While discussing the crisis in West Asia, the Syrian Refugee crisis and the IS continue to garner front-page headlines and ample television coverage. There is another travesty unfolding in the region: Yemen. The situation in Yemen, which has turned into a humanitarian crisis, warrants a study from several angles. The regional political divide between two groups, each claiming to be the legitimate government- one led by the Houthis (also known as Ansar Allah) and the other led by President Hadi; the religious dissection between the Shiites and the Sunnis that not only has local, but also regional dimensions with Saudi-Iran tensions; the geo-strategic impact that Yemen has as an important point on the global sea trade; the UN’s role to contain the humanitarian crisis that is unfolding; and the role that global powers (such as the US and the UK) have in the crisis. Yemen is also a case which reminds one of just how important is the strategic partnership between the US and Saudi Arabia.
Why is Yemen important?
Despite the fact that Yemen is not a ‘world-shaking’ oil producer, the country is strategically located and hence is interesting from the geo-political perspective. Along with a long porous border with Saudi Arabia, Yemen has ports (such as Aden) that are at the crossroads of some of the world’s busiest sea lanes. Yemen also overlooks the Bab el Mandeb Strait: a maritime chokepoint at the tip of the Persian Gulf. Thus, instability in Yemen opens up the possibility of pirates using its long and sparsely populated coastline to make shipping in the region even more vulnerable.1
With growing instability, both the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (IS) have extended their reach and this is a problem for Yemen’s neighbours, Saudi Arabia and Oman with whom it shares borders. Thus, for both Saudi Arabia and Oman, the need of the hour is a stable neighbour.
Source: Google2
Another reason why Yemen should become stable is the immigration crisis. Though Yemen is a small country, it has one of the highest population growth rates in the world. With the Civil War going on, petroleum production and exports have declined, thereby crippling the already deteriorated economy. This has pushed the Yemeni people to move into other Arab countries. Saudi Arabia and Oman face a major threat from illegal immigration and human smuggling across the borders. But another important fact is that the immigration problem that these countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Oman, face are not just the Yemeni citizens, but also other illegal immigrants and extremists from unstable countries like Somalia and Ethiopia.3 Add to this the fact that Yemen neither has a national legislation regarding refugees nor a mechanism for determining refugee status. The scale and intensity of the conflict has left thousands of migrants undocumented, trapped and deprived of basic resources and attention. All these factors have encouraged smuggling and human trafficking gangs to operate with impunity in Yemen.4
Yemen is also a growing reminder of how important is the US strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia. The US needs Saudi Arabia as a tactical partner to maintain regional stability so that the US can concentrate on its war against the IS. But at the same time, there are accusations that the bombings by Saudi Arabia in Yemen have caused human suffering; the airstrikes from both the sides have been criticized as adding to the humanitarian crisis, especially after the bombing of the MSF hospital in Taiz. The Houthis have alleged that nearly 6000 people (and half of them, civilians) have been killed since the Saudi coalition entered the conflict. According to the Houthi forces, Saudi Arabia entered the conflict only to control what the Saudis saw as growing Iranian influence in the Arabian Peninsula region.5 It must be pointed out that while he took note of the military operation al-Hazm Storm, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon asked the regional nation-states to “refrain from any action that undermine the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen.”6
Another factor about the crisis in Yemen is that apart from the UN, the international powers such as the US, Russia and the UK seem hesitant to involve themselves (unlike in Syria). Despite the humanitarian crisis and uncontrolled spread of violent jihadist groups (such as the al-Qaeda’s Yemeni Franchise and the Islamic State), these countries harbour reservations regarding the conflict’s necessity, duration and consequences. These qualms must change, especially with the new UN report coming out that much of the humanitarian crisis that Yemen faces is due to ‘indiscriminate bombing and shelling by the parties’7 involved in the conflict; this means that both the sides to the crisis are to be blamed for destroying livelihoods, homes, communities and essential civilian infrastructure while killing and maiming civilians.
All these reasons warrant a look into the crisis that Yemen is facing. However, the Yemeni crisis has various angles to it and each of them has to be tackled bearing in mind the other factors as well.
The Various Shades of the Conflict:
As a part of the Arab Spring in 2011, Yemen too had an ‘uprising’ against the regime of the then President Ali Abdullah Saleh (January 2011). After much fiddling, on 23rd November 2011, Saleh agreed to leave office under the terms of the ‘transition agreement’ brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), otherwise called the GCC Initiative. The Presidency powers were transferred (in exchange for immunity from criminal prosecution) to Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who was the Vice President. In March 2012, a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was launched. The NDC was intended as a transitional dialogue process to help in the Yemeni crisis reconciliation efforts. However, the assassination of two Houthi representatives within the NDC led to the eruption of hostilities between the Houthi tribe and the government elements. This caused the NDC to end by January 2014.
In the meantime, Saleh took advantage of popular dissatisfaction with the Hadi government and tacitly allied himself with the Houthis against their common enemies to stage a political comeback through his party, the General People’s Congress (GPC). The Houthis advanced towards Sana’a, the seat of the government and captured it. Targeted sanctions were imposed by the Yemen Sanctions Committee of the UN8 against the former President Saleh and two Houthi military commanders. Despite the UN brokered agreement to get the political and civil transition back on track, the confrontation accelerated as the Houthis continued to consolidate and expand their hold on power and territory. By January 2015, President Hadi, his Prime Minister and the Cabinet had to resign. The Houthis, under Abdel Malik al-Houthi, declared their control over the Yemeni government. According to him, the Houthis had captured power through a ‘glorious revolution’; contrary to this, the international and regional community called it a ‘coup d’état’ because President Hadi was and is still seen by the UN and the GCC as Yemen’s legitimate authority.
The Houthi movement traces its roots to a revivalist movement that emerged in Yemen to promote Zayid (Shia) beliefs and culture. This was a response to the growing Sunni or Salafi influence in the northern part of Yemen. Around forty-five percent of Yemen’s population is Shia and they are concentrated in the North of Yemen, mainly around Sana’a9. Along with these two, the al-Islah, an Islamist Party, also grew. Now, the al-Islah, or the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, is the largest Islamist party in Yemen. Predominantly Sunni, it has served as both the official opposition and an ally of the government.
Though the Houthi movement played no part in the GCC Initiative, it did participate in the NDC. This strengthened its political appeal beyond its traditional base. However, the NDC’s main recommendation that Yemen should be divided into six federal regions10 was opposed by the Houthis, fearing that it would diminish their territorial powerbase.
Added to this domestic standoff, there have been accusations by the Saudi government that the Houthis are supported by Iran. Though the Houthis come from a different Shia sect that is dominant in Iran, such accusations do feed into the divisive and sectarian rhetoric. Thus, not only is the conflict in Yemen taking on a religious turn, but it also seems to resemble a proxy war being fought between the world’s dominant Sunni nation (Saudi Arabia) and its Shia adversary (Iran).
There has also been a dangerous expansion of extremist groups in Yemen. Taking advantage of the security vacuum caused by the Houthi-Hadi conflict are groups such as the AQAP and the IS. They have used the conflict to forge resentment towards the Shia Houthis amongst Yemen’s majority (more than fifty-five percent) Sunni population.11 AQAP has also used the North-South divide to fuel sectarianism, while the IS launched a number of suicide attacks specifically targeting Houthi Shia mosques. In short, the al-Qaeda and the IS movement, both appear determined to fight the Houthis and take advantage of the state’s collapse to claim territory.
The Houthi-Hadi divide, though the most explosive, is not the only conflict in the region. The South, which was an independent state prior to its 1990 union with the North, has started agitations again.
This South versus North conflict is not new. ‘North’ Yemen gained its independence after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and by 1962 the Yemen Arab Republic was established. Within another five years, the People’s Republic of Yemen (in the South) was formed which again was renamed as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen when the Marxists came to power in 1969. Both the Yemens faced border clashes in 1972 which ended with a ceasefire brokered by the Arab League. The ceasefire did not last long. Fresh fighting between the North and South again erupted in 1979 by the end of which efforts at unification were renewed. In May 1990, both the Yemens united as the Republic of Yemen with Ali Abdullah Saleh as the President. But the tension between these two states endured with repeated civil wars in 1994, 1997 and 2003.
The Southern Movement, also called al-Hiraq, is basically a loosely coordinated coalition of seven different groups. They are united in their opposition to the central government and in demanding equal opportunities for the people in the South.
Nevertheless, each of the parties of the Southern Movement tries to impose its own political agenda. Herein lies their disunity and hence the reason why they cannot force themselves upon the political powers that sit in the North.
The other main supporters of Hadi are the Muslim Brotherhood linked al-Islah Party and the civil society leaders.12 However, the people of the Southern Movement do not trust the Northern leadership of the al-Islah Party in particular because of the latter’s role in the War of 1994. They are also suspicious of Hadi, a southerner who supports continued unity with the North. Thus, these groups have mutual animosity, which would be a hindrance in fighting the Houthis and Saleh jointly.
Tensions are also brewing between the alliance of the Houthis and the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Both want to be the one in power willing to compromise on power-sharing as little as possible.
The internal power struggle between the various factions in Yemen was eclipsed and reshaped when Saudi Arabia decided to militarily intervene in March 2015 through the GCC coalition backed Operation Al-Hazm Storm. The operation’s basic aim, primarily through air strikes, was to “protect Yemen and its people from the continuing aggressions by the Houthis.”13 While Saudi Arabia and Egypt provided the boots on the ground, the United States announced that it would assist with intelligence, targeting and logistics. This Saudi-led military intervention aimed to reinstate the ousted government of Mansour Hadi. Since Saudi Arabia views the Houthis as a part of expanding Iranian influence in the region, the Yemen struggle added fuel to the Sunni-Shia conflict angle and is seen as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
However, after a year of Operation Al-Hazm Storm, on 17th March 2016, Saudi Arabia has stated that it would be scaling down on its operations in Yemen, while continuing to provide ‘air support’. The coalition’s primary task now would be to help build the Yemeni army, for which ‘small’ teams of coalition troops would remain.14
Source: Google15
The Way Forward:
An important step in the peace-building process would be a comprehensive settlement built on the general framework of confidence-building measures, such as the release of all political detainees; but more importantly, lifting of all obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all the affected regions. Other acts like cutting of electricity and water supplies, and attacks against hospitals and ambulances must stop.
An important step forward is the establishment of the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which was intended to expedite legitimate commercial imports of commodities such as food, fuel and medicines. The Mechanism has increased the import of fuel and food through the Yemeni ports.16
These steps should be accompanied by resumption of economic life of Yemen, which in turn calls for an end to the black-market trade by the Houthi warlords; the black-market not only of edible goods and aid, but also of illicit small arms and light weapons.17
The recruitment of children too must end and those who were forcibly taken on must be released from their ranks. Reintegration into their communities will be a hard task for the powers that be, but it is not one that should be shirked.
The process of consultation that was supposed to take place in January this year seems to have been put on hold indefinitely. It should not be so. The conflicting parties must realize that the failure of political stability and nation-state means a fertile ground for non-state institutions like terrorist organizations (namely al-Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate and the IS) to take root, and then no one gains.
A long term strategy is also needed to tackle the conflict of South and North Yemen. Since the conflict in South Yemen has political and socio-economic roots, an attempt has to be made for economic and financial improvement of their situation. Political reform, greater transparency and an end to corruption are the necessary steps, but these are easier said than done.
Yemen’s political transition process will need the participation of all the stakeholders and one of the ways in which this process can be carried out is in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Initiative, its implementation mechanism and the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference. The deadlock that the GCC Initiative acknowledged in 2011 still persists today and so does the hardship of the Yemeni people. Hence, a return to the implementation of the GCC Initiative is very important. This step includes drafting a new constitution and holding timely general elections. The people of Yemen and, in fact, the Houthis should understand that no constitution in the world is perfect. The new constitutions do have an advantage of learning from the shortcomings of the older ones and every constitution can evolve according to the times. Thus, blatantly opposing a constitution is not fair play. Nor is the forcible capture of government and security institutions.
Another fact to remember is that Saudi Arabia has taken a more than keen interest in the crisis in Yemen. However, even though the Saudi-led coalition claims that the primary aim is to see the restoration of internationally recognized President Hadi’s government, Saudi Arabia must also make sure that there are no civilian casualties. This is a tough task given the number of civilians that have become victims to the bombings.18 A stable Yemen works in regional interest, and yet, there are clear limits to what the GCC states can or wish to do. While they can provide the platform for discussions (like Saudi Arabia just did), it looks like only the international powers might be able to convince both the sides to meet at a common table (like Switzerland did19). Still, international powers like the US and the EU seem to have a rather hesitant attitude towards the Yemeni situation. This must change because though the UN called upon all the concerned parties to engage in dialogue and to take urgent actions to address legitimate grievances, what it lacks is a strategy to translate the call into action.
Nevertheless, the way forward seems to include an open dialogue between the parties involved. This has been done but as was seen, maintaining the peace in Yemen has been more difficult than the initial process of peace-making. For example, the initial round of attempts at peace-making through the National Dialogue Conference and the GCC Initiative could be described as successful till the assassination of Houthi representatives within the NDC in January 2014. Another attempt for peace was made in Switzerland in December 2015, which resulted in ‘constructive talks’ between the Yemeni Government and its military and political opponents. The dialogue provided a firm foundation for resuming talks in the future and the basis for a ‘renewed and strengthened’ cessation of hostilities.20 However, in February 2016, this peace-making phase underwent a setback with the battles over the Fardhat Nihm, a strategic military base close to Sana’a. The Houthis had also launched Scud missiles into Saudi, thus further escalating the tensions.21
Hence, one of the most important ways forward is for all parties to lay down their arms and each form a political front to represent their view. Everyone must remember that in conflicts such as this, the idea of a so-called ‘winner’, no longer has any meaning because everyone is losing and the biggest victims are the innocent civilian population.
Conclusion:
The Yemeni conflict, in brief, pitted the Houthi rebels and the military units allied with ex-President Saleh against a diverse mix of opponents, loosely headed by President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Mansour Hadi is backed by a Saudi coalition, in turn supported by the US, UK and France. Thus, the political limbo in Yemen is the situation where the Houthis claim a Government headed by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, which is not recognized by the UN, US and the GCC countries. With the GCC Coalition military Operation Al-Hazm Storm (in March 2015), Yemen further descended into its Civil War; there still seems to be no end in sight.
Among the many battles raging in the West Asian region, the Yemen war is also important. Over 2700 civilians22 have been killed mainly from airstrikes from both sides while an even larger number has been displaced. The acute humanitarian crisis has triggered what could soon turn into famine and refugee flows; this will further destabilize the region. International pressure has to become more intense. Regional actors, in particular Saudi Arabia, seem to be stuck in a war that was easy to launch, but much more difficult to end. The Houthi bloc and Hadi government appear willing to talk, but do not want to commit themselves to the prerequisites of peace such as de-escalation, reconciliation and compromise.
Ending the war will require negotiations that include security arrangements, such as military withdrawal from the cities and a return to the political process pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 2216 and the GCC Initiative. This should also include interim settlement of transnational leadership or, in other words, the regional actors must immediately cease military action and help domestic parties agree on a broadly acceptable President or Presidential Council. It is certain that reaching such negotiations will take time, but time is a luxury the people of Yemen do not have. Thus, the immediate priority should be to secure an agreement on delivering humanitarian aid and commercial goods to the war-torn besieged areas.
There seems to be a step forward with the scaling back of Saudi Arabian and the coalition troops with the recently released statement of Brigadier General Ahmed al-Asseri stating that ‘the major fighting in Yemen is nearing an end ... (and) the next phase is a stage of restoring stability and reconstructing the country’.23 In the end, restoration of peace in Yemen would be beneficial for the region and would also create an understanding about resolving the other ongoing crises in West Asia.
***
* The Author is a Research Intern at Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The Views expressed are that of the Researcher and not of the Council.
Endnotes:
1These sea lanes are already prowled by Somali pirates and the Coast Guard of Yemen has been part of international efforts to protect shipping in the region.
2https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiPnr_IksrLAhVDE5QKHaeUDacQjRwIBw&url=https%3A%2F%2Fsyrianfreepress.wordpress.com%2F2016%2F02%2F21%2Falmandeb-socotra%2F&psig=AFQjCNHXVH-xampdzcNDlTywxXhYEzvQKw&ust=1458386836541858, Accessed on 28/01/2016.
3 “UN refugee agency warns over perilous Horn of Africa sea crossings” (2016)
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53047#.VqnChtJ97cs, Accessed on 28/01/2016.
4 “Situation of Human Rights in Yemen: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights” (2015), p14, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/30/31, Accessed on 27/01/2016
5 “Saudi-led air strike targets Yemen hospital: Saba news agency” (2016)
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0UP1DT20160111, Accessed on 28/01/2016.
6 “Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Yemen” (2015)
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8493, Accessed on 27/01/2016.
7 “Statement of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O’Brien” to the Security Council on Yemen, 16 February 2016, file:///E:/RI/yemen/2a_hrc_30_31.pdf, Accessed on 19/02/2016.
8 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/yemen.php, Accessed on 27/01/2016.
9 The World Factbook, US Central Intelligence Agency,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html, Accessed on 28/01/2016.
10 Charles Schmitz (2014), MEI Policy Paper 2014-1: Yemen’s National Dialogue http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Charles%20Schmitz%20Policy%20Paper.pdf, Accessed on 15/02/2016.
11 The World Factbook, US Central Intelligence Agency,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html, Accessed on 28/01/2016.
12 Civil society leaders are those who believed in the promise of the Rule of Law and the implementation of the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference.
13 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015)
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2216(2015), Accessed on 27/01/2016.
14 “Major Fighting in Yemen coming to an end: Saudi coalition spokesman” (2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0WK0TR, Accessed on 18/03/2016.
15 http://libertyunyielding.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Yemen-coalition-map-2.jpg, Accessed on 27/01/2016.
16 “Statement of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O’Brien” to the Security Council on Yemen, 3 March 2016, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/USG%20OBrien%20to%20SecCo%203Mar2016.pdf, Accessed on 18/03/2016.
17 The Saudi imposed blockade on Yemen seems to have had only a limited effect. The blockade seems not to have prevented Saleh and the Houthis from acquiring fuel and military supplies.
18 “The Situation in the Middle East”: United Nations Security Council Meetings Record S/PV.7622 (2016), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7622.pdf, Accessed on 18/03/2016.
19 “The Situation in the Middle East”: United Nations Security Council Meetings Record S/PV.7596 (2015), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7596.pdf, Accessed on 28/01/2016.
20 “The Situation in the Middle East”: United Nations Security Council Meetings Record S/PV.7622 (2016), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7622.pdf, Accessed on 18/03/2016.
21 “Yemen: Is Peace Possible?”: International Crisis Group Report 9 February 2016 (2016), p4, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Yemen/167-yemen-is-peace-possible, Accessed on 16/02/2016.
22 “The Situation in the Middle East”: United Nations Security Council Meetings Record S/PV.7622 (2016), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7596.pdf, Accessed on 18/03/2016.
23 “Major Fighting in Yemen coming to an end: Saudi coalition spokesman” (2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0WK0TR, Accessed on 18/03/2016.