Pakistan is at the cusp of myriad troubles. The most highlighted within the country are the political episodes taking place in context of Imran Khan’s repeated calls for rallies and his evasion of arrest facilitated by his supporters. Especially in Punjab, where provincial elections were earlier postponed until 8 October this year (though the new date is 14 May) the noise on the streets of Lahore in particular has been unmissable. Added to this political quagmire are Pakistan’s continuing economic woes. The delay in getting the next tranche of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans approved, something that Pakistan is in dire need of given the deteriorating economic situation, is negatively impacting the country. While the media channels are focusing on such issues, what is being overshadowed is a deeper analysis of the situation in northwest Pakistan.
Terrorist attacks in areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have increased manifold in the last few months. Particularly in Balochistan, resentment against the Government has also been visible in the form of various protests. What this indicates is the increased momentum of yet another insurgent movement in the making, at a time when Pakistan has troubles all around. Along with the volatile political situation in Punjab, therefore, what need a closer look are the gradual but problematic developments within Balochistan.
Two major points of reflection appear in this context. First, the violent activities emanating from Balochistan have added to the deteriorating security situation in the country. Second is the lack of the Government’s ability to address issues raised by protesters over various projects and other grievances in the province. Both these issues taken together have resulted in an increased scope for insurgency in Balochistan.
Rise of violence and Baloch insurgency
Violence in Pakistan is on the rise. Within forty-eight hours of the abrogation of the five-month long ceasefire between the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Pakistan Government in November 2022, there was a suicide bombing in Balochistan’s capital, Quetta.[i] Since then, many attacks have been carried out by the TTP across the country, largely targeting police and security forces in Pakistan. This issue of TTP is being discussed with the Taliban in Kabul, albeit without much gain.[ii] Instability at the border with Afghanistan is on a rise. So has terror activities been reported near the Iran-Pakistan border. For example, on April 1 this year, four Pakistani soldiers were killed in a reported attack from inside the Iran border in the Kech district in Balochistan.[iii] Yet, what is a major cause of instability in northwest Pakistan is the increasing belligerence of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) as well as the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF).
The BLA was formed in 2000 and has taken to violent means since the mid-2000s. While its leaders (from the Marri tribe) believe it to be part of a larger Baloch national movement, fighting against the Pakistani government for better share of resources and self-autonomy (sometime separation or independence from Pakistan) of the province, the BLA has been marked as a terror group by Pakistan, UK and US governments. What is alarming, is the rise of terror activities by the BLA in the recent past. As per the Global Terrorism Index, 233 deaths were recorded as a consequence of BLA terror activities in 2022, a nine-fold increase since 2021 with an estimate of 26 deaths.[iv] On December 25, 2022, the BLA coordinated five bomb attacks in different parts of the province which killed at least six Pakistani security personnel. With the Pakistani State under duress, the response to these attacks have been less than adequate. In turn, security forces and officials have come under increased attacks, giving more confidence to the BLA. Whether it be the killing of a ‘facilitator’ against the BLA in Turbat in January this year,[v] the IED (improvised explosive device) blasts in Kolhu that killed two Pakistani security personnel in February[vi] or the death of Brigadier Mustafa Kamal Barki, a high-ranking official of the Inter Sevices Intelligence (ISI) on March 21, 2023, during an encounter,[vii] the number of attacks has only risen.
The BLF, on the other hand, has been active and coalescing with the BLA to fight against the Pakistani government. BLF, a much older organization formed in 1964, with the objective of fighting for independence of Balochistan, was at the forefront of the Baloch insurgent movement in the 1970s. It re-emerged in the mid-2000s, determined to fight for the Baloch cause. The Baoch insurgency was heightened after the killing of the Baloch leader, Akbar Bugti, in 2006 and reached a peak in 2015.[viii] Together, along with factions of BLA and Baloch Republican Guard, they formed the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) in 2018. As the Baloch insurgency has grown again, Dr Allah Nizar Baluch, the leader of the BLF (as well as the Head of BRAS), is among the most-wanted in Pakistan today. In an interview in January this year, Baluch noted that the ultimate goal of the BLF is “to get rid of Pakistan’s forcible occupation and colonial rule”[ix]. Beyond the obvious, what the BLF resistance has done is that it has also slowed down the infrastructural developments taking place in Balochistan.
Protests and local resentment
One of the core issues of the Baloch movement has been the alienation of the local Baloch population at the hands of federal governments, in their share of resources within their own territory, a territory that is said to have been annexed by Pakistan in 1948 when the Khan of Kalat was pressurized to sign the accession agreement. The Punjabi led dominant ruling class of Pakistan have largely treated the Baloch insurgent movements in the past as the instigation of a handful of feudal ‘sardars’, though many governments have attempted to placate the movement by mainstreaming their leaders. Over phases in history, the Balochis have therefore demanded more power for themselves, ranging from greater autonomy to complete separation from Pakistan.
Area-wise, Balochistan is the largest of the four provinces in Pakistan. Politically however, because of its sparse population, it accounts for only 17 seats in the Nationally Assembly comprising a total of 342 seats. But, Balochistan is rich in its resources, such as gas, and is strategically crucial for Islamabad. In fact, Balochistan can be said to be a reason for the ‘all weathered friendship’ between China and Pakistan. The BLF has strongly opposed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Chinese involvement in the region in the last few years. When the Belt and Road Initiative was announced, CPEC was touted as a game-changer for Pakistan. Though both sides quote that as much as USD 25 billion has been invested into CPEC,[x] it has not fructified into any tangible benefit for Pakistan as was expected. In fact, this has heightened the sense of alienation within Balochistan, especially in Gwadar.
In 2022, the Haq do Tehreek (HDT) movement led to a massive 50-day sit-in protest at the port and international airport at Gwadar. Most of the demands pertained to protecting fishing rights of the Baloch people, decreasing check-posts in the city, putting an end to deep sea illegal trawling and facilitating better trade at the Pakistan-Iran border. Though some concessions were given earlier in 2021, dissatisfaction amongst the locals have remained. By December 2022, the Government banned these protests and arrested the leader of Gwadar protest movement in January this year. The problem is that, while the former Imran Khan Government looked at the CPEC as a PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) vehicle to reach China, the current Government is tied up with more immediate political and economic issues in Islamabad and Punjab. For instance, Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif has been unable to fulfil his promises in Balochistan and has been blamed of not releasing the provinces’ share of finances amidst economic crisis.[xi] This has only vindicated the reasons for Balochi resentment towards the center. In February 2023, Balochistan’s Finance Minister, Zmarak Achakzai, is reported to have threatened the federal Government, stating that Balochistan would cut off supply from the Sui gas field in the province, an important source of gas for the country.[xii] Certainly, the previous history of suppression of movements and protests in Balochistan — abduction of people, enforced disappearance, torture in captivity and media blackout in the province — have not helped to improve the situation in Balochistan.
Conclusion
Balochistan has become a hot-bed of insurgent activities, growing protests and site of violent attacks — ingredients that add to make Pakistan a boiling pot. It may be concluded that focusing on Balochistan has become very crucial for three reasons, as given below.
Firstly, in context of internal developments, the BLA and BLF, along with other Baloch groups, have combined strengths in the recent months to give a message to the Pakistani Government in Islamabad as well as the military establishment in Rawalpindi. Additionally, the rise of the TTP has dovetailed well with the rise of the Baloch insurgency, forming a combined force against the center, although there does not exist any formal alliance between the two.
Secondly, in context of external developments, as noted above, clashes at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have increased, while Iran’s border with Balochistan has also witnessed terror activities. It is to be noted that crackdown on anti-regime protestors in Shistan and Balochistan region of Iran has escalated since September last year. On 30 September government forces in Iran violently suppressed rallies that killed and injured more than 300 people in Zahedan, an event that has been termed as the Zahedan massacre or Bloody Friday. This has added to fuel the overall Baluch movement in the region.
Thirdly, while the political drama in Punjab and economic stresses in the country are taking a larger share of attention within Pakistan, this has resulted in a gap in understanding the causes of increasing instability in the entire northwestern region of Pakistan, and therefore, in finding a robust solution to the Balochistan conundrum. There appears to be no clear policy on Balochistan. Given the PML-N’s close association with China and its failure to respond to the local problems in the last few months, not much can be expected. At a time, especially as Pakistan is repeatedly looking at China for economic assistance, any troubles caused, particularly by the BLF, in context of the already lagging CPEC projects or attack on Chinese nationals, as has happened in the past, will further tighten the noose on Islamabad’s neck.
It is thus crucial to draw immediate attention to Balochistan, as much as it is important to tackle the political and economic problems in other parts of a troubled Pakistan.
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*Dr Shrabana Barua is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Gul Yousafzai, Suicide bomber attacks Pakistan police guarding polio vaccination team, kills four, Reuters, 30 November 2023, URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/blast-targeting-police-patrol-injures-over-20-pakistan-official-2022-11-30/. [accessed on 3.4.23]
[ii] Anwesha Ghose, High-level Pakistani delegation meets Afghan Taliban to discuss security concerns, ICWA, 9 March 2023, URL: /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9157&lid=5944. [accessed on 3.4.23]
[iii] Inter Services Public Relations, On 1 April 2023, a group of Terrorists operating from Iranian side attacked a routine border patrol of Pakistani security forces operating along Pakistan-Iran Border in Jalgai Sector, District Kech. URL: https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail?id=6507. [accessed on 5.4.23]
[iv]Global Terrorism Index 2023. Institute for Economic and Peace. URL: https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-270323.pdf. [accesed on 28.3.23]
[v] ANI, Pakistan: Balochistan Liberation Army attacks security forces in Turbat, Panjgoor, 21 January 2023, URL: https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/pakistan-balochistan-liberation-army-attacks-security-forces-in-turbat-panjgoor20230121221003/. [accessed on 5.4.23]
[vi] ANI, Pakistan: Two security personnel killed in blast in Balochistan's Kohlu, 10 February 2023, URL: https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/pakistan-two-security-personnel-killed-in-blast-in-balochistans-kohlu20230210171803/. [accessed on 5.4.23]
[vii] Inter Services Public Relations, On 21 March 2023, during an encounter with the hard core terrorists in general area Angoor Adda, South Waziristan, intense fire was exchanged. URL: https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail?id=6500. [accessed on 5.4.23]
[viii]Rising Organized Political Violence in Balochistan: A Resurgence of Baloch Separatism, ACLED, 4 September 2020, URL: https://acleddata.com/2020/09/04/rising-organized-political-violence-in-balochistan-a-resurgence-of-baloch-separatism/. [accesed on 28.3.23]
[ix]Interview quoted in India Defence Review, by Manish Rai, 7 January, 2022, URL: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/interviews/ending-pakistans-forcible-occupation-is-the-ultimate-goal-balochistan-liberation-front-blf/ [accesed on 3.4.23]
[x]Andrew Small, CPEC: A Status Check, Indian Express, 7 November 2022, URL: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-a-status-check-8246061/ . [accessed on 28.3.23]
[xi] Rahul Kumar, Baloch politicians threaten to cut-off gas supply as friction with Islamabad rises, India Narrative, 17 February 2023, URL: https://www.indianarrative.com/world-news/baloch-politicians-threaten-to-cut-off-gas-supply-as-friction-with-islamabad-rises-109301.html. [accessed on 28.3.23]
[xii] Ibid.