Introduction
As the premier forum for international economic cooperation, the G20 plays an important role in contributing to the provision of global public goods and working towards a sustainable global economy. It was recognised that the forum needs participation from both developing countries and the developed to achieve the G20’s overarching objective of strong, sustainable and balanced growth. At its inception as a leader-level forum in 2008 in the wake of the global financial crisis, the G20 focused on restoring economic growth, ensuring global stability and promoting resilience. Since then, the G20 has broadened its agenda to encompass social and environmental challenges with sustainable economic dimensions—from preventing the spread of pandemics to reducing inequalities.[i]
The current gridlock in international forums and multilateralism, in general, has highlighted the need to push for collective action to address the pressing challenges faced by the global economy and the international community. As the prime forum for international economic cooperation, the G20 needs to lead by example to advance the agenda for sustainable development, support for public good, climate change mitigation policies and supporting the Global South’s ability to build capacities to design and implement sustainable development strategies. Brazil, Latin America’s largest economy, together with Argentina and Mexico represents the region at the G20.
Overview of Brazil’s Foreign Policy
The changes in the international system in the past two decades have provided many States, such as Brazil, greater autonomy to increase their leadership role in the region and in the international arena. Brazil defines the priorities of its foreign policy as cooperation with its regional and international partners to address global challenges and exerting Brazil’s soft power. Although it continues to maintain cordial ties with all major centres of power, such as the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and India, the idea of bringing other emerging countries together to counterbalance the might of traditional Western powers has been an aspect of Brazil’s foreign policy. Coalitions with emerging partners has helped boost Brazil’s global presence, its diplomatic efforts geared towards bolstering its international standing independently of other nations, with its role as a global player being firmly grounded in the ideas of autonomy and universalism.[ii] Regionally, Brazil has supported the reintegration process such as the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South American (IIRSA), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) as well as the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008 and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2011. From 2004 to 2017, Brazil commanded the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Globally, it is a member of the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa, or G3), the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the G20.
Neighbourhood Policy
The Constitution of Brazil (1988) states that “The Federative Republic of Brazil shall pursue the economic, political, social, and cultural integration of the people of Latin America, with a view to form a Latin-American community of nations.”[iii] This has been the guiding principle of Brazil’s relations within the region.
Within the region, Brazil’s partnership with Argentina remains the most important, despite differences that have been visible from time to time. Brazil’s growing leadership position within the region and the growing asymmetry between the two countries both economically and in terms of their regional influence have been a cause of friction. Nevertheless, bilateral dialogue on a political level has been maintained, and cooperation between different corresponding ministries from the two countries, such as education, energy and labour, continues. The second aspect of Brazil’s regional policy has been integration including paving the way for the UNASUR in an effort to integrate the MERCOSUR and the Andean community. The regional platforms provide Brazil with an opportunity to assume a leadership role in South America. IIRSA, MERCOSUR and UNASUR provided a framework for cooperation not only in health and education but also in security, as envisioned in the South American Defense Council (SADC). The SADC would act as a mediator and security provider, which meant dealing with border, drugs, environmental and migration issues. These frameworks for the region were important as the inter-American forums were largely dominated by the United States.[iv] Its foreign policy prioritised the construction of a structured South American framework under Brazilian leadership, with Brazil taking decisive responsibility for the integration and regionalisation process by using its soft power and reinforcing multilateral initiatives. Brazil emphasised on technical and financial cooperation along with investments in infrastructure development projects to reinforce integration and support cooperation in non-trade-related sectors. Beyond South America, Brazil has also focused on engagements with Central American States and the Caribbean nations. Brazil’s command of the UN mission in Haiti allowed it to foster ties with the Caribbean. The CELAC further cemented these ties.
International Relations
In his speech at the Davos Summit 2003, President Lula stated, “…(Brazil’s) foreign policy is firmly oriented towards the search for peace, for negotiated solutions to international conflicts and towards the intransigent defence of …(Brazil’s)… national interests.”[v] It is one of the largest and most influential countries in South America, sharing borders with 10 neighbours and a coastline of 7400 km. Brazil is the seventh largest economy in the world with a gross domestic product of US$2.4 trillion—equivalent to more than 40% of Latin America’s economy. Brazil is the world’s largest exporter of meat, coffee and sugar, and the second largest exporter of soya beans and iron ores. It is also the sixth largest exporter of aircraft. Brazil is the second largest producer of ethanol fuel in the world after the United States, and is a world leader in renewable energy with its energy profile being the least carbon intensive in the world. It is home to two-thirds of the Amazon rainforest, making it central to the fight against global climate change.
The shifting political and economic dynamics of the 21st century necessitate a more focused understanding of the politics and economics of the countries of the Global South. Brazil has been at the forefront of increased South-South cooperation. President Lula in a press conference to media organisation in Algeria (2006) had stated,
The South-South relationship is not only possible; it is also necessary. The South is not an amorphous complex of underdeveloped and dependent countries that have nothing to offer other than raw materials to wealthy countries. (…) Together we can become stronger, not only through the growth of our trade, but also by participating more actively in economic and political forums, such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations, where questions of great interest to humanity are discussed. (…) Now, a more intense, more creative and a stronger relationship between countries of the South, does not mean that we will abandon our relations with developed countries, which are also important to all of us. Let’s do what developed countries do; take advantage of all opportunities and make our union our strength.[vi]
With China, India and Russia, it is a country that is trying to reform the multilateral international order. China and the United States are its top two trading partners, and the country has forged closer political and military ties with Russia. Multilateral organisations such as the BRICS and IBSA allow Brazil to connect with other regional powers such as India and provides a platform for them to share their economic skills, exchange information, develop resources and collaborate on political agendas, which has profound implications for both the participating states and the rest of the world.
In these groupings, it has found a willing partner in India, which shares its desire that a reformed multilateral order reflects the present realities of international geopolitics. In 2022, India and Brazil celebrated 74 years of diplomatic relations. As the two countries navigate an international order in flux, their shared vision of multipolarity provides a unique opportunity to explore avenues for greater cooperation. The two nations have build a strategic partnership through cooperation within the BRICS, IBSA, G4, G20, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) and the wider multilateral context of the United Nations. Brazil and India have become relevant voices in decisions related to renewable energy, not only because of their substantial energy needs but also because of their commitment to promoting renewable energy sources. India is a partner in Brazil’s Biofuture Platform, with Brazil being part of the International Solar Alliance. For Brazil and India to intensify their rapprochement in the energy sector, more focus is needed on a strategy of visibility and a search for greater leadership in the political scenario; this would enhance the status of the two countries before the international community, considering their unique traits, similarities and relevance in counterbalancing North-South relations.[vii] The two countries are exploring the possibilities of working together to strengthen the WTO. Within the UN, apart from seeking a reformed UN Security Council along with other G4 partners, the two nations are exchanging views on UN peacekeeping operations. As troop-contributing countries they can learn from each other’s strengths. Brazil and India are also looking at how they can leverage defence partnerships as part of the Indo-Brazil cooperation. As the two become part of the G20 Troika, comprising countries from the Global South for the first time, their agenda will be reflective of their need to build a more inclusive and responsive international global architecture.
The Global South Troika: Brazil and the G20
Brazil will host the G20 annual meetings in 2024. In 2008, it was the host for the meeting of G20 Finance Ministers in São Paulo. As the incoming President, it will work closely with the Troika to ensure continuity of the agenda. Troika refers to the top grouping within the G20 that consists of the current, previous and the incoming presidencies—Indonesia, Italy and India (Figure 1).
Figure 1. The G20 Troika.
Source: https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/
The current Troika provides the G20 with a unique opportunity to bring the perspectives of the developing nations on development and build the agenda where the focus on issues such as food security, energy security, renewable, digital economy, development of blue economy, rising interest rates and indebtedness among some developing countries would be discussed with due consideration to the effects on developing countries.
Brazil’s G20 initiatives have included the need to reform the international financial architecture itself. From the start, it has encouraged the G20’s discussion of the reform of international financial institutions. At the G20 meeting in China in 2005, Brazil along with other nations of the global south secured a G20 commitment that the first stage of International Monetary Fund (IMF) voice and vote reform would be done.
The São Paulo Ministerial Meeting, Brazil (2008) was the tenth G20 meeting. This meeting endorsed the need for financial regulatory reform. In this meeting, the G20 agreed that the Financial Stability Forum, created in 1999, “must expand to a broader membership of emerging economies,” that “emerging and developing economies should have greater voice and representation” in the Bretton Woods bodies, and that financial stability and global growth must have “poverty reduction and social inclusion” as equal goals. The G20 welcomed the discussions on reforms as an “important step in enhancing international cooperation” and committed to “comprehensive, coordinated and timely measures” but endorsed additional fiscal stimulus only for countries where circumstances permitted and with due regard for “fiscal sustainability” over the longer term. It also pledged to support employment, resist trade and investment protectionism.[viii]
Apart from the G20 São Paulo ministerial meeting, Brazil also hosted the finance ministers of India, Russia and China along with South Africa and Mexico. The countries outlined the need for global financial reforms and cooperation in addressing the 2008 economic crisis. They also welcomed the first G20 Summit in Washington but demanded that Financial Stability Forum be expanded to include new economies and thus the Financial Stability Board was established as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum.
Brazil’s G20 Leadership: Possible Agenda
Brazil’s contribution to G20 governance is evident from its strong record of compliance (of close to 81 per cent), with summit commitments. Brazil’s compliance is highest in the areas of energy (+1.00), food and agriculture (+1.00), climate change (+0.50) and macroeconomics (+0.50).[ix] These are all areas where Brazil’s capabilities are strong, and they are part of the agenda proposed by India for its Presidency of the G20.
Brazil can provide leadership in addressing some specific issues. First, for Brazil, there is an urgent need to address the food and energy security challenges that disproportionately affect the poorest, particularly in developing and lower-income countries. As the third largest food exporter and second largest producer of biofuels, Brazil is well positioned to provide a leadership role in addressing these challenges. As stated before, Brazil is a leader in the region on renewable energy research and practical implementation. The current reorganisation of global energy markets offers an opportunity to accelerate energy transitions. Further investments in renewable and bioeconomy-based solutions such as hydrogen, solar and wind energy, and in biofuels, biomass and biomethane, could be the focus for Brazil as it prepares for its upcoming Presidency. Accelerating energy transitions will contribute to international efforts to protect biodiversity and mitigate climate change, but Brazil is also aware of the fact that each country must pursue its own energy transition, based on its specific conditions and limitations.
To promote food security, Brazil could work to keep international food supply chains open and accessible, and strengthen the resilience, reliability and sustainability of these supply chains. Apart from the G20, it could also continue to work towards liberalising agricultural trade in the WTO and removing measures that restrict the free circulation of foodstuffs and agricultural inputs worldwide.[x]
The second need is promoting digitisation. The pandemic highlighted the critical role of digital technology. From use in health care, education to financial inclusion, digital technologies can help nations implement their sustainable development initiatives and inclusive growth. The goal is to provide financial regulation mechanisms that address the needs of emerging and developing economies. Brazil has been using digital transfer of fund in some of its welfare scheme, such as Bolsa Familia, to ensure transparency and accountability in its direct cash transfer schemes. During the pandemic, the government digitalised 31 public services within its efforts against COVID-19, with effective results. To enable everyone to benefit from such digitalisation, Brazil could advocate that digital connectivity infrastructure become a G20 priority.[xi]
The third is strengthening G20 governance on sensitive issues such as democratisation, human rights, multiculturalism, equitable access to vaccines and building coordinated responses to common challenges. Brazil could strive to ensure that the G20 remains sensitive to the needs of the emerging countries.[xii] In all three of these agendas it will find a partner in India which has espoused a similar approach for its presidency of the G20. India’s presidency “will strive to ensure that the G-20 acts as a global prime mover to envision new ideas and accelerate collective action…(and work to ensure that)…. the benefits of development are universal and all-inclusive.”[xiii] As a member of the troika that takes forward the agenda of the G20, Brazil is well positioned to take the lead in strengthening G20 governance due to its experience as a key member of a number of plurilateral, multilateral, and trans-regional groupings, which include developed and developing countries such as the Summit of the Americas and the BRICS.
Conclusion
In the past two decades, Brazil has pursued a foreign policy that aims to expand the country’s presence in global political and economic negotiations, multilateral institutions and regional affairs. It has strengthened its relations with India, China and the United States and remains engaged with Russia and the European Union. It continues to maintain its presence within the region while fostering South-South cooperation. Brazilian foreign policy has become concerned with the humanitarian impact of military action and the importance of balancing peace, solidarity and globalisation.[xiv] It has stressed on the reforms of international institutional structures and make them the representative of the present realities.
As Brazil prepares to take over the Presidency of the G20 in 2024, it will strive to build convergences of interests. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis have political, economic and social consequences. The two events have disproportionately affected the developing world in health, employment, education, food security, poverty reduction, energy security and rising inflation. To respond to the manifold challenges confronting us, nations need to collaborate with each other, and Brazil believes that G20 would be fundamental to this process. In all its endeavours, Brazil will find a partner in India. The G20 provides Brazil with the unique opportunity to forge an agenda that would bring the Global South to the centre of development planning.
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*Dr. Stuti Banerjee, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] OECD, UNDP, “G20 Contribution to the 2030 Agenda: Progress and Way Forward.” https://www.oecd.org/dev/OECD-UNDP-G20-SDG-Contribution-Report.pdf (Accessed January 11, 2023).
[ii] Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva. “Continental Regionalism: Brazil’s Prominent Role in the Americas.” http://aei.pitt.edu/40231/1/WD_No_374_Brazil's_Continental_Regionalism.pdf (Accessed January 12, 2023).
[iii] Federal Supreme Court. “Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil (1988).” https://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/legislacaoConstituicao/anexo/brazil_federal_constitution.pdf (Accessed January 12, 2023).
[iv] Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo. “Brazilian Foreign Policy: From the Combined to the Unbalanced Axis (2003/2021).” https://www.scielo.br/j/rbpi/a/PksmBqv6mmZFkPDfxCgVDqm/?lang=en (Accessed January 11, 2023).
[v] Brazil Ministry of External Relations, Bureau of Diplomatic Relations. Brazilian Foreign Policy Handbook 2008. http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/454-Brazilian_Foreign_Policy_Handbook.pdf (Accessed January 12, 2023).
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] Maria Cândida Arrais de Miranda Mousinho. “Is Renewable Energy the Way Out for Brazil and India?” in Karin Costa Vazquez (ed.) Brazil-India Relations Beyond the 70 Years (Brasilia: Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019), p. 45, http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/1015-Brazil-India-relations-beyond-the-70-years.pdf (Accessed January 12, 2023).
[viii] John Kirton. “Brazil’s Contribution to G20 and Global Governance,” G20 Information Centre provide by G20 Research Group, University of Toronto, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/kirton-eneri-110518.html#top (Accessed January 10, 2023).
[ix] Ibid.
[x] Jair Bolsonaro. “The G20: Challenges and Recovery,” the Global Governance Project. https://www.globalgovernanceproject.org/the-g20-challenges-and-recovery/jair-bolsonaro/ (Accessed January 10, 2023).
[xi] Ibid.
[xii] Op.Cit 8 John Kirton.
[xiii] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “English Translation of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s remarks at the closing session of G20 Summit in Bali 16 Nov.2022,” https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/35890/English_Translation_of_Prime_Minister_Shri_Narendra_Modis_remarks_at_the_Closing_Session_of_G20_Summit_in_Bali, (Accessed on January 17, 2023)
[xiv] Monica Hirst. “An Overview of Brazilian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century.” https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Policy-Briefing-6.pdf (Accessed January 13, 2023).