Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The cooperation between the Coast Guards of the Philippines and Vietnam can be a game changer as it can potentially reset the security architecture and political discourse between the littorals in the disputed South China Sea region. 

In a first, the Coast Guards (CG) of the two maritime neighbours of Vietnam and the Philippines held a multi-day engagement that included joint drills in Manila between 5 and 9 August 2024. This CG cooperation is not merely a goodwill visit of the Vietnamese CG vessel to the Philippines but is indicative of resettingthe equations between the littorals of the South China Sea.This is so as the maritime cooperation isa follow-up to the January 2024 visit of Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s visit to Hanoi, wherein the two agreements, oneon “incident prevention in the South China Sea” and a second on “maritime cooperation” between two coastguards, were inked.[i] 

The two agreements of January 2024 were aimed at boosting maritime cooperation between Hanoi and Manila, given the fact that these two maritime neighbours are also parties to the multi-stakeholder territorial dispute in the South China Sea, which has Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwanas interested parties. In this context, the cooperation between the Philippines and Vietnam gains significance for a few specific reasons. 

First and foremost, the South China Sea is one of the most contested maritime spaces, for the issues at hand are not only limited to the territorial dispute that plagues these waters but also the near-constant hostile posturing by parties to the dispute and the other stakeholders. Secondly, the larger South China Sea region is also a theatre for issues like the dispute between Beijing and Taipei over the sovereignty of Taiwan, which dates back to the days of the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949. Additionally, the Taiwan question also has both geopolitical and geostrategic implications. 

The third and lesser-acknowledgedaspect is the multidimensional economic imperatives the South China Sea holds for the littoral. As of 2023, it has been estimated that the South China Sea has a conservative reserve of 3.6 billion barrels of oil and 40.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.[ii] In terms of fishers, a minimum of 3.7 million people are engaged in fishing, and this region accounts for more than half the global fishing fleet.[iii] By some estimates, about a third of global shipping[iv] with a commercial annual value between $3–5 trillion[v] transits through this region, of which the South China Sea is at the heart of it. Apart from this, the waters of Eastern Asia play a critical role in shaping the world’s economic prospects owing to the high concentration of the leading economies of the world as its littorals. 

Owing to these factors, this sea lane of communication is a highway that links the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean and also acts as the economic lifeline of most of Eastern Asia. Resultantly, this region now is a focal point for the evolving geopolitical situation between multiple players, which includes both littorals and non-littorals in the Indo-Pacific region.

Map I: South China Sea Maritime Territorial Dispute

Source: What is the South China Sea dispute?BBC, July 7, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349. Accessed on August 16, 2024.

Will Security Cooperation Lead to Military Coordination? 

Given this backdrop, what makes the cooperation between the Philippines and Vietnam important is the implications of the same. Given the fact that, for more than a couple of decades now, efforts to negotiate a Code of Conduct (CoC) on the South China Sea have been frozen as the parties to this dispute have been unable to work out their differences. Thus far only a“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” of 2002[vi] has been agreed upon, and the same has been the basis of all other engagements. Despite repeated assertions by the concerned parties, progress on a CoC has been slow. The stumbling block is not as much as within the Southeast Asian countries but China,which has been reluctant to revisit its claims or position on this dispute. 

It is in this context that the agreement between Hanoi and Manila on “incident prevention in the South China Sea” and “maritime cooperation”is to be seen. The first reason is that the January agreements do not address the overlapping claims of either Hanoi or Manila but act as an instrument where the two countries and their respective Coast Guards are in a position to cooperate. This in turn, as in the words of the Filipino Coast Guard spokesperson, is “a good template to de-escalate” and can be seen as an effort of “even rival claimants can have an opportunity to nurture a (bilateral) relationship.”[vii] 

Secondly, there is the question of interoperability between maritime agencies. This becomes important as the Philippines and Vietnam operate different military platforms and equipment. The Philippines predominantly operates US or other Western platforms, whereas Vietnam operates mostly Soviet/Russian equipment. This, thus, requires efforts from both sides to find avia media for their forces to cooperate and coordinate their engagement in the South China Sea. Such efforts in the long run could become a means for the two sides to deepen the interoperability of their respective agencies and, in turn, foster greater cooperation. This, taken in light of the effort of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the security sector, which saw the first-ever regional joint military exercise, theASEAN Solidarity Exercise, in September 2023[viii] has the possibility of leading the regional bloc to emulate the cooperation between Manila and Hanoi in terms of operating procedures and joint understanding and coordinating their naval efforts in the disputed waters, even while not directly addressing the dispute. 

This has the potential to have a positive impact on ASEAN unity in managing the dispute. This is so as both the Mania-Hanoi bilateral engagement of August 2024 and the ASEAN Solidarity regional engagement of September 2023 steered clear of contentious issues and focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). Additionally, HADR, a constabulary function of the naval forces, can also address issues like Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in this region. The implications of IUU fishing are not only limited to ecological issues but, when seen in the context of the “maritime militia” of China, also have security and political connotations. 

At a bilateral level, Vietnam and the Philippines have had a strategic partnership arrangement since 2015, and the engagement between their Coast Guards can be seen as operationalising the same. However, it remains to be seen whether this bilateral maritime initiative between the Philippines and Vietnam will set a precedent for a similar arrangement among the countries of Southeast Asia. If such an arrangement is to become a reality, then the regional dynamics in the South China Sea will be significantly altered.

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*Dr. Sripathi Narayanan, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.

End Notes

[i]“Vietnam, Philippines sign deals on security in disputed South China Sea,”Al Jazeera, January 30, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/vietnam-philippines-sign-deals-on-security-in-disputed-south-china-sea, accessed on August 9, 2024.

[ii] “South China Sea,” United States Energy Information Agency, March 21, 2024, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/South_China_Sea, accessed on August 14, 2024.

[iii]“Deep Blue Scars,”Centre for Strategic and International Studies, https://features.csis.org/environmental-threats-to-the-south-china-sea/#group-section-I-Life-in-the-South-China-Sea-bLRSGbbm0d, accessed on August 17, 2024.

[iv]“How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?”Centre for Strategic and International Studies,https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/#easy-footnote-bottom-1-3073, accessed on August 5, 2024.

[v]John Quiggin, “Myths that stir trouble in the South China Sea,” Lowy Institute, December 23, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myths-stir-trouble-south-china-sea, accessed on August 9, 2024.

[vi]“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” ASEAN, May 14, 2012, https://asean.org/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2/, accessed on August 12, 2024.

[vii]Sam Beltran, “South China Sea: Philippines, Vietnam join forces but Hanoi policy a stumbling block?” South Chian Morong Post, August 7, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3273499/south-china-sea-philippines-vietnam-join-forces-hanoi-policy-stumbling-block, accessed on August 7, 2024.

[viii]‘Baby steps’ for ASEAN as it wraps up first-ever joint military drills, Al Jazeera, September 25, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/25/baby-steps-for-asean-as-it-wraps-up-first-ever-joint-military-drills, accessed on August 12, 2024.