Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction 

It was almost 13 years ago when a small protest in the town of Dara (Syria), soon galvanized into a full-fledged civil war in Syria, causing heavy bloodshed and a deep humanitarian crisis. Though over the last few years, there has been a significant decline in the violence and today the war is largely confined to the rebel-held areas in northern part of Syria but the impact of the civil war is still visible. Despite some progress on economic and political fronts, today 90% of the population is poverty-stricken and Syria has a long way to go before it retrieves its pre-war status. 

While the return of Syria to the Arab League and visit of President Assad to Arab capitals in recent period after his decade-old isolation seemed to have helped strengthen his political stature and gain lost ground, the war in Gaza has struck a new blow to the country. The Israel-Gaza conflict would hamper recovery in political and economic spheres, as Syria has been caught in the ongoing crossfire between Hamas and Israel. Since the inception of the war on October 7, airports in Damascus and Aleppo and other national defence installations in the country have been subjected to repeated Israeli air strikes. The most important pretext cited by Israel is the use of Syrian territories by Iranian militias against Israel, with Syria being a route for arms supplies to Hezbollah. From Syrian territories too, several rockets have been fired across northern Israel and the Israel-occupied Golan Heights.[i] What came as a disconcerting sign of the turning of the Israel-Hamas war into a regional conflict was the killing of Haj Sadiq Ameed Zada, the commander of Iran’s intelligence service along with his four colleagues in Damascus’s diplomatic quarter on January 20, 2024 .[ii] Meanwhile, attacks on US bases in Syria and Iraq have become more frequent, inducing more retaliations from the US military bases in Iraq and Syria. 

Syria after 13 Years of Civil War 

After 13 years of civil war, the country today is suffering from a severe humanitarian crisis. Out of the current population of 21.7 million, around 14 million people are in need of assistance[iii], ranging from food to shelters to medicines to education to day-to-day other necessities. The day-to-day social service system has eroded significantly as water supply and sanitation systems and public health services are badly hit.[iv] Today one can see a close link between ongoing conflict and persisting hunger in the country as war and siege in many parts of northern Syria undermine food security as constant attacks on crops, lands, farmers and agricultural workers, the food supply chain, markets, and key infrastructures are directly contributing to the rising stances of food insecurity.[v] Today, Syria is listed among the six nations in the world with the lowest food security and around 5.5 million people are displaced internally.[vi] Since the beginning of the war, Syria has witnessed an exponential level of inflation  rendering common people more vulnerable, and people are forced to make choice between food items, school, or medicine when it comes to spending.[vii] At the same time, the United Nations Food Programme was suspended recently due to shortage of fund, leaving millions in the grip of hunger, and this year, the number of Syrians seeking asylum were the highest in the last seven years.[viii]

The period between 2020 and 2021 witnessed the worst drought and rainfall scarcity, and irrigated land has been reduced to half in comparison to the past. The earthquake in February 2023 has worsened the situation, further hampering aid operations which have in any case become difficult owing to divisive political landscapes and ongoing fight between the government and the rebel forces. 

Recent months have witnessed a sharp rise in violence in the backdrop of the Israel-Gaza war. Around 4.5 million people are still trapped in opposition-held areas in northern Syria, and the country continues to suffer from one of the largest displacement crisis in the world. At present, there are five fronts in Syria that are fully engulfed in conflict of both low and high intensity. There are routine joint Syria-Russia operations in North-West Syria against anti-Assad forces, while North-East Syria is under frequent attacks from the Turkish forces, which are fighting to subdue the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), linked to the banned PKK of Türkiye. The SDF itself is involved in a military campaign against the local tribes of Deir al-Zor, the largest town in eastern Syria.[ix] The separate US and Israeli attacks against alleged Iranian militia bases in different parts of Syria have taken place. In October 2023, the town of Homs, one of the worst-hit cities during the civil war, witnessed one of the worst incidents of violence since 2020 when a drone attack laden with explosives killed 120 people and injured 300, including students, parents and family members who had gathered for a Military College Graduation ceremony.[x] In response, the Syrian Army and Russian forces launched a joint operation in northwest Syria, targeting 2,300 rebel-held locations, including schools, hospitals, markets and different public places.[xi] A volunteer group, “Syrian Civil Defence Forces”, also known as the “White Helmet” informed that the joint Russia-Syria operation forced around 67,000 people to flee towards the Syria-Turkish border.[xii] In the wake of the Gaza conflict, the country is suffering attacks from both Iranian militias and Israeli forces, and since October 7 alone, the US military bases in Syria have been reportedly subjected to more than 50 attacks by Iranian militias.[xiii]    

Hamas-Syria Ties 

The Israel-Palestine friction has continued to be a major component of Syrian foreign policy discourse since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. For numerous historical, geographical, religious, ideological, strategic and political reasons, Syria has remained an active player in the Arab-Israel conflict. Syria was at the forefront of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. But over the years, particularly after the Arab uprising and subsequent reconfiguration in domestic and regional strategic terms, Palestine lost its centrality. Further Hamas-Syria ties lost their past prominence during the civil war when Hamas expressed its support for the anti-Assad rebel forces in 2012 for the first time, and subsequently Hamas international headquarters was forced to shift from Damascus to Doha (Qatar). But recently the Syria–Hamas relationship has witnessed some thaw, particularly after the visit of the Hamas delegation under the leadership of the deputy head of Hamas in Gaza, Khalil al-Hayya, to Syria in October 2022. Khalil had then said that the decision had been taken considering the political realism and strategic requirements amidst rapid regional and global developments surrounding the Palestinian cause.[xiv] In a recent statement, Hamas said that Syrian leadership and people have always supported Palestinian people and their just cause. The move to restore ties has been several years in the making.  Iran and Hezbollah seemed to have played a catalyst role in brokering the deal, as both happen to be close allies of Syria. The new turn in the Hamas–Syria relationship can be seen in the light of changing political dynamic between Israel and Arab countries (read Abraham accord)[xv] and improving ties between Syria and other Arab countries, in particular. 

Israel-Gaza War and Syria-Israeli War of Attrition 

Soon after the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack and subsequent Israeli retaliation, there was anticipation that Syria sooner or later would be entangled into an extra-territorial military attack from Israel, owing to Israel’s old belief that Syria is an operational ground for Iran-Hezbollah anti-Israel activities. Even before the October 7 attack and during the height of the civil war in Syria, the Israeli air forces frequently conducted pre-emptive military strikes at the suspected sites of Iranian-backed militias and other shelters belonging to anti-Israeli extremist groups. In 2023, Israel targeted 156 military and other defence sites in Syria, killing 156 Syrian armed personnel.[xvi] The number of average attacks has increased significantly in Syria after the Aqsa Storm, and Israeli forces are targeting sites that they claim are bases of Iran-backed armed groups. According to the spokesperson of Israel Defence Forces, there were 50 incidents of airstrikes between October and December 2023, and January alone saw seven such attacks.[xvii] Within a week after October 7, the Israeli army informed of firing artillery and mortar shells towards Syria in response to missiles launched from Syrian territories. On October 25 2023, Israel struck a Syrian radar battalion along with a huge army depot in Izraa near the town of Dara, the most prominent military depot in Syria. In the October 25 strike, several members of Iranian militias were killed, and some Syrian civilians also lost their lives.[xviii] The most frequent targets of Israeli air strikes have been the airports of Damascus and Aleppo, rendering them defunct. The latest one was on March 29 ,2024, when Israeli air forces hit the Aleppo airport, killing six Hezbollah members and thirty-six members of the Syrian armed forces.[xix] But Syria on its part did not retaliate this time and instead maintained strategic silence and preferred not to be provoked for an asymmetric adventure. This year, the country has allocated 75% of its national budget for defence[xx] but it seems that such a huge sum is intended for the domestic civil war rather than for external foes. 

On January 25,2024, an Israeli attack killed a prominent IRGC commander, Brigadier General Reza Mousavi, in the city of Damascus, and on January 28, the US attacked several military facilities in Syria, killing 28 militias in response to the killing three of US soldiers in Jordan.[xxi] Since October 7, the US has targeted 16 Iranian militia bases in Deir al-Zor (Syria) and similarly attacks against US military bases in Syria have become more frequent. 

In the ongoing Gaza conflict, Iran seems to be expanding the scope of the conflict. Though it also seems to be cautious to not let it reach to a point of direct conflict with the US. Iran aims to deepen its strategic and military engagement with Hezbollah and further with Syria in face of mounting Israeli military pressure and also to prevent the expansion of Israeli military action further. During the ongoing Israel-Gaza war, the number of Iranian militia bases has increased to 570, and Iran is further helping Syria beef up its security in the wake of mounting Israeli attacks on its territories. 

On its part, Syria unlike Hezbollah or Houthis, seems to be refraining from politics of retribution and keeping the war away from its border. Within a week of the Gaza conflict, President Assad held telephonic conversations with his Iranian and Russian counterparts. Also, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian visited Syria on October 12, 2023 for talks regarding emerging eventualities in and around Syria.[xxii] President Assad also participated in the joint Arab League-OIC Conference in Riyadh, and in his deliberation, he called for an end to the suffering of people and said that Gaza is not an issue but an embodiment and essence of the Palestinian people.[xxiii] But in his deliberation, he refrained from naming Hamas. 

President Assad’s government currently does not seem to be capable of any retribution against these Israeli attacks because of its decade-long, exhaustive, and expensive war against the rebel forces. Further, the existing geopolitical situation in the region and the domestic situation does not allow Syria to open another war front when the country is already in turmoil. The presence of the US naval fleet in the Mediterranean must have also prevented the Syria-Hezbollah-Iran (Axis of Resistance) from opting for a full-fledged war against Israel. Moreover, the existing policies of majority of the Arab countries vis-à-vis Israel-Gaza war might also have been catalyst in shaping President Assad’s policy on Israel-Hamas war. Syria will not like to antagonise other Arab governments which have contributed significantly to his return to the Arab fold after a decade of isolation. However, because of the dominance of Iran in Syria, some Iranian-backed militias were able to launch a few rockets inside the territories of Israel, and a few were targeted at the Golan Heights.[xxiv] Some media sources have also reported that the Syrian government has not fired even a single shot towards Israel in the last five decades under a truce signed in 1974 following the Yom Kippur War of 1973.[xxv]

It is also a fact that no country in the Arab world has involved itself militarily in the ongoing wa, Egypt and Jordan, which are likely to suffer the most because both, in addition to Lebanon, share immediate border with Israel. Egypt government is under pressure due to the possibility of migrants arriving from the Gaza Strip and Jordan’s lower economic growth might face further predicament if situation escalates in the West Bank.[xxvi] Syria too, has neither the appetite nor the resources to join the war. Any involvement with Israel would further weaken the Syrian government and further destroy an already devastated infrastructure. 

Apart from the pursuit of policy of strategic silence, the Asad government has also imposed a ban on protests, and if any, they need prior approval from the intelligence services. For violating the rules, a number of Palestinian activists have been reportedly arrested.[xxvii] Like Syrian opposition forces, the Assad government avoided mentioning Hamas in its official briefings, despite its recent normalization with the Hamas. Moreover, the Syrian government issued no condemnation over the assassination of senior Hamas leader Saleh Al-Arouri in Lebanon.[xxviii]

Israel-Gaza War and Response of Syrian Opposition Forces 

Though the country is not in a position to respond or extend any significant military assistance to Hamas in the ongoing conflict, the Government has called for an immediate ceasefire.[xxix] As far as the street reactions are concerned, people have expressed their resentment about the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza. The Syrian Islamic Council(SIC), an opposition entity, was the first Syrian organization to express support for the Palestinian people after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation.[xxx] SIC called upon the global community to provide all assistance to the heroic people of Palestine in their struggle against oppression. Other opposition groups and militias have condemned the Gaza war as well and asked the UNSC to assume its responsibility to stop the killing of innocent people.[xxxi] The head of the Syrian National Council (SNC), one of the earliest opposition groups to emerge in Syria during the civil war, called upon the international community to take stern measures against Israel and condemned the displacement of people from Gaza. The SNC also called upon the Arab League to stop the daily massacre and plight of the common people in Palestine.[xxxii] On its part, the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), affiliated with the ‘National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition Forces’, declared a three-day mourning with the half-mast flag in the areas under their control in the northern part of Syria against the massacre at Baptist hospital.[xxxiii] Other opposition forces too, like the government, have not expressed any support for Hamas so as not to alienate the US and European countries that are supporting their fight against President Assad’s army. 

Likewise other anti-Assad groups seem to have sympathy for the people of Palestine barring Hamas because of its growing intimacy with the Axis of Resistance, which for many of Assad’s adversaries is equally complicit in crime against people in Syria. Even Syrian Islamic Council, in its statement against Israel, avoided mentioning Hamas notwithstanding its old affinity with Hamas. The recent reconciliation between Hamas and the Asad government has restrained the decades-old ties between Hamas and Syrian Islamic Council. 

It is worth recalling here that the restoration of Hamas’s ties with the Syrian government in 2022 came under severe criticism and the opposition forces in Syria had expressed their discontent with Hamas, indicating that any reconciliation with President Assad would deprive Hamas of the Arab support and sympathy. They further claimed that the government of President Assad lacks legitimacy and hence it can offer nothing to the people of Palestine.[xxxiv] The Syrian National Council had also stated that Hamas cannot denounce its glorious past of opposing imperialism and oppression by aligning with those who are committing all crimes against humanity.[xxxv]

The opposition forces in Syria accuse Hamas of duplicity by calling the Arab world to support the cause of Palestine and maintain not only a conspicuous silence on Syrian brutality but are sympathetic towards the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Axis. The Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish group, is maintaining complete neutrality and has expressed its solidarity with the civilian losses in Gaza. They did not condemn the Israeli military operation in Gaza owing to its strategic and geopolitical equilibrium with Israel and ideological and political animosity with Hamas and Hamas’ deep ties with Türkiye, an opponent of the Kurdish liberation movement in Turkiye and beyond. Their non-empathy towards the Hamas can also be attributed to the support Syrian Kurds are receiving from the US and other Western powers in their fight against ISIS and their struggle for autonomy within the territories of Syria. 

Moreover, the US and European nations are unlikely to support those forces in Syria or anywhere which harbour any empathy towards Hamas or other terrorist groups. Further when President Assad seems to have enhanced his political clout after Syria’s return in the Arab League, his adversaries on the battle ground are facing declining military and materialistic support from the Arab and other Western countries to the opposition forces due to changing geopolitical priorities.[xxxvi]    

Conclusion 

In light of the above, it can be concluded that since the outbreak of the Gaza war, Syria, seems in one way or the other to have been dragged into the ongoing conflict as some parts of the country, including Damascus and Aleppo airports are subjected to frequent air strikes by the Israeli forces. The Gaza war may be seen as having an adverse impact for a country which had begun to progress towards the path of relative economic and political stability after a prolonged civil war. However, it will be Syria’s effort to keep itself away from Israel-Gaza conflict to the extent it can.  At the moment, Syria cannot expect much assistance from Iran or Hezbollah too, its two traditional allies, because of the Hezbollah being already in a war-like situation with Israel and Iran gearing up for retaliation after the recent Israeli attack on its consulate in Syria few days ago. 

In addition, the current Gaza war seems to have strengthened President Assad in comparison to domestic political opponents with the world focus shifting towards Gaza away from Syrian civil war. There are reports that since the outbreak of Gaza war, the battle between the Government forces and the rebel forces have intensified in rebel-held areas with the Government forces gaining ground. Today the biggest worry for the Assad government would be how to escape the Gaza conflict which is very much on the cusp of becoming a regional war. Moreover, the changing trajectory of Hamas-Assad ties is having its own impact on Syrian domestic politics where President Assad is pursuing a well-guarded approach towards Hamas while Hamas is keen for all support from Syria. It is also difficult to predict for how long Syria can continue with its current policy of non-retaliation against Israel and a moment might come when the country would be left with no choice but to come with guarded response to at least pacify the anger on the streets against violation of Syrian sovereignty.

*****

*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Ellie Sennett, Iran Proxy Fights and Assad Strikes, The National, January 22, 2024 Accessed  https://encr.pw/1j4ZB  March 22, 2024.

[ii]Ellie Sennett, Iran Proxy Fights and Assad Strikes, The National, January 22, 2024 Accessed  https://encr.pw/1j4ZB  March 22, 2024.

[iii] Syria Arab Republic: 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview, Relief web, December 21, 2023, Accessed   https://encr.pw/P4SCC  March 21, 2023.

[iv] Syria Arab Republic: 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview, Relief web, December 21, 2023, Accessed   https://encr.pw/P4SCC  March 21, 2023.

[v] The Link between Conflict and Hunger in Syria, Relief web, April 19, 2023, Accessed https://encr.pw/IotNc  March 24, 2024.

[vi] Syria Arab Republic: 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview, Relief web, December 21, 2023, Accessed   https://encr.pw/P4SCC  March 21, 2023.

[vii] After 13 Years of War in Syria: More than Half the Population Faces Hunger, Action against Hunger , March 15, 2024, Accessed  https://rb.gy/s2rwj7 March 25, 2024.

[viii] Paulo Pinheiro, Syria Faces a new Wave of Conflict Amidst Gaza War, Asharq al Awsat (Arabic Daily), February 18, 2024, Accessed https://l1nq.com/cTbGr  March 14, 2024.

[ix] Paulo Pinheiro, Syria Faces a new Wave of Conflict Amidst Gaza War, Asharq al Awsat (Arabic Daily), February 18, 2024, Accessed https://l1nq.com/cTbGr  March 14, 2024.

[x] Omar Albam, How Violence in Syria is Connected to Israel Hamas War, DW, October 31, 2023, Accessed  https://l1nq.com/0WKOU  March 25, 2024.

[xi] Paulo Pinheiro, Syria Faces a new Wave of Conflict Amidst Gaza War, Asharq al Awsat (Arabic Daily), February 18, 2024, Accessed https://l1nq.com/cTbGr  March 14, 2024.

[xii] Omar Albam, How Violence in Syria is Connected to Israel Hamas War, DW, October 31, 2023, Accessed  https://l1nq.com/0WKOU  March 25, 2024.

[xiii]Paulo Pinheiro, Syria Faces a new Wave of Conflict Amidst Gaza War, Asharq al Awsat (Arabic Daily), February 18, 2024, Accessed https://l1nq.com/cTbGr  March 14, 2024.

[xiv] Adam Kahlil, Hamas decision to reset with Syrian Government Sparks Controversy, Middel East Eye, June 22, 2022, Accessed   https://encr.pw/Un7zi  March 25, 2024.

[xv] Hamas delegation Visits Syria for First Time in Decade, will meet Assad, The Times of Isarel, October 19, 2022, Accessed  https://encr.pw/pMmCm  March 30, 2024.

[xvi] Ali Fayyaz, How is Syria Affected By Gaza War despite Neutrality, Noon Post. February 20, 2024 Accessed https://www.noonpost.com/198944/  March 31, 2024.

[xvii] Ali Fayyaz, How is Syria Affected by Gaza War despite Neutrality, Noon Post. February 20, 2024 Accessed https://www.noonpost.com/198944/  March 31, 2024.

[xviii]Umar Adli, Syriana Stance Towards Gaza Attack, Harmon Centre for Contemporary Studies, January 14m, 2024, Accessed  https://acesse.dev/Q3bl5  March 28, 2024.

[xix] Dozen Killed in Israeli Strike on Syria, Asharq al Awsat (Arabic Daily), March 28, 2024, Accessed https://l1nq.com/tTkXc  March 31, 2024.

[xx] Wazah Haider, Silence a Principal Stand: Why Assad did not React to Gaza Attack, Khaleej online (Arabic portal) December 9, 2023, Accessed https://l1nq.com/H4JoU March 20, 2024.

[xxi] Paulo Pinheiro, Syria Faces a new Wave of Conflict amidst Gaza War, Asharq al Awsat (Arabic Daily), February 18, 2024, Accessed https://l1nq.com/cTbGr  March 14, 2024.

[xxii] Umar Adli, Syriana Stance Towards Gaza Attack, Harmon Centre for Contemporary Studies, January 14m, 2024, Accessed  https://acesse.dev/Q3bl5  March 28, 2024.

[xxiii]  Umar Adli, Syriana Stance Towards Gaza Attack, Harmon Centre for Contemporary Studies, January 14m, 2024, Accessed  https://acesse.dev/Q3bl5  March 28, 2024.

[xxiv] Israeli Army: A  Missile Launched from Syria Landed in Golan Heights, Andalusia Agency, December 30, 2023 ,Accessed  https://acesse.dev/RKYez   March 27, 2024.

[xxv] Wazah Haider, Silence a Principal Stand: Why Assad did not React to Gaza Attack, Khaleej online (Arabic portal) December 9, 2023, Accessed https://l1nq.com/H4JoU March 20, 2024.

[xxvi] Ibrahim Husseini, Israel-Hamas Was War could already Threaten Fragile Economy in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, The New Arab, October 26, 2023, Accessed https://rb.gy/p0x2kl  April 4, 2024

[xxvii] Syrian Authority Arrests Three Palestinians, Action Group for Palestinians of Syria, November 11, 2023, Accessed  https://encr.pw/1j2iT  March 03, 2024.

[xxviii] Umar Adli, Syriana Stance Towards Gaza Attack, Harmon Centre for Contemporary Studies, January 14m, 2024, Accessed  https://acesse.dev/Q3bl5  March 28, 2024.

[xxix] Syrian Interim Government Statement, October 18, 2023, Accessed  https://www.syriaig.net/ar/3795/content  March 29, 2024.

[xxx]  Statement in Favor of Palestine and Al-Aqsa Mosque, October 8, 2023, Accessed   https://sy-sic.com/?p=9569 

[xxxi] Umar Adli, Syriana Stance Towards Gaza Attack, Harmon Centre for Contemporary Studies, January 14, 2024, Accessed  https://acesse.dev/Q3bl5  March 28, 2024.   

[xxxii] Umar Adli, Syriana Stance Towards Gaza Attack, Harmon Centre for Contemporary Studies, January 14, 2024, Accessed  https://acesse.dev/Q3bl5  March 28, 2024.   

[xxxiii] Syrian Interim Government Statement, October 18, 2023, Accessed  https://www.syriaig.net/ar/3795/content  March 29, 2024.

[xxxiv] National Coalition Condemns Hams Resumption of Ties with Syrian Regime, July 01, 2022, Accessed   https://acesse.dev/RdmQn  March 27, 2024.

[xxxv] National Coalition Condemns Hams Resumption of Ties with Syrina Regime, July 01, 2022, Accessed   https://acesse.dev/RdmQn  March 27, 2024.

[xxxvi] Umar Adli, Syriana Stance Towards Gaza Attack, Harmon Centre for Contemporary Studies, January 14, 2024, Accessed  https://acesse.dev/Q3bl5  March 28, 2024.