Indian Council of World Affairs

The South Pacific region has been undergoing many significant developments in recent times and is also experiencing increasing attention and engagement from major global powers. On 15 January 2024, the Government of Republic of Nauru announced its decision to severe “diplomatic relations” with Taiwan, saying that in the “best interest of the country and people”, country will be “moving to the one-China policy”.[1] Nauru is third island country in recent years to do so, after Solomon Islands and Kiribati announced similar decisions in 2019. Earlier, an important development in November 2023 was the 52nd Summit meeting of the Pacific Regional Forum (PIF), concluded in Cook Islands. A major development on the sidelines of the Summit was the Treaty signed between Australia and Tuvalu called the ‘Falepili Union Treaty’. The Treaty marks a crucial step in enhancing Australia’s ties with its neighboring small island country, in the light of recent changes in geopolitics of the region, especially China’s increasing clout and US-China contestations. All these developments need to be analysed in the background of significance of the South Pacific region in the larger geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. 

South Pacific Region: A Brief Background 

The South Pacific region, which serves as “the strategic front line between Asia and the Americas”[2], consists of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), which are part of the three major groups of islands: Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia;[3] scattered in the South-West Pacific Ocean. These are certainly not a uniform group of countries, having diverse set of ethnic groupings, culture, languages, economy, political system and various other differences. Five island countries in the region are in Free Association with the larger nations – which entail that, their defence and foreign policies are managed by the larger nations, while others are sovereign nations. Niue and Cook Islands are in Free Association with New Zealand, and Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, with the US.[4] In many of the PICs, a democratic style of government co-exists along with traditional social systems. 

Much of the significance of the PICs lays in their resource rich Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). For example Kiribati, one of the smallest island countries, alone has 3.5 million sq. km, of an EEZ, which is more than that of India’s EEZ and just a little less than that of Chile’s.[5] Then there is Nauru, an island with an area of just 21 sq km, it has an EEZ of 320,000 sq km which is more than that of Thailand’s EEZ. These remotely located islands are characterised by small populations, with the total population of the region estimated at approximately 6.6 million,[6] high costs of telecommunications and transportation, poor infrastructure, long distances from markets, a heavy reliance on imports and increasing exposure to climate change. Economies of many of the PICs rely on a single or just a few commodities. Major sectors of economies largely include agriculture, tourism, fisheries, sugar, livestock farming and mining in certain cases. Given their geography, over 80 percent of populations in the PICs live within 1.5 km of the Ocean. Therefore, climate change is in real sense an existential challenge for them. At the 52nd PIF Summit, the leaders noted that the climate change and related disasters have far-reaching impacts on human security and mobility in the island region. On an average, more than 50,000 people displaced every year due to climate and disaster related events in the Pacific. 

Table No.1 PIF members
Source: PIF Website

52nd PIF Summit: Why Is It Significant? 

The PIF is a multilateral platform, originally formed in 1971, as the South Pacific Forum (SPF) and renamed as the PIF in 1999; it is based on the ‘sense of common identity and purpose’.[7] It has 18 members[8] which include Australia, New Zealand, fourteen PICs and two French overseas territories of French Polynesia and New Caledonia. The Forum has 21 dialogue partners, India being one of them along with China, South Korea, Japan, France, Germany, EU, US, UK etc. The Forum provides the remotely located small island countries of the region an opportunity to be heard and to attract the attention of the international community. The combined EEZs of the PIF members cover more than 10 percent of the world’s ocean surface area. The Forum members are a heterogeneous group of countries with diverse ethnicities, culture, languages, economies, and political systems.[9] Leaders’ level summits are held annually which has brought the Pacific's leaders together regularly for more than 50 years now, to discuss their shared challenges and regional solutions. 

The 52nd PIF Meeting was held in Cook Islands from 6 to 10 November 2023, chaired by the Prime Minister of Cook Islands, Mark Brown. The theme of the meeting was “Our Voices, Our Choices and Our Pacific Way: Promote, Partner and Prosper”. The meeting was attended by the Forum members, dialogue partners, observers, civil society representatives. The member countries were represented by the Heads of State, Government, and Territories, except for New Zealand, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Vanuatu, and Solomon Islands, which were represented at the Ministerial Level. In New Zealand, the centre-right National Party, led by Christopher Luxon had just won the election held in October 2023, results of which were announced on 3 November 2023. The PM elect at that time was involved in the process of forming the government and he could not attend the PIF meeting. Instead, it was attended by National's Foreign Affairs spokesperson Gerry Brownlee, who was accompanied by outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Carmel Sepuloni.[10] From Solomon Islands, which have been closely pursued by China recently, Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare missed the Summit, as the government was busy with the arrangements of the Pacific Games that the country hosted few days after the Summit. Besides, in case of PNG and Vanuatu, no clear reasons were given as to why the meeting was not attended by the Heads of State/Government. 

The 52nd PIF Leaders’ Summit is important; firstly, because of late some members had been considering leaving the organization for one reason or another. In July 2022, just before the 51st PIF Summit meeting, Kiribati had announced its intention to withdraw from the Forum. This crisis goes back to 2021, when five Micronesian members of the PIF (Nauru, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau) had announced that they have decided to leave the Forum over the issue of appointment of the new Secretary General of the PIF (Henry Puna, PM of Cook Islands from Polynesia region). After much deliberation, members of the Forum had managed to reach on a crucial deal, the Suva Agreement, in June 2022, to prevent the PIF from breaking up. But later, Kiribati’s announcement of withdrawal came as a setback to the efforts made over a year, to mend the rift among the Member Countries. This divide in the organisation had also brought to the fore, an implicit tension between the North and the South within the Forum.[11] There is a feeling that the group is dominated by the South, especially bigger players including Australia, New Zealand and Fiji.[12] Micronesian nations feel that Canberra and Wellington want to preserve their influence in the region. In January 2023, Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka, who was the then Chair of the PIF, visited Kiribati, where he set out to convince the government of Kiribati to rejoin the Forum, later the Kiribati President Taneti Maamau announced that his government intended to return to the PIF.[13] So, the 52nd Summit is significant, as finally it was held after resolving all the issues, with participation of all the members of the Forum. 

Secondly, the Summit of 2023 is important in the background of geopolitical manoeuvring and great power contestations in the region which can have long-term consequences, China’s bolstering diplomatic and economic footprints, then growing strategic competition between the US and China and regional countries pursuing proactive approach to deepen their engagement with the island nations. In such a situation, the PIF being the only major region-wide platform, its role is significant for small island countries.

Figure 1:
Source: United Nations Statistical Division

At the 52nd Summit, leaders reaffirmed their collective commitment to 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, as the region’s long-term strategic policy document.[14] The PIF also adopted Phase 1 of an implementation plan, titled 2050 Strategy Implementation Plan: 2023-2030, which calls for collective action and to deepen and strengthen regionalism, peace and security, working on climate change and disaster, people centric development, technology connectivity, partnerships and cooperation etc.[15]

Leaders at the Summit also recognised that the countries in the region are largely dependent on aid, and called on all development partners to provide substantially greater levels of climate finance, capacity and technology to accelerate decarbonisation in the region.[16]


The Communiqué issued after the Summit also mentioned that “leaders noted the update provided by Australia and welcomed the transparency of Australia’s efforts, and commitment to compliance with international law, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Rarotonga Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard agreements”. It is important to note here that nuclear issue has been a sensitive topic for the islands in the region, as they have been concerned about nuclear testing, dumping of nuclear wastes that could result into contamination of marine environment of the region,[17] for that purpose Treaty of Rarotonga or South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was signed and entered into force in 1986.[18] On AUKUS, there were a few voices of unease in some of the island nations whether Australia’s submarine acquisition under AUKUS would breach the Treaty of Rarotonga.[19] However, the Communiqué clarifies that countries are satisfied with Australia’s update on the AUKUS. 

The Communiqué also welcomed the Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement. It encouraged members to sign the BBNJ or the ‘High Seas Treaty’, as it is popularly known. [20]

A major development on the sidelines of the Summit was the announcement of ‘Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty’, which needs to be analysed here, as it is one of the most significant treaties in the South Pacific region in recent times.

Australia-Tuvalu ‘Falepili Union’: The Treaty 

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese attended the 52nd PIF Leaders' Meeting in Cook Islands and on the sidelines of the Summit, the Government of Tuvalu and the Government of Australia signed Security and Migration Pact on 10 November 2023, which in the words of Australian Foreign Minister, Penny Wong showed that Australia was a "genuine, reliable and regional partner of choice". She further stated that “the Treaty is the most significant development for Australia and a Pacific Island nation for decades”.[21]

The Joint Statement issued after the signing of the Treaty says that “the Tuvalu government had formally requested Australia to consider elevating bilateral partnership, through transformational and durable arrangements”, which resulted into the Treaty.[22] Australia’s Minister for the Pacific, Pat Conroy, had visited Tuvalu in August 2023, it was then that the Tuvalu PM Kausea Natano had provided him with a submission outlining the proposal for the Treaty, for consideration by the Australian Government. Negotiations after that proceeded swiftly, which culminated in the announcement of the Treaty in November 2023.[23]

Tuvalu[24] is a geographically remote country, located halfway between Hawaii and Australia in the South Pacific Ocean. Tuvalu's population is approximately 11,204, with about half living on the atoll of Funafuti, which is the capital. With the country’s highest point just 4.5 meters (15ft) above sea level, it is especially vulnerable to the climate crisis.[25]

By signing the Treaty, the two countries agreed to upgrade their relationship, calling it “the Falepili Union”. ‘Falepili’ in Tuvaluan language translates into ‘traditional values of good neighbourliness, duty of care and mutual respect’.[26] The Treaty talks about “respect and support for each other's sovereignty, and recognises the importance of collective sovereignty, whereby a country's actions can impact on its neighbours”. Under the ‘Falepili Union’, Australian Government said, “We commit to continuing to work closely together to support Tuvalu's development needs”.[27]

The text of the Treaty is available on the Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s website. It has three major elements; climate crisis, human mobility and the security guarantee that Australia is offering to Tuvalu. Some of the major points of the Treaty are as follows:[28]

1.  The Treaty recognises that climate change is Tuvalu's greatest national security concern. Through the Treaty Australia is promising to work with Tuvalu “in the face of the existential threat posed by climate change”, which can include helping the country to adapt to a changing climate, increasing the disaster-resilience capacities of coastal areas and improving warning systems. Through the Treaty the Australian government is promising to promote Tuvalu’s requests in regional and international forums, such as the United Nations. Australia’s own National Defence Strategic Review 2023 recognises that “climate change is now a national security issue”.[29]
2.  As per the Treaty agreed between the two parties, “Australia shall arrange for a special human mobility pathway for the citizens of Tuvalu” or in other words ‘climate visas’ to Tuvaluans, to access Australia, which shall enable citizens of Tuvalu to:
a.  live, study and work in Australia;
b.  have access to Australian education, health, and key income and family support on arrival[30] 

The number of such visas is not set out in the Treaty itself, but the government says up to 280 Tuvaluan citizens each year can be beneficiary of this scheme.[31] 

3.  The section of the Treaty on cooperation for security and stability, says that following a request from Tuvalu, Australia shall provide assistance to Tuvaluan to respond to: 
a.  major natural disaster;
b.  a public health emergency of international concern;
c.  military aggression against Tuvalu.

For that purpose, if necessary Tuvalu “shall provide Australia rights to access, presence within, and overflight of Tuvalu's territory”. The conditions and timeframes applicable to Australian personnel operating in Tuvalu's territory will be decided in due course.

4.  Another important clause of the Treaty says that ‘Tuvalu shall mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement, or engagement with any other State or entity on security and defence related matters. Such matters include but are not limited to defence, policing, border protection, cyber security and critical infrastructure, including ports, telecommunications and energy infrastructure’.[32] This clause of the Treaty amounts to an Australian veto on Tuvalu entering into security agreements with others, and it is at a time when there is intense competition for influence in the Pacific.[33]
5.  The Agreement shall continue in force unless terminated by parties in writing.[34]

Some of the critics have pointed out that deal goes "against Pacific agency" and that without any financial provisions, the beneficiary of the scheme would be only the Tuvalu’s wealthiest and not the ones, most impacted by the climate change.[35] Although the Treaty is yet to go through “domestic processes” in both Australia and Tuvalu before coming into effect, however, the Tuvalu Treaty goes much further in positioning Australia as the primary security partner for Tuvalu. Tuvalu PM Kausea Natano said Tuvalau will aim to "negotiate" similar treaties with other Pacific nations, including New Zealand and Fiji, for the advancement of the Tuvalu people.[36] Some details of the scheme under the Agreement are still being worked out. The Tuvalu’s Climate Change Minister, Seve Paeniu said that his government is yet to finalise the process of how to choose who will move to Australia but the deal is not to be seen “as a refugee settlement”, and the two sides have “agreed to limit (the number of migrants) and avoid a situation where “a whole flurry of people are leaving Tuvalu and entering Australia”. [37]

Migration from the Pacific Islands to neighboring New Zealand and Australia is not uncommon. Tuvalu along with other PICs is already a part of Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) scheme, since April 2022. Through the PALM; eligible businesses can recruit workers for short-term jobs for up to 9 months or long-term roles for between 1 and 4 years in unskilled, low-skilled and semi-skilled positions.[38] At present, Australia houses around 250 people of Tuvaluan origin, with just 30 Tuvaluans migrating to Australia in 2021.[39] However, once this Treaty comes into effect, it could almost double the number of Tuvaluans in Australia in just a year. 

At the same time it is also too early to comment on the long term implications of the Treaty as this year, Tuvalu is going for general elections, slated to be held on 26 January 2024. And the former PM of the country, who is currently in opposition, Enele Sopoaga, says that if he comes to power, he will ‘throw away’ the Treaty. He rather wants Australia to focus on curbing coal and gas developments, which are ‘serious problems’.[40] So, the future of the Treaty depends a lot on the outcome of the elections. 

Significance of the Treaty amidst the Changing Geopolitics of the South Pacific 

Tuvalu currently is one of the few countries in the Pacific that maintains a diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, rather than China. Now after Nauru’s recent switch, eleven island countries in the region have diplomatic relations with China and only three have with Taiwan, Tuvalu being one of them. Concerned about Beijing’s actions in past few years, the Treaty can be seen as crucial aspect of Australia stepping up its game in the neighboring region.

If one looks at the reaction of other countries to the Australia-Tuvalu Treaty, in New Zealand, the National Party which won the elections in 2023, hailed the Treaty. The US also looks at the Treaty positively. Among the islands countries of the region the response to Treaty has been positive. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson did not comment much when asked during regular press conference. He only said that “all countries are able to enhance friendly cooperation with Pacific Island countries in the spirit of openness, inclusiveness, mutual benefit and solidarity, and together contribute to the peace, stability and development of that region”.[41] However, from Australia’s perspective the Treaty can be seen as a strategic move, as the country has been working on to strengthen its engagement with the neighboring islands, given the concerns about China’s increasing influence in its backyard. 

The Australia-Tuvalu deal is significant as it comes in the backdrop of rapid changes in the regional geopolitics. The small island states in the region, which have so far remained on the sidelines of the popular discourse on the Indo-Pacific, and also from the point of view of great power contestations, are attracting greater attention from regional and extra regional powers in recent years, most significantly marked by China’s deeper inroads in the region that seem to challenge the traditional western predominance causing apprehensions among the regional players. 

A major recent development has been the switching of the allegiance of Nauru from Taiwan to China this month, announced on January 15, 2024. US Department of States called, Nauru’s decision “a disappointing one”.[42] Earlier in 2019, Kiribati and Solomon Islands had also severed their ties with Taiwan. After that, China signing the Framework Agreement for Security Cooperation with Solomon Islands was a crucial development. The security agreement between Beijing and Honiara signed on 19 April 2022, took Australia, New Zealand, and other Pacific nations completely by surprise. The deal marked Beijing’s first known bilateral security agreement in the Pacific. Regional countries fear that the deal can result in China’s active military presence in the region and a possible military base close to them. 

Soon after the deal, in May 2022, Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister, Wang Yi, visited ten PICs, with whom China had diplomatic relations, and the second China-PICs Foreign Ministers level meeting was held. Just before Wang Yi’s visit, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had published a report titled ‘Cooperation Between China and Pacific Island Countries: Fact Sheet’ on 24 May 2022, which mentioned that China and the PICs have long-lasting friendly exchanges, which was upgraded to ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ in 2018, during President Xi’s  visit to PNG. 

Among the small island countries of the region, aid narrative has mainly determined their relationships with the larger countries. Australia and New Zealand together still contribute about 55 percent of the total aid to the region.^[43] Australia is the Pacific's largest development partner, providing 39 percent of development financing to the region.[44] While Australia remains the largest development and aid partner for the islands in the region, over the past few years, China has slowly emerged as one of the highest donors to the PIC’s with substantial increase in Chinese aid to the region.[45] China has provided nearly US$ 3.46 billion in aid including concessional loans to the PICs from 2009-2021.[46] Beijing’s aid and assistance to the region have come mostly in the form of many loan-based infrastructure projects. China’s willingness to increase investment in the region had come as an alternative for small island nations, which were in need of such assistance. 

But China’s loans and aid on highly unfavourable terms to most of the island countries challenges their economic stability and puts them under mounting debt pressure. For many of the countries in the region like PNG, Tonga, they already owe a major percentage of their total outstanding external debt to China. 

With Beijing using its financial muscle and economic diplomacy to gain geopolitical clout in the region, the regional countries are also pursuing their active approach to enhance their engagement with the neighbouring island countries, in the region in the wake of intensification of geostrategic competition. Australia is enhancing its role in the region with its Pacific "step up" policy that aims at augmenting security, economic, diplomatic cooperation with the region. On the other hand, New Zealand announced a fresh approach to the region, with the “Pacific Reset” policy in February 2018, focusing on building deeper and more mature partnerships with PIC’s, as well as increasing its diplomatic presence.[47] ‘Pacific Reset’ also focuses on close cooperation with Australia, and other major partners in the Pacific.[48] PM Luxon during his visit to Australia, which first was his foreign tour after assuming office, said that the two countries will continue to support Pacific priorities and respond to the region’s shared challenges in the wake of island countries facing challenge of climate change and increasingly contested strategic environment.[49]

For the US, Pacific Island region connects the US with the broader Indo-Pacific region. In recent years, the US' has also heightened its engagement with this vital region. A Pacific Partnership Strategy was announced in 2021, which highlighted that elevating “broader and deeper engagement with the Pacific Islands both individually and collectively is a priority of the US’ foreign policy”.[50] Two leaders’ level Summits have been held between the US and PICs in Washington and President Biden has promised to make it regular summit every two years.  At the last Summit held in September 2023, US$200 million additional funding was announced for the region, for projects aimed at stimulating economic growth, mitigating the effects of climate change, countering illegal fishing and improving public health infrastructure.[51]

The US also plans substantial increase in diplomatic personnel and spending for facilities at the newly opened US embassies in the Pacific, in Honiara, Solomon Islands, opened in February 2023,  embassy in Tonga, opened in May 2023 and planned embassies in Vanuatu and Kiribati.[52] The US concluded the ‘Compact of Free Association Agreement’ with Palau on 22 May 2023 and Federated States of Micronesia on 23 May 2023. US the Secretary of State Anthony Blinken confirmed that said that the US is looking forward to finalising negotiations on a similar agreement, with the Marshall Islands very soon.[53] Earlier in May 2023, during the Secretary Blinken’s visit to PNG, the US had signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and an Agreement Concerning Counter Illicit Transnational Maritime Activity Operations, with PNG.[54] It was also announced that a 2+2 strategic dialogue with PNG will be launched soon. So clearly the US is focusing its energy on re-engaging with the region, increasing its diplomatic and development engagement, however what cannot be denied is that, the major driver for this recent shift in US’ orientation towards the region has been the China factor. The US has expressed concerns over China’s increasing investment across the region and lack of transparency in its actions. While the Pacific Islands have been largely welcoming of these attempts to reengage, they are also skeptical about the US’ commitment in the long term, as the US has not been seen continuously committed towards the region.
 

Then there are other countries also who are taking interest in the reign, South Korea recently hosted the first ‘Korea-Pacific Islands Summit’ on 29-30 May, 2023. Japan also hosts Summit level meeting with the PICs called Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) every three years since 1997. Then France, which has overseas territories in the South Pacific, has been hosting regular ‘France-Oceania Summit’ since 2002. So clearly, the PICs are witnessing increasing attention from regional and extra-regional powers. 

India’s Approach towards the Region 

In recent years, India’s overall approach towards the PICs has undergone a gradual positive shift; highlighting the government’s willingness for greater engagement with these small island countries.  

India’s approach toward the PICs focuses on a more transparent and inclusive relationship building on its historical ties with countries like Fiji. India is a committed development partner for island nations in the Pacific focused on their priorities. The formation of Forum for India and Pacific Island Countries (FIPIC), in November 2014, as an action-oriented multilateral platform, to discuss common areas of cooperation and facilitating multidimensional cooperation, has been the most important development in recent years, marking India’s renewed interest in the island region. The third FIPIC Summit was held in Port Moresby, PNG, on 22 May 2023, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Pacific island nation, aimed towards fostering stronger linkages with partner countries. 

India looks at the island countries, as ‘not small but large ocean countries’. Over the years, India has announced enhanced grant-in-aids to the Pacific island nations and concessional Line of Credits (LOC) which can be availed by them for undertaking solar, renewable energy and climate related projects. India has also extended support to the PICs in the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sectors, and has sent technical experts in the fields of agriculture, healthcare and IT and continues to provide assistance to PICs under Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC). Overall, India’s approach in the region is human centric and not transactional. 

India has welcomed the decision of some of the Pacific islands for joining the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and has also invited the Pacific leaders to join the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI). PICs also form an important part of voice of Global South, some of the island countries from the region including Nauru, Fiji and PNG participated at the Leader’s level, in the recently concluded Voice of the Global South Summit, held virtually 17 November 2023, hosted by India. 

Conclusion 

In recent years, rapid changes are taking place in geopolitical landscape of the South Pacific region. The island countries in the region may be geographically small, but they have significant political, strategic and economic significance in global affairs. Given the current situation of increasing engagement from regional and extra-regional powers, the region is likely to become a contested space in the overall Indo-Pacific geopolitics. The small island countries fear of becoming a pawn in this great power game. Although broadly they welcome assistance and engagement from major powers, they would not want to be caught in a zero-sum game between China and the US. At the same time, the time is also opportune for the PICs to use their bargaining power while engaging with the major regional and extra regional powers. It is crucial to see how small island countries navigate through the changing geopolitical environment, without compromising on their agency.

*****

*Dr. Pragya Pandey, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.

End Notes

[1] Twitter, Nauru Department of Foreign Affairs, https://twitter.com/DFATNauru/status/1746791862651011073/photo/1

[2]Cleo Paskal, Strategic Overview of Oceania, https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publication/strategic-overview-oceania

[3] The three groups of islands in the South Pacific are:

Micronesia:  Kiribati, Nauru, the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau

Polynesia: Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, French Polynesia

Melanesia: Fiji, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands

[4] Tevita Motulalo, “India's Strategic Imperative in the South Pacific Opportunities and Challenge”, Gateway House Report, October 2013, http://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Indias-Strategic-Imperative-in-the-South-Pacific.pdf

[5] Kiribati, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, http://www.forumsec.org/kiribati/

[6]World Bank, Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance, “ pacific Island Countries”,  chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/136831/ccsbrief_pci_en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y,

[7] Pacific Island Forum, https://www.forumsec.org/who-we-arepacific-islands-forum/

[8] The members of the Forum include Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

[9]  The members of the Forum include: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, for more info see:https://www.forumsec.org/who-we-arepacific-islands-forum/

[10] Luxon not attending the Pacific Islands Forum, forming a govt ‘a priority’, November 2, 2023, https://www.1news.co.nz/2023/11/02/luxon-not-attending-pacific-islands-forum-forming-govt-a-priority/#:~:text=Prime%20Minister%2Delect%20Christopher%20Luxon,is%20to%20form%20a%20government.

[11] Pacific Islands Forum on brink of collapse over leadership dispute, 8 February 2021, https://amp.smh.com.au/politics/federal/pacific-islands-forum-on-brink-of-collapse-over-leadership-dispute-20210208-p570iw.html, Accessed on August 1, 2022.

[12] The Micronesian nations, with smaller economies and population, feel marginalised in some ways by their larger, economically bigger and more influential neighbours in the south. As Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo commented, “What we have seen is a South Pacific that looks down on the North Pacific” (See:https://www.abc.net.au/radio-australia/programs/pacificbeat/fsm-pres-covid-pif/13120114)

[13]https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/07/how-the-pacific-way-of-diplomacy-shored-up-the-pif/

[14]The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, PIF, https://www.forumsec.org/2050strategy/

[15] 2050 Strategy Implementation Plan: 2023-2030 Phase 1 , https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Annex-A-2050-Strategy-Implementation-Plan-2023-20230.pdf

[16] PIFLM52- Communique of the 52nd Pacific Islands Leaders Forum, 2023, https://www.forumsec.org/2023/11/09/reports-piflm52-communique-of-the-52nd-pacific-islands-leaders-forum-2023/

[17] Treaty of Rarotonga, https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/south-pacific-nuclear-free-zone-spnfz-treaty-rarotonga/

[18] Treaty of Rarotonga signed in 1986, Australia and New Zealand along with island countries of the region are parties to it. The Treaty has been signed and ratified by France and UK. US has signed but not ratifies the treaty. China has signed and ratified few not all the provisions. For details see Treaty of Rarotonga | NATIONS UNIES

[19] Tracking the evolution of Pacific island sentiment towards AUKUS, 28 Jul 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/tracking-the-evolution-of-pacific-island-sentiment-towards-aukus/

[20] Ibid.

[21] Interview with David Speers, ABC Insiders, 12 November 2023, Interview with David Speers, ABC Insiders | Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (foreignminister.gov.au)

[22] Joint Statement on the Falepili Union between Tuvalu and Australia, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/joint-statement-falepili-union-between-tuvalu-and-australia

[23]Tuvalu residency and security treaty: what is it and why is Australia doing it?, 10 November 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/10/tuvalu-residency-and-security-treaty-what-is-it-and-why-is-australia-doing-it

[24] Tuvalu is a geographically remote country, has a fragmented landmass, and a scarcity of natural resources. It comprises nine islands consisting of four reef islands and five coral atolls.

[25] Pacific Island Forum Website: https://www.forumsec.org/tuvalu/

[26] Joint Statement on the Falepili Union between Tuvalu and Australia, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/joint-statement-falepili-union-between-tuvalu-and-australia

[27] Joint Statement on the Falepili Union between Tuvalu and Australia, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/joint-statement-falepili-union-between-tuvalu-and-australia

[28] Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty

[29] National Defence Defence Strategic Review, file:///C:/Users/Dr.Pragya/Downloads/NationalDefence-DefenceStrategicReview_edit%20(1).pdf

[30] Ibid. no. 22

[31] Tuvalu residency and security treaty: what is it and why is Australia doing it?,  10 November 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/10/tuvalu-residency-and-security-treaty-what-is-it-and-why-is-australia-doing-it

[32] Ibid. no 22

[33] Ibid. No.25

[34] Either Party may terminate this agreement upon written notice to the other Party. Such termination shall become effective twelve months following the date on which the other Party receives the written notice of termination.for details see: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/joint-statement-falepili-union-between-tuvalu-and-australia

[35] Australia-Tuvalu treaty is 'to maintain our identity', Kausea Natano says, 14 November 2023, https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/502395/australia-tuvalu-treaty-is-to-maintain-our-identity-kausea-natano-says#:~:text=The%20Australia%2DTuvalu%20Falepili%20Union,to%20live%2C%20work%20and%20study

[36]Ibid.

[37]Stay or go? Offered a future away from home, Tuvalu’s people face a painful choice, 18 November 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/19/stay-or-go-offered-a-future-away-from-home-tuvalus-people-face-a-painful-choice

[38] Pacific Australia Labour Mobility, https://www.palmscheme.gov.au/

[39] Australia's Population by Country of Birth, 2022 | Australian Bureau of Statistics (abs.gov.au), 31 October 2023,

[40] Ex-Tuvalu PM running for office in 2024 will 'throw away' falepili treaty, 29 Novembner 2023,https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/503529/ex-tuvalu-pm-running-for-office-in-2024-will-throw-away-falepili-treaty

[41]Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, 10 November 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202311/t20231110_11178441.html

[42] Nauru Officially Breaks Ties with TAIWAN, Press Statement, US Department of States, January 15, 2024, https://www.state.gov/nauru-officially-breaks-ties-with-taiwan/

[43]Lowy Institute, Pacific Aid Map, 2021, https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/, Accessed on August 1, 2022.

[44] Ibid

[45]The Mapping Foreign Assistance in the Pacific Project, Lowy Institute for International Policy, https://chineseaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/

[46] The Mapping Foreign Assistance in the Pacific Project, Lowy Institute for International Policy, https://chineseaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/, Accessed on August 1, 2022.

[47]Our relationship with the Pacific, new Zealand Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/pacific/

[48] Our relationship with the Pacific, New Zealand Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/pacific/, Accessed on June 25, 2022.

[49] Press conference – Sydney, Transcript, Wednesday 20 December 2023, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-sydney-10

[50] Fact Sheet: President Biden Unveils First-Ever Pacific Partnership Strategy, The White House, September 29, 2022https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/29/fact-sheet-president-biden-unveils-first-ever-pacific-partnership-strategy/ , Accessed 7 0October 2022.

[51] Pacific Security Snapshot | 29 September 2023, 29 September 2023, https://pacificsecurity.net/pacific-security-snapshot-29-september-2023/

[52] US aims to counter China by opening Solomon Islands embassy, 12 February 2022, US aims to counter China by opening Solomon Islands embassy | AP News

[53] U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Dialogue in Papua New Guinea, 22 May 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-pacific-islands-forum-leaders-dialogue-in-papua-new-guinea/

[54] Media Note, Office of Spokesperson, The US Department of States, 22 May 2023, https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-papua-new-guinea-sign-new-defense-cooperation-agreement-and-an-agreement-concerning-counter-illicit-transnational-maritime-activity-operations/