The interaction between the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the President of Timor-Leste, Dr. Jose Ramos Horta, on the side-lines of the 10th Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit, held in the western Indian city of Gandhinagar in early January 2024, was the first such engagement at the Head of Government or Head of State level between these two countries. Though the two leaders interacted at the Summit, which also saw the participation of their contemporaries and counterparts from other nations, this engagement carries with it immense geo-economic and geo-political significance, especially in the Indo-Pacific Region, both for New Delhi and Dili.
Going beyond symbolism, the invitation extended by the Indian Prime Minster to President Dr. Jose Ramos Horta to participate in the Summit was not merely a gesture of goodwill but was also indicative of the growing salience of the Southeast Asian region in the context of India’s foreign policy within the framework of the Indo-Pacific vision. Prime Minister Modi further reaffirmed the importance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the Indo-Pacific region, especially given the fact that Timor-Leste is slated to join the regional bloc (See Map: I). This engagement between the two leaders also comes months after India announced in September 2023 to establish an Embassy in Dili which would facilitate in ‘meeting the development priorities of Timor Leste’.[i]
Map I: Locating Timor-Leste
Source: “Timor-Leste”, Insight IAS, September 11, 2023, https://www.insightsonindia.com/2023/09/11/timor-leste/, Accessed on February 19, 2024.
East Timor: Raining from the Ashes
The contemporary history of Timor-Leste can be seen as a reflection of the complexity that is integral to Southeast Asia, as the road to Timor-Leste’s independence was marked by prolonged struggle and bloodshed.
On November 28, 1975, Timor, then the sole colony of Portugal in Asia, unilaterally declared its independence. However, this was short-lived as neighbouring Indonesia’s military on December 7, 1975, and took over the nascent state. The ostensible reason given by Jakarta then was the fear of the spread of Communism, particularly in the backdrop of the Viet Cong victory against the United States in Vietnam. It was for this reason that some countries, including those in Southeast Asia, were sympathetic towards Jakarta and its actions.
However, even the years before November 1975 were a tumultuous period for Timor, as the political landscape of Portuguese Timor was marred by competing and competitive political entities trying to outdo one another. It was the FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente in Portuguese, or the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), with its left-leaning revolutionary militant political moorings, that came to dominate the political space. The rise of FRETILIN and its role at the epicentre of Timor’s politics caused concerns among many nations that had strong reservations about Communism and leftist politics, including Indonesia, which finally annexed this region of less than 14,874 sq. km[ii] on July 17, 1976.
The invasion and subsequent annexation by Indonesia sparked stiff resistance, which cost an estimated 90,000–115,000 lives until 1999. Of the lives lost in nearly two and a half decades, it is estimated that 73,000–95,000 were a result of hunger and illness, and the rest can be attributed to combat and targeted human rights violations.[iii] Despite these losses and the strong approach of the Indonesian administration, FRETILIN did not lose its political appeal with the masses and was able to sustain its resistance vis-a-vis Jakarta.
However, two prominent overriding factors came into play that paved the way to independence for Timor-Leste. The first was the changing political contour within Southeast Asia in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which ended the three decades of Suharto’s Presidency in Jakarta. The second was the changing political priorities in many capitals of the world, especially in the post-Cold War era.
UN Resolution 384 of December 22, 1975, had called upon Indonesia to withdraw its troops and recognise the “administering power” of Portugal. The resolution did, however, recognise the right to self-determination of the people of East Timor.[iv] It was this resolution that was resurrected and subsequently paved the way for the referendum that was held on August 30, 1999, under the aegis of the United Nations. The referendum saw overwhelming public support for independence. It was, however, only on May 20, 2002, that Timor-Leste was recognised as a sovereign state. In the interim, a peacekeeping force, International Force East Timor, under the UN banner was deployed, and the region was governed by an UN-led transition administration.
Timor-Leste and the Timor Sea Question
Neither the road to independence nor its journey since then were easy. One of the first challenges that this nascent nation faced was state building, which is still an exercise in process. However, like in the past, the post-independent Timor-Leste had to deal with its neighbour, this time Australia, to its south over demarcating the maritime territories. This was a legacy that Dili inherited from Portugal first and Indonesia later, has a four-and-a-half-decade-old history, beginning with the 1972 Australia-Portugal agreement, followed by the 1997 arrangement between Australia and Indonesia.
Notably, Dili signed the Timor Sea Treaty with Australia on the very day of its independence, May 20, 2002. This treaty focused on sharing hydrocarbon resources and the proceeds from them between the two nations. This treaty was seen to be one-sided, favouring Australia. Later on, in 2007, Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea was signed between the two countries, which addressed the disparity of the previous arrangement.
Subsequently, on August 30, 2018, in New York, the two sides agreed to demarcate their maritime boundaries, keeping with the principles enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and thus finally put to rest the long and convoluted discourse on this subject. What is of interest is that the 2018 Treaty that came into force a year later, on August 30, 2019, also covered the commercial interests of the two counties in the Timor Sea. Resultantly, it has been agreed, especially in the Greater Sunrise (oil) Fields, to have a revenue-sharing model with Australia getting 30 per cent of the proceeds if the upstream development is in Timor-Leste and only 20 per cent of the same if it is in Australia. Thus, this Treaty not only addressed the concerns raised by Timor-Leste but also ensured that Dili’s share of the proceeds would be either 70 or 80 per cent of the total. With this maritime demarcation, the concerns of Dili and Canberra with respect to the maritime domain have been addressed to the satisfaction of both parties.
The Road to ASEAN Membership
In 2011, with Indonesia as the Chair of ASEAN, Timor-Leste formally applied to join the regional grouping, with Jakarta extending its full support to Dili.[v] It was after a decade at the 2022 Summit that ASEAN agreed in principle to admit Timor-Leste as its 11th member. Following this, Timor-Leste was, for the first time, invited as an observer to the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) meeting held in February 2023, with Indonesia once again as the Chair of the regional grouping.
Indonesia’s support for Timor-Leste is a reflection that the two nations have buried the hatchet and have moved ahead. However, not all ASEAN members view the inclusion of Timor-Leste into the ASEAN fold favourably. One of the reasons was scepticism over Dili’s capability to honour its commitments to the regional grouping with all its structures and institutions. This has been compounded by the fact that a third of the population is illiterate, with youth unemployment hovering over 40 per cent. Added to this is that the national economy is driven solely by its hydrocarbon reserves,[vi] which is another area of concern as the countries’ economy is far from being stable. It was in this context that President José Ramos-Horta lamented that “it seems like the road to heaven – to reach the perfection of heaven – is easier than to reach the gates of ASEAN” in July 2023.[vii] However, ASEAN has now agreed to welcoming Dili as a fellow member of the Southeast Asian community, which is not only a welcome move but also carries significant geopolitical and geo-economic implications.
Timor Leste and SLOCs: The China Factor
At the outset, the importance of Timor-Leste in the Indo-Pacific theatre is its location. As part of Indonesia’s Archipelagic Sea Lanes (Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia-ALKI), Dili sits on the crossroads of the Timor Sea and the Straits of Ombai-Wetar. These sea lanes of communication may not be as significant when compared to the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, but given the multiplicity of interstate flashpoints in the region and the evolving regional landscape, every channel of waterways, including the coastline of Timor-Leste has the potential to transform into a sensitive geopolitical focal point. (See Map II)
Map II: Indonesia’s Archipelagic Sea Lanes: ALKI
Source: Bara Maritim, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/baramaritim_as-a-result-of-indonesias-recognition-as-activity-7155074715529748481-VVzr/
The added impetus is that Dili, as recently as September 23, 2023, had entered into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) with China. The Joint Statement that followed the Dili-Beijing CSP made specific reference to the One China Policy, with Timor-Leste opposing the very notion of “Taiwan Independence”. The Joint Statement also referred to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) while also identifying key areas of cooperation: (i) industry revitalisation and cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector, (ii) infrastructure development, both in terms of physical and communication infrastructure, (iii) food self-sufficiency including fishing and fish farming, and (iv) livelihood improvement, especially for the people of Timor-Leste.[viii] The statement made specific reference to enhancing high-level military exchanges, strengthening cooperation in areas such as personnel training, equipment technology, and the conduct of joint exercises and training.
It was against this backdrop that the CSP was received with scepticism by Australia as this agreement is suspected by Canberra to be the beginning of what would eventually become a “military pact”. Canberra’s concerns also get compounded in light of the fact that a number of Pacific Island countries are seen as drifting into the Chinese orbit. These island states and the maritime space that they occupied were seen for long as the strategic backyard of Australia.
In a bid to address this concern, President Dr. Jose Ramos Horta said that “Australia, Indonesia and other ASEAN members like Singapore and Malaysia 'could at peace', because the agreement would not turn Timor-Leste into a threat to its neighboursˮ.[ix] While this statement at the surface was made to address the concerns of Dili’s neighbours, the same can be interpreted as signalling to others, such as the United States. This is so as Washington has increasingly come to play a prominent role in providing a semi-balance of stability and as a guarantor of sovereignty to the multiplicity of challenges that now dominate the maritime space of both the South and East China Seas.
While Australia has been vocal about its opinion on the CSP, Indonesia seems to have adopted a soft diplomatic approach in the form of expediting the process of bringing Timor-Leste within the ASEAN fold. The importance of ASEAN in assuaging the concerns over the Dili-Beijing CSP, paving the way for a military pact and thus securitisation of the Timor region lies in the very character of ASEAN with its Charter, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific region (AOIP), apart from other mechanisms of ASEAN.
Delhi-Dili and the Region
Irrespective of how developments are to evolve, the shadowboxing of geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region will now also be played in the waters of the Timor Sea. Nonetheless, AOIP finds resonance with New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative (IPOI), as the emphasis is on peace and stability as a prerequisite for the development and economic progress of this region. Similar sentiments also resonate with India’s Act East Polity, as it emphasises deepening the engagement with the ASEAN community.
Given the synergies in both India’s and ASEAN’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific region, the role that New Delhi would play would be both multidimensional and dynamic. The developmental partnership and capacity-building approach of New Delhi is already an expectation of Dili and the same would also be appreciated by ASEAN. Secondly, India could play the role of being a balancer in the complex geopolitics that has now come to dominate the waters of Southeast Asia.
*****
*Dr. Sripathi Narayanan, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.
[i] ‘Prime Minister‘s meeting with the President of Timor-Leste’. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, January 9, 2024, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1994417, Accessed on March 1, 2024.
[ii] ‘Timor-Leste- Country Summary”, CIA World Factbook, February 21, 2024, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/timor-leste/summaries/, Accessed on February 22, 2024.
[iii] “The Profile of Human Rights Violations in Timor-Leste, 1974-1999”, Human Rights Data Analysis Group, https://archive.ph/20120529004414/http://www.hrdag.org/resources/timor_chapter_graphs/timor_chapter_page_02.shtml#selection-539.26-551.51, Accessed on February 15, 2024.
[iv] “Resolution 384-East Timor”, United Nations Security Council Resolutions, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/384, Accessed on February 19, 2024.
[v] Roberto Soares, “Timor-Leste’s Aspiration for ASEAN Membership” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, March 9, 2023, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/timor-lestes-aspiration-for-asean-membership/?doing_wp_cron=1707906288.3389759063720703125000, Accessed on February 2, 2024.
[vi] Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, “Timor-Leste’s Road to ASEAN Membership Will be Challenging: An Economic Integration Perspective”, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, November 18, 2022
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cms/timor-lestes-road-to-asean-membership-will-be-challenging-an-economic-integration-perspective/, Accessed on February 16, 2024.
[vii] Parker Novak, “José Ramos-Horta’s Australian visit: A Checklist”, The Interpreter,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/jose-ramos-horta-s-australian-visit-checklist, September 5, 2022, Accessed on February 19, 2024.
[viii] Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on Establishing Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, The State Council- People’s Republic of China, September 23, 2023,
https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202309/23/content_WS650eced8c6d0868f4e8dfb32.html, Accessed on February 23, 2024.
[ix] Kornelius Purba, “Indonesia, Australia split over Timor-Leste-China strategic partnership”, Jakarta Post, October 6, 2023, https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2023/10/06/indonesia-australia-split-over-timor-leste-china-strategic-partnership.html#google_vignette, Accessed on February 22, 2024.