Indian Council of World Affairs

China has initiated the rapid construction of Xiaokang border villages in Tibet, close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Middle and Eastern sectors of the India-China border. Consequently, it has emerged as another point of friction in the India-China relation. 

This paper delves into the concept of Xiaokang and its geostrategic implications for India. 

Background 

The genesis of the term Xiaokang can be traced back to the Chinese Book of Songs, dating back to 2000 years ago.[i]  In Mandarin, the term Xiaokangimplies“moderateprosperity”.[ii]This ancient concept was revitalized in modern times by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, who used the term to describeChina’s modernisation goal,which aimed to elevate China from its low-income countrystatus.Consequently,Xiaokang became a key developmental objective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Throughthe 12^th National Congress in 1982, Hu Yaobang madeXiaokang the medium for achieving China’s economic development to ensure that people could live a life of moderate material and cultural prosperity by the end of the 20th century.[iii]

In the following years,the Xiaokang modelgained significant relevance as it evolved into a concept that encompassed a comprehensive development of Chinesesociety in “all aspects.”At the 16^th National Congress in 2002,Hu Jintao emphasized achieving a Xiaokang society in “all aspect”,which implies achieving development targets in multiple areas, including democracy, science and education, cultural and social harmony.[iv]

In the 18^th National Congress in 2012,Xi Jinping expanded China’s Xiaokang goal by declaring it the first centenary goal, which is to be achieved by 2021.[v]Notably, Xi Jinping’s prioritisation of raising the living standards of rural residents and his strategy of successfully building a Xiaokang society coincided with the timing of introducing Xiaokang border villages in Tibet in 2017. Although economic development and rural revitalizationwere supposed to be the main elements of building a Xiaokang society,they appear to be strategically calculated in the name of development.

Xiaokangin Tibet

Xiaokanghas become a part of Xi Jinping's visible interest in the Tibet region to consolidate  hold over the territory. His strategy of securitising the frontiers of Tibet and assimilating the Tibetan people into the Chinese nation-state[vi]has resulted in China issuing the “Plan for the Construction of Well-off Villages in Border Areas of the Tibet Autonomous Region (2017-2020)”. Under the plan,China completed the construction of over 604 border villages,and 130 border roads were renovated.[vii]TheXiaokang model aims to populate the 21 Himalayan border counties, including Nyingchi, Shannan, Shigatse, and Ngari prefectures. Overall, the planaims to construct new Xiaokangborder houses, infrastructure, and public service facilities in these counties to enrich the border areas and create a strong border force in the border areas of Tibet.[viii]

Seemingly, it is China’s relentless effort to extend its military power across its borders with India. It is also a means of combining the ideological framework of Xiaokang,which in turn encourages these border residents to view their role as an active border defence, blending traditional values with modern nationalistic sentiments.

Geopolitical Implicationsof Xiaokang

Mainling County 2024

Mainling County 2009

Source: Google Earth Satellite Image (MAP 1)

The development changes in border areas of Tibet are evident in Map 1. Located just 12 km from the eastern part of LAC, Mainling County, a prefecture-level city in Nyingchi in eastern Tibet, has undergone significant improvements. In 2009, MainlingCounty was relatively underdeveloped compared to its current state in 2024. These changes have become more pronounced following Xi Jinping's implementation of the Xiaokang policy in Tibet in 2017. The proliferation of Xiaokangvillages in these border counties of Tibet is seen as China’s attempt to increase its presence on the borders indirectly. It is evident from the increase in Han population in Tibet from 8.2 percent in 2010 to 12.2 percent in 2020 and the decrease in Tibetan population from 90.5percent in 2010 to 86 percent in 2020.[ix]All supplements Xi Jinping’s Xiaokang plan in Tibet. 

It is pertinent to note that the Xiaokangborder plan aimsto populate the border areas with people loyal to the CCP to create a civilian border force through its military-civilian fusion strategy, which has been increasingly promoted under Xi Jinping’s term.Given China’s emphasis on military-civilian fusion, it is natural to expect that these Xiaokang border villageswill serve as a forward border post for troop deployment. The broad networks of roads and active civilian force near the border would act as a border defence force and an active deployment of resources in cases of border skirmishes. As a result, these villages would act as extended troop cantonments near the LAC. 

Developing these Xiaokang villages as a forward post for border patrolling and troop deployment also reflects China’s preparedness to consolidate its hold over disputed territory. For instance, 100Xiaokang village homes were built by China on the banks of the River Tsari Chu in the upper Subansari District of Arunachal Pradesh.[x]Additionally, the establishment of the Xiaokangbordervillage near Tawang and in the Chumbi Valley region near the Siliguri Corridor has raisedconcern for India’s security. 

The establishment of Xiaokang villages close to the LAC is also against the spirit of the 2005 agreement between India and China concerning the “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the settlement of the India-China Boundary Question”. According to Article VII of the 2005 agreement “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas”.[xi]By populating and re-populating these border areas, China’s action can be interpreted as a move to claim the disputed territories by arguing that these areas are inhabited by a “settled population”.Consequently, the illegal transgression into Indian territories through the salami slicing technique by constructingXiaokangvillages and eventually expanding them into settled populations would allow China to tactically influence Article VII of the 2005 agreement.Article VII of the 2005 agreement also implies the importance of maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas to prevent the escalation of conflicts and preserve the interests of the border people. However, by constructing border villages close to the LAC, China has created tensions along the LAC. All indicate a disregard for maintaining peace and stability in the border areas, thus violating Article VII of the 2005 agreement.In addition,Article IV of the 2005 agreement also noted that “The two sides will give due consideration to each other’s strategic and reasonable interests, and the principle of mutual and equal security”.[xii]However, the construction of the Xiaokang border villages close to the LAC, Tawang, and Siliguri Corridorhas acted in a way that has violated India’s strategic interests. 

Conclusion 

By constructing border villages and military structures in close proximity tothe LAC, Tawang, and Siliguri Corridor, and disputed areas,China has acted in a way that poses a threat to India’s security.China aims to unilaterally consolidate its position along the LAC. These developments close to the LAC would further aggravate the already tense situation between India and China.

*****

*Sibani Choudhury, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] “China Focus: Xi Declares China a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects.” Xinhua, July 1, 2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2021-07/01/c_1310038553.htm. (Accessed on 16 May 2024).

[ii]“Full Text: China’s Epic Journey from Poverty to Prosperity.” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, September 28, 2021. http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2021-09/28/content_77779569_3.htm.(Accessed on 29 May 2024).

[iii]Ibid.

[iv]Ibid.

[v]“Full Text: China’s Epic Journey from Poverty to Prosperity.” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, September 28, 2021. http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2021-09/28/content_77779569_3.htm. (Accessed on 29 May 2024).

[vi] International Campaign for Tibet. “Xi’s 10 Years in Tibet Focus of New Report.” International Campaign for Tibet, August 8, 2023. https://savetibet.org/xis-10-years-in-tibet-focus-of-new-report/. (Accessed on 29 May 2024).

[vii]“Well-off villages light up Tibet’s border areas.” Xinhua May 31, 2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com/local/2021-05/31/c_1127514303.htm. (Accessed on 19 May 2024)

[viii] “Accelerate the construction of well-off villages in Tibet border areas.” People's Political Consultative Conference Newspaper, September 24, 2020. http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2020/09/24/ARTI1600907994469243.shtml. (Accessed on 3 June 2024).

[ix] Hu, Angang, and Shaojie Zhou. “China’s ‘Miracle of Poverty Reduction’: From an Extremely Poor Country to a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects.” SpringerLink, March 23, 2024. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-97-0938-0_1. (Accessed on 3 June 2024).

[x] TNN / Nov 19, 2021. “Second Chinese Village along Arunachal Border: Satellite Images: India News - Times of India.” The Times of India. November 19, 2021. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/second-chinese-village-along-arunachal-border-sat-images/articleshow/87788526.cms. (Accessed 27 May 2024).

[xi] Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the political parameters and guiding principles for the settlement of the India-China, April 11, 2005. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6534/Agreement+between+the+Government+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Government+of+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+the+Political+Parameters+and+Guiding+Principles+for+the+Settlement+of+the+IndiaChina+Boundary+Question. (Accessed on 29 May, 2024)

[xii]Ibid