Indian Council of World Affairs

The last three years witnessed momentous shifts in South Asian politics marked by regime changes that were accompanied by mass protests or political turmoil. As the world focuses on the unrest in Bangladesh following the departure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, one is reminded of the developments that occurred in Afghanistan in the month of August, three years earlier.   

After a 20-year insurgency, the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan on 15 August 2021. By that evening, former President Ashraf Ghani had fled the country with his allies, and the “victorious” Taliban took over ARG—the Presidential Palace—and several government offices in Kabul, proclaiming the “war is over”.[i] The U.S. military completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan on 30 August, a day earlier than planned, bringing an end to its 20-year military presence in the country. NATO, a key ally in the U.S.-led intervention, also decided to withdraw around the same time. With the departure of Western troops, Afghanistan, which had been ravaged by over four decades of war and instability, was—as BBC journalist Lyse Doucet described it—turned "upside down and inside out".[ii] Since then, new conflicts in other parts of the world have diverted global attention from Afghanistan and the issues faced by Afghan women and girls under the Taliban rule. The Taliban completes three years in power.

This article provides an overview of the current situation in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime. 

Three Years of Taliban: Expectation versus Reality 

When the Taliban took power in 2021, many anticipated that they would return to the strict governance style of their first rule from 1996 to 2001. However, shortly after gaining control, there was a sense of optimism among some observers who hoped that the new Taliban administration—often referred to as Taliban 2.0—would be different. This optimism was fuelled by the Taliban’s declaration of a nationwide “amnesty”, their promises to uphold girls’ rights to education, and their discussions about forming an “inclusive” government. Yet the past three years have largely confirmed the initial concerns about their continued strict approach. The following section offers a comprehensive overview of how internal, regional and international dynamics have shifted during these three years of Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

Internally, the Taliban have been able to consolidate power across the country with Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Amir al-Mu’minin, as the central figure. Although, occasionally, there have been reports about factionalism within the Taliban, so far, those were not serious enough to wreck the coherence of the movement. Shortly after taking power, the Taliban announced "interim" appointments for all ministries except the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which remained vacant and was eventually disbanded. All acting ministers were senior Taliban leaders; no external political figures were included; the majority were from the Pashtun ethnic group, and all were men. Since then, the Taliban have restructured various ministries and reinstated the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, infamous during their 1990s rule for enforcing strict social codes as a “morality police”.[iii] Inside Afghanistan, inter-ethnic relations have been quite stressed. Ethnic groups, including religious minorities, faced increasing marginalisation, prejudice and forced evictions. The policies imposed on the Afghan population have resulted in a continuous, systematic rescinding of a multitude of human rights, including the right to education, work, freedoms of expression, assembly and association. The Taliban have excluded women from most areas of public life and prohibited girls from attending school beyond the sixth grade, implementing harsh measures after taking power in 2021. Since the regime initially promised a more moderate approach towards girls’ education, these actions have drawn widespread criticism from the international community. The security situation across the country has improved, particularly when compared to the final years of the Afghan Republic. Under the Taliban, taxation and revenue collection have become more streamlined and centralised, which is seen as one of the regime’s key economic achievements, especially after the economy collapsed following the withdrawal of billions in aid from Western donors as the group took power. In April 2022, the Taliban’s Emir announced a comprehensive ban on opium cultivation, production, processing and trade, leading to an over 85 percent reduction in poppy cultivation over the next year.[iv] However, there has been a significant surge in synthetic drug trafficking, “particularly methamphetamine, with a nearly twelvefold increase in seizures over the past five years”, according to a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).[v]

As far as anti-Taliban resistance is concerned, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) assessment report in June 2024 stated that although “two anti-Taliban resistance groups, namely the National Resistance Front, and the Afghanistan Freedom Front have conducted verified attacks in the capital and northern provinces in recent months, the armed opposition ‘did not pose a significant challenge’ to the Taliban’s hold on territorial control since they regained power in August 2021”.[vi] Currently, the anti-Taliban resistance is facing a bleak prospect in the absence of a lack of international support and funding. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) has become the most prominent armed opposition to the Taliban regime. ISKP has expanded its operations to various provinces, targeting both the Taliban and their officials, as well as the minority Shia community and civilians. The United Nations has raised concerns over the high concentration of transnational jihadist groups in Afghanistan, which seeks to destabilise regional sturdiness, and urged the Afghan Taliban to take action against those groups. Although it is unclear what sort of influence the Taliban have on these foreign terrorist groups, so far, it seems the Taliban are not too eager to take any steps against their former allies, especially at a time when their presence can be utilised as leverage in dealing with the neighbouring countries.

Regionally, Afghanistan’s neighbours appear to have accepted that the Taliban is an inescapable reality in a post-U.S. Afghanistan. As a result, they have been increasing diplomatic efforts to coexist with the Taliban, often putting aside longstanding animosities. Despite the Taliban regime’s questionable domestic policies, there is a general recognition that the regime is likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future. Consequently, neighbouring countries have expanded their diplomatic and economic engagements with the Taliban, although no country has officially recognised their administration. In the region, relations with Pakistan have been showing signs of strains over the Durand Line and its fencing by Pakistan. Also, there are signs of strains due to the presence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan inside Afghan territory, where local populations suspected of harbouring them have been subjected to artillery and aerial attacks by the Pakistani military to neutralise the TTP attacks inside Pakistan. The expulsion of Afghan refugees from Pakistan has only added to the tensions in relations between the neighbours. Iran, which had cautiously welcomed the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021 following the U.S. and NATO withdrawal from the region, remains concerned about the influx of Afghan refugees, water supply and the spread of ISIS in Khorasan. Central Asian countries have approached their policies with a focus on carefully balancing their pragmatic interests while avoiding formal recognition of the Taliban regime. Despite facing some difficulties in their initial interactions with the Taliban, a pragmatic approach that prioritises economic interests has ultimately emerged as dominant. However, the Qosh Tepa Canal Project, which the Taliban is advancing, and the ongoing threats of terrorism and drug trafficking from Afghanistan remain significant challenges for relations between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. China’s involvement with Afghanistan is driven by two main concerns: managing the threat of foreign military groups and protecting its economic interests. Additionally, Beijing aims to limit the influence of Western powers, particularly the US. Finally, India’s policy towards Afghanistan since the fall of Kabul has evolved into one of gradual engagement, with a focus on supporting the Afghan people while exerting pressure on the Taliban to form a more inclusive and representative government. Currently, many neighbouring countries maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul, and some have received Taliban diplomats in their capitals. This underlines that such representations do not amount to implicit or explicit recognition but are more of a technical prerequisite for managing co-existence with Afghanistan.[vii] These working-level relationships will, in all probability, proliferate in the near future, but they are likely to be more sporadic in nature.

Internationally, Europe and the West in general have limited their involvement in Afghanistan to humanitarian assistance. The US has stepped back to a primarily counterterrorism monitoring role. Despite ongoing calls for the formation of an inclusive government, regional countries and global powers have focused on protecting their interests by setting up communication channels with the regime. Diplomatically, despite the Taliban’s efforts to secure recognition and international legitimacy, they have not had much success. Several embassies have either maintained their missions in Afghanistan through the takeover, including Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran and some CARS, or returned to Afghanistan since then, including the European Union; the number has been considerably higher than the number of maintained missions during the Taliban’s first stint in power. However, none have formally recognised the Taliban. In November 2023, the United Nations released an independent assessment of international engagement in Afghanistan by UN Special Coordinator for Afghanistan Feridun Sinirlioglu.[viii] It observed “a lack of coherence in stakeholders' approaches” and recommended “appointing a UN Special Envoy to oversee international engagement in Afghanistan, establishing an international contact group, and maintaining the current large group format”.[ix] The Taliban have expressed opposition to the Special Envoy proposal, suggesting they see such “a role as inappropriately portraying Afghanistan as a conflict zone requiring special intervention”.[x] Interestingly, Russia and China were also not forthcoming about the proposition and had abstained from voting for the UNSC resolution on the appointment of a Special Envoy. Therefore, the international consensus, as it stands now, appears increasingly tenuous.

Conclusion

Over the past three years, Afghanistan appears to have become less of a priority for the international community. Aside from three UN-led international talks in Doha, concerns related to Afghanistan have largely remained on the periphery. Barring the issues related to the non-recognition of the “Islamic Emirate” and occasional calls for an inclusive government, most countries have focused on engaging with the Taliban to address their security concerns and explore economic and investment opportunities. In doing so, they have largely overlooked the regime’s domestic policies and the ongoing violations of the rights of women and ethnic minorities. This appears to have emboldened the Taliban, which seems prepared to face international isolation in order to maintain its policies. Regardless of some progress in improving the security situation internally, Afghanistan remains a key source of security threats for the region. There was a belief that the progress that was achieved in the two decades of international intervention in Afghanistan cannot be taken away; however, the past years have demonstrated the opposite. It is essential for the international community to remain engaged with Afghanistan and not abandon its people. At the same time, it is also essential to ensure that this engagement does not inadvertently strengthen the Taliban regime. The upcoming days will be pivotal, and the international community must proceed with caution.

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*Dr. Anwesha Ghosh, Research Fellow, ICWA. 
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes 

[i] Afghan president Ashraf Ghani flees country ‘to avoid bloodshed’ as Taliban enter Kabul.” Independent 15, 2021. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/central-asia/afghanistan-taliban-ashraf-ghani-flee-b1902917.html  (Accessed on 9. 8.2024)

[ii] “Will there be women in the Taliban's new government?” - BBC News, September 1, 2021 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CMgr7nkFLjo (Accessed on 9. 8.2024)

[iii] “One Year Later: Taliban Reprise Repressive Rule, but Struggle to Build a State”, USIP, Aug 17, 2022. Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/one-year-later-taliban-reprise-repressive-rule-struggle-build-state

[iv] “As Taliban Poppy Ban Continues, Poppy Bn deepens”. USIP, June 20, 2024. Available at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/06/taliban-poppy-ban-continues-afghan-poverty-deepens (Accessed on 9. 8.2024)

[v] “UNODC: Methamphetamine trafficking in and around Afghanistan expanding rapidly as heroin trade slows”. UNODC, September 10, 2023. Available at:https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2023/unisnar1476.html#:~:text=KABUL%2FVIENNA%2C%2010%20September%20(,today%20by%20the%20United%20Nations(Accessed on 9. 8.2024)

[vi] “UN documents surge in anti-Taliban attacks in Afghanistan”. VoA, June 21, 2024. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/un-documents-surge-in-anti-taliban-attacks-in-afghanistan/7665035.html(Accessed on 9. 8.2024)

[vii] “The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan”. International Crisis Group, Available at: The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan | Crisis Group (Accessed on 9. 8.2024)

[viii] United Nations, S/2023/856, The Independent Assessment on Afghanistan.  

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Kate Bateman and Andrew Watkins, “What to Expect from the Doha Conference on Afghanistan,” U.S. Institute of Peace, February 15, 2024, https://www.usip. org/publications/2024/02/what-expect-doha-conference-afghanistan.