Indian Council of World Affairs

M: Before we begin, I request everyone to kindly put their mobile phones on silent mode. 

Excellencies, Distinguished guests present here, Ladies and Gentlemen, a very good afternoon to all. On behalf of the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, it is a pleasure to welcome you all for the special lecture on the theme, How can Thailand and India be Strategic Partners. The program of the event will be as follows: Welcome remarks will be made by Ambassador, Vijay Thakur Singh, Director General, ICWA, who will also be Chairing this session. His Excellency, Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Thailand, will deliver his lecture thereafter. His Excellency has also kindly agreed to take a few questions at the end of this lecture. The Q&A will be moderated by the Chair, Ambassador Vijay Thakur Singh.

With this, may I now invite, Ambassador Vijay Thakur Singh, DG ICWA, to make her welcome remarks. Thank you. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Good afternoon. Namaskar, His Excellency, Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand. We have with us, of course, also Ms. Busadee Santipitaks, the Deputy Permanent Secretary of Thailand, the Deputy Chief of Mission of Thailand here in Delhi, and the Delegation of Thailand, Heads of mission, and members of the Diplomatic Corp., my senior colleagues who are present here today, amongst them Ambassador, Suresh Goyal, and members of the Academia, members of the media, and students.

It is a privilege for the Indian Council of World Affairs to host the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand for a special lecture, How Can Thailand and India Be Strategic Partners? Vice Minister, Sihasak served as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2011 to 2015. Thereafter, he was Thailand's Ambassador to Japan, and then later on as Ambassador to France. Earlier, he was Thailand's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and international organizations in Geneva. His Excellency, Vice Minister Sihasak, was in India earlier this year, in January. And I'm confident that when he was here, he would have observed the goodwill that exists in India towards Thailand. And this is because of our historical and civilizational links, and the fact that our warm and strong relations have been steady and continue to remain strong, even as we are in a changing world, with multiple transitions underway. 

As we know, globally, the economic growth centers have shifted from the West to the East. There are new power centers in the world today. A multipolar world is emerging, with new alignments. In this environment, how can India and Thailand work together for a stronger bilateral partnership? Firstly, it would be well to remember, that India and Thailand are maritime borders. Hence, they do have an interest and stake in the peace and stability in the region, and they also understand the importance of secure and safe sea lanes of communication. The ongoing U.S.-China contestation and the tensions in South China Sea have implications for all countries located in the shared geographical space of Indo-Pacific. 

Initiatives, like the, Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative of India and ASEAN's outlook on Indo-Pacific provide a range of options for cooperation in the maritime domain, as well as in other areas in the region and beyond. Secondly, the foreign policy approaches of the two countries, India's Act East Policy and Thailand's Look West Policy, provide the necessary convergence in our bilateral external priorities. India accords importance to Thailand as a pillar in its Act East Policy and considers it as a strong friend within the ASEAN community. 

Thirdly, India and Thailand also work together in other regional fora, whether it is BIMSTEC, whether it is the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, IORA, ACMEX (Ph 0:04:45), and also the IMT-GT, which is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Corridor. So this is a number of platforms in which we engage with each other. Thailand currently holds the Chairmanship of BIMSTEC and is organizing the next BIMSTEC Summit this year. Later, last year, we were the Chair of G20 and we had organized two summits, Voice of the Global South Summits, the first one in January 2023 and the second one in November 2024. Thailand participated in both these summits, demonstrating that we are working together as partners in the Global South. Multilateral institutions today are non-representative and ineffective. Reformed multilateralism is important even as we are cooperating on regional platforms. I hope we can work together on the agenda of reformed multilateralism as well. 

Finally, let me say that it was a matter of honor, that Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin attended the Republic Day Reception, organized by the Embassy of India in Bangkok on 26 January 2024. This was of course, a special gesture, and it resonates a political commitment to a longstanding and special relationship. Excellency, the ongoing visit to India of Dr. Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Thailand currently to India, as well as, Excellency, your presence here today underscores that India and Thailand have a growing partnership. 

With these words, may I now invite His Excellency Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand, to deliver the special lecture on how can Thailand and India be strategic partners. Excellency, you have the floor. 

Sihasak Phuangketkeow: Thank you, Ambassador Singh. It's a great pleasure for me to be here and to speak before this very distinguished audience. I understand that we have diplomats, we have intellectuals, we have students, and members of the general public. When I drove into the driveway, I saw two very big photographs of myself, and I told myself, Sihasak, this is your big day. So I hope, that my remarks justify the kind invitation extended to me. 

In your introductory remarks, I think you were right to say that our partnership has to be viewed in the context of the tremendous, profound changes taking place in the world. It's not just the dynamics between our two countries, I think it's the broader dynamics in the international system that is propelling our partnership forward. But in coming here, I'm reminded of the first time I visited India and New Delhi. I came with -- I was Private Secretary to our former late Prime Minister, General Chatichai Choonhavan. He was, in fact, the first Thai Prime Minister to visit India. But to be very frank, at that time, our relations were very much different from what it is today. The world was very much different from the world that we're living in now, and the fact of the matter was that there was some distance in our relationship, because of the Cold War. 

So the view from Bangkok was not the same as the view from New Delhi. But of course, with the end of the Cold War, a lot has changed. And I think we've seen a lot of realignment of relations. We've seen a lot of redirection of foreign policy because of the end of the Cold War. And also, I think it has to do a lot with the changes within India, the reforms in India, the opening up of India. And a lot of it has to do with the changes in my region, the changes in East Asia. And so that has led to closer engagement between India and ASEAN and India with East Asia. And that began, I think, in 1991 when your Prime Minister at that time, Prime Minister Rao, pronounced the Look East policy. And subsequent to that, I think we've seen India growing closer to the region. India became a full dialogue partner in 1995. And then you became -- we had upgraded our dialogue relations to a summit level in the year 2002, I think, after I asked my Deputy Perm Sec here -- no, 2005, 2005. And then the year 2012 was significant, because India became our strategic partner. And 2014, if you will recall, Prime Minister Modi announced the -- I would say the continuation of the Look East into the Act East Policy. And in 2002, India became a comprehensive -- we entered into a comprehensive strategic partnership between India and ASEAN. So that is the evolution of the relationship. And the developments, the broader dynamics of the region has had a very beneficial impact on the partnership between Thailand and India. 

But looking ahead, I am pretty much convinced that this partnership is bound to become stronger. And it's not simply going to be a bilateral partnership, it's going to be a regional partnership. And I hope a global partnership as well. The reason I am confident that our partnership will grow and hopefully become a strategic partnership is because, this very profound development in international system that you have noted is the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region. 

Now, when I joined the Foreign Ministry 40 years ago, there was no term, Indo-Pacific. We only had South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. And then when the economies of East Asia began to boom, we talked about the East Asian economies. And then the United States wanted to be part of the booming economies of East Asia. We had cooperation that extended on both sides of the Pacific region. So we had the Asia-Pacific cooperation. And now the term that we hear so frequently, is the Indo-Pacific. And Indo-Pacific will have a very important bearing on our partnership, now and going into the future. 

But what is the Indo-Pacific? I don't think it's a geographical region as such. I think in truth it is a geopolitical, geo-economics construct. What does it reflect? It reflects the profound transformative changes that have occurred in the world. You noted in your remarks some of these changes. First, the shift in the balance of power, from the west to the east. And now we all talk about this Asian century. We are in an Asian century, but are we going to be able to sustain the Asian century? That depends on our ability to meet the challenges ahead. But the Indo-Pacific community, I mean it's not a community yet, maybe a community with a small C, reflects I think two very profound developments. First, the rise of China. Second, the rise of India. And, you know, nowadays it's very fashionable to talk about the rise of India. You know, definitely, especially under your present Foreign Minister, you know, people talk about the expanding role of India, the growing influence of India, and the remarkable way India has been able to carve out its special brand of foreign policy, a brand that is independent but yet constructive, a brand that retains India's strategic autonomy in the midst of the growing geopolitical competition that we face. 

And I think the term Indo-Pacific also reflects the connections between the two oceans, in terms of the important sea lanes of transport, sea lanes of communication that transverse the region. And, so what has happened, is that the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Oceans have become one strategic space, one strategic domain. And so freedom of navigation, security of sea lanes, and maritime security are important issues for all of us in the Indo-Pacific. And now we have an Indo-Pacific that is growing in economic importance and in strategic importance. And this indeed has a very important bearing on the direction of our partnership. 

And I forgot to mention also that our partnership will also be determined by -- also by another important development, that is the rise of ASEAN, the 10 countries of ASEAN. We are now the combined together, the fifth largest economy in the world. Of course, India alone is the fifth largest economy in the world. We're hoping that if we get things right, by the year 2030 we will be the fourth largest economy in the world, if we get things right. 

And we also pride ourselves in -- I was in Germany a few days ago, and I told my German colleagues that, you know, we consider ourselves the second most successful regional organization after the EU, but we will never be the EU. I'm not sure we aspire to be the EU either, because we are not a supranational organization. We are an association of sovereign states, integrating more, working hard to strengthen our unity, cohesiveness and centrality, which is of course subject to challenges because of geopolitics of the region now. 

So, what does it say, this Indo-Pacific for the partnership between our two countries? I think opportunities should abound for a closer partnership. But that also depends on our ability to together meet the challenges that we face in the region. Obviously the partnership should focus on economic cooperation, and that is because I think the Indo-Pacific will continue to be the centre of growth of the global economy. And right now the Indo-Pacific comprise 60% of the world's population. It contributes to two-thirds of global growth. And so if we do things right, I'm sure that we will continue to enjoy greater prosperity. But the reason that I'm confident is because, in the Indo-Pacific we are a very diverse group. We're not homogeneous. We have democracies, we have Quasi-Democracies, we have authoritarian regimes. But all of us have one thing in common, which is to improve the livelihood of our people, to better the lives of our people, to continue with our pro-growth, pro-business and market-oriented policies. And also not to do it alone, but also to integrate our economies, so that we can increase the pie even bigger. And so in the region, ASEAN itself, we have the ASEAN Economic Community. We're promoting free trade in the region through the RCEP, which is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is right now the biggest trading arrangement in the world. Of course, we wanted India to join, but India made the decision. But still, the door is open for India to join when it is ready. 

And then, of course, we have the CPTPP, and it's a long name. It originally was the TPP, as many of you probably know. It was pioneered by the United States. Then President Trump said, no, he doesn't want TPP. So Japan came to the rescue, and it became the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. And, of course, the door is open for the U.S. to return. But surprisingly, China has already applied to be a member of the CPTPP. And the region is unique also in a sense that it doesn't have an overarching security architecture. We don't have. In Europe, they have NATO, they have the Helsinki Accord. But in our region, it's a patchwork of architecture. Of course, you have the ASEAN-led architecture, which is the ARF, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the biggest multilateral security dialogue. Then we have institutions like the EAS, the East Asia Summit, which India is very much a part of. And then, of course, we have the BRI. Which is China's version of economic and security architecture, promoting development of infrastructure. And then there is the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, and other versions of the Free Indo-Pacific. And, of course, India, you have your version in the Indian Pacific Ocean Initiative, which we very much welcome. 

And then we have Quad, and we have AUKUS, and now we have IPEF. So it's a patchwork of regional structures that comprise the regional architecture. We hope that somehow all this patchwork will be going in the same direction and make for a good piece of cloth that we all can be proud of. Meaning that this architecture should help to underpin peace, stability, and prosperity of the region. It doesn't mean that it has to be the architecture created by ASEAN. It should also include other architectures as well, as long as we keep the region free, open, inclusive, and rules-based. I think that's the key. 

And so, what are the opportunities? Of course, I talked about the economic partnership. I think going into the future, we have to work harder on connectivity. Connectivity, I see my friend Tino here, who writes a lot about connectivity. Connectivity will lead to more trade, more investment, enhance our economic partnership. Now, Thailand hopes to provide that bridge of connectivity for India to engage in a more enhanced way with ASEAN and beyond. There is one important project that we've been discussing for a long time, I'm afraid 20 years now. And that is the Trilateral Highway Project between India, Myanmar, and Thailand. Tomorrow, we will have a meeting of the Joint Commission between our two countries. This is going to be an important project for us to discuss. We want to expedite the project. I think Thailand and India are ready. But I think we have to wait a little while before things settle down in Myanmar, which I'll talk a little bit later. 

And I think another very important connectivity is the connectivity, sea connectivity. And we realize now that the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea is connecting us also together. And that's why BIMSTEC is important. BIMSTEC connects South and Southeast Asia. And it's unavoidable that the two countries which have to drive BIMSTEC, is Thailand and India. That's the reality. And we are supposed to organize a BIMSTEC summit this year. It should have been held last year, but we've postponed it to this year. We have not set a date yet, because we really want to think hard about what should be the deliverables at the BIMSTEC summit. When we have the leaders together, I think we must make sure that they accomplish something. And I think there's much more that BIMSTEC can accomplish, especially in terms of connectivity and also we talked a lot about the Free Trade Agreement among the BIMSTEC country. 

Another important area where I think we should work closely together, is the development of the Mekong sub-region. The Mekong sub-region I think is important to ASEAN, because the Mekong countries, with the exception of Thailand, are at a lower level of development. So it's important for us to close the development gap. But for India, it also supports Mekong sub-region cooperation through the Mekong-Ganga Initiative, which is led by India, will also connect India to mainland Southeast Asia. And I think that should be an important economic boost for India as well. So, in all these dimensions, I see the economic partnership between our two countries striving, going forward, and becoming more strategic. But we also have to deal with the challenges that we face, and that's the challenge to our peace and security. 

Again, you mentioned that the geopolitical competition between a rising power and established power, which is China and the United States. The theory is that when you have a competition like that, most of the time it's going to lead to war. I hope that the pundits will be proven wrong. But it's not just a geopolitical competition that we see, it's a geo-economic, geo-technology competition. So it covers all the domains of the relationship, and it's becoming what everybody calls the defining factor, or the defining force, in international relations these days. We certainly -- India is much stronger than Thailand, but we don't want to take side, and we don't want to be forced to take side. And so -- but at the same time, we cannot be neutral all the time, because the space for neutrality is very limited. So that means that we have to take stand when it comes to matters of our interests. We have to take a stand when it affects the principles, values that we believe in, like the UN Charter. 

But most of all, we hope that the major powers would see it in their interests, and in the interests of the region, to get their act together, to better manage their relations, because it's their responsibility as major powers to manage their relations well. There will always be contentious issues, but there are also areas for cooperation. And I'm glad that they're talking about guardrails, they're talking about how to avoid conflict, talking about cooperating where they can. And the most significant development in the competition between the two major powers is the meeting that President Xi Jinping had with President Biden on the sideline of the APEC Summit in San Francisco. I think this has led to efforts to stabilize the relationship. 

And most recently, Thailand was very happy to have hosted or provided the venue for the meeting between U.S. National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. And so, again, we hope that that has helped for both sides to see their way clearer as to how they're going to manage this very important relationship between the two major powers. And so -- then we have the second challenge. Of course, we have flashpoints, like the South China Sea, East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait. But I think from our common perspective is the challenge of maritime security. How do we maintain freedom of navigation? How do we ensure security of our sea lanes from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean? Before, our attention, Thailand's attention and ASEAN's attention was focused mainly eastward, Pacific South China Sea. But now, increasingly, our attention is being drawn to the maritime security in the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal, and the Andaman Sea, which constitute the gateway into the Malacca Straits. And I'm very glad that India is engaging more closely with Thailand and some of the coastal ASEAN countries in dialogue, on maritime security, in the naval exercises. I think these are important, in terms of enhancing our maritime security. 

Now, the third challenge for me is this partnership between Thailand and India is anchored on ASEAN's centrality. And ASEAN's centrality is in trouble these days, to be very frank, because of the geopolitical competition that we are witnessing now, because of the changes within ASEAN. The expansion of ASEAN from 5 to 6 to 10 has made it more difficult to manage the different expectations within ASEAN. And right now, we are being pulled left and right, we are being pulled front and back because of the geopolitical competition. 

And so how do we maintain our unity and cohesion in the midst of the geopolitical competition? Not easy. I think, you know, going back since the founding of ASEAN, everybody talked about ASEAN survival. So it depends on ASEAN being able to do two things. First, think of our national interests. Second, think of our regional interests as going together. This is an Indonesian concept of national and regional resilience. Or to simply put, my good friend Bilahari Kausikan, who's come to India many times to talk about regional security, unless ASEAN is able to hang together, we will be hung separately. So we in ASEAN have to be constantly reminded of that truth, that reality that confronts us. 

Then, the challenge within ASEAN going forward is, what do we do about the ASEAN way? The Deputy Permanent Secretary was the DG of ASEAN. ASEAN's success has been we operate on the basis of consultations and consensus, which is good. That means that everyone is on board. But then consensus sometimes means the lowest common denominator. Or consensus means we act after something has already happened. So ASEAN really has to rethink about this principle of consultation and consensus. We will never be able to change this principle, but how can we arrive at a consensus more quickly. We've been thinking about the role of the Chair, having an ASEAN permanently as a decision, ASEAN Troika permanently as a decision-making body. But those ideas are still on the drawing board. 

Then at the heart of the difficulty that ASEAN finds itself right now, especially when we deal with Myanmar, is this principle of non-interference. This is the sacrosanct principle of ASEAN. This is why ASEAN has succeeded. Because when we established ASEAN, we were in the same region but we did not know each other. We didn't have trust and confidence. And that's why we needed this principle to make sure to build up trust and confidence, so that we can cooperate and integrate. But right now we've integrated. Right now we are interdependent. There's no way of drawing a dividing line between domestic and external affairs. Oftentimes domestic affairs have spillover effects. They affect other countries, in the case of Myanmar. So if we continue to limit ourselves rigidly to this policy of non-interference, we're going to be paralyzed on many important issues. So we have to be flexible. Because ASEAN, when we talk about domestic issues, it's not intended to undermine a member country. It's intended to help a member country out of a difficult situation. 

For us, non-interference is a very important principle. But if you look at the ASEAN Charter that we have signed, that we are committed to, when was it signed? 2007? But this is our constitution. In the ASEAN Charter, if you go and read the section on principles and values, we talk about democracy. We talk about human rights. We talk about rule of law. We talk about justice. What I'm trying to point out is that the principles of non-interference must be applied against the other principles that exist within the ASEAN Charter. And most important of all, you cannot use the principle of non-interference as a blank check to do whatever you want against your people. There has to be accountability and responsibility. So for ASEAN to maintain our centrality, to be the anchor of this partnership, engagement of India with the region, we have to really look and re-look at the ASEAN way. 

But the most immediate challenge that we face right now and which brought me to India a few weeks ago in January is Myanmar. The crisis in Myanmar has been continuing. It has been prolonged for over three years now. No end in sight. The armed hostilities, in fact, are increasing. We face a very complicated situation because it's not just the military versus the NLD. Now you have the NUG, you have the PDF, the People's Defense Force, you have also the EAOs, the Ethnic Armed Organizations. And so it's a very difficult situation. But in ASEAN we have been endeavoring to help resolve the situation with what we call our blueprint, which is the five-point consensus. 

But basically, it's remained a blueprint on paper. We've had three changes of Chairmanship. There has been no progress. And the three elements of the five-point consensus are basically reduction in violence, cessation of hostilities, humanitarian assistance, and dialogue. None of that has been implemented. 

Now Thailand, of course, we are the country next door like India. What do we do? Because if anything that happens in Myanmar, Thailand is to be immediately affected like India. So we have no choice but just to find various options to implement the five-point consensus to get things started. And so, when we did our brainstorm, we thought humanitarian assistance is the starting point. Because humanitarian assistance in itself meets the immediate needs, addresses the plight of the people. 

Right now, you have over 2 million displaced persons in Myanmar, quite a few of them along the Thai-Myanmar border. So we believe that humanitarian assistance cross-border, humanitarian assistance is needed. But our thinking goes beyond humanitarian assistance. If we can get this off the ground in the right way, humanitarian assistance that is distributed to everyone without discrimination and not become an instrument of one party. I think if it becomes effective, credible, transparent. Then maybe we can have something bigger in the offering, such as maybe leading to a humanitarian pause, and then maybe to a humanitarian dialogue. 

But we believe that this is the first step in re-engaging Myanmar with ASEAN. Because Myanmar outside ASEAN, we will never have the opportunity to discuss, maybe to persuade the government in power in Myanmar. So re-engaging with ASEAN. But it has to be re-engagement based on concrete progress, and that is the humanitarian assistance. 

Second, it may be seen by the international community as responding to the concerns of the international community. So this may pave the way for some constructive engagement between Myanmar and countries outside the region, who also plays a very important role. I'm talking about neighboring countries, talking about Japan, China, the U.S. Because in the end, all of us have to pitch in to help, to help Myanmar still return back to the path of peace and democracy. 

But you see, we can only do so much to help Myanmar. Eventually, it's the Myanmar parties themselves that have to solve the problem. We can entice them, we can persuade them, maybe a little bit of coercion. But they will have to agree on what is the future of Myanmar. And the future of Myanmar is not, it's going to have to be a different future than before. And I think it's up to, we hope, that the parties within Myanmar will see it in their future to work together. And certainly, we'd like to work with India in partnership on the question of Myanmar. 

Now, I have a problem with the strategic partnership between Thailand and India, to be very frank. It's taken too long. We talked about the strategic partnership when I was Permanent Secretary. I came here with Prime Minister Yingluck. She was the Guest of Honor at your Independence Day. But that was, so about 12 years now. We haven't made progress in our strategic partnership. And in the meantime, you had strategic partnership with Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and comprehensive strategic partnership with Vietnam. We have nothing against. That's good. We need more stronger engagement of India in the region. 

So in this visit and in our discussions tomorrow, we hope to be able to convince our Indian colleagues that it's time to, given all the dimensions of our partnership, the bilateral partnership, the regional partnership, it's time now for us to go towards a strategic partnership that fits the level of relations between our two countries. And most of all, I think what we have in common is our vision of the Indo-Pacific, which is a vision that is free, open, emphasized with underlined inclusive, including everyone, excluding no one, rules-based, and most of all, based on economic cooperation, economic prosperity that's going to help the long-term and lasting peace and stability of our region. 

So thank you very much. 

M: Thank you, Excellency, for your insightful remarks. Now I request Ambassador Vijay Thakur Singh, DG, ICWA, to moderate the Q&A session. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Thank you. Thank you so much. Vice Minister, Sihasak, for your very comprehensive and insightful lecture, which covered geopolitical, geo-economics, geotechnical competitions across the globe, and in particular, also in our region, in Indo-Pacific. You have, of course, mentioned the main question is how does regional architecture with ASEAN centrality be maintained when ASEAN itself is, from what I hear from you, is looking at its own self and seeing where it needs to look at its way of conduct business and how to move forward as ASEAN. 

And also, you mentioned that India-Thailand strategic partnership is something which has been in works for a while. And you highlighted three areas: the economic partnership, connectivity, and maritime security. And in that, you covered other engagements. So with these, of course, I dare say these are not a summary, or I cannot dare summarize everything, but just the broad trends. 

And now I open the floor for questions. I'll take three at a time. Identify yourself and get to the questions immediately. I see a hand here and I see a hand there, and I see a hand there. So three. Go ahead. 

M: Should we take them separately? Should we take them together, three at a time? 

Vijay Thakur Singh: No, it's there. I'll take it in the next round. Go ahead. 

Pankaj Jha: Thank you, Excellency. I have two very straight questions, primarily from India's point of view. My name is Professor Pankaj Jha, I teach international security in O.P. Jindal Global University. My first question is, a few of the projects that were undertaken under BRI in Thailand have been reduced, which means truncated. Can you highlight the reasons thereof? First. 

Second, within India there is a lot of talk every now and then with regard to Kra of Isthmus Canal. Is this thing still alive or you have put it under the burner? Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Okay. I take a question right at the back there and then one in the front and then I'll go into the second round. 

M1: Excellency, thank you so much for your insightful lecture. You briefly touched upon ASEAN centrality, so my question relates to that. So we all agree to the point that ASEAN centrality is crucial for maintaining regional stability. So would you like to share your views on how can Thailand play a leading role in strengthening ASEAN unity and collective voice on the global stage? Thank you. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: And one right in the front here. Next round, I’ll take. 

M2: Thank you, His Excellency, for the very thoughtful and excellent presentation. You rightly said that profound and very transformative changes are taking place in the world international system. My question here is what kind of global role Thailand envisions for itself in this situation? And how do you see India's fitting role in Thailand's strategic calculus in different regions, including in Indo-Pacific? Thank you, sir. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: His Excellency? 

Sihasak Phuangketkeow: Thank you. Well, on the BRI, I mean, really, I think there's been a lot of criticism about the BRI, but you must look at it on the positive side as well, because it does meet the immense need for human infrastructure development in the region. But, of course, everything comes with both the benefits and certain downsides. And if you're the country that is the recipient, it's up to you to make the best decision. Right? And so I don’t think the Chinese can impose all what they want with that particular country on that particular country. 

So in the case of Thailand, it's like that. What is good for Thailand? That's the basis of our decision. And so maybe we have to curtail, scale down the project a bit. But of course, that's something that a decision we have to make. But I mean, there are so many other projects which I'm sure has been very beneficial to enhancing connectivity, economic development of each country. And so we're looking at it project by project. And we're choosing what is good for Thailand. And so that's our approach to BRI. 

On the Kra Canal, yes, it's been discussed so many years, going back hundreds of years, I think. The digging of canal is people are fascinated, captivated by the canal concept, how it could be a game changer. But the reality is that, again, coming back to connectivity, the security of the sea lanes, the safety of the sea lanes, so important. And right now, we have one choke point, a very major choke point, which is the Malacca Straits. And congested, of course, and there are certain risks involved. So we thought maybe we should look at this project. But it's not going to be a canal. It's going to be, with the new technology available nowadays, it's going to be what we call a land bridge. 

So we will have two ports constructed, one on the Gulf of Thailand, facing the Pacific, South China Sea, Pacific Ocean, and then another on the Andaman Sea, facing Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean, and beyond. And we tried thinking of connecting these two ports, deep sea ports, by rail, by road, and pipeline. That's the idea. 

And the Prime Minister has been, in his visits abroad, he's been promoting this project. It's a big project. It's not going to be handled by one country or one company. And so first of all, we are explaining what the project is about, what we hope to achieve with this project, how it's going to benefit in terms of commerce, in terms of transport, and also enhancing maritime security as well. And so we're hoping that countries will be interested, private sector would be interested. But it's a huge project. And we're trying to come up with more details as we go along. 

Now, there is a question on ASEAN, how can Thailand help? It's not just Thailand. It has to be the 10 countries of ASEAN, which have to realize that ASEAN has to get its act together. But we also recognize that reality is that some countries will have to take the lead in ASEAN. The countries that have taken the lead are countries like Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, and now Vietnam. But the problem with Thailand, and to be very frank, is that we have been in this category of MIA, Missing in Action, for the past few years. People have said now foreign policy has maybe domestically focused. So Thailand has to step up to the plate and contribute, not our leadership, but help with other countries of ASEAN to find a way of navigating the challenges of geopolitical competition, how ASEAN can maintain its centrality. Again, coming back to the core principles of ASEAN that we have to adjust, to adjust to the realities of our integration, to the reality of the present day. 

And so, I hope that Thailand can contribute in terms of our thinking to helping to reinforce and reinvigorate ASEAN centrality. 

Now we're talking about transformative change. I think one thing that we've seen is the shift in the balance of power from west to the east. But the other important profound development is the diffus in the balance of power. We have, as you rightly noted, we live in a multipolar world. But we have two powerful poles. But we have other poles that should play a part in shaping the new international, the world order that is taking shape. And among that pole, because India will be there, and countries like, we have the BRICS and all that. But what is important is the Global South. The global south that, when you Chair the G20, you talked about being the voice of the Global South. So we must also make the international system, the institutions, more democratic, more representative. 

And we hope to work with major partners, we hope to work with the Global South in shaping the new order that is bound to come, that is bound to reflect the changes that we've seen in the international system. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Thank you. I'll take the next questions. I'll give the floor here; you had asked earlier. I think I have to take this side, I'll give it here, okay, we'll start. 

Suresh Goel: Thank you very much Vijay and Excellency, thank you very much. Now that was a very comprehensive presentation you made. My name is Suresh Goel, former Foreign Service Officer, served 10 years in the region where you are located, including one Ambassador posting in Laos, your next-door neighbor. 

My question is relating to your very central role in the region, and you talked a lot about it, connectivity. And Thailand is central to connectivity, not just BIMSTEC, ASEAN, practically the whole Indo-Pacific. If you forget Straits of Malacca, from land to land, you had East-West Economic Corridor, that was a central part of the connectivity being established there. My question is that any good connectivity project, which is central to, I think, political and strategic stability in the area, would also require a corresponding security environment where one does not feel pressured from the other. I'm not naming anything at all, but you understand what I'm saying. 

Now the issue really here is, and that is the basic objection we also had to BRI earlier, that any kind of connectivity project in the region would have the security factors which ASEAN itself has not been able to deal with. How do you do that? 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Thank you. Right there, Sridhar. 

Sridhar Kumaraswami: Good evening, sir. Sridhar here from the Asian Age and Deccan Chronicle, right here, sir. Sir, we in India have been given to believe or assume that in the past few years we have actually stepped up our engagement with Thailand through BIMSTEC and through the ASEAN. We have been engaging the ASEAN, inviting all the 10 leaders to our Republic Day celebrations and holding talks with them. So therefore, we are a bit surprised to hear that you seem to be quite disappointed with the pace of bilateral ties, and you seem to feel that not much has been done to strengthen our strategic partnership, what are the reasons for this, what are the factors, is it a bit of a give and take missing between the two countries, that's my question. Thank you so much. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Thank you. And one right here. I'll take you next. 

Avni Sablok: Thank you, Excellency, for the insightful lecture. I'm Avni Sablok, and my question is on the digital economy. India and Thailand both are playing an increasingly important role in the digital economy. So what are the key challenges and opportunities for Thailand in its pursuit of becoming a leading digital economy, and how can India and Thailand cooperate in this area? Thank you. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Excellency? 

Sihasak Phuangketkeow: Yes, thank you. In terms of connectivity, and I think you touched upon the security geopolitical implications and pressures, and I think that you're probably implying a certain country. I think, the reality that we live with is that, we have to deal with all the major powers. And we have to deal with them knowing that there are benefits and there are vulnerabilities that come in our relations with major powers. And so -- and that's the way that we have to approach our relations. 

I guess you're referring to the major power up north from Thailand. So you see, that country is in the region. That country, is an expanding power. It brings benefits, and again, it brings vulnerabilities. So how do you deal? So I think we have to have the wisdom to deal with that major power. But at the same time, when you have geopolitical competition, if you're -- I think my friend, Bilahari, again said, if you're smart enough, if you have the wisdom, if you have the agility, maybe you have – you can discover a certain degree of agency when you're in your dealings with the two major powers and in the way that you handle pressures from the major power. So we don't have a simple solution, but I guess we have to be able to learn how to deal with pressure, and also, you know, that's the reality that we live with. 

On engagement. Yes, well, I'm disappointed, not because I'm disappointed with India, I'm disappointed with the pace. Right? 12 years, we haven't been able to make progress. Maybe it's a reflection on Thailand's part. What has happened in the 12 years with Thai politics, maybe? You know what happened? I don't have to tell you. I'm sure that you know what happened, and maybe the ups and downs of Thai politics contribute to the delay that we've encountered. And maybe, because of, being internally focused, we somehow disappeared from the radar screen of a few countries, and maybe along the way it lost some of our strategic significance. 

So I think it's a reflection on Thailand as well. But again, in the context of Thailand now, Thailand that has a democratic elected government, Thailand that has a civilian-led government, Thailand who's a government who's not shy to talk about democracy and human rights. And so I think it's time, and also Thailand that is reinvigorating our economy, restructuring our economy. It's time that we really try to move our strategic partnership forward, because it doesn't do justice to our past, it doesn't do justice to our present, and also the future of our relations. So that's my hope. But I'm not disappointed with India, but I'm just stating a fact. 

Third, on digital economy, yes, definitely, because, I think the challenge faced by many countries, especially in the wake of COVID-19, is simply not economic recovery, as business as usual. We have to transform our economy, we have to transition our economy towards green economy and digital economy. And so without, going towards a digital economy, I think we cannot be competitive. And so we're doing a lot in terms of digital economy. 

In Thailand, we digitalized our banking system, you know, and we're working hard to be a digital data center. And so we have many projects that are ongoing. When our Prime Minister went to New York, he met with Microsoft, he met with Amazon, Google to try to invite them to come to set up a data center in Thailand, which is important if you're going to promote digital economy. And definitely India, I think, I forgot the name of the company, but there is a big company in India that is going to invest in Thailand, in digital data center, in this place that we call the EEC, which is our flagship economic development zone on the eastern shore of Thailand. 

So definitely digital economy, digitalization, digital technology is something that we invite, we'd like to promote. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Thank you, Excellency. I'll take one last round of questions. I have one hand there, one hand at the back, and one hand at the back here. Is that okay? All right. So, next one. You can start there. Come, you start from here. Next you. 

Rajlaxmi Deshmukh: Thank you Excellency for your insightful session. My name is Rajlakshmi, I am from a Delhi University student, and my question is that, what's your view on China rising influence in North, sorry, South East Asian countries? What's your view? Please share. Thank you. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Thank you. A question there. All right, you start, you start. 

F1: Thank you, Excellency for your insightful remarks. In your talk, you talked about South China Sea. I was just wondering with Thailand's geographical location and economic ties with the claimants of South China Sea, what future strategies can Thailand pursue to contribute to a stable and peaceful long-term solution in the South China Sea? Is negotiating a code of conduct with China the way forward? 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Okay, and the last question there. 

M2: Good afternoon Minister. Thank you for your insightful presentation. My question is about Indo-Pacific. You spoke about various initiatives being launched in the last few years, be it IPEF, QUAD, and AUKUS, and a number of countries we have seen have expressed reservations about formation of various blocs. Does Thailand also hold this view that in fact formation of various blocs would be detrimental for overall peace in the region? 

And second question is about Myanmar. You said Myanmar's situation is really very complex and precarious, and then you suggested that ASEAN has to do more. So what kind of role actually you feel ASEAN should play in bringing the situation in Myanmar under control? Thank you. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Excellency? 

Sihasak Phuangketkeow: Again, on China influence in Southeast Asia. I noted that already, because China is virtually our next neighbor. China is growing in terms of economic might, in terms of political might, in terms of its influence. So we cannot avoid that. And I think I was told by my Vietnamese colleague, and he told me that anyone who aspires to be the leader of Vietnam has to be able to do two things. First, live with China and stand up to China. So, I mean, that's the reality. I think when you're confronted with a major power, you have to live with a major power and stand up to that major power. 

But of course, the view from Southeast Asia is not the same. The view from Vientiane, Laos, is not the same as the view from Manila, Philippines. So that's the problem. So ASEAN has to manage this different security perception in a way that we have to recognize that it's in our best interest to stick together, to be able to -- if we stick together, if we have unity, cohesion, and demonstrate our centrality, that's the best way to manage our relations with a major power. 

Now, on the South China Sea, a very complicated situation, a major flashpoint in the region. But, you see, not all of ASEAN, not every country is a party to the conflict. You have quite a few of the ASEAN countries, China, but the problem -- with claims, conflicting claims in the South China Sea. But I guess the main problem is that China with its Nine Dash, Dash Nine, claiming the whole South China Sea based on historical facts. But, you see, I think for us, is that let's -- let sanity prevail. Let reason prevail. And let's not have unprovoked incident. We have to keep things as calm as possible. And make sure that, we resolve through diplomacy. Because it can be very complicated. Especially, it could be overlaid by the geopolitical conflict, which will make it even more difficult. And so, for us, first, is to have, ensure freedom of navigation, security of the sea lanes, respect for international law, self-restraint on the part of everyone. And we're trying to work on this code of conduct so that these principles will be embraced by everyone and then maybe we can try to establish channels of negotiations between the parties concerned. But what is necessary is to avoid the situation from affecting regional peace and stability of the region and so the code of conduct is very important in this regard. 

Now on the Indo-Pacific. Again, we don't have an overarching security structure. We have a patchwork, we have the ASEAN-led, which is open and inclusive, multilateral, focusing on dialogue. But then we have arrangements like QUAD, which is not inclusive. We have AUKUS, which is not inclusive. But we have to live with that reality also. India is a member of the QUAD. India doesn't see QUAD the same way as the United States sees QUAD, I think so. 

But anyway, you see, maybe these arrangements, QUAD or AUKUS, can also serve some useful purpose if they maintain the regional equilibrium, if they provide the deterrent capability, provide deterrence, because we have this geopolitical competition going. But if it works out in a way that it leads to creation of blocs, military bloc, directed at a particular country, then we have a dangerous situation. And we don't want to see that kind of architecture, because the architecture that we believe in is inclusive, that leads to equilibrium in the balance of power. So that's how we see it. 

We have to live with reality. We cannot say that we don't like QUAD and please go away. So we express our hope that QUAD will not become a military bloc, not become directed at any particular country seeking to contain or seeking to isolate. It could be helping to deter, but I think over the long term we should work towards a common vision of Indo-Pacific that all of us share. Thank you. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Thank you, Excellency. But just to add a bit on QUAD, because QUAD is really a partnership between four partners, equal partners. And we've joined together to look at issues on which we can work together. And there's been a variety of issues on which we've worked together from during the COVID time on the vaccine diplomacy and we’ve work together in various other domains. You've got the Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative coming out from the QUAD, which is helpful to the whole region. So we really see QUAD as a partnership. It contributes to degree of stability in the region. 

And the initiative of, I mean, it's not really a QUAD, but you have the initiative of IPEF, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, in which India is a partner and I understand Thailand is a partner as well. So there are multiple initiatives in the region and we are, I think, all working towards the same purpose of peace and stability and partnership. 

Sihasak Phuangketkeow: And also it takes countries like India to steer those initiatives towards constructive direction, positive direction. As you mentioned, so many areas where, we can work together with QUAD. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Yes. Yes, Excellency. There is partnerships in various areas and I think there's a number of areas where ASEAN can also see and work together with us collectively. So with those, would you like to take a few more questions? 

Sihasak Phuangketkeow: No, I can’t. 

Vijay Thakur Singh: Thank you. Thank you. Thank you so much, Excellency. Thank you so much for taking the various questions and a range of questions that came. And we look forward to your discussions tomorrow and we'll await the outcome. Thank you, Excellency. 

Sihasak Phuangketkeow: Thank you very much. Thank you for having me here. 

M: On behalf of ICWA, I would like to take this opportunity to once again thank His Excellency Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow for graciously accepting our request of delivering the special lecture on such an important topic. We have benefited immensely from your remarks and gained valuable insights. I also thank our audience this evening for their valuable participation in this event. May I now invite everyone for high tea in the foyer. Thank you all and have a good day.

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