kashmir-Xinjiang interface, the story of the interplay of three powers, principally the Russians and the British, but also to some extent the Chinese. But what is also interesting and what comes out from a close reading of the book is how from time to time the Kashmir Darbar or the government of Jammu and Kashmir retained some agency and was able to play an independent role and how critical that role was at different points of time.
So this is a story of cultural, political, trading contacts, old trading routes and because Professor Warikoo knows that region well, he is able to animate that discussion and analysis very, very well, so that there is a certain dramatic force in the narrative itself. Some of the chapters are especially interesting, the Shahidullah affair, the story of India's Kashgar consulate. But the parts I liked the most were two specific incidents. One is about Gilgit in 1947-48, Operation Datta Khel, when a young British officer, he was a captain or a major, staged what in effect was a coup d'etat. He made up his mind that Gilgit has to be part of Pakistan and possibly was able to convince his superiors. Or perhaps he got a slight nod of encouragement from his superiors. But I know that is your view. But in my view, it wasn't so much policy which was crafted from the very top, but it was more an example of local initiative driving policy and local initiative in the end bringing about a situation where policy had to mold itself to accommodating it.
In any case, it was a coup d'etat. And it had enormous consequences for the history of South Asia thereafter.
The other interesting episode which I enjoyed reading very much, I had read it earlier and I reread it again, was about how some Kazakh officials, Chinese officials, after the revolution in China decided to take refuge in Kashmir and then what happened to them. And they finally ended up in Bhopal, where obviously the heat would have killed off most of them. But it's a very interesting story to read. In general, the book raises several questions, some of which have been answered, but some are unanswered because these are events which are unfolding. And one of those questions is that, and it's something which I don't think government has a position on it, but it's something which we should think about in think tanks and in analyses, in analytical circles, that what is the end game in Kashmir? I mean, what is the optimum future we envisage?
One is, as Nutan pointed out, and this is something which we all believe in, that we have to take a certain progressive view on trade and to define our region's future in terms of not shutting ourselves in, but in having expanding relations with our entire region. And obviously, overland trade is the best way of doing that.
But can we apply that general principle to Kashmir? Since 2014, for instance, a certain bold experiment which had been attempted between 2004 and 2014, which was of softening the line of control, had been attempted. And one part of it was that you open up trade routes between the foothills, which is the Jammu region and the comparative part in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The other was in the valley between Uri and Muzaffarabad.
The third part, which was not yet even attempted but remained as a target, was of opening such a route in Ladakh, between Skardu-Kargil. And that, in a sense, would have meant that you make the entire line of control somewhat porous, open it up, make it softer, and then think about this aspect of overland trade in a broader context, because in the end that is one way forward. As I said, that process came to an end, or at least has been suspended since 2014-2015.
Is it feasible to think about reinstituting it in today's context, given the entire security situation, the way it has developed, what is happening in Afghanistan, what is happening in the Pakistan-Afghanistan interface, the security implications for us? Because if it is not, then we have to think of other optimum solutions. It may not fit in with our overall approach to trade and to opening up and being part of a wider region, but it may be a better option then to bring down the shutters and to try to insulate yourself from the coming storm, so to say. Because it is possible that given the wider global changes which are taking place, some people say we are already in the midst of a second Cold War, perhaps it is better to concentrate on safeguarding our position and strengthening our defenses and insulating ourselves from possible influences coming in from outside.
I think the debate on Kashmir really is poised between these two binaries, and when we look ahead we have to think about what is the way forward and what is the best way forward given our own national interests.
So with that, may I request Professor Warikoo to give us a brief overview of the book, and thereafter I will request our panelists to also convey their points of view. Again may I thank ICWA for inviting me here today. Thank you.
Warikoo: Thank you, sir. As has already been started, the book actually was conceived in late 1979. And I had a chance meeting with the last Uyghur refugee staying in Srinagar. And then my meetings with late R.K. Kak, he was a doyen of Kashmir Journalism, Express Times, etc. And he had covered all the series of events, important events since the 1930s. And I had about a decade-long interaction with him. He had actually covered this Uyghur and Kazakh exodus from Xinjiang into Kashmir. Had interviewed Isa Yusuf Alptekin and Muhammad Amin Bughra, who were the main leaders of Xinjiang.
And Kak sahab told me that they had already informed the Indian government. And they were close with Shahidullah. And they had probably met Nehru. And that about the Chinese designs on regarding Aksai highway, Aksai Xinjiang highway, and other designs. Because they were holding very prominent positions in the Uyghur-Xinjiang government. Then I had one meeting with, it was by chance meeting at Srinagar, Abdul Waheed Rodha, who was a great caravaneer and was leading the Alapchak mission, a tea trade mission, semi-official mission between Kashmir and Ladakh and Tibet.
So he had great political insights and was very incisive, informative, and politically minded. And he gave me very good insights into the situation into Xinjiang and that region. In fact, he had probably, not probably, actually helped Americans during the Dalai Lama's plight and other things. So then when I learned about the trading activities between Xinjiang and Kashmir, so a group of Hoshiarpuri traders were actually operating that trade in Xinjiang.
So one Biharilal Parashar, so I tried to make contact with him. He was from Gagret in Hoshiarpur. So in 1983, 1984, I had a series of meetings with him. So he gave me, because he stayed for 14 long years in Yarkand and looking after trading activity, he was an agent looking after the bigger trading house activities there. So he gave me a detailed account of the situation there and what he told me that after he came in 1950, he had written a 90 page document and given it to Indian authorities, officials, maybe intelligence agencies in Leh.
When I looked for archives, national archives, so I found the report, Bihari Lal Parishar report, but it was closed. I couldn't access it. But Bihari Lal's report, that report was there. So these are the basic and my frequent visits to Xinjiang and I was lucky to have the opportunity to get help and assistance from Zhou Shuqing. He was the director of some institute and they were dealing with Xinjiang and actually they were Huns based in Xinjiang, but China is very wise. They have used these Huns, officials and academics or given their experience of Uyghur affairs and Xinjiang affairs, they put them in charge in various positions in Beijing.
So this institute hosted me once, but then they facilitated my two visits to Xinjiang, both once southern Xinjiang and other 2011 northern Xinjiang. So I covered and earlier I had been several times there. So this book should have been out much earlier, but since this was a very tedious job, as you have seen, it is spanning 16 chapters and I have tried to cover as much as possible about the bilateral issues, whether it is trading, culture or diplomatic context, as you said yourself, Kashmir maintained very strong diplomatic presence in Xinjiang through the medium of Kashmiri Muslim traders. Maharajas would give them some gifts and they would perform their job. They would report back keeping the British away, without the knowledge of the British. The British were very keen that the Maharaja doesn't indulge into direct interaction with the trans-Karakoram nobility or the authorities in Xinjiang or Kokand or Bukhara or otherwise. But the prestige and position of Kashmir state, Kashmir Darbar, was so high across the Karakoram in Central Asia that they would once again, and his hospitality would attract them to stay with him. And then they would confer.
So all these minor details of this diplomatic maneuvering, outmaneuvering by the British and the machinations. And finally, when I read this point of this Gilgit, as you said, Operation Datta Khel. Major Brown is the main instrument. But actually, it was Cunningham who was the NWF governor. And then Baker. Not Baker, some other name. Bacon. They were placed, Roger Bacon. He was appointed as political agent in Gilgit in early '47. Then he was the main link between Pakistan government, Major Brown, and George Cunningham. And Ernest Bevan, the British foreign secretary, spoke to George Marshall, the US Secretary of State, on 27 October 1948 during a meeting. He stated, I quote, the main issue was who would control the main artery leading into Central Asia. The Indian proposals would leave that in their hands. So the main issue before the British was to keep India away from that highway.
Now, you must have seen the reports about China trying to occupy Wakhan, whether that is true or not. But the Chinese have put up some posts there also on that corridor. In 2011 or '12, I visited Tajikistan again for a field study. But I was keen to go to southern, that is, Badakhshan, Gorno-Badakhshan region. So it was, again, a providence. I didn't plan to go there. I had planned. Up to I had read this George Curzon's notes and others. So I had planned to go to Kharag and other places. But the local professor Waldos, in Kharag University, they were so happy to see me. Probably they had seen my work and my enthusiasm and interest. He took me along with him to the last village, or inhabited village, in Langar on the Wakhan Corridor. So it was the last village.
So there, when that lady showed me, this is India. So when I looked, I just was perplexed. But then I recovered myself and then saw that only 10 or 15 kilometers away, the gap between that portion where I stood and Gilgit was only 10 to 15 kilometers. So that day it shook me. It was brimming in my mind how, but I started collecting materials. And I found that this was the reason that the British intention was not to allow. And now the irony of history is that the artery is in the same hands of communist China and Pakistan.
They have built Karakoram Highway. They have upgraded it to a CPEC. And I must tell you, share with you, that as for figures I got from the archives, in London archives, yes, 1936, the annual trade turnover between Xinjiang and Ladakh, Indian trade with Xinjiang via Ladakh was INR2 million in 1936 via Leh-Yarkand route. In the same year, the trade turnover between Gilgit and Kashgar was 0.1 million. That is 20 times less. But we are frozen. Our trade is frozen. We are in a cage in a strategic bottleneck. But Gilgit is well-connected with Khunjab, with Tashkurgan, and Yarkand, and Kashgar. And it is now not only Karakoram, but it is upgraded as part of CPEC.
And Chinese, as you must have seen in my exclusive chapter on Raskam, China's interest in Gilgit is not new. It is much older, it starts from 18th century. And when British agent in Gilgit installed the Gilgit chief, Mohammed, I forget his name. So Chinese government in Xinjiang ensured that their two senior representatives were present in Gilgit at that ceremony, installation ceremony. They wanted to present some document or some edict to the new Nizam of Gilgit. But the British said, no, you just sit here, as a respected guest. And they were in 1899, or '91, something like that. In the extensive chapter on Raskam, we talk about our right on this 3,000 or 5,000 kilometers of territory, Trans-Karakoram Territory in Raskam, Taghdumbash and other. I have culled out all the original documents based on Hunza sources and the British archival sources that how the Raskam lands and Taghdumbash and others were part of the Hunza state.
So that is for the first time. And as regards Shahidullah, I have put a separate chapter. Shahidulla was well, it is about 80 kilometers beyond Karakoram Pass. So it was seen, it is strategically located because from there you could oversee the movement from three directions, from Yarkand, from other side, from Hunza side, Gilgit side and other side. Maharaja wanted to have an eye on that post. So he put an outpost there with some soldiers. They were withdrawn because of being too distant and maybe due to winter.
But the British ensured that this territory is taken over by China. They virtually physically induced Chinese government in Xinjiang. Younghusband went there. Then others, please take up, otherwise Russians will come. Russians will come. And this happened because Russian officer Grombchevsky had also landed up in that region and he had come to Hunza.
So many games were being played in this region. But the end result is that as an independent India, as a citizen of independent India, I feel very bad that how we lost Gilgit by proxy. Even though the situation was deteriorating, it was worsening at that front. In 1999, when Kargil War took place, after Kargil War, I got an opportunity to go to Kargil, Dras and Leh by road. Some team was going, so they asked me to accompany them. So there we stayed in Kargil and the Kargil local Muslim old man, he was very much sore about how we lost Skardu. He was very bitter and said why India didn't take any action at that point. And so bitter was his memory that Skardu would have been ours had, India taken, Government of India had taken any interest in reclaiming it or just defending it.
But the fact is that that is why all these issues, it took me long years, I think. Now 40 years, I think. 40 plus. But this could not have been done better. It needed a long calculation, contemplation, and assessment of different maneuvers and outmaneuvering and different sources. So that is how this book has come about. Thank you, sir.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Thank you very much, Professor Warikoo. It's interesting what you mentioned about Skardu, because this is a perennial debate. It's like the debate about the Shimla Agreement. There is this view that what we gained on the battlefield, we lost on the negotiating table. Similarly, there's the view that in 1948, if the Indian army had been allowed to finish the job, they could have taken back the whole of POK. But when you actually look into the historical record, then it doesn't appear so clear.
General Sinha, who has written about his role in Skardu and in the possible operations in Skardu, he's quite tentative about it. There was no clear military outcome which could have been predicted. So they were not able to give a categorical recommendation to the government that this was militarily a possible or it was worthwhile to invest in this in operational terms. So it is a much more complex question when you go into the details of the historical record. But your general point is a valid one, that there were imperial games afoot. And at that time, amidst all the confusion of 1947-'48, it was not possible to anticipate all of them. And certainly, to some extent, it was difficult to control the consequences.
The other bigger irony, of course, is the whole of the present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There was never a Muslim League government over there. It was run by the Congress, and the Congress party had performed well in all the elections. So it's also one of those ironies. And there is a book by Raghavan Singh with just this lament. The title is The Lost Frontier. But I will now request Mr. Ranade to make his comments about the book and about other aspects, the questions which arise from this book. Thank you.
Jayadeva Ranade: Thank you, Ambassador Raghvan, and thank you, ICWA and the others for inviting me today. At the outset, let me say that two things strike me about the book. The first is the more that things change, the more they remain the same. And the great game is one example. It's still going on. From the 1800s till today, in different forms, maybe the dramatis personae have changed, but the objectives and the manner in which it is being played out remain the same.
The second, of course, is the British behavior or British actions, which oftentimes, as you brought out, I mean, you haven't brought it out specifically, but you hinted at it or you pointed us towards it the British actions were at times independent of the interests of British India. It was what you can say England or Britain wanted, and their commercial interest was supreme. That, of course, is something which continues till today, where they're doing the same thing, and how the Chinese have been there. But the Chinese themselves very often were not active players. They were passive, they were present, and they were either drawn into it or used.
But let me get down to the book itself, and I'll say that initially when I started going through it and I say this to the wider audience, first few pages, it was like a history book. It was like telling me, you know, what happened, until you go a bit deeper. I mean, once you've crossed chapter one, you start seeing what exactly is being spelt out, what is happening there, and how the principal actors, what their interests are, and how they're sort of trying to play that out.
And here I find, for example, if I may just mention, the claims on Hunza and Kashmir's claim on Shahidullah, they were sacrificed, though they were very much under, if I may call it a Hindu rule or the rule of the Kashmir kings, but they were ignored. And in fact, the Dogras were restrained from going ahead and taking it, to my mind for two reasons. One, of course, the British interest that they wanted their trade to continue and their passage to Central Asia, etc., to continue. But the second was also, I think, they didn't want to offend the Chinese. And that comes through, yes, it comes through very clearly.
Sometimes, of course, there were minor interests, like they wanted to elevate their consulate in Kashgar, etc. But primarily, I think they didn't want to offend the Chinese. The reason is not far to see. I think it was the opium trade which netted them a lot of money. And here again I see a similarity in the charas trade that went through the year. And mind you, there is, I think, Aichinson has written there how it's disturbing the mental capacities of the Sikh, the charas coming in, yeah, into Punjab, through Kashmir into Punjab. But that they continued, the opium trade they continued, and they sacrificed other things for that purpose.
So I think that comes through very clearly. And having been in Leh many years ago, of course, in the 1970s, when it was still primitive, but I have chanced to meet a lot of the old Ladakhi families, mainly Muslim, actually, the Kalon himself, who benefited from the trade along the southern Silk Route. And they were full of stories about how they went, what happened. And I remember from that time also them saying that the Chinese were not very obvious in their presence in those areas. It was mainly the Tibetans and these people going across, till they were able to get across, as they said, to the Uyghur traders or people from Xinjiang who would come down and trade with them.
So that was an interesting thing. And this policy of concessions for the Chinese, and not wanting to offend the Chinese, as I said, it was because of the trade, etc. But it persisted. And even as late as or as recently as 2020, they changed the language of the treaty with the Tibetans. Instead of saying Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, which is what they said, they changed it to Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. And I remember asking a British diplomat here at that time as to why the change, because it's a major change. And he looked at me and quite, apparently, innocently, he said, why, what's the difference? Suzerainty and sovereignty mean the same thing. So, I mean, that is the way in which they were trying to present that.
But today, again, we see, just in the last few months, an apparent reversal in British policy from a hardening of positions vis-a-vis China, and going along with the Europeans and with the Americans, Keir Starmer has again now gone full tilt trying to befriend the Chinese and derive economic advantage. So I don't know where that will go, but their policy obviously is to get to a point which both of you made just now, economics and trade is obviously at the center of what they're doing. And British policy has always had, or at least for a long time, has had a bias, a negative bias, as far as India is concerned.
And somehow it strikes me even here when we talk of Operation Datta Khel, and it was, as you rightly said, one man who decided that he would rather quit and rather die, but get Gilgit to Pakistan. I mean, what was the reason for that passion, I would say, in his endeavor, I'm not able to figure out. But certainly, again, that whole area is strategically very important, Gilgit, etc. And by his taking that action, I think it set many things in motion, including Operation Gulmarg, which the British tried in 1947, and they sent those raiders in under British officers. They came all the way up to Baramulla and things like that before they were pushed back.
But one thing I will agree with you, you mentioned it in a fairly lengthy para at the end of one of the chapters, and you asked the question, why did we not really negotiate harder? Why did we not take a stand with regard to Gartok and all those places? That's something that many of us wonder. I mean, yes, Kashgar, yes, yes. Many of us wonder, I mean, whether it was in Lhasa or these places, we didn't seem to have put up even a tough negotiating stance. Yes, they asked, we gave. In one place, of course, we didn't have a protective element, but in Lhasa, we did. And there was not even any discussion.
Now, when we discuss it with people who maybe had memories or who were working at that time somewhere or saw the correspondence, because much of it is not there, available on record, their position was that India was not strong enough. But I often wonder that China and India, we became independent at roughly the same time. And our armies also had fought in the First and Second World Wars. Millions of them came back. So they were battle-hardened. They were battle-tested. The Chinese, of course, had fought their guerrilla wars and come in.
So would it really mean that much of a contest among unequals? I don't know. And I think at least we could have put up a tougher position. But I sort of feel that, unfortunately, even today we have that tendency of sort of, I won't say succumbing, but at least being very sensitive to what the Chinese say. And the same area which you have been talking about Gilgit, Hunza, Shaksgam, Taghdumbash and Raskam, today they're so important. And Shahidullah, they're so important. One of the things to talk about today's time is our discussions with the Chinese or negotiations with the Chinese on the Depsang Plains. That's just next to that area. It's part of that larger area. And the Chinese, in fact, we see are hardening their positions there. And they built a new airport just now at Tashkurgan. They're building airports at Yarkand and some other places. They are beefing up the positions in Pangong.
So these are all in the same area. And Shahidullah is another. They built a new airport there. It's almost complete. So these are areas of crucial importance. And they're at the mouth of the Karakoram, literally, and where the CPEC is passing through. And so for us, to my mind, it's sort of making, shall I say China is consolidating its position and its hold in the region. It's also strengthening its, shall I say, connections with the Central Asian republics through that route. That's why they're beefing up a lot of military infrastructure in Xinjiang. They're improving transportation arteries in Xinjiang to reach out to Central Asia. But they're also in the process tightening their grip or firming their grip on Pakistan.
And I think with Pakistan having ceded all those territories, thousands of square miles, and receiving nothing in return, it's going to be a problem. And as far as Xinjiang is concerned, it's becoming more and more -- I think it would become more and more difficult for the Uyghurs to try and gain even autonomy, I would say. Chinese have tried all kinds of methods there, the soft approach, the hard approach. And now we are seeing a pretty tough approach there that Adrian Zenz has written in detail about what is happening there.
But finally, let me just say that you did touch upon the Western theater command. And I think for us, two points I would make. One, I think the abolition of Article 370 was a good move. It showed that at least we are now taking a decision that no one else has a say in the matters of Kashmir. But we have to move further. But I think with the Western theater command, China has actually imposed limits on what can or cannot be done and what we could do. And let me just quote what their official mandate to the Western theater command was laid out, it was laid out in February 2016.
When they said that among its tasks it will be countering threats to Xinjiang and Tibet as well as Afghanistan and other states that host training bases for separatists and extremists. It's a very wide mandate for the largest theater command in China which has one-third of the land forces in it and which of course sits immediately across us. And again, actually what the Western theater command does is extend China's military might right across our northern border to the west if we include Pakistan in it which I tend to do.
I think the Pakistan military capacity today is linked in or dovetailed into the Chinese military capacity. And again, when you talk of Shahidullah and all in your book of becoming imported, exactly, that is exactly what happens. And I think this is the period that we have to look ahead. There was mention of trade Vayu on what we are likely to do. I think what I anticipate is the first obstacle that we have to overcome is this blockage of our direct routes into Central Asia. And I think that is why we are looking at the alternate through Chabahar and things like that. If that works out, I don't know. But certainly the way I see it with China and Pakistan operating together, it will become difficult for us to open that route. We will have to look for something else.
Secondly, it also opens up a pressure point for the Chinese and the Pakistanis against us if they do want to apply pressure. And here Kashmir becomes actually a bit vulnerable. It has routes, ingress routes and it is exposed to that extent. So, I will just make these points. But I just feel that the book is certainly something that brings up many points. You have also touched upon how in the fifth and sixth centuries it was the Hindu rulers who were actually in control of all these areas, which is a good point to make with the Chinese, at least, who keep pulling out old maps and showing where they were.
So these are good stuff to counter it with. But I think the book is something, certainly, it's worth reading by students not only of Central Asia, but also of Pakistan and China. And it is, as you said, it's a unique perspective. And I think it's something that is worth reading. And I thank you for it. Thank you very much.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Thank you. Thank you very much. May I now request Professor Behuria to make his.
Ashok K. Behuria: Thank you, sir. I congratulate Professor Warikoo for this wonderful book. In fact, as a discussant, I always set my role for myself. And I always think, where are the holes I can pick? And I will take a dig at the author. But I must confess that it is very difficult on my part to pick those holes in this kind of a book, which has such a broad sweep and focuses on an area which is of import to us. I would say that when I was reading this book, because I have been also looking at this northern border powers, with China, with Pakistan, and the imperial conspiracies, so to say, to shape it in a particular way and to leave a lot of things undecided, undefined. In fact, that is what is the reason for the distress that we have today, with China, with Pakistan, with everybody around us.
So the colonial legacy that we have is actually creating problems for us. And when I was going through the book, it doesn't stray from the dominant narrative. The dominant narrative is that the British left us where we are today. And that was because of their own reasons, because of their own machinations. While it doesn't digress from the dominant narrative, it fills it up with a lot of facts and details, which actually prompts you to think that, well, this was actually so. There are two ways we can look at it.
If a book like this convinces you about your best prejudices, how do you move from there? Is it the case that you will bury your past and move on? If Professor Warikoo has said that Kashmir is the breeze, should we try to open up a line of communication with the Chinese, and show them this book, and say, look at this. This is the way it was. Should we not go ahead and do it again? It is interesting, like China post-70 is not the China pre-70. And China post-49 was a different creature altogether. When we were asked to shut down or cancel it, China was different. Perhaps they did not want this kind of relationship to be with us again. People have taken a dig at Nehru, people have taken a dig at his administration for not having bargained well.
But I would say that the hands were full, a lot of issues were there. Chinese were not welcoming. So a lot of issues were there. So rather than putting the blame on a particular individual or a particular administration because that is so fashionable today, we should look beyond that, like what actually we can do. For example, this book has a mine of information in it. People say that all the Central Asian states, people from Central Asian states used to use that Lake YarkanD route to go to Hajj. That was the kind of route that was there. And when it came from Sanju Pass to Shahidullah to Sugeth, then went eastward through Chang Chenmo Valley to Leh, the other one was to Nubra to Leh. As the crow flies from Nubra to Kashgar, it will be around 340 kilometers.
If you Google it, if you say that take me from Nubra to Kashgar, it gives you a result, 11,996 kilometers. It goes through the entire breadth of India, goes to Southeast Asia, and comes back and meets there. So that is a void. So it is talking about that void. Why it is so and how it can be perhaps, he hasn't talked about this. But the problem with history is that people say that if you do not know history, you are condemned to repeat it. And I would say that if you know too much of it also, you suffer from the pangs of remembrances as well.
So I suffered from the pangs of remembrances when I read this book. Like what might have been possible and what was not possible. For example, there are a lot of ifs and buts about history. Look at the Hunza. The Hunza chapter is excellent. Again, it fills in a lot of gaps. And he has taken it from several sources. I must thank you for having spent your time, because only he could have done it. My generation were the last, I think, last of the Mohicans, as they say, who could have patiently looked at the archives and picked out those details. That's what I'm saying. Today. People copy and paste and forget. But he has taken a lot of pains to go to National Archives, to Kashmir archives, to India Office Library.
And I think full marks goes to you, sir, for having put it all together in front of us. I would rate this book as one of the, in fact, you must have read JN Rao and Karunakar Gupta, then Parshottam Mehra. They had also done commendable work in putting these facts together. And actually, a lot of gaps were there and this book fills in those gaps. So it is in line with that kind of significant substantive work that has been done on this thing.
Coming to the Hunza chapter, which is most interesting in the entire book, look at the way the colonial policy evolved within that so-called, quote-unquote, great game fold. If great game would not have been there, would the British behave differently? We have to ask ourselves. You see, in 1865, suddenly Johnson, who was in the Surveyor of India Office, he comes out with a line. Johnson line, 1865. And in 1865, who is in power in Kashgar? It is Yakub Beg. Yakub Beg assumes office in 1865. And suddenly, the entire British administration is looking at him as somebody who can deliver. Yakub Beg also sends his messengers to the British.
And there is an interesting relationship brewing between the two. And that is the time when the British are upscaling their claims. 65 is the maximalist line. That we are also subscribing to. We accept it in total. And that includes not only Shaksgam, but also Raksham. That Karakas Valley, where Shahidulla stands. So the entire thing, we accept. But look at the way it peters out. When it becomes Johnson-Ardagh line, Ardagh is a military intelligence expert in UK. When it becomes Ardagh line, it is 1899. Yakub has already been killed. '77, Yakub goes. He was there for 12 years. Then he goes. And the Chinese are getting in. The King dynasty had already started asserting itself. And in 1899, Johnson-Ardagh line comes down a bit around Shahidullah.
And then in 1902 or 1903, you have the other one, McCartney-MacDonald line. McCartney was in Kashgar. And Macdonald was in Peking. So they together come out with a line which is below Kunlun around Karakoram. So British were trying to revise that line all along. And in 1911, 1912, they come out with another map where the entire northern flank is undefined territory. So they created this confusion in the minds of the rest of Indians. Of course, Indians were so busy fighting for their independence that there was no time for looking at the map and trying to assert that this is our outer border. And I don't think at that point of time also there was no saffron brigade who could have extended it to Xinjiang. So it was like that at that point of time.
So if you look at it, we are so busy, we're not looking at it objectively. So what happens when Nehru comes in, he also becomes a little confused as to what to do. At one level, he's a nationalist, ardent nationalist. In fact, in Discovery of India, he writes chapters which even put saffronites to shame, the kind of eulogy he serves for India, Indians, nationalism. And he was also a nationalist. Of course, he said somewhere that not a blade of grass grows. But he was also trying in his own way to defend the border, that undefined border. And we are left with that kind of a situation today.
But coming back to the theme that he deals with, even after Yakub Beg, the line of communication stays. People come and go, even after in the 1930s. Even 1931, you have identified quite rightly. That is the time when you find migrations taking place from Xinjiang to Kashmir. There's a lot of Xinjiang people who settled down in Kashmir during that time. And it continued over two decades, till about 1951, 1952, after 1949. So that route was there. Even by 1951, it was there. But gradually, it fell off. Now you have G219, then G219 meets G314, which comes to Pakistan. 315 goes to Kashgar. It is all Chinese-made superhighways which are there.
Whereas these tracks, mule tracks and kachar tracks, they have been forgotten by history. So the point now is whether it can be revived. Can we have a CIEC like CPEC? That's the question. And rather than looking at China as a threat, can we also look at it as an opportunity? Of course, people will get riled by what I'm saying. But the problem is, it compels me to think that way. You talked about Western Frontier, Western Command, and such a huge, massive, what do you say, force stationed there, which actually, you have talked about also Samsalpras, where they have built a 35 kilometer road, which overlooks Siachen. This creates a lot of panic in us, a lot of scare in us. And because of the power asymmetry that is there between China and India.
But at another level, the Chinese are also master, what is it, businessmen. What Bismarck said about Englishmen in the 19th century is perhaps apt on Chinese today, the nation of shopkeepers. They are nation of businessmen now. So can we do it? Can we do this turnaround? Or will we continue to look at China through other prisms? These are questions that are left in the air. But coming to the book, the true value of a book lies in the kind of discussion it provokes. And true value of a book lies in the issues that lie outside the book, that it compels you to think about.
In that sense, you have achieved your aim. And I think it's a very good book, and it is a must read for youngsters around me who are here. You must read it, and try to take a cue from here and read top other books that I referred to. But before I forget and before I conclude, I will tell you, sir, the one thing, we have been talking too much about Operation Datta Khel. And of course, I have gone through Sinha Sahab's book, I have gone through L.P. Sen's book, Slender Was the Thread. So there are a lot of speculations about what India could have done at that point of time.
But I think you are absolutely right there, that perhaps we could not have done more than what we did. But there is one area where we perhaps could have done more, that is Skardu. Skardu was possible. But we are not looking at it with as much interest as we are looking at it today. Perhaps there is a book, a very small book by Karunakar Gupta, which talks about this. And it also refers to somebody who was there at the helm of affairs at that point of time. When Gilgit was taken out, Skardu was still hanging in the balance, by a balance. And we perhaps did not look at it that closely. Perhaps it is not there, but this is something that we can also take up for a further discussion later. Thank you. Thank you so much, sir.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Thank you very much. I must thank both our panelists for not just the insightful remarks they made, but the candor with which they made them. The whole idea of think tanks is to think laterally and to think of possibilities which are not otherwise being discussed in the public domain. So with these, let's have some questions and comments, and we can ask our authors and our panelists to also contribute. Yes, madam. May I request the people asking a question or making a comment to be brief, and also to identify themselves.
Sunita Dwivedi: Thank you, sir. I'm Sunita Dwivedi. Ashok and I were senior fellows togetherat Nehru Memorial and Museum Library. Is this on? Thank you. I wanted to react to the general sense, and especially mentioned by Ashok, whether we could do more in the war. And since he mentioned Lieutenant General Sen's book, which I have also read, the funny thing is, and I felt this many times at many points when I was reading the book, that I don't know if anyone wants me to say this, but that the presence of Mountbatten in the Defense Committee actually being the whole and sole authority on what will happen, except when Patel sidelines him and moves in certain actions.
The sense that I got at many points, which he mentioned, and this only a military person can solve by looking at the military records, which are totally classified, not open to people like us, that many times the coordination between Delhi on troop movement and sending of reinforcements, placing people, is a thing that needs to be looked at if India wants to solve this issue of the British role. Not just the British officers in Pakistan, but right here in Delhi.
And the specific incidents I want to mention is that one day, a man identifies himself as a Major General sent from this thing, and trying to change an order of movement at a very critical moment near the Baramulla before going to Srinagar. And he, by chance, mentions to the other guy that, should I do this? And he said, where's the order? And then he blows up. But the officer who lands up there, saying that he's the boss, he remains in Kashmir all that period, because they don't dare to have a scandal. But this thing is very clearly a sabotage. Why independent India has, till today, no military scholar has studied this aspect? I think it is something I'm mentioning because of senior people like you. You can take it forward. It needs to be done. Thank you.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Any response? Yes, yes.
Jayadeva Ranade: I agree with you that this needs to be looked at. But just to add to what you said, what you mentioned was one part in one slice of British perfidy, I would say. But they also tried to retain the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the time when we got independence. And that command came from the admiralty in London. And it was just by chance that out here, our staff got to know of it. But a lot of this was happening, I'm sure, because there were British officers in Pakistan. And here, also, we had British officers after independence. I mean, I can't understand that. And even if our hands were full, as you said, fighting our own independence. This is inexcusable, frankly, that we had people who had suppressed us, and then they continued. But I'm sure many more things will come out if there is a study of that history.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Thank you. Would you like to comment?
Ashok K. Behuria: I don't disagree, because this is a person that is there in Sen's book. And as you said, that is another instance of British perfidy. But we can keep blaming the British for what happened. But for years, we can do it. But the problem now is how to move on from there. What has happened has happened. We can think about it, how not to surrender your right to act in the face of adversity. That lesson we can take. But we have to move on.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Thank you.
Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Prof. Warikoo mentioned that China's interest in Xinjiang could be traced back to the 1800s century. I mean, you cited some instances. It's much earlier, but you have recorded some events which can sort of prove that, can be cited. And, Mr. Ranade mentioned that the British always had a policy of extending concessions to the Chinese. There is also a view that the Chinese were a victim of the Great Game. Would you agree with that view?
Jayadeva Ranade: That's why I said they were a passive player, in the sense that when the British wanted, they would draw them in. At other times, they would just leave them there. The Chinese were present, but not much happening. And as far as the Great Game itself is concerned, there are records, British records, which claim that it was exaggerated. Because the Russian who came there, by the time he was spotted near Lhasa, and then he was spotted in Lhasa, by the time those reports reached Shimla and later Calcutta, the number of people accompanying him had grown in just the transmission of the letter.
And later on, when the British went there, they said, there is no threat, there's just gentleman with one more assistance. In fact, the British presence was larger than his. So the Great Game took on, I would say, a life of its own in that context. But again, I feel that the Chinese were not that, I mean, the Chinese were also powerless to a large extent in the front of these people. And later on, with the opium and all coming in, they were really a spent force.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Well, as you said, the more things change, the more they remain the same. And it is in the nature of security and intelligence analysis to exacerbate the possible threat. So the Pakistanis convinced themselves that we have 56 consulates along the Durand line, and we are now convincing ourselves about many threats, some real, others imaginary. So this is part of games whether great or not. Any other questions or comment? Yes, sorry. Sorry. Sorry.
Ashok K. Behuria: Chinese threat, China question between 1860s and about 1910s, '11s. In 1911, the Qing dynasty goes. So you have Republicans coming in. But before that, if you look at it, the British were playing their own game, and of course not too loudly. They were very persistent, but they were trying to ward off the Russian threat, basically. When Petrovsky was given the status of a consul in Kashgar, they said, why not ours? McCartney should also be given. McCartney was not given. McCartney was just staying there. They just tolerated him. They did not give him any position, diplomatic status.
So British were looking at that, like, to have China on their side in a manner that the Russians will not be able to get in here. So when Yakub Beg emerged in the horizon for 12 years, he held sway. And the Chinese were constantly trying to run him down. During that period, the British were actually trying to align with Yakub Beg against China. Yeah, they thought that Yakub will come out with a buffer zone there, which will actually be to their advantage. So they were trying to play this game in the Taghdumbash area, basically. And they forced Hunza to give up his claim over Rakhsham, whereas, he was given estate in Yarkant. Not only that in Tashkurganj. And up to Tashkurganj his writ ran. Because he used to collect levies up to Tashkurgan and up to Raskam, Shahidulla on the east.
So, that was a broad area, and the Chinese had granted them even after Yakub Beg left. Even in 1890s, the Chinese said that Hunza's writ run there. So, in that sense, even if the Chinese were saying this, the British were telling them that come and insert yourself here. So, that they will have a more credible buffer between the Russians and them.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Any other questions? Yes.
Puneet Gaur: Sir, it is related to what could have been done. Actually, I was in Kazakhstan and one of my colleagues was Uighur. And we were discussing at that moment many things. When he was saying, because this particular book is related to Kashmir and Xinjiang, he was telling me that in one's time that Kashmir was the heaven for Uyghurs. Like something like that. So, he was telling that I think India misses that time when he could have been, and it could have been raised this concern of Uyghurs very promptly. So, it was the case as of now also he was telling me that now in present time also India is not doing what it can be possible, could be possible to done with Uyghurs issue in terms of Xinjiang and Kashmir. So, I just want to have a light on that.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Yes, please go ahead.
So, particularly about the Uyghurs. Few years back some Uyghurs were going to come to Dharamshala for a conference. They were not, I think, this Dholkul Eswai and others, they were not given visas.
Athar Zafar: Thank you, sir. And I have also read this book and found very distinct and informative. And about this prospect of opening Leh route, sir, you said, you discussed it, but is it possible to open unless the boundary is settled? And also, can it be an alternative to INSTC, stakes of other, from Central Asia or Russia?
Athar Zafar: No, just want to extend, if it can be extended to Central Asia and also to Eastern Europe or Russia.
T.C.A. Raghavan: The problem is, first problem is accepting any line now, because we have a constitutional position also to safeguard, because there is, I mean, one can have a theoretical debate that our positions based on the Westphal-Johnston line, how credible they were, but that debate has been closed. You cannot reopen it at this stage.
Madan Yadav: First of all, congratulations, sir, for these very important books on geopolitics. Myself, Dr. Madan Yadav, I am a teacher at IGNOU headquarters, Department of Political Science. Prof. Warikoo my supervisor there in JNU. Sir, the crossroad, the Kashmir-India bridge to the Xinjiang, sir, we know that what kind of tactics playing by the China in the last four, five years during the pandemic time. The crossroad is here, but it is the Chinese tactics to capture the Indian territory through the Ladakh, Galwan, and other tactical frontier. We can say the low flashpoint is the China-India borders.
Second point, sir, why do you think that China is very assertive and India is defensive because our Prime Minister is not ready to speak a single word against the China, whatever the India-China border issue.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Go ahead.
So their perception is based on this idea that we don't have, because they have a line of command and they have a perfect unity of thought and action, right from top to right up to bottom, to a cobbler in Xinjiang or Tibet. Because I was part of Major Ahluwalia's expedition, cultural expedition he took to Central Asia, Xinjiang, Tibet, etc., in 1994. So wherever we went, so one Ladakhi his name was Wangdu, he was taking photographs, it was 5th July, I think, Dalai Lama's birthday, in Lhasa. So outside their monastery, I forget his name, Jakun or something, Jakun, Jokun, because they were milking the cows, so a cobbler came here, I don't know whether he was an intelligent man or not, but he snatched his camera and didn't allow him to take any photographs because it was the demonstration of Tibetans celebrating Dalai Lama.
And then, it was 1994, today it's been 30 years, at that time, all around Jakun, they had put up pickets here, pickets here, CCTV from there, they were watching the movement of people. So there is a very strong securitization in practice in Xinjiang and Tibet in particular, which I have witnessed. No confusion, no confusion.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Yes, please go ahead.
Nandini Khandelwal: I have a very small question for you, sir. So you talked about, while giving your speech, you posed a question that, why do we have to look at China as a challenge and why not as an opportunity? So I just want to ask, in what sense can India look at China as an opportunity, given its cartographic aggression, which we see from time to time?
Ashok K. Behuria: I knew it was coming. No, I said that, looking at the book, it talks about a bridge. So is there a bridge? So can we look at it as an opportunity? But coming back to your question, I know what you mean. In fact, we are thinking too much as a state. We scholars, because we should stop being statist. From a state's perspective, it is looking like something. But if you look at history as a process, as an amalgamation of processes, so there are different processes at work.
In 2020, you went ahead and banned all the apps that you could see from China. At that point of time, your trade with China was hovering around $70 billion. Today, where are they? So some people in India have discovered some opportunity in China and translated it into good dividends for themselves, or not. So state is looking at China in a different way. But people within the state are unleashing processes which can, who knows, bring the two countries together. Because it will create, as a student of international politics, I'm fascinated by their term, complex interdependencies.
So there's an opportunity for this kind of complex interdependencies between states. So there is not only one angle and one lens through which you can look at states. Look at China. Do you think Chinese interest, or for that matter, American interest, Indian interest, will always converge? They will pursue their interest as much as you will pursue your interest. But there has to be some way of looking at each other as opportunities. Only then you can take the issue forward.
But if we are looking at it too much through the realist lens, where it is balance of power, it is what is called opportunity for one will be definitely a disadvantage for someone else, then it is done. History doesn't move that way. I'll put it that way.
T.C.A. Raghavan: Thank you very much. I think we have a…
Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Sir, I just would like to answer to that gentleman there. I'm in the Foreign Service, and I've served 28 years. Amb Raghavan has been my boss. I've reported to him, and he's served so many years in key positions. One thing you must remember, that in the Indian foreign policy, there is something called, across party lines, there is a consensus on foreign policy issues since independence. There may be variations in views, and different parties may ask for a government's response on what they have done, an explanation, which is their right, in the parliament, or even outside through the media. Again, which is something that we all admire in our country, and which is not there in many, many other developing countries.
So one thing on key issues, and on something like China, I mean, to think that the political leaders won't be on one side, it is really something that, it just doesn't hold good. Okay?
T.C.A. Raghavan: Well, thank you very much. We've had a very engaging discussion, but I think the time has also come to an end. But I, first of all, would like to thank Professor Warikoo again, and I hope he writes an update, and a new edition comes out, because things have changed, to some extent, from what he mentioned in his last chapter. But I think it's also good that we reflect on the larger issues which the book has thrown up, and the question which was posed about China's cartographic aggression.
And I think it's important that we realize that there are multiple views in India. So if you live your life in Delhi, going from ICWA, to IDSA, to ORF, or to IPCS, you will get one view of China. It's true. But if you go across the road to FICCI, or to CII, you will get a different view. And the fact is, there are multiple conversations taking place at any point of time. So at the same time as our military and security fraternities putting forward one point of view, the Economic Survey will say that it's time to open up on investments from China.
So I think it's good to be conscious of the fact that there are multiple points of view, and none of these views can be easily dismissed. So when you look at it from a policy angle, you have to see what is the optimum, because there are no black and white solutions. If we commit ourselves to a policy based on China's cartographic or other aggressions, following that policy to its logical conclusion would mean reducing your GDP by 2 or 3 percentage points, at least for the next five to seven years, perhaps even longer.
So they're very difficult judgment calls. So it's good to be, as Professor Behuria said, to be open to different perspectives, and not to, especially in think tanks, to avoid taking statist views, because the whole point is to undertake lateral thinking or thinking out of the box. ICWA is a very good platform for that. So thank you very much again, Nutan, for inviting me and for hosting such a good discussion. Thank you.
Puneet: Thank you, sir. On behalf of the Indian Council of World Affairs, I extended gratitude to Ambassador T.C.A. Raghavan, sir, for agreeing to chair today's book discussion, and the esteemed panelist Sir Jayadev Ranade, sir, and the Dr. Ashok K. Behuria, sir, for their valuable intervention. We have benefited immensely from your insightful remarks on the book, The Crossroad Kashmir India's Bridge to Xinjiang, authored by Professor K. Warikoo. We appreciate the valuable comments and observations, as well as the questions raised by the experts among the participants, including me. We express a special thanks to all the participants for joining today's program.
To know more about ICW research work, events, and outreach program, do visit our website and social media handles, X, LinkedIn, YouTube, and Facebook. With this, may I now invite everyone for high tea in the foyer. Copies of the book are available outside for purchase. Thank you all, and have a good evening.
*****