The 30th Ministerial Council of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was held in Skopje, North Macedonia, on 30 November 2023. The meeting was crucial for two reasons. First, the OSCE still remains the largest and most inclusive security organization in Europe, which “embraces” States from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”. Therefore, any development within the organization holds relevance for the much-debated European Security architecture in the backdrop of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Second, Russia was able to participate in the Council after North Macedonia, which is the current OSCE Chair, opened its airspace for Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to travel despite sanctions imposed on him since February 2022.
The three Baltic States– Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and Ukraine, did not attend the meeting in Skopje. In a joint statement, the Baltics noted that they “deeply regret the decision enabling the personal participation of Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov at the 30th Session of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Skopje” and added that “Russia has, through its unlawful and atrocious actions, proved time and again that it is not a security partner to Europe. In fact, today Europe needs security from and against Russia, rather than together with it”.[i] Russia (along with Belarus), on the other side, had vetoed the Chairmanship application of Estonia as the next OSCE Chair. Ultimately, Malta ( which is part of the European Union but not North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was announced as the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for 2024.[ii]
As the war in Ukraine continues, OSCE Ministerial Council and the controversies surrounding it have brought to the fore several questions with respect to the future trajectory of OSCE in shaping the European security architecture. This brief focuses on the roots and structure of the OSCE and delves into the constraints it faces in decision-making.
Origins and Structure of the OSCE
The OSCE was initially set up during the Cold War period as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, in1975. It was conceived to facilitate cooperation between the Soviet-led Eastern bloc and the West by serving as “a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between the two”. During the Budapest Summit of 5-6 December 1994, it was acknowledged that the CSCE was no longer simply a Conference, and its name was revised to be as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was eventually renamed as the OSCE in 1995. This gave the organization “a new political impetus, while also reflecting its institutional development since the end of the Cold War”.[iii] The organization stood out in the immediate post–Cold War period owing to its diverse membership, which was aimed towards complementing other institutions and strengthening “the overall cohesion of the highly differentiated European institutional architecture”.[iv]
At present, the OSCE includes 57 states from Europe, Central Asia, and North America, which are referred to as “participating” rather than “member” states.[v] The OSCE is premised on a broad vision of “comprehensive security” that encompasses economic, military as well as human rights related issues. In this sense, it caters to both traditional “hard” and “soft” security issues.
Limitations of the OSCE
Despite its ambitious template which includes ensuring cooperation between the West and Russia, the OSCE has failed to become the fundamental pillar of peace and security as it was envisaged to be in the 1990s. This is because divisions have widened between the European Union and Russia particularly since the former’s eastward enlargement since 2004. These divisions wirh Russia have exacerbated further owing to NATO’s expansion to the east around the same period.
The major constraint that the OSCE faces is that it lacks the legal mechanisms and the resources that could make it a platform for ensuring European security. Decisions are taken by consensus due to which disagreements between participating countries have impeded decision-making process and reduced its efficiency. This is exacerbated by the fact that the East-West and North-South divide has intensified within Europe with respect to dealing with various security issues, especially in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. These divisions have widened further since the beginning of Ukraine war in February 2022.
As a result of these differences among member states, the OSCE has proved to be inefficient in the resolution of two major conflicts- Nagarno Karabakh region and Ukraine. The Minsk Group (Minsk process) was created in the 1990s to “find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” and was chaired by the United States, Russia and France. However, despite being functional for three decades, it proved to be ineffective in reaching any breakthrough between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The widening divisions among the chairs of Minsk Process also contributed towards its inefficiency with spearheading negotiations.[vi] The Minsk process for Nagarno Karabakh stalled altogether after the beginning of war in Ukraine in 2022.
Similarly, although OSCE played an active role in the beginning of first wave of Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2014, it was unable to find a lasting resolution to the crisis in the long run. The OSCE acted promptly in the formation of “Trilateral Contact Group”, which included the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine in 2014. It worked in tandem with the members of the Normandy format (Germany, Russia, France) to spearhead consultations which resulted in Minsk Protocols (September 2014 and February 2015), which outlined the conditions for peace in Ukraine.[vii] In contrast, the OSCE has been virtually absent in the latest wave of Russia-Ukraine crisis since February 2022 due to greater isolation between the West and Russia.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the limitations, OSCE’s main advantage is that it the only European body that includes participation from both sides of the Ukraine conflict. This makes it is the only “regional organization” that can act as a negotiating bridge between Russia, Ukraine as well as the West. As discussed in the brief, the OSCE played a crucial role in the initial stage of Ukraine crisis in 2014 where it acted as a platform for the negotiation of peace agreements. Even though these agreements failed later, the involvement of OSCE as a platform for negotiations was acceptable to all stakeholders from the West as well as Russia.
Given the ongoing stalemate in the war in Ukraine, the immediate stakeholders of European security need to revisit OSCE as platform to initiate dialogue between Ukraine and Russia. With Malta as OSCE chair in 2024, there is scope for facilitating negotiations as the country has not taken sides in the ongoing crisis.
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*Dr. Himani Pant, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal
Endnotes
[i]MFA Estonia, “Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,”
28November2023,https://vm.ee/en/news/joint-statement-foreign-ministers-estonia-latvia-and-lithuania, Accessed on 30 November 2023.
[ii] OSCE, OSCE Chairman-in-Office Osmani announces Malta as 2024 Chairpersonship, extension of senior officials following 30th Ministerial Council, https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/559671
[iii] CVCE, “Budapest Summit Declaration,” 6 December 1994, https://www. cvce.eu/content/ publication/2003/2/21/3b5d8bc6-b22f-49ea-9c88-f0d85d0a4459/publishable_en.pdf, Accessed on 12 December 2023.
[iv] Stefan Lehne, “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015,http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12952, Accessed on 5 December 2023.
[v] https://www.osce.org/participating-states
[vi]CSIS, Understanding the Normandy Format and Its Relation to the Current Standoff with Russia, OSCE Minsk Group, https://www.osce.org/mg, Accessed on 13 December 2023
[vii] https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-normandy-format-and-its-relation-current-standoff-russia