Since the Hamas-Israel war broke out on October 7, 2023, many neighbouring countries of Israel, such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan, have been alarmed by the widening orbit of the conflict beyond the Israel-Palestine territories. Lebanon is already trapped in the war of attrition, with regular missile and drone attacks and counterattacks. The threat of a full-fledged military strike by Israeli forces is already looming large at the town of Rafah, which divides the Egypt-Gaza border. Millions of Gazan refugees are located there as they look for shelter in and around Rafah. Apart from the immediate neighbours of Israel, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, are also worried about the spread of conflict beyond Israel-Gaza into their territories. Today, different bases of Iran-backed militia groups and home-grown terror outfits in Iraq are being targeted almost daily by the US forces in retaliation for their attacks on the US military bases there. Last December, one member of the Iraqi security forces was killed and eighteen were injured, including some civilians in a retaliatory attack by the US .[i] The Government of Iraq called the attack an act of hostility and an unprecedented assault on Iraqi sovereignty, which would harm bilateral relations.[ii] The US officials claimed that the attack was against Iran-backed militia Kataib-Hezbollah, which had claimed responsibility for an earlier attack on a US airbase in Harir in Erbil of the Kurdistan region.
Current Political Landscape of Iraq
The political model that evolved in Iraq following the 2003 invasion of Iraq is based on Muhasasa (confessional democracy), where major ethno-sectarian groups (Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd) are given the top executive posts in proportion to their population. Under this model in Iraq, the Presidential post is fixed for Kurds, while the posts of Prime Minister and Speaker of the house are reserved for Shites and Sunnis, respectively.[iii] Since 2003, the country has witnessed five general elections, and the last one took place in October, 2021 earlier then the scheduled timeframe of October 2022 because of the mounting discontent on the streets and large-scale protests against rampant corruption, inflation, and unemployment and growing demand for resignation of the regime of the day.
In October 2019, after almost a decade of relative peace and stability in Iraq, the country witnessed a prolonged phase of protest, (the October Movement), which primarily demanded fundamental political reform and doing away with the divisive sectarian polity or sectarian quota system imposed by the US and its allies after the dismantling of Saddam’s Baathist party. The system promoted an elitist political culture, deterring the evolution of an inclusive democracy and equitable allocation of power. In the October Movement, the Al-Sadr movement of Muqtada Sadr, a renowned Shiite clergy, was at the forefront of opposing Iran’s growing political clout in the domestic politics of Iraq. Amidst continuous protests, several prime ministers resigned but all failed to restore political stability.
The election for choosing a new parliament was announced, and polling was held in October 2021. Total turnout did not exceed 36%, which was the lowest since the first post-Saddam election of 2005.[iv] Muqtada Sadr’s party, Al-Sadr Movement, secured the highest number of seats and improved its tally from 54 (2018) to 73 seats in the new Parliament,[v] which has a total strength of 329 members.[vi] On the other hand, the Fateh group, comprising several affiliates of the People Mobilisation Force (PMF),[vii] came down from 48 (2018) to 17.[viii] Former Prime Minister Al-Maliki’s alliance, ‘State of Law’ secured 35 seats. Sunni Sovereign group led by current Speaker of Parliament Mohammad al-Halbousi, won 37 seats, while the Kurdish Democratic Party secured 32 seats.
The party of Muqtada Sadr, despite securing the most seats, failed to dictate the post-election political trajectory because of the dominance of Iran-backed political blocs. The ‘Coordination Framework’ consisted largely of pro-Iran Shiite parties which were opposed to Muqtada Sadr. had the support of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Sunni Sovereignty group.[ix] Having seen his chances diminished in the evolving politics of Iraq, Muqtada Sadr asked his members to resign from the Parliament in June 2022.[x]
Since the Iraqi constitution does not allow vacant or unoccupied seats in Parliament, second-ranking candidates in the October elections were sworn in as new members of Parliament after resignation of members belonging to Muqtada’s party. This exercise paved the way for the Coordination Framework to secure a majority and they with the support of Kurdish and Sunni Arab parties, formed the government.[xi] Abdul Latif Rashid (Kurd) was named the President, who appointed a consensus candidate of the Coordination Framework, Mohammad Shia’ Al Sudani, as Prime Minister in November 2022. Al Sudani’s ascension to power came after a year of political deadlock, and his government seems to have helped Iran further wield its influence in Iraq, which many of the political blocks, including the Al-Sadr movement, have been against it.
Al-Sudani, unlike his predecessor, is known to enjoy cordial relations across the political spectrum and has no sympathy for sectarian politics. It was under him that Iraq played an important role in the Saudi-Iran deal. He has also worked towards regional integration,[xii] and was among top Arab leaders who participated in the Cairo Peace Conference, convened soon after the outbreak of the Israel-Gaza war.
The Gaza War’s Echoes in Iraq and the Future of the US-Iraq Relationship
After a short spell of US’ military inaction in Iraq against ISIS, it was on November 21, 2023, that a US AC 130 gunship attacked Iraqi militias in Anbar, Baghdad, in retaliation to an attack on a US military base in the town of Aseer. The attack on the US Aseer military base was one of a series of similar attacks that members of the US forces have been subjected to since the eruption of the Gaza War.[xiii] In the first week of December last year, the US embassy in the highly secured Green Zone of Baghdad was targeted by a missile. Later on January 20, there was an attack on an air base in Ain al-Asad in western Iraq which hosts the US and other international forces. For most of these attacks, Iran-backed militias like Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, Sayyid al-Shuhada (all PMF factions), and factions of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq and Harkat al-Nujaba are being held responsible.
It is worth mentioning that Iraq was among the few Arab countries that called the Israeli military operation in Gaza ‘Zionist aggression’.[xiv] While most of the countries in the Arab world were forging ties with Israel in 2020, Iraq enacted a law imposing the death penalty or life imprisonment on anyone found establishing ties with Israel.[xv]
The incident of routine attacks might also be seen as a reflection of a complex domestic polity where competing political forces are trying to turn the situation in their own favour by being more belligerent towards the US for its explicit support to Israel. The reasons for these attacks could also be attributed to the presence of many Shite factions in the ruling alliance (Coordination Framework) who are known to be Iran loyalist and anti-Israel. Those who have been deprived of power in the current government are trying to turn the table against central authority, which itself has been formed after a year-long deadlock and hard-earned political bargain.
The Gaza War came as a political opportunity for Muqtada-Al-Sadr, who is known to be both anti-US and anti-Iran in the political spectrum of Iraq. He has been asking for the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq for a long time and in 2022 he was amongst the first one to urge the Sudani government to ask the US to shut down its embassy in Iraq over unfettered US support for Israel in the Gaza conflict.[xvi] Some members of the Iraqi parliament have supported the call of Muqtada-Al-Sadr, and a letter calling for a special session to vote on the closure of the US embassy has already received the signatures of some members in the Council of Representatives.[xvii] During the visit of the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Iraq in November, Muqtada-Al-Sadr called for large-scale protests against him. He is trying very hard to make political gain out of his current anti-US rhetoric and anti-Israel bellicosity, because despite securing the plurality of seats in 2022, he failed to form the government.[xviii]
Most of the militias and political groups are trying to outperform each other in expressing their solidarity with the people of Gaza to widen their political bases. The head of the Badr organisation called for the suspension of the global coalition against ISIS. The head of Popular Mobilisation Forces, Abdul Aziz Mohammadavi, a designated terrorist by the US in 2021, called an emergency meeting of his PMS group and said that Iraq is in a very critical situation because of the ongoing war in the region.[xix] He said that the independence of Palestine is the key to the solution of the regional crisis.
Despite its retaliatory military actions in Iraq and imposition of sanction against some members of Kataib Shuhada and Iraqi Hezbollah, the US does not want to antagonise Iraq, one of its closest allies in the region. It can also be recalled here that those who have been sanctioned by the US in Iraq are not so exposed to US finances, unlike the sanctioned entities of Syria or Lebanon. The negotiation about the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq had begun in 2020, but now it has gained a new momentum amidst the Gaza conflict. The rising anger against the US’ support for Israel in Iraq seems to have prompted Prime Minister Al Sudani to call for the speedy exit of the US-led coalition forces. The US officials have said that withdrawal from Iraq would not be without consequence for Iraq,[xx] and exit of the US forces is unlikely to deter the attack on Iraqi territories by multiple groups of militias operating there. At present, there are around 2500 US military personnel present in Iraq to advice and train Iraqi military forces to prevent the revival of ISIS.
It can also be mentioned here that in January 2020, former President Donald Trump had hinted that Iraq could lose on access to its central bank account at the Federal Reserve Bank if the Iraqi government insisted on the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq. Under an agreement, Iraq puts its revenue from the oil sale in the Federal Bank and takes out the money from time to time to pay salaries to its officials and for other contractual works.[xxi] As a consequence, perhaps, it has also been observed that many of the allies within the Coordination Framework have toned down their anti-US rhetoric in their political discourse.
Conclusion
It can be concluded that Palestinian issue continues to be political and strategic linkage between the domestic politics of Arab countries and what is happening on the Israel-Hamas front. Countries like Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Iraq are testimony to it. Iraqi domestic politics may not remain unaffected by what is happening in Gaza, primarily due to the close proximity between the regimes in Iran and Iraq and due to Israel being a major issue in Iraqi political discourse. Further, Iraq is confronted with the challenges related to Israel-Hamas conflict when it is on the path of economic recovery after a long phase of economic regression on account of decade-long conflict and COVID-19. It has come at a time when the nature of political discourse is changing and political parties seem more poised towards focussing on social and economic progress instead of hitherto divisive and conflictual politics. Many reports, including a study by SIPRI, suggest that today Iraq is enjoying the most stable phase since the 2003 US invasion.
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*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] US launches over Iraq over drone attacked blamed on Iran-aligned Forces, Aljazeera, December 26, 2024, Accessed https://shorturl.at/eCDIS February 14, 2024.
[ii] US launches over Iraq, Aljazeera, December 26, 2024, Accessed https://shorturl.at/eCDIS February 14, 2024.
[iii] Yasir Kuoti, Iraqi Governance under Al-Sudani: Beyond Service Delivery, Carnegie Foundation, October 10, 2023, Accessed https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/90720 , February 16, 2024.
[iv]Lahib Higel, Iraq’s Surprise Election Results , Crisis Group, November 16, 2021, Accessed https://shorturl.at/ACFT4 February 20, 2024
[v] Lahib Higel, Iraq’s Surprise Election Results, Crisis Group, November 16, 2021, Accessed https://shorturl.at/ACFT4 February 20, 2024
[vi] Patricia Karam, Will Iraq’s new prime minister bring change-or more of the same , The Hill, October 27, 2022, Accessed https://shorturl.at/bHSZ1 February 15, 2024
[viii] Patricia Karam, Will Iraq’s new prime minister bring change-or more of the same , The Hill, October 27, 2022, Accessed https://shorturl.at/bHSZ1 February 15, 2024.
[ix] Nawzad Shukri, the formation of Iraq’s new government is a major victory for Iran and its allies, Fikra Forum, November 8, 2022, Accessed https://shorturl.at/djxU7 February 14, 2024.
[x] Time Lines: Iraqi Political Crisis, Middle East Policy Council, October 2021, Accessed https://shorturl.at/akmJL February 16, 2024.
[xi] Time Lines: Iraqi Political Crisis, Middle East Policy Council, October 2021, Accessed https://shorturl.at/akmJL February 16, 2024.
[xii] Sarhang Hamasaeed , Iraq’s Al-Sudani government, one year later, US Institute of Peace, November 2, 2023, Accessed http://tinyurl.com/y9xrhf9f February 16, 2024.
[xiii] Bilal Wahab and Selin Uysal, Wil an Iraqi Front Open in the Hams-Isarel War, Washingotion Institute for Near East Policy, November 21, 2023, Accessed http://tinyurl.com/mpe35rua February 13, 2024.
[xiv] https://ina.iq/eng/29272-prime-minister-directs-employees-to-perform-a-stand-of-solidarity-and-mourn-tomorrow.html
[xv] C. Anthony Pfaff , the conflict in Gaza threatens Iraq’s stability, progress in Iraq-US relations, Atlantic Council, October 20, 2023, Accessed http://tinyurl.com/5c8hphh8 February 20, 2024.
[xvi] Iraqi cleric Al-Sar demands closure of US embassy over Israeli ties, Reutters, October 27, 2023, Accessed http://tinyurl.com/4mp8usbd February 14, 2024.
[xvii]Sarhang Hamasaeed , Iraq’s Al-Sudani government, one year later, US Institute of Peace, November 2, 2023, Accessed http://tinyurl.com/y9xrhf9f February 16, 2024.
[xviii] Bilal Wahab and Selin Uysal, Wil an Iraqi Front Open in the Hams-Isarel War, Washingotion Institute for Near East Policy, November 21, 2023, Accessed http://tinyurl.com/mpe35rua February 13, 2024
[xix] Iraq after Aqsa Operation: Iran’s Plan for Early Collapse, Asharq Al Awsat(Arabic Daily) n.d. Accessed http://tinyurl.com/46us427v February 14, 2024
[xxi] Emma Newberger, Trump warns Iraq could lose its account in New York Federal Bank if US forces forced to leave: WSJ, CNBS, January 11, 2020, acceded https://rb.gy/42d9lc February 26, 2024