Indian Council of World Affairs

Three recent developments have brought global strategic attention to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. First, since December, Iran-backed Houthi rebels have launched a series of attacks on global shipping passing through the region. As a result, major shipping companies decided to stop using the Red Sea-Suez Canal route for their cargo ships. Second, in response to the Houthi threat, the United States (US) launched Operation Prosperity Guardian to patrol the waters off the Horn of Africa and provide security to the ships transiting through the Red Sea route. And finally, Ethiopia signed a deal with the self-governing territory of Somaliland for sea access in exchange for the recognition. All three developments are important for their impact on regional geopolitics as well as for their potential to reshape the strategic dynamics of the wider region.

Why are the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden important?

The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are important for global geopolitics as they link the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 has been a turning point in increasing the strategic significance of these water bodies. Before the opening of the Suez Canal, Europe and Asia were connected by the long, circuitous route via the Cape of Good Hope. The opening of the Suez Canal shortened the distance by almost 40% and facilitated greater movement of trade and people. 

The wider region between Egypt and India is home to three maritime chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz that links Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb that links Red Sea with the Indian Ocean while Suez Canal connects Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. These maritime chokepoints are important as the cargo ships are vulnerable to attacks and interdiction while transiting through these narrow waterways. 

With the discovery of oil and gas in West Asia, the strategic importance of the Red Sea route went up even further. Every year, 17,000 ships pass through the Suez Canal. It means, 10% of global trade passes through the Canal.[1] If the shipping companies avoid this route, costs of transportation will go up, the consumers in Europe and Asia will face delays and this will perhaps contribute to the rise in inflation in fragile economies already suffering due the knock-on effects of Russia-Ukraine war. The Houthi attacks on global shipping have to be seen in this context.

Houthi Attacks on Global Shipping 

Yemen has been embroiled in the conflict since 2014 and Houthi rebels have managed to survive despite the coordinated military intervention by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Houthis have been supported by Iran and therefore, Yemen was seen as proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.[2] With the entrenched Houthi presence in Yemen, near the strategically important strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, Iran has managed to acquire a forward operating foothold in a region that is critical for the global economy. Tehran already supports Hezbollah in Lebanon and has provided support to Hamas in Gaza in the past. Therefore, Iran, through its network of proxies, is in a position to strike in the region stretching from Lebanon in the north to Yemen in south and Arabian sea in the west against the Israeli and American interests.   

In the latest iteration, to extend its solidarity with the Palestinians and send a message to Israel, Houthis decided to launch attacks on ships passing through the region that are linked with Israel. So far, as per ACLED, since October, 50 violent incidents have taken place in the Red Sea.[3] (The intensity of these attacks can be compared with the fact that since 2015, there have been 250 incidents that have taken place off the coast of Yemen.) The purpose of these Houthi attacks has been to link the Israeli war in Gaza with the well-being of the global economy, draw attention to the plight of Palestinians and demonstrate the capacity and willingness. In a calibrated manner, over the last few weeks, the intensity and frequency of attacks have gone up. The launch of the American naval coalition and the thwarting of attacks have not deterred the Houthis in any significant manner so far. The attacks have continued and in fact, Houthis have even released a video footage of the hijack of a ship named Galaxy Leader.[4]

US-led Naval Coalition and the Deployment of Indian Warships 

In response to the Houthi attacks, the US launched Operation Prosperity Guardian. The operation works as part of the existing US naval task force Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) that patrols the Red Sea. The US reached out to key allies and partners to participate in the operation. As per the initial announcement, the coalition would include countries as diverse as the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, Netherlands, Norway and Seychelles. The purpose was to ‘jointly address security challenges in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden’ to ensure ‘freedom of navigation for all countries’ and bolster ‘regional security and prosperity’.[5] However, Spain and Italy have reportedly distanced themselves from the US-led operation. 

Given the strategic importance of the region, the Indian Navy too has deployed its warships to the region to ensure security of sea lanes. India, with its regular naval presence since the anti-piracy operations of 2008, has been a major player in the geopolitics of the Western Indian Ocean region. The critical region around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has become even more important since 2022 as India has increased oil imports from Russia and is exporting refined petroleum products to the West, both of which pass through the Suez Canal. As per reports, India has deployed as many as 10 frontline warships to the region along with commandos. P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft and MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones have been positioned to bolster the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.[6]   
Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal 

Meanwhile, as the geopolitics of the region was becoming increasingly uncertain and volatile, Ethiopia and Somaliland announced a deal on January 1^st that would ensure sea access to Ethiopia while the self-governing territory of Somaliland would be recognized by Ethiopia. The deal is a win-win for both parties, as Ethiopia’s navy will get 12 miles of, commercial and military, sea access while Somaliland would begin its journey as a de-jure independent country. The deal is valid for 50 years and will include Ethiopia granting stakes to Somaliland in its state-owned Ethiopian Airlines.[7]

The deal is expected to diversify Ethiopia’s access to sea and also realize its aspiration of sea access since the secession of Eritrea in 1993. Ethiopia is the largest land-locked country in the world and depends on Djibouti for sea access. Addis Ababa pays almost $ 1.5 billion in transit fees to Djibouti and has sought to diversify its sea access.[8] Ethiopia has been making efforts to access the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden for a while. In 2018, UAE, Ethiopia and Somaliland had joined hands to develop the port of Berbera (in Somaliland). However, the agreement appears to have stalled. This time, it is a bilateral deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The strategic location of Somaliland along the southern coastline of Gulf of Aden has been critical and has attracted major powers in the past too. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had a major base at the port of Berbera and was utilized to project Soviet naval power in the region South and East of Suez. 

Somalia’s Reaction 

The deal and the possibility of recognition of Somaliland has been seen as an attack on Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Somalia’s government has called the agreement ‘null and void’ and passed a law to that effect. Somalia claims Somaliland and has reacted quite sharply against the deal.[9] Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud has said that ‘we will protect every inch of our sacred land and not tolerate attempts to relinquish any part of it’.[10] However, whether Somalia can do anything to stop the deal from going forward is an open question. Somalia has been beset with intense internal squabbling and weak state capacity. The state has not been able to exert control over Somaliland since 1991. Meanwhile, Mogadishu has not been able to defeat the terrorism of Al-Shabab within Somalia and its ability to launch military action against either Ethiopia or Somaliland is limited. 

Somalia’s close partner Turkey has raised ‘concerns’ about the deal. Turkey has reaffirmed its commitment to Somalia’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and reiterated the importance of international law in this context. Turkey’s foreign ministry has said that ‘this situation underscores the necessity, as in the past, for the resolution of disputes between Somalia and Somaliland through direct negotiations and encourages a peaceful settlement among Somalis’.[11]

Maritime Geopolitics and Impact on the Region

The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region consists of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. This region has seen increased foreign military presence since the anti-piracy deployments that began in 2007-08. Since then, major regional and global powers have sent their navies to the region, sought to establish military bases and expand their strategic presence. It includes countries as diverse as the US, Russia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, European Union (EU), Turkey, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.[12] Djibouti hosts military bases of US, China, France, and Japan while Eritrea, Sudan and self-governing territory of Somaliland have been engaged by different countries willing to build naval bases. 

These developments have been playing out primarily in the maritime domain as could be seen in activities such as the modernization of ports, building railways, pipelines and road links to access sea, agreements to build naval bases and regularize the strategic presence of naval forces to the region. In this context, it would be interesting to take a closer look at the wider region from Suez to Somalia and the implications of the recent developments on regional security and stability. 

Egypt 

Egypt has been the biggest beneficiary of the Suez Canal as ships passing through the sea route pay transit fees to Egypt, for example: Cairo earned $ 6.3 billion in 2021. In October 2023, owing to the rising economic challenges, Egypt had increased transit fees by 5-15%.[13] If on account of Houthi attacks, shipping companies divert their ships away from the Red Sea and choose the Cape of Good Hope route, Egypt will lose this important source of revenue. Cairo will have to find ways to reduce its dependence on the revenues generated by the Suez Canal.   

The North African country has been suffering since the Russia-Ukraine War began as the cost of wheat imports from the Black Sea region went up considerably. Egypt depends heavily on food imports and tried to diversify its food suppliers.[14] Cairo engaged India for grain supplies. Besides the domestic discontent over the issue of inflation and rising food costs, Egypt faces an external security challenge as it borders Gaza. As Israel expands its military operations in Gaza, Egypt is staring at a refugee and humanitarian problem.

Therefore, it is clear that Egypt is facing the negative fallout of wars in Ukraine as well as Gaza.

Sudan 

Since April 2023, Sudan has been gripped by the civil war. The Sudanese army (SA) and Rapid Support Force (RSF) are battling each other and vying for control over cities and territory. There are reports of external interference in the Sudanese civil war:  UAE supports RSF while Egypt supports SA.[15] As the global attention is fixated on the wars in Ukraine and in Gaza, Sudan has slipped under the radar. However, the situation is dire. As per the UN, so far, 12000 civilians have been killed while eight million have been displaced. The diplomatic efforts to end the protracted conflict and broker a deal between RSF and SA have not yet yielded results. How the situation unfolds remains uncertain. Can SA or RSF win decisively? Will their external backers be able to provide support to change the battlefield situation to their advantage?[16]

Russia and Sudan had signed an agreement to allow Moscow to establish a naval base at Port Sudan in 2017. The deal, which has been reviewed many times since then, remained in place till March 2023 and the growing Russian presence in the Red Sea was on cards.[17] However, with the ongoing civil war, the future of the Russian base is not clear. Will Russia be able to build a naval base? There are speculations that if RSF gains in the Sudanese civil war, UAE’s desire to acquire a foothold on the Red Sea may be fulfilled.[18] However, as of now, unstable Sudan contributes to the instability in the Red Sea geopolitics.    

Eritrea 

Recently, there were tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea owing to Addis Ababa’s quest for sea access and the public articulation of such desire by Abiy Ahmad, Ethiopian Prime Minister. Eritrea has had a difficult relationship with Ethiopia. Both countries have normalized ties in 2018. Since 2020, Eritrean troops had taken part along with the Ethiopian troops in their fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).   

Eritrea holds a coveted location on the Red Sea. Compared to Sudan, it is politically stable and is located close to the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. On the issue of Ukraine, Eritrea has been a constant supporter of Russia in the UN. The shared hostility to the West is a binding factor for Russia-Eritrea relationship. Moscow included Asmara among six African countries that would receive free grains from Russia. There is a possibility of a Russian naval base in Eritrea as Sudan slips into uncertainty.[19]

Djibouti 

The spate of attacks in the southern Red Sea and the launch of naval coalition has underscored the strategic importance of maintaining a regular military presence near the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. In this context, the importance of Djibouti’s location off the strait has gone up significantly. Therefore, the wooing of Djibouti by major powers is on the cards. On the other hand, Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland will mean that Djibouti’s role as a major conduit for Ethiopian trade is going to diminish. The transit fees that Djibouti earned by the Ethiopian cargo would be affected. Moreover, the strategic leverage that Djibouti may have enjoyed over Ethiopia is likely to reduce as well.   

Conclusion 

The maritime geopolitics in and around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is set to remain volatile, and uncertain. Such instability on the sea will add to the instability in the Red Sea littoral countries. The region from Suez to Somalia will remain important for global trade as well as security owing to its geostrategic location. In this context, the role of key regional and global players will be significant as they are expanding their strategic presence in this region. The unfolding dynamics makes it imperative for India to expand its strategic presence and deepen security links with the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden states as well as prepare to deal with the regional instability.   

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(Author Bio: Sankalp Gurjar is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Udupi, India. Prior to that, he worked as a Research Fellow with the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi. He writes on Great Power Politics, Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region and Indo-Pacific security.)

References:

[1] BBC News, ‘More big shipping firms stop Red Sea routes after attacks’, December 16, 2023. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67738792 (Accessed on January 11, 2024)

[2] CFR-Global Conflict Tracker, ‘War in Yemen’, January 3, 2024. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen (Accessed on January 11, 2024)

[3] Luca Nevola, ‘Q&A: Why Are Yemen’s Houthis Attacking Ships in the Red Sea?’ ACLED, January 5 2024. Available at: https://acleddata.com/2024/01/05/qa-why-are-yemens-houthis-attacking-ships-in-the-red-sea/ (Accessed on January 11, 2024)

[4] The video can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ie3tQSG_Lo&t=58s&ab_channel=EveningStandard

[5] US Department of Defence, ‘Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea’, December 18, 2023. Available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/#:~:text=Operation%20Prosperity%20Guardian%20is%20bringing,freedom%20of%20navigation%20for%20all (Accessed on January 11, 2024)

[6] Rajat Pandit, ‘Over 10 warships sent to deter pirates of the Arabian Sea’, Times of India, January 9, 2024. Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/over-10-warships-sent-to-deter-pirates-of-the-arabian-sea/articleshow/106646794.cms?_gl=1*vbvrht*_ga*NDMzOTQ3NjI1LjE2OTk4OTk4Mjc.*_ga_FCN624MN68*MTcwNDc2ODMzOS4xLjEuMTcwNDc2ODQxOS41OS4wLjA&from=mdr (Accessed on January 11, 2024)

[7] Kalkidan Yibeltal, ‘Ethiopia signs agreement with Somaliland paving way to sea access’, BBC News, January 2, 2024. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566 (Accessed on January 11, 2024) ; Abdi Sheikh, Somalia president signs law nullifying Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal, Reuters, January 7, 2024. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/somalia-president-signs-law-nullifying-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-07/ (Accessed on January 11, 2024).  

[8] Abdi Latif Dahir, ‘Somaliland Deal to Grant Ethiopia Red Sea Access Draws Condemnation’, The New York Times, January 2, 2024. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html#:~:text=The%20%241.5%20billion%20a%20year,options%20in%20Sudan%20and%20Kenya. (Accessed on January 11, 2024). 

[9] Abdi Sheikh, Somalia president signs law nullifying Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal, Reuters, January 7, 2024. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/somalia-president-signs-law-nullifying-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-07/ (Accessed on January 11, 2024). 

[10] Abdi Latif Dahir, ‘Somaliland Deal to Grant Ethiopia Red Sea Access Draws Condemnation’, The New York Times, January 2, 2024. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html#:~:text=The%20%241.5%20billion%20a%20year,options%20in%20Sudan%20and%20Kenya. (Accessed on January 11, 2024).

[11] TRT World, ‘Türkiye raises concern over the deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland’, January 4, 2024. Available at: https://www.trtafrika.com/world/turkiye-raises-concern-over-the-deal-between-ethiopia-and-somaliland-16529021 (Accessed on January 11, 2024). 

[12] For more on this, see: Neil Melvin, ‘Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa’, SIPRI, April 2019. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-background-papers/foreign-military-presence-horn-africa-region (Accessed on January 11, 2024). 

[13] AP, ‘Egypt to raise Suez Canal transit fees for ships in 2023’, The Economic Times, September 19, 2023. Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/trade/exports/insights/egypt-to-raise-suez-canal-transit-fees-for-ships-in-2023/articleshow/94293536.cms?from=mdr (Accessed on January 11, 2024). 

[14] Michaël Tanchum, The Russia-Ukraine war forces Egypt to face the need to feed itself: Infrastructure, international partnerships, and agritech can provide the solutions, Middle East Institute, July 25, 2023. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-ukraine-war-forces-egypt-face-need-feed-itself-infrastructure-international (Accessed on January 11, 2024).

[15] International Crisis Group, ‘Sudan’s Calamitous Civil War: A Chance to Draw Back from the Abyss’, January 9, 2024. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudans-calamitous-civil-war-chance-draw-back-abyss (Accessed on January 11, 2024). 

[16] Ibid  

[17] The Maritime Executive, ‘Sudan's Leader Agrees to Host Russian Naval Base on Red Sea’, February 12, 2023. Available at: https://maritime-executive.com/article/sudan-s-leader-agrees-to-host-russian-naval-base-on-red-sea (Accessed on January 11, 2024).

[18] International Crisis Group, ‘Sudan’s Calamitous Civil War: A Chance to Draw Back from the Abyss’, January 9, 2024. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/sudans-calamitous-civil-war-chance-draw-back-abyss (Accessed on January 11, 2024). 

[19] Andrew McGregor, ‘Russia in the Red Sea: Port Options in Eritrea (Part Two)’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 20 Issue: 171, November 6, 2023. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/russia-in-the-red-sea-port-options-in-eritrea-part-two/ (Accessed on January 11, 2024).