Indian Council of World Affairs

In June 2024, the Al- Aza’im foundation published the 36^th issue of Islamic State Khorasan Province’s (ISKP)english magazineVoice of Khorasan. It slams the Afghan Taliban for engaging with “unbeliever” states like India, China, and Russia, and allegedly abandoning the implementation of Shari’a in Afghanistan. The issue also contains messages against India, with its cover mentioning “O Indian infidel kings! Be ready to face Mahmud Ghaznawi again.”^[i]Just three months ago, on 22 March 2024, one of the deadliest attacks in recent years, that killed 145 people at the Crocus Hall in Moscow, was claimed by ISKP. While experts had observed that ISKP, a terror group that carried out as many as 130 attacks in 2018, may not be as potent in its operational and functional capabilities today[ii],yet, these recent episodes make it imperative to raise serious concerns about ISKP’s links and their implications.What may be noted are the growing evidences of ISKP within Pakistan, making it a threat, not just for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, but for the whole of Central Asia and South Asia at large.This paper delves into the linkages of ISKP in Pakistan and enumerates several evidences in support. It also examines the implications of the rise of ISKP within the region. 
 
The Rise of ISKP and the Pakistan factor 

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was formed in 2015 with Hafiz Saeed Khan becoming its first emir. ISKP is identified as an affiliate of the terror group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which was later named as the Islamic State. Its activities are aimed at establishing a global Caliphate, under which ISKP works towards strengthening the WilayatKhorasan (Islamic Province of Khorasan). Khorasan refers to the modern day parts of South and Central Asia.It found core ground in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and had made some advances in occupying territories, particularly in the regions of Nangarhar and Kunar, but were soon defeated and rooted out by the Afghan Taliban. The Taliban and ISKP have been at loggerheads. Their rivalry for resources, validation, leadership, and ideological supremacy is making ISKP a challenge for the Afghan Taliban. 

ISKP’s formation saw the participation of many key individuals and factions from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghan Taliban, and Al-Qaeda. TTP is the deadliest militant organisation in Pakistan, popularly known as the “Pakistani Taliban”. It was formed in 2007, and since then has maintained close association with the Afghan Taliban, with Noor WaliMehsud, the emir of TTP renewing TTP’s allegiance to the Afghan Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.[iii]Many of the founding figures of ISKP, such as Hafiz Saeed Khan and Abu SayedBajauriwere former TTP commanders.Most of the emirs of ISKP, including the first four were Pakistani nationals. Evidently, ISKP had deep connections within Pakistan. TTP defectors make a very significant portion of the ISKP leadership and cadres. One of the biggest reasons for this was the intensity of the conflict between TTP and the Pakistani state. The intensification of the conflict between them, makes it much more beneficial for the TTP commanders to defect and assume leadership role in ISKP.^[iv]

Enumerating evidences 

Several evidences point towards ISKP’s suspected Pakistani connection, including reports that reflect on ISKP shifting much of its operational base from Afghanistan to Pakistan.^[v] First, in April 2024, the authorities of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan arrested some Tajiks. Allegedly,they were recruited by ISKP while in Russia and were instructed to travel to Quetta. There they were supposed to receive their training (both religious, and military), and were instructed to disperse to different conflict zones upon completion.[vi]Second, a speech on April 25, 2024, by Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, mentions how three of Afghanistan’s neighbours have contributed to the rise of ISKP – one becoming a source of new recruits, one serving as the transit route, and the third for providing centres for planning, training, and funding the group’s activities[vii]. Third, in a meeting at the UN Headquarter on March 27, 2024, Dr.NaseemBaloch, the Chairman of the Baloch National Movement, was also quoted saying, “the active camps of the international terrorist organization known as Daesh are operating in Balochistan under the direct supervision and support of the Pakistani army.”[viii]Fourth, the former spokesperson of the TTP and Jamaatul-Ahrar, Ehsanullah.Ehsan, presents this evidences in a series of articles published in The Sunday Guardian, and talks about the “Dabori Agreement” (named after Dabori, a place in the Orakzai district of Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa), which took place between the Pakistani Security Agencies and the top ranks of ISKP. He believes this agreement is the reason why ISKP, while having a strong presence in Pakistan, has always focused its activities in Afghanistan, and in return, the Pakistani agencies have taken minimal actions against them.[ix]In fact, Ehsan mentions several names from the Pakistani security forces, who claim to have been involved in protecting and facilitating the ISKP cadres in Bajaur.[x] Fifth, Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, a founding member of the ISKP, and formerly a part of Daesh’s central Shura, after surrendering to the Afghan Taliban, also became a source of similar evidence. In a video that surfaced on “X”, he can be seen talking about how many Pakistani Army/ISI officers had facilitated the financial support for Hafiz SaeedKhan for the formation of ISKP.[xi]Sixth, in 2020, the arrest and subsequent interrogation of the then ISKP chief, AslamFarooqi aka Mawlawi Abdullah, a Pakistani national, by Afghan security forces reveal many links between the group and Pakistan’s ISI.[xii] All these connections need to be factored in while understanding and analysing the rise of ISKP and the implications thereafter. 

Implications of ISKP-Pakistan links

Pakistan, through its sway over groups such as ISKP, attempts at increasing and asserting its influence, especially in its neighbourhood. The rivalry between the Afghan Taliban and the ISKP, can be seen to have influenced the rivalry between TTP and ISKP as well. Therefore, the control and influence over ISKP seems to be one of the primary tactics which Pakistan has employed to keep the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the TTP in check. Another reason, especially after the Crocus Hall attack in March 2024, seems to be that with the group’s extending reach in Central Asia, Pakistan wants to maintain its importance as a primary fighting force against such groups in the region. This is similar to Pakistan’s role during the Global War on Terror, where it posed itself as the primary defence against such groups (in Afghanistan), through which it plans to capitalise on that image.

In 2011, Hillary Clinton famously said, “You can't keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours”. This has come to strongly apply to Pakistan, especially after 2021,when Pakistan’s western front has remained disturbed. Since 2020, ISKP has carried out a number of large and small attacks in the Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (KPK), and Balochistan, with the last major attack carried out in an election rally in the Bajaur district in KPK in July 2023, which resulted in the death of more than 60 people.[xiii]

Pakistan’s linkage with ISKP also poses a threat for India. The anti-India posturing reflected in the 36^th issue of the Voice of Khurasan hints that Pakistan might not just be using ISKP as a check on the Afghan Taliban and the TTP, but also for continuing its agenda of sponsoring terrorism, not just in Jammu and Kashmir, but in other parts of India as well. It may be noted that this is not the first time that ISKP has issued warnings and threats against India. Several video messages and articles have been released by the ISKP against India in the past. Additionally, a UN Security Council report published in July 2023 had identified India as a peripheral country, where groups like ISKP and Al-Qaeda are planning to increase their operations^[xiv][xv]. This report should be seen with earlier reports of ISI’s attempts to shift many ISKP cadres to the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, to increase their disruptions in Jammu and Kashmir^[xvi][xvii]. All of these point towards the potential of ISKP’s disruption level, with its deep-links in Pakistan.

Conclusion

In the past, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s meteoric rise and expansion in 2014 left many hard-learned lessons for the world. It is not only crucial to identify the factors that shape ISKP’s path and activities in the region but also analyse the connections between ISKP and the Pakistani state, which is no secret today. However, threat will continue to loom if countries in the region do not fight terrorism in a comprehensive and coordinated manner.

*****

*Arnav Mishra, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes 

[i]Memri. (2024, June 12). Article In Issue 36 Of ISKP Magazine 'Voice Of Khurasan' Slams Afghan Taliban For Abandoning Implementation Of Shari'a In Afghanistan, For Befriending Unbeliever Countries Like U.S., China, Russia, Israel, India. Memeri, Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor. https://www.memri.org/jttm/article-issue-36-iskp-magazine-voice-khurasan-slams-afghan-taliban-abandoning-implementation

[ii]Sareen, S. (2021, August 29). ISKP: The exaggerated threat. Observer Research Foundation.https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/iskp-the-exaggerated-threat

[iii] Joscelyn, T. (2021, August 19). Pakistani Taliban’s emir renews allegiance to Afghan Taliban. FDD's Long War Journal.https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/08/pakistani-talibans-emir-renews-allegiance-to-afghan-taliban.php

[iv]Jadoon, A., & Mines, A. (2019, September).Taking Aim: Islamic State Khorasan’s Leadership Losses.CTCSentinel, 12(8).CTC at West Point.https://ctc.westpoint.edu/taking-aim-islamic-state-khorasans-leadership-losses/

[v] Al Mirsad. (2024, April 29). This group has transferred its headquarters and leadership to Pakistan. X (formerly Twitter). https://x.com/AlmirsadEnglish/status/1784956549951029299

[vi] Al Mirsad. (2024, April 09). X (formerly Twitter). https://x.com/AlmirsadEnglish/status/1777677494352495039

[vii] Al Mirsad. (2024, April 25). FM Muttaqi: one neighboring country serves as a recruitment center

for the ISKP, another as a transit route, and a third providing centers for planning and fundraising

for the group. Al Mirsad. https://almirsaden.com/fm-muttaqi-one-neighboring-country-serves-as-a-

recruitment-center-for-the-iskp-another-as-a-transit-route-and-a-third-providing-centers-for-planning-

and-fundraising-for-the-group/

[viii]InfoSecBNM. (2024, March 27). Chairman BNM Dr.NaseemBaloch Raises Concerns Over Active

Daesh Camps in Balochistan at UN Side Event Baloch National Movement.Baloch National

Movement.https://thebnm.org/chairperson/20355/

[ix]Ehsan, E. (2023, December 10). ISIS leadership enjoying hospitality of Pakistan agencies - The

Sunday Guardian Live.Sunday Guardian. https://sundayguardianlive.com/top-five/isis-leadership-

enjoying-hospitality-of-pakistan-agencies

[x]Ehsan, E. (2023, December 24). Pak Army's IqbalJadoon, Rao Imran, Khalil TajKeyani protecting

ISIS radicals - The Sunday Guardian Live.Sunday Guardian. https://sundayguardianlive.com/top-

five/pak-armys-iqbal-jadoon-rao-imran-khalil-taj-keyani-protecting-isis-radicals

[xi]Afghan Analyst. (2023, January 29). Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost saying that Pak Army/ISI

officers provided financial support to Hafiz Saeed Khan [X]. X.

https://x.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1619456385233854464

[xii] Gupta, S. (2020, April 4). ISKP chief's arrest for gurdwara attack brings out clear link to Pakistan's

ISI: Official. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/iskp-chief-s-arrest-for-

gurdwara-attack-brings-out-clear-link-to-pakistan-s-isi-official/story-

NPxxscxPawaFkD0y0WrALN.html

[xiii]Palmer, ., & Holtz, M. (2023, August 3). The Islamic State Threat in Pakistan: Trends and

Scenarios.CSIS.https://www.csis.org/analysis/islamic-state-threat-pakistan-trends-and-scenarios

[xiv]UN Security Council. (2023, July 25). Report.UNSC.https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4016440?ln=en&v=pdf

[xv] Lt. General P.C. Katoch (Retd). (2023, August 14). Terror Shadow Over India. SP's Land Forces. https://www.spslandforces.com/experts-speak/?id=1038&h=Terror-Shadow-Over-India

[xvi] IANS. (2023, March 25). ISI sending ISKP cadre to PoK to hit J&K in a big way: Intel. IANS. https://www.ians.in/english-wire-detail/isi-sending-iskp-cadre-to-pok-to-hit-jk-in-a-big-way-intel1716251

[xvii]Times Now Digital. (2021, September 9). Pakistan's ISI sending Islamic State-Khorasan Province cadre to PoK for big strike in Kashmir: Intel reports. Times Now. https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/pakistan-isi-sending-islamic-state-khorasan-province-cadre-to-pok-for-big-strike-in-kashmir-intel-reports/810035