Indian Council of World Affairs

The swearing in Ceremony of the newly elected President Mahamat Deby, held on May24, 2024, marks the end of three years of military rule in the oil rich Chad[i]. Eight African Head of States and the French Minister of Foreign Trade and Francophonie, Franck Reister attended the swearing in ceremony. According to the National Election Management Agency of Chad, President Mahamat Deby secured more than 61 % of the votes, while his key opponent Succes Masara won 18.3% votes. It is for the first time that Chad has witnessed a peaceful transition of power. Chad’s transition to democracy is of significance given that it is one of the several states in the Sahel region where the military government had seized power in 2021 and it is the first to organize the elections.  A stable and peaceful transition to democracy is essential not only for Chad but also for the region at large.[ii] This election has also set the precedent for how the regional organizations like African Union and the Economic Community of Central African States respond to the challenges posed when a coup leader gets elected as the Head of the State. The western powers in particular France and US have welcomed Chad’s democratic transition as a milestone and urged the Chadian authorities to work with all the stakeholders to strengthen the inclusivity and transparency of Chad’s institutions[iii]. Both France and US have also been interested in Chad’s transition to democracy as it would be convenient for them to engage with the democratically elected governments rather than the military regimes given their past experience with the military governments in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Besides being a key ally of the Western powers in the region, Chad has also turned to Russia and has increased its engagement with the Middle Eastern countries. 

In this context, this paper examines significance of Chad’s democratic transition and the foreign policy priorities of the new government in Chad. 

Significance of Chad’s Democratic Transition 

Military leader Mahamat Deby assumed Chad’s Presidency and formed a transitional military government in April 2021, following the sudden demise of his father, President Idriss Deby Into, while battling rebels in Northern Chad. The opposition leaders dubbed Mahamat Deby’s takeover as the President of Chad in April 2021 as a constitutional coup, as right after coming to power, President Deby declared a curfew, suspended the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and declared an 18 months transition to civilian rule, which was later extended for another 24 months till October 2024. 

However, it is to be noted that Mahamat Deby’s announcement of the Presidential elections conducted in May 2024, which was initially scheduled for October 2024, showed his intention to complete the transition faster than the stipulated time frame and earlier than its neighbors like Mali and Burkina Faso where the military juntas have kept delaying their promised elections[iv]. In Burkina Faso, for instance, the military government under President Ibrahim Traore has postponed the elections, which were supposed to take place in July 2024, indefinitely, claiming that they are not a priority. Similarly, in Guinea, the transitional regime is continuing. [v] Chad’s neighboring state Sudan has been undergoing a civil war for the past one year.[vi]. Thus, democratic transition of Chad is significant as it marks a step towards Chad’s political stability and the political stability of the region, setting a precedent for other countries under military rule in the Sahel region. This may instill a trajectory of transition in the states which have encountered military coups and are governed by the transitional military councils. ^[vii]However, it remains to be seen whether it will lead to peace and stability in the region, given that Chad is surrounded by the countries affected by conflict such as Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic.  ^[viii]   Besides, Chad’s increasing engagement with major powers such as France, US and Russia pose significant geopolitical challenges. 

Foreign Policy Approach of the New Government 

Given the regional security situation and growing interest of the external powers like the US, France and Russia in the region as well as the Middle Eastern powers like UAE and Turkey, the new Chad government faces stark choices on foreign policy priorities and approach. 

Regional Security 

One of the key foreign policy priorities of the newly elected Deby’s Government is to deal with regional security and stability.[ix]  The threat of the rebel movements in Chad using the neighboring states of Libya, Sudan and Central African Republic as bases, has been a security concern for the Government. According to UNHCR more than 8,000 rebels have been scattered across Chad’s borders with Central African Republic, Libya and Sudan.[x] This has often resulted in straining of Chad’s relations with these states. For instance, according to media reports, in October 2023, some of the rebel groups present at Chad- CAR border, were involved in recruiting fighters from northern CAR to launch an attack on Chad. Thus, relations between the two states became strained as both sides accused each other of harboring armed rebel groups[xi]. To this end, President Deby’s Government aims to strengthen its relations with Central African Republic and Libya. Chad’s closer ties with both Libya and Central African Republic will allow it leverage over the armed rebels on their soil. President Mahamat Deby had invited the Libyan President Abdul Hamid Dabaiba and the President of Central African Republic Fausten Touadera to attend his swearing-in ceremony in Chad[xii]. 

Besides, Chad is deeply impacted by the ongoing civil war in the neighboring Sudan. After more than one year into the crisis, nearly nine million people have been displaced, where in more than one million people have fled to the neighboring states[xiii]. Chad has received the largest share of refugees fleeing from Sudan. According to an estimate by UNHCR, Chad is currently hosting 38% of the Sudanese refugees[xiv]. Chad has provided armed escorts for the humanitarian groups assisting these refugees. However, the official refugee camps in Chad struggle to keep up with the pace of arrival of refugees. The increasing inflow of refugees from Sudan is putting immense pressure on Chad’s socio-economic capacities. 

In addition to this, as far as Sudan conflict is concerned, Chad was initially neutral, however, later- due to the its growing engagement with UAE, Chad opted for positive stance towards the Rapid Support Forces(RSF). President Deby’s support to RSF has been poorly received by the Zaghawa ethnic group (which also forms the part of political elite in Chad and the community to which Deby belongs), as Zaghawa ethnic community residing near the Chad-Sudan border suffered at the hands of Janjaweed militia (later rebranded as RSF) during Darfur crisis. Thus, Chad’s support to RSF might have a deep impact on regional security.[xv]

Relations with the Western Powers 

Chad has maintained strong relations with Western powers, including the US and France, and has leveraged its partnership with the Western powers to strengthen its military capabilities and improve its internal security. Its geostrategic location is significant for Western powers as it is at the crossroads of North, Central and West Africa[xvi]. It was once the largest base for the French troops in Africa and received French and European troops when they were withdrawn out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. French President Emannuel Macron congratulated President Deby on his election. According to France’s Special Envoy to Africa, Jean Marie Bockel,“ We are satisfied with the transition process and of course we will stay in Chad”[xvii]. Presently, there are around 1000 French troops stationed in Chad.[xviii] However, in May 2024, the authorities in Chad called for the withdrawal of US troops stationed in Chad. This however, should not be perceived in the same manner as the departure of Western powers from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. According to experts, the demand for US withdrawal from Chad is part of President Deby’s bargaining strategy to actually increase US support for Chad’s Government, and it is likely to renegotiate with the US.^[xix] The US perhaps is now seeking to re-collaborate with Chad on the security operations in the region. This is evident from the official statement made by the US State Department’s spokesperson Matthew Miller that, “We welcome the peaceful conduct of elections... We welcome the milestone of Chad’s transition process”[xx]. 

The Deby administration while preserving its partnership with the Western powers is seeking to diversify its foreign policy by initiating new security partnerships with Russia and with the Middle Eastern countries, including the UAE and Turkey. 

Relations with Russia 

Amid Russia’s expanding influence across the Sahel region, the new Government in Chad seeks to   increase its cooperation with Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is the first Foreign Minister to visit Chad after the swearing in ceremony of newly elected Deby Government. During his, visit the two leaders have decided to deepen their defense and security cooperation and to enhance their economic engagement. [xxi]Russia will also provide its support to Chad in dealing with the humanitarian crisis caused by terrorism leading to displacement of 3.6 million Chadian citizens. President Deby had also paid a visit to Russia in January 2024. Despite the presence of French troops on its soil, Chad seeks to maintain good diplomatic relations with Russia, as the latter already has a strong presence in the neighboring states of Chad, including Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Niger. Secondly, as some opposition leaders had accused France of intervening in Chad’s internal affairs and supporting Deby’s family’s dynastic succession, the Deby administration perceives Chad’s approach to  Russia as an opportunity to show that his administration is not tied only to French support.[xxii] 

Relations with the UAE 

Chad is strengthening its bilateral relations with the UAE in seeking to diversify its arms suppliers, as it previously relied on the European powers to combat militants and rebels present at its borders. Since the beginning of the war in Sudan in 2023 and the declining French influence in the Sahel region, the UAE has also increased its support to Chad to bring about stability in the region. Thus, amid the increasing conflict in neighbouring Sudan, Chad became a key ally of the UAE in the region^[xxiii].  During his official visit to the UAE in 2023, President Deby signed several military cooperation agreements with the UAE, which called for the transfer of military equipment from the UAE to Chad, wherein around six armoured vehicles were delivered to Chad. In early 2024, the UAE also deployed its troops in Chad to train the Chadian soldiers and support the Government’s efforts to fight terrorism by strengthening border protection. Chad’s security partnership with the UAE reflects its policy of turning away from Europe’s sphere of influence in the area of military equipment^[xxiv].The President of UAE Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan congratulated President Deby on his electoral victory. Besides, Shakhboot Bin Nahyan, the Minister of State of UAE attended the inauguration ceremony of President Deby, which affirmed the deep-rooted ties between both the states[xxv]. President Deby also emphasized that Chad’s relationship with UAE is witnessing a continuous development which serves the interests of both Chad and UAE[xxvi]. 

Relations with Turkey 

Chad has become one of the key partners of Turkey in Africa and both the states seek to deepen their relations through increased engagement in trade, energy, infrastructure and security. The trade volume between the two countries has reached up to 112 billion US dollars. On the security front, Turkey has provided support to Chad through the defence partnership with Chad^[xxvii]. In 2023, both countries signed a comprehensive agreement on military cooperation, which includes intelligence sharing, joint operations, training and logistics.[xxviii]

Conclusion 

The 2024 elections in Chad are of paramount importance as they mark the return of civilian rule in Chad, which is essential for the peace and stability of the region. However, despite the apparent stability in Chad, there are several challenges, including the complex regional security dynamics and geopolitical relations, as Chad is now seeking to diversify its security partnerships to also include Russia and the Middle Eastern powers like UAE and Turkey, in addition to the Western powers. It is to be seen how the newly elected Government will navigate its future foreign policy to lend support to its domestic agenda of furthering development and security.

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*Dr. Gauri Narain Mathur, Research Fellow, ICWA.
The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Mahamat Ramdane. ‘ Chad Interim President Deby Kicks Off Campaign for Vote to end Junta Rule’. Reuters . 15 April 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/chad-interim-president-deby-kicks-off-campaign-vote-set-end-junta-rule-2024-04-14/

[ii] Francesca Crusedo. ‘ Highlighting the Importance of the Upcoming Presidential Elections in Chad.’ ACCORD. 24 April 2024. https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/chads-elections-in-may-2024-are-of-great-importance-for-regional-stability/

[iii] ‘US at odds with African Union over Chad's disputed polls. Voice of Africa. 24 May 2024. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/us-at-odds-with-african-union-over-chad-s-disputed-polls-4634132

[iv] Ruth Maclean. ‘ Chad Election 2024: What to Know’. The New York Times. 30 April 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/30/world/africa/chad-election-2024.html

[v] Ibid

[vi] Francesca Crusedo. ‘ Highlighting the Importance of the Upcoming Presidential Elections in Chad.’ ACCORD. 24 April 2024. https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/chads-elections-in-may-2024-are-of-great-importance-for-regional-stability/

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] [viii] EI Hassan Hzaine. ‘Chad’s Fifth President Faces Complex Heritage and Imperatives of Change.’ Morocco World News. May 28, 2024. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2024/05/362923/chads-fifth-president-faces-complex-heritage-and-imperatives-of-change.

[ix] ‘ Chad’s Constitutional Council Confirms Deby’s Win  After Disputed Vote’.  The East African. 17 May 2024. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/chad-constitutional-council-confirms-deby-win-in-disputed-vote-4625690

[x] ‘ UNHCR: Update on Chad Situation’. UNHCR.  1 March 2024. file:///C:/Users/Dell/Downloads/UNHCR%20CAR_CHAD_Situation%20Update%20-%20March%202024%20(1).pdf

[xi] Mahammed Yousef. ‘ CAR, Chad Conduct Separate Military Operations   Amid Border Security Concerns’. Voice of Africa. 6 October 2023.  https://www.voanews.com/a/car-chad-conduct-separate-military-operations-amid-border-security-concerns/7299958.html

[xii] ‘ Chadian President Meets PM Abdelhamid Dbaiba.’ Libyan News Agency. 24 May 2024.  https://lana.gov.ly/post.php?lang=en&id=308014

[xiii] Nocmot Gbadamosi. ‘ Sudan’s Refugee Crisis Strained Chad’. Foreign Policy. 21 Feb 2024.  ttps://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/21/sudans-refugee-crisis/

[xiv] Ibid

[xv] Enrica Picco. ‘The Fallout in Chad from the Fighting in Darfur’ Crisis Group. 10 August 2023. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/fallout-chad-fighting-darfur

[xvi] EI Hassan Hzaine. ‘ Chad’s Fifth President Faces Complex Heritage and Imperatives of Change’. Morrocco World News. 28 May 2024. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2024/05/362923/chads-fifth-president-faces-complex-heritage-and-imperatives-of-change

[xvii] Zeenat Hansrod. ‘Chad's opposition fears France will maintain status quo after elections. RFI Africa. 18/3/2024. https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20240318-chad-s-opposition-fears-more-business-as-usual-for-france-after-coming-elections

[xviii] ‘French Troops to Stay in Chad’. Qatar News Agency. 8 March 2024. https://www.qna.org.qa/en/News-Area/News/2024-03/08/0013-french-troops-to-stay-in-chad

[xix] Nocmot Gbadamosi. ‘Chad’s Great Power Balancing Act.’ Foreign Policy. May 01, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/01/chads-great-power-balancing-act/.

[xx] US at odds with African Union over Chad's disputed polls. Voice of Africa. 24 May 2024. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/us-at-odds-with-african-union-over-chad-s-disputed-polls-4634132

[xxi] Elena Teslova. ‘Russian foreign minister says developing security cooperation with Chad’. Africa World.  5 June 2024. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/russian-foreign-minister-says-developing-security-cooperation-with-chad/3241477

[xxii] Mathiew Oliver. ‘ Behing the scenes of Chad’s strategic rapprochement with Russia’.  The Africa Report. 29 January 2024. https://www.theafricareport.com/334616/behind-the-scenes-of-chads-strategic-rapprochement-with-russia/

[xxiii] ‘UAE Increases Military Support Aid to Chad Amid Sahel Strife.’ Africa Defense Forum. 13 February 2024. https://adf-magazine.com/2024/02/uae-increases-military-support-aid-to-chad-amid-sahel-strife/.

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] ‘Shakhboot bin Nahyan attends inauguration ceremony of Chadian President’. Aletihad. 24 May 2024. https://en.aletihad.ae/news/uae/4488257/shakhboot-bin-nahyan-attends-inauguration-ceremony-of-chadia.

[xxvi] Ibid

[xxvii] ‘Turkey’s Resolute to Increase Cooperation with Chad.’ TRT World. https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/turkey-resolute-to-increase-cooperation-with-chad-president-erdogan-24549.

[xxviii] Ibid