Indian Council of World Affairs

On 23 June 2024, the Office of the Prime Minister of Pakistan (PMO) issued a statement announcing the launch of an operation, Azm-i-Istehkam. Its objective was defined as “to combat the menace of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner.” Given that terrorism has been on the rise in Pakistan, it was stated that a “reinvigorated and re-energised national counter-terrorism campaign” was required. The question is: will this operation be different from previous operations undertaken by Islamabad to combat terrorism, which has so far had no substantial impact on uprooting terrorism from Pakistan at large? Many aspects of Operation Azm-i-Istehkam hint that Shehbaz Sharif’s government has taken this step more for optics than for fighting terrorism. 

Past Picture 

During Chief of Army Staff’s, General Kayani’s, tenure, Pakistan launched a series of military campaigns to recapture territories that had fallen to militant groups, especially in north-western areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), which comprised seven agencies and merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa/KP in 2018.[i] Operation Rah-e-Haq (2007) and Rah-e-Rast (2009) in the Swat Valley, Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem in 2008, and Rah-e-Shahadat in 2013 are examples of the time. While some of them had immediate trigger points in incidents of attacks and kidnapping, these were projected as continuing efforts of Pakistan’s contribution to the US-led “war on terror.” Pakistan supported Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, capture the key leaders of Al Qaeda and operationally destroy them. It was during this period that Pakistan’s deep state ended nurturing the roots of terrorism even more strategically than uprooting them. 

Since the last decade, Pakistan has been facing the brunt of its own making in the form of increased terror attacks across the country. This is attributed to the rise of radical Islamist groups, such as Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and the resurgence of insurgent and terror groups like Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA).[ii] It is noted that by 2018, of an estimated 67 active terror groups around the world, 12 were in Pakistan.[iii] Consequently, in the first quarter of 2024 alone, 245 terror and counter-terror incidents were reported in Pakistan.[iv] From 26 estimated deaths due to BLA’s terror activities in 2021 to 233 recorded deaths the next year, a nine-fold increase was highlighted by the Global Terrorism Index Report of 2023.[v] Pakistani state personnel, its army men, as well as Chinese people and their interests, have increasingly been the target of attacks in the last few years. Operation Azm-i-Istehkam is said to be a response to these developments. 

Current Assessment 

Since 2014, two main instances of Pakistan’s anti-terror efforts can be cited. First, on 8 June 2014, an attack on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi by TTP men killed 34 people and wounded many more. A week later, Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched as a “comprehensive” joint military offensive to renew attempts against terrorism in the Northern Waziristan region. This was said to be full-fledged kinetic action with a strategy to “seek, destroy, clear and hold.” Like some of the operations in the past, it impacted Pakistani society and people as well. By September 2014, the number of internally displaced people (IDP) had reached a record one million.[vi] Second, on 16 December 2014, an attack by TTP at the Army Public School in Peshawar led to the massacre of 149 people, including 132 students. On 24 December, the National Action Plan (NAP) was announced to supplement ongoing anti-terror action, especially in FATA. In both cases, the trigger points for state action were clear. In the case of Operation Azm-i-Istehkam, the timing of the announcement and the nature of the campaign need deeper analysis. Four problematic areas can be highlighted in this context. 

A Chinese trigger - Notwithstanding the overall deteriorating security situation in Pakistan, the Shehbaz Sharif government had no urgent reason or trigger point to launch Operation Azm-i-Istehkam. Yet, one pressure point is visible: China. The growing resentment and protests against Chinese projects and interests in Balochistan, especially in Gwadar, have been clear. But direct attacks targeting Chinese nationals are taken as a breaking point for the all-weather friendship between Pakistan and China. The most recent incident was the 26 March 2024 suicide bombing that killed five Chinese people near the Dasu hydropower project in KP. Not only did China suggest that Pakistan must take action, but it has more than once officially said how it must do so, by “hunting down the perpetrators” and giving “severe punishments.” In addition to a clear message in this regard from the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan in April 2024,[vii] the Joint Statement by Pakistan and China[viii] published in June 2024 also specifies the severity of the recent attack, reflecting on Chinese anger over the inability of Pakistan to defend China’s projects and its people. Interestingly, Liu Jianchao, head of the International Department of China’s ruling Communist Party, had also expressed grave concern over the security situation in Pakistan, a day before the Sharif government announced the operation.[ix] It is not a surprise that the official statement by Pakistan’s PMO also notes that Operation Azm-i-Istehkam looks to “ensure full-proof security for Chinese nationals in Pakistan.” As such, it becomes quite clear that it is Chinese pressure that has made Pakistan announce an anti-terror measure. Pakistan’s aim is focused on placating China rather than taking genuine anti-terror measures. 

Confusing nature - Operation Azm-i-Istehkam, which in Urdu means “resolve for stability,” as understood initially, had two components. On the one hand, it was to be “renewed and full-blown kinetic efforts of the armed forces” with “full support from all law enforcement agencies, empowered by effective legislation” that would also aim for “award of exemplary punishments” to terrorists.[x] On the other hand, it is meant to be “duly complemented by socioeconomic measures aimed at addressing genuine concerns of the people and creating an environment that discourages extremist tendencies”.[xi] In general, there is much criticism about the collateral displacements and impact on ordinary lives in areas where a full-swing kinetic operation is put in place. It is perhaps this reason that made Islamabad decide to emphasise the softer aspects of the operation. The confusion, however, is due to a later statement from the Pakistani PMO clarifying that Azm-i-Istehkam is not a large-scale kinetic military operation. The statement read that because Pakistan had been “decisively degraded by earlier kinetic operations … no large-scale military operation is being contemplated where displacement of population will be required.”[xii] This makes it clear that the Sharif government is only toying with an anti-terror operation with a very sketchy approach. 

Growing opposition - Operation Azm-i-Istehkam was reportedly announced after a consensus was reached at a high-level meeting of the Central Apex Committee on the NAP in June 2024. [xiii] All stakeholders were present at the meeting. In the Dosra Rukh Programme of Dawn, Defence Minister Khwaja Asif also claimed that the Chief Minister of KP, Ali Amin Gandapur, had participated in the discussion on the operation. This was denied by Mr Ali, who stated that nothing about the operation was discussed. When the Pakistan PMO statement was released, it read that “complete national consensus and system-wide synergy” are the foundations of such an anti-terror measure. Unlike in 2014, when consensus was eventually reached, to implement the 20-point NAP (despite initial protests, especially by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf), the opposition seems to be growing in this case. Within the Parliament itself, no clear consensus can be seen. PTI, Jamat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur (JUI-F), Awami National Party (ANP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) have openly opposed the government’s decision on the operation. Street protests, jirgas and rallies were also held in many parts of KP, reportedly also opposing the operation in particular. Therefore, with a weak and faltering start to Operation Azm-i-Istehkam, it is unlikely that Pakistan will achieve anything through it. 

External factors -  Besides the China angle, there is fear that Operation Azm-i-Istehkam may escalate Pakistan’s tensions with the Taliban regime, with whom it has already soured relations. On 8 March 2024, cross-border strikes against TTP hideouts in Afghanistan led to further tensions between Kabul and Islamabad. Further, Islamabad continues to state that it will not shy away from repeating such a strike. Now that Azm-i-Istehkam seeks regional cooperation in fighting terrorism and therefore hints at tactical cross-border attacks, including within Afghanistan and Iran, Pakistan’s ties with its Western neighbours are expected to go through more troubled times. Meanwhile, Pakistan has sought “small arms and modern equipment” from the US.[xiv]

Conclusion 

Despite the various military operations that Pakistan has undertaken to deal with terrorism, nothing substantial has been gained in this regard. On the contrary, Pakistan managed to abet terrorism for decades in the name of fighting it. As a result, the rise of terror groups and militancy has become a major security problem for Islamabad. In April 2023, Shehbaz Sharif, as PM, announced plans for an anti-terror operation, which never materialised.[xv] There are many reasons to believe that Operation Azm-i-Istehkam will be no more than just yet another operation launched in Pakistan.

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*Dr Shrabana Barua is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] See Zahid Ali Khan, ‘Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan,’ Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 2014, URL: https://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1339999992_58398784.pdf.

[ii] Shrabana Barua, ‘Why Balochistan Needs More Attention within Pakistan,’ ICWA Issue Brief, April 11, 2023, URL: /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9260&lid=6008

[iii] Centre for Strategic and International Studies study, as cited in Sudhakar Jee, ‘Understanding Pakistan’s deep state and its threat to world,’ India Sentinels, November 06, 2021, URL: https://www.indiasentinels.com/opinion/understanding-pakistans-deep-state-and-its-threat-to-world-5204.

[iv] Business Standard, ‘Pak sees 245 terror attacks, counter-terror operations in first qtr of 2024,’ April 01, 2024, URL: https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/pak-sees-245-terror-attacks-counter-terror-operations-in-first-qtr-of-2024-124040100264_1.html#:~:text=Pakistan%20witnessed%20as%20many%20as,to%20a%20think%20tank%20report.

[v] Global Terrorism Index 2023, Institute for Economic and Peace. URL: https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-270323.pdf.

[vi] ‘Pakistan’s IDPs reach record one million,’ Al Jazeera, September 01, 2014, URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/9/1/pakistans-idps-reach-record-one-million

[vii] H.E. Jiang Zaidon, Ambassador of the PRC to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ‘Implement a Holistic Approach to National Security, Write a Security Chapter in Building the China-Pakistan Community With a Shared Future,’ April 2024.

[viii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, ‘Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,’ June 07, 2024, URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202406/t20240609_11415903.html#:~:text=The%20Chinese%20side%20reiterated%20its,and%20prosperity%2C%20in%20firmly%20combating.

[ix] Prabhas K. Datta, ‘Is China behind Pakistan’s anti-terro drive Azm-i-Istehkam? It’s not a first,’ Firstpost, July 01, 2024, URL: https://www.firstpost.com/world/is-china-behind-pakistans-anti-terror-drive-azm-e-istehkam-its-not-a-first-13788006.html

[x] The Khorasan Diaries on X, June 22, 2024, URL: https://x.com/khorasandiary/status/1804538109159158270.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] As quoted in ‘Azm-i-Istehkam is no large-scale military op,’ Dawn, June 25, 2024, URL: https://www.dawn.com/news/1841822

[xiii] PTV News, on X, June 25, 2024, URL: https://x.com/PTVNewsOfficial/status/1805318487042408914.

[xiv] ‘Pakistan seeks small arms from US for ‘Operation Azm-i-Istehkam,’’ Indian Express, June 29, 2024, URL: https://indianexpress.com/article/pakistan/pakistan-seeks-small-arms-from-us-for-operation-azm-i-istehkam-9422578/#:~:text=Pakistan's%20ambassador%20to%20the%20US,newly%20approved%20counter%2Dterrorism%20initiative.

[xv] ‘Amid turmoil, Pakistan to launch operation against armed groups,’ Al Jazeera, URL: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/7/amid-turmoil-pakistan-to-launch-operation-against-armed-groups.