Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction 

On 26-27 May 2024, the leaders of South Korea or Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) convened in Seoul for a series of meetings. This included separate bilateral meetings between the three countries on 26 May 2024 and the ninth edition of the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit on 27 May 2024.[i] The Ninth Trilateral Leaders’ Summit was organised after a gap of more than four years ever since the eighth edition was last held in December 2019 at Chengdu, China.[ii] The Trilateral Leaders’ Summit had been on a hiatus, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic struck soon after the 2019 meeting, in addition to the burgeoning complications of relations between the three neighbours. 

The revival of the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit was sparked off first when the Tenth Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ meeting was held on 26 November 2023 at Busan, South Korea[iii], which was also the first in four years after the ninth edition took place in August 2019 at Gubei Water Town in China.[iv] During the Tenth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in November 2023, the three countries “concurred on expediting preparation for holding the Trilateral Summit at the earliest convenient time.”[v]

Background 

In the past four years, the Indo-Pacific region has borne witness to the emergence of several groupings, namely the AUKUS in 2021, the Japan-South Korea-US trilateral in 2023, the Japan-Philippines-US trilateral and the Japan-US-Philippines-Australia partnership in April 2024. These new developments can be taken as the outcome of an overtly complex security environment, leading states to behave in a certain way that can be situated through the lens of the Balance of Threat theory. The theory posits that “when a state perceives a growing threat from another state or alliance, it will look to build alliances or strengthen existing ones to counter that threat.”[vi]

The minilateral partnerships mentioned above are also emblematic of the hub and spokes system,[vii] where the US is the hub and the partner countries represent the spokes. China had issued strong statements against the formation of each of these groupings, at times calling them out as either a “mini-NATO grouping in the Asia-Pacific” or an “anti-China gathering.”[viii]

However, in a striking development, the South Korea-Japan-China trilateral was also revived after a long break for its ninth edition and to mark the 25^th anniversary of the Trilateral Cooperation mechanism.[ix] This meeting can be seen as an attempt by the allies of the US, namely South Korea and Japan, to alternatively hedge their bets and leverage their economic ties with China to manage potential security concerns and promote regional stability. It was also highlighted as an opportunity for restarting of ties between the three countries amidst the increasing global tensions. 

Bilateral Summits on the Sidelines of the ROK-Japan-China Trilateral 

In the face of several emerging groupings that are set out more likely as a deterrent against China’s aggressive intentions, the ninth edition of the Japan-ROK-China Trilateral Leaders’ Summit witnessed bilateral Summits between the three countries, which were anticipated to be filled with challenging agendas. 

ROK-Japan Summit 

Prior to the Trilateral Summit, the ROK-Japan leaders in continuation of their “shuttle diplomacy” met and discussed ways forward to further elevate bilateral relations to new heights, especially with the 60^th anniversary of the normalisation of the ROK-Japan diplomatic relations due to arrive in 2025.[x] The leaders of ROK and Japan acknowledged their growing cooperation in economic, defence, security and foreign policy fields and welcomed positive developments for new collaborations through the “Future Partnership Fund.”[xi]

One of the issues discussed between the two neighbours was regarding the friction over South Korean Naver Corp.’s 50 per cent stake in LY, a venture with Japan’s SoftBank, which surfaced after a major security breach at Naver’s cloud computing servers in October 2023.[xii] President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan discussing the row surrounding Naver Corp.'s Line app, agreed to closely communicate to prevent it from hampering bilateral ties.[xiii]

The two leaders also exchanged views on the latest issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula, especially with regard to the North Korean nuclear and missile threats.[xiv] The North Korean abductions of Japanese and South Korean citizens was also deliberated, with President Yoon reiterating his support for an immediate resolution on the abductions issue.[xv]

Japan-China Summit

In the meeting between Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and Mr Li Qiang, Premier of the PRC, the talks focused on efforts to stabilise Japan-China relations through continuous dialogue at various levels, which is important for the region as well as for the international community.[xvi] The Prime Minister of Japan later emphasised that the discussions were comprehensively aimed at promoting a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests. The two countries aimed for mutual endeavour to attain progress regarding various challenges and outstanding issues. 

The leaders highlighted the importance of cooperation at different levels in various fields, such as “green economy, including environment and energy conservation, as well as medical care, nursing care and healthcare.”[xvii] On the subject of export restrictions, the Japanese side urged the Chinese side to resume beef imports and expand the import of polished rice from Japan. There were also exchanges on the resumption of visa waiver measures for Japanese nationals’ short-term stay in China and to support the increase of people-to-people exchanges. 

During the bilateral Summit, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida addressed several points of tensions with China. He expressed serious concerns about China's intensified military activities near the Senkaku Islands as well as areas surrounding Japan in the East China Sea, along with Beijing’s collaboration with Moscow. Additionally, he highlighted concerns regarding human rights issues in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. 

On Taiwan, Kishida emphasised the importance of regional stability and called for a peaceful resolution. Premier Li, on the other hand, underscored that Taiwan was a “major issue of principle concerning the political foundation of the Japan-China relations, and the Taiwan question is at the core of China's interests and a red line.”[xviii] 

The bilateral Summit also discussed the discharge of the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water from Japan's Fukushima plant. Both leaders acknowledged progress in technical talks and agreed to accelerate consultations on the ALPS treated water. Prime Minister Kishida further urged China to lift import restrictions on Japanese food products owing to the ALPS issue.[xix]

Premier Li expressed China's deep concern over the release of Fukushima nuclear-contaminated wastewater, emphasising its impact on global health and the marine environment. As a major stakeholder, China expects Japan to demonstrate sincerity and a constructive attitude by addressing international concerns, establishing long-term monitoring arrangements and fulfilling its responsibilities and obligations regarding the issue.[xx]

ROK-China Summit 

South Korea-China relations have been undergoing a significant change since President Yoon Suk-yeol assumed office in 2022. Unlike his predecessor, President Moon Jae-in, the current administration under President Yoon has shown a more coherent and definite foreign policy approach focusing on intensified security cooperation with the US. As a result, the ROK-China relations have been undergoing a certain regression, with Seoul being more outspoken at times over issues including the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.[xxi]

Therefore, having a bilateral Summit between the two countries on the sidelines of the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit was an appropriate moment for South Korea and China to iron out certain challenging issues that have been building up. For South Korea, China is important not only because of the trade dependency on Beijing but also because the PRC still holds diplomatic heft in dealing with North Korea. 

As a result, the leaders of ROK and China, during their meeting, agreed to launch a bilateral diplomatic and security dialogue for better strategic communication that would help mitigate the deterioration of relations.[xxii] The diplomatic and security dialogue is expected to comprise a 2+2 consultative body between the respective foreign and defence ministers of each side, and its first meeting is expected to take place in mid-June.[xxiii] The two countries also agreed to resume the second phase of the ROK-China free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations to upgrade their bilateral trade relations.[xxiv] The first phase of the negotiations took effect back in December 2015, which removed tariffs on major goods.[xxv]

Premier Li also highlighted the deeply intertwined industrial and supply chains of China and the ROK, which further adds to the enormous potential for economic cooperation between the two countries.[xxvi] While stressing the need to resist the politicisation of economic and trade issues jointly, Premier Li emphasised the need to maintain stable and unimpeded industrial and supply chains.[xxvii]

The discussions held at the recent bilateral meeting between President Yoon and Premier Li suggest an attempt at mitigating constraints and finding common interests to stabilise ROK-China relations amidst Seoul’s closer alignment with Washington under the Yoon administration. 

Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit 

The ninth edition of the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit between South Korea, Japan and China was held on 27 May 2024 after a four-year hiatus. At the end of the meeting, a Joint Declaration for the ninth summit was issued with two attachments, namely, “Joint Statement on a 10 Year Vision for Trilateral Intellectual Property Cooperation”, and “Joint Statement on Future Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response.”[xxviii]

Joint Declaration for the Ninth Summit 

In an overview, the joint declaration underscores the importance of Trilateral Cooperation in promoting mutual understanding, addressing common challenges, and contributing to regional and international peace and prosperity. Amidst the growing contestations between China on one side and Japan-ROK, who are also allies of the US on the other side, there were expectations that the Trilateral Summit would miss out on concrete deliverables. Nevertheless, specific issues were jointly addressed for the greater good of the region. 

North Korea 

One of the core issues that was much anticipated to be addressed was the inclusion of a resolution on the North Korean abductions in the joint statement of the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit.[xxix] Since the 2018 and 2019 joint statements of the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit had previously included the resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees in North Korea, it was considered to be of high possibility that the ninth Summit will likely highlight the issue of Japanese abductees as well as South Korean nationals. 

North Korea has been a core issue for peace and security in Northeast Asia. Prior to the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit, Pyongyang had even made an attempt to launch a military reconnaissance satellite, which failed due to an “accident” as the carrier rocket exploded mid-air on 27 May 2024.[xxx] This launch was the second by Pyongyang after the first spy satellite was successfully placed in orbit in November 2023. Then afterwards, the ROK Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) announced on 29 May 2024 that they detected close to 260 balloons carrying trash which were flown from North Korea and which fell in various locations across the country in South Korea.[xxxi] A day after on 30 May 2024, North Korea launched 10 short-range ballistic missiles towards the Sea of Japan.[xxxii] North Korea’s latest provocations having occurred so close to the beginning and end of the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit where even China was present has led some analysts to suggest that Pyongyang is signalling its frustration even towards Beijing.[xxxiii] China remained silent on North Korea’s announcement of the satellite launch during the Trilateral Summit.[xxxiv]

Due to the provocations just prior to the Summit, the joint declaration could have had a united stand against North Korea. However, on the issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula the declaration sounded watered-down as it failed to mention North Korea. It stated, “we reiterated positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the abductions issue, respectively”.[xxxv] In comparison, the eight Summit held in 2019 at Chengdu, China had stated, “the leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea hope that the abductions issue between Japan and the DPRK will be resolved through dialogue as soon as possible”.[xxxvi] Moreover, the 2019 declaration had even mentioned of a joint commitment to “complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula”,[xxxvii] which in the current declaration was reduced to “denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula”. 

One of the reasons for the moderated tone on North Korea is conceived to be due to China’s attempts at getting closer with Pyongyang after the recent flourishing of relations between Russia and North Korea. The North Korean state has been making inroads into deepening its relations with Russia as the war in Ukraine occurred. Certain analysts even considered that this recent deepening of relations between Pyongyang and Moscow had seemingly outpaced North Korea’s ties with China. Even when Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proposed security talks between Moscow, Pyongyang and Beijing in October 2023[xxxviii] to deal with increasing US-led regional military threats, China remained ambiguous regarding this potential trilateral grouping.[xxxix]

However, to compensate for the lack of engagements since North Korea’s belated opening of its COVID-19 pandemic restrictions in September 2023, Zhao Leji, the current Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the third-ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), visited Pyongyang in April 2024 for one of the highest-level talks between China and North Korea in years.[xl] Therefore, it can be understood that China deliberately took a stand to not incriminate North Korea directly in the joint declaration to avoid risking its ongoing engagements with Pyongyang.

Promoting Institutionalisation of the Trilateral Cooperation

Another central issue that was stated in the joint declaration was promoting the institutionalisation of the Trilateral Cooperation to “enhance respective bilateral relations and foster peace, stability, and prosperity in the Northeast Asian region.”[xli] The three countries declared to strengthen the Trilateral Cooperation through regular “intergovernmental consultative mechanisms such as high-level meetings and ministerial meetings in areas including education, culture, tourism, sports, trade, public health and agriculture.”[xlii] They aimed to strengthen and promote the capacity building of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) established in 2011. 

Regarding Trilateral Cooperation projects, the joint declaration emphasises the importance of implementing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement transparently, smoothly, and effectively, highlighting it as the foundation for a potential Trilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It pledges to expedite negotiations for this Trilateral FTA to create a free, fair, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial agreement. Additionally, it reaffirms RCEP's status as an open and inclusive regional engagement and encourages the RCEP Joint Committee to hasten discussions on the accession procedures for new members to broaden its reach further. 

Trilateral + X Cooperation Framework 

The three countries also proposed the promotion of a “Trilateral + X Cooperation” framework, which is aimed at extending the benefits of their partnership with third-party countries so that they can prosper together.[xliii] One of the countries that is targeted for collaboration is Mongolia, with the objective of reducing dust and sandstorms in East Asia.[xliv] Through the Trilateral + X framework, the three countries are also looking at projects promoting “marine environmental conservation to achieve sustainability of the ocean for future generations.” The leaders of ROK, Japan and China also agreed to work together to “complete the work of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution at its fifth session (INC-5), which will be held in Busan, South Korea, in November 2024.”[xlv] In addition, the declaration outlines specific projects and initiatives under the Trilateral Cooperation in areas, such as people-to-people exchanges, sustainable development, economic cooperation and trade, public health, ageing society, science and technology collaboration, digital transformation and disaster relief and safety.[xlvi]

Regional and International Peace and Prosperity 

On regional and international peace and prosperity, the leaders of the three countries reaffirmed their commitments to maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in Northeast Asia, including addressing issues related to the Korean Peninsula and supporting ASEAN frameworks, such as the ASEAN+3 (APT), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).[xlvii] Together, the three leaders also expressed their strong support for ASEAN Centrality and unity. They also pledged to engage in other multilateral frameworks, such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), given that the three countries are currently serving together as members of the UNSC in 2024.[xlviii]

In terms of regional security and peace, apart from the North Korean provocations, the Taiwan Straits issue was also avoided in the joint declaration. Prime Minister Kishida had highlighted the Taiwan Straits issue during his bilateral with Premier Li, which was rebutted by Premier Li.[xlix] On the other hand, according to the Xinhua news agency, the South Korean President adhered to the “one-China” principle during his meeting with Premier Li.[l] Therefore, there was no consensus statement issued regarding the Taiwan Straits in the joint declaration for the Trilateral. 

Joint Statement on a 10 Year Vision for Trilateral IP Cooperation 

This joint statement, the first of the two documents in attachment to the joint declaration, primarily outlined a 10-year vision for intellectual property (IP) cooperation. It acknowledged the role played by the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO), and the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) in launching the trilateral IP cooperation back in 2001 to “facilitate exchanges and utilisation of patent examination information, harmonizing patent examination practices, and establishing international norms.”[li]

The joint statement on IP anticipates a more intensive convergence between industries and technologies in the next decade. Therefore, it emphasises the importance of technological progress and innovation in overcoming global crises like COVID-19. The statement outlines specific goals for the next decade, including establishing an IP system adaptable to fast-changing technologies, enhancing public accessibility to patent information, and expanding IP cooperation beyond the three countries to include other regions in tandem with the Trilateral + X Cooperation framework, and terming it “Trilateral + X IP cooperation.”[lii]

Joint Statement on Future Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response 

This statement, the second document attached with the joint declaration, focuses on strengthening national and global efforts, building a multi-sectoral approach, and fostering regional and international collaboration to prevent, prepare for, and respond to future pandemics. The joint statement emphasised that the three countries “need to actively address future pandemics and public health emergencies through the implementation of relevant national strategies and activities to enhance international cooperation.”[liii] The joint statement goes on to outline five steps to be undertaken collectively, which are:

1. Emphasising Universal Health Coverage (UHC) for a stronger global health architecture.
2. Improving equity in access to medical countermeasures (MCM) against infectious diseases, including vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics based on public health risks and needs. Join global efforts through international organisations and related funding, thereby contributing to making the world safer from infectious diseases.
3. Enhancing multi-sectoral approaches to dealing with infectious disease outbreaks and clarifying the goals and responsibilities of each sector involved in pandemic prevention, preparedness and response.
4. Increasing significance of the “One-Health” approach, which integrates human, animal and ecosystem health, in preventing, preparing for, and responding to future pandemics and public health emergencies.
5. Committing to strategic cooperation in health security to promote peace and prosperity in the region, including strengthening regional health security through bilateral and multilateral initiatives, joint research, policy dialogues and sharing of experiences.

Conclusion 

The much-awaited South Korea-Japan-China Trilateral Leaders’ Summit has finally been restarted after a gap of four years since the last meeting in 2019. Amidst multifaceted challenges surrounding the regional and international security environment, this particular trilateral agreement arrives as an attempt at a “comprehensive resumption of cooperation between East Asia’s economic powerhouses,” per Premier Li Qiang.[liv]

There is a school of thought that considers the resumption of the South Korea-Japan-China Trilateral an attempt by China to influence Seoul and Tokyo away from their deepening engagements with the US and its allies on regional security issues. However, obstacles are likely to emerge since the effectiveness of this trilateral endeavour depends heavily on establishing trust, confronting past matters, and accommodating the concerns of involved parties. Managing the power dynamics in the region also demands a nuanced approach, balancing the promotion of collaboration with the handling of competition, with the ultimate goal of fostering a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia that benefits everyone.

*****

*Dr Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, ICWA.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Hyonhee Shin, 2024, “South Korea, China, Japan to hold first summit in four years on May 26-27,” Reuters¸ May 23, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-china-japan-hold-summit-seoul-may-26-27-reports-yonhap-2024-05-23/ (Accessed 24 May 2024).

[ii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019, “The Eighth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit,” December 24, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page3e_001141.html (Accessed 24 May 2024).

[iii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023, “The Tenth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” November 26, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page6e_000402.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[iv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019, “The Ninth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” August 21, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page3e_001060.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[v] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023, “The Tenth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” November 26, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page6e_000402.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[vi] Stephen M. Walt, 1985, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, 9(4): 3–43, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540 (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[vii] Yasuhiro Izumikawa, 2020, “Network Connections and the Emergence of the Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System in East Asia,” International Security, 45 (2): 7–50, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00389 (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[viii] Global Times, 2024, “China blasts US-Japan-Philippines summit, lodges representations,” April 12, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202404/1310515.shtml (Accessed 24 May 2024).

[ix] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, “The Ninth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit,” May 27, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/pageite_000001_00376.html (Accessed 28 May 2024)

[x] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, “Japan-ROK Summit Meeting,” May 26, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/pageite_000001_00372.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xi] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, “Japan-ROK Summit Meeting,” May 26, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/pageite_000001_00372.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xii] Kyodo News, 2023, “Line operator says 440,000 personal records leaked in data breach,” November 27, 2023, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/11/0542908c40ad-line-operator-says-400000-personal-data-items-possibly-leaked.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xiii] Kim Eun-jung, 2024, “Yoon, Kishida agree on close communication over Naver's Line app row,” Yonhap News Agency, May 26, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240526004252315?section=national/diplomacy (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xiv] Kyodo News, 2024, “Japan, South Korea to deepen ties ahead of 60th anniv.: Kishida,” May 26, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/05/fe2374cafc08-kishida-yoon-to-agree-to-cooperate-on-n-korea-security-threats.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, “Japan-ROK Summit Meeting,” May 26, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/pageite_000001_00372.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xvi] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, “Japan-China Summit Meeting,” May 26, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/pageite_000001_00373.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xvii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, “Japan-China Summit Meeting,” May 26, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/pageite_000001_00373.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xviii] The State Council Information Office People’s Republic of China, 2024, “Chinese premier urges Japan to work with China in the same direction,” Xinhua, May 27, 2024, http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2024-05/27/content_117215460.htm (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xix] Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, 2024, “Japan-China Summit Meeting (Summary),” May 26, 2024, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/diplomatic/202405/26china.html (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xx] The State Council Information Office People’s Republic of China, 2024, “Chinese premier urges Japan to work with China in the same direction,” Xinhua, May 27, 2024, http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2024-05/27/content_117215460.htm (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xxi] Ji Da-gyum, 2023, “China continues to pounce on Yoon’s Taiwan remarks ahead of S.Korea-US summit,” The Korea Herald, April 23, 2023, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230423000112 (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xxii] Hankyoreh, 2024, “S. Korea and China to launch diplomatic, security dialogue,” May 27, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1142247.html (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xxiii] Kim Eun-jung, 2024, “S. Korea, China agree to establish diplomatic security dialogue,” Yonhap News Agency, May 26, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240526003851315 (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xxiv] Hankyoreh, 2024, “S. Korea and China to launch diplomatic, security dialogue,” May 27, 2024, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1142247.html (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xxv] Kim Eun-jung, 2024, “S. Korea, China agree to establish diplomatic security dialogue,” Yonhap News Agency, May 26, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240526003851315 (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xxvi] People’s Daily Online, 2024, “Chinese premier urges Seoul to join Beijing in grasping general direction of bilateral friendship,” Xinhua, May 27, 2024, http://en.people.cn/n3/2024/0527/c90000-20174268.html (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xxvii] People’s Daily Online, 2024, “China, S. Korea building up momentum to grow ties, bolster cooperation,” Xinhua, May 27, 2024, http://en.people.cn/n3/2024/0527/c90000-20174758.html (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xxviii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, “The Ninth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit,” May 27, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/pageite_000001_00376.html (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xxix] Kim Han-joo, 2024, “Trilateral summit's statement to possibly include resolution of N. Korea's abduction: sources,” Yonhap News Agency, May 24, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240524001100315?section=nk/nk (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xxx] Jeongmin Kim and Shreyas Reddy, 2024, “North Korean military spy satellite launch ends in failure after rocket explodes”, NK News, May 27, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/05/north-korea-launches-unidentified-projectile-from-main-spaceport-seoul/ (Accessed 31 May 2024)

[xxxi] Choi Kyong-ae, 2024, “N. Korea sends over 260 balloons carrying trash into S. Korea: Seoul military”, Yonhap News Agency, May 29, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240529002256315?section=nk/nk (Accessed 31 May 2024)

[xxxii] Kyodo News, 2024, “North Korea fires over 10 suspected short-range ballistic missiles”, May 30, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/05/57d2ee59b213-update2-n-korea-fires-short-range-ballistic-missiles-toward-sea-of-japan.html (Accessed 31 May 2024)

[xxxiii] Steven Borowiec, 2024, “North Korea's latest provocations signal frustration with Beijing”, Nikkei Asia, May 31, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/North-Korea-s-latest-provocations-signal-frustration-with-Beijing (Accessed 31 May 2024)

[xxxiv] Jeongmin Kim and Joon Ha Park, 2024, “China silent on North Korea’s satellite launch plans at Seoul trilateral summit”, NK News, May 27, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/05/china-silent-on-north-koreas-satellite-launch-plans-at-seoul-trilateral-summit/ (Accessed 31 May 2024)

[xxxv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea, 2024, “Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit”, May 27, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=321010 (Accessed 28 May 2024)

[xxxvi] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019, “Trilateral Cooperation Vision for the Next Decade”, December 24, 2019, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000552950.pdf (Accessed 29 May 2024)

[xxxvii] Tomoyuki Tachikawa, 2024, “Japan, South Korea, China to pursue North Korea denuclearization: Kishida”, Kyodo News, May 27, 2024, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/05/844fe5afa077-japan-s-korea-china-leaders-likely-to-agree-on-broad-cooperation.html (Accessed 31 May 2024)

[xxxviii] Kyodo News, 2023, “Russia proposes regular security talks with North Korea, China,” October 19, 2023, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/10/5344e62d2ad2-n-korea-russia-agree-to-deepen-cooperation-during-lavrov-visit.html (Accessed 30 May 2024).

[xxxix] Chad De Guzman, 2023, “Why China, Russia, and North Korea Joining Forces in the Indo-Pacific Isn’t a Prelude to War,” Time, September 5, 2023, https://time.com/6310786/china-russia-north-korea-indo-pacific-alliance/ (Accessed 30 May 2024).

[xl] The Guardian, 2024, “China reaffirms ties with North Korea in high-level meeting,” April 13, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/13/china-reaffirms-ties-with-north-korea-in-high-level-pyongyang-meeting (Accessed 30 May 2024).

[xli] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, “Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit,” May 27, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100675321.pdf (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xlii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea, 2024, “Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit,” May 27, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=321010 (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xliii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024, “Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit,” May 27, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100675321.pdf (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xliv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea, 2024, “Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit,” May 27, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=321010 (Accessed 28 May 2024).

[xlv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea, 2024, “Joint Declaration of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit,” May 27, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=321010 (Accessed 28 May 2024).

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