Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The United States Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the resultant expansion of defence cooperation with Cocos (Keeling) Island of Australia, the Philippines, Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea have the potential to alter the geo-strategic landscape and the security calculus of the Indo-Pacific Region. 

The geopolitical contestation in the Indo-Pacific region, which is now synonymous with the maritime territorial dispute in the South China Sea, seems to be moving away from this enclosed water body. This is so as it has been reported that the United States has expressed its intent to develop military facilities in the periphery of the South China Sea, especially along the critical sea lines of communications (SLOCs). The United States Naval Facilities Engineering Command has solicited commercial bids to develop and upgrade the military infrastructure in Cocos (Keeling) Island of Australia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste at an estimated cost of $15 billion.[i]<sup>&[ii]

The intent to upgrade the maritime infrastructure in the said locations is part of the United States’ Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) of 2021.[iii] The PDI is on similar lines to the 2017 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), as both are legislated by the US Congress with the intent to focus on addressing capability gaps of the allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region by prioritising defence investments.</sup>

While the EDI aims to “enhance the presence and readiness (of the United States) in Europe to deter Russian aggression,”[iv] the PDI is a counter-response by Washington to the perceived threat imposed by the expanding Chinese military capability and capacity in the Indo-Pacific Region. Thus, regional initiatives like the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) or the SQUAD—the regional alliance between Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States—can be attributed as the outcomes of the PDI. 

It is to be noted that the Chinese have already taken a negative view of PDI. Beijing’s criticism is based on the belief that the PDI will be detrimental to its “equal and mutually beneficial cooperation” with Pacific Island countries.[v]

Expanding Frontiers 

What makes this multi-billion-dollar announcement significant is that it is a display by Washington of its commitments to the Indo-Pacific region. By partnering with Australia in AUKUS and with the Philippines in SQUAD, Washington has reinvigorated its security and strategic engagement with both Canberra and Manila. However, Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste are to be seen as new avenues for American outreach, as they do not have a history of being a part of the American security network in this part of the world. Needless to say, the American outreach will pave the way for the greater militarisation of the Indo-Pacific though for deterrence. 

It is to be noted that the PDI will enhance the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability and that of its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. This capability will be essential in the event of a confrontation with China.[vi] However, the PDI will not only be limited to ISR, which inherently rests in the realm of defence domain. It will also cover a wider canvas as any engagement in the maritime domain would prerequisite an “effective understanding of any activity associated with the maritime environment that could impact upon the security, safety, economy or environment,” also known as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).[vii]

What makes the MDA component of the PDI and the selected locations of the expanding American security footprint in the Indo-Pacific region noteworthy is that the threat to the peace, stability and prosperity of this region is not only owing to conventional military concerns, it also has a larger non-military component. As the expanding Chinese maritime footprint is not limited to its naval deployment but also includes the dual-use capabilities of Beijing’s fisheries fleet, marine research, merchant fleet, and marine installation like ports and harbours in the littorals of the Indo-Pacific region, heightening the need for greater MDA. Additionally, unlike ISR, which is limited in its operational aspects, MDA, given its broader canvas, necessitates a cooperative mechanism among stakeholders for it to be effective.[viii] This in turn has the potential to foster greater synergies among partnering countries. In other words, MDA can strengthen the ties between the regional partners of the United States, even those who are neither its allies nor those who strongly disfavour an alliance-type security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.    

For one, given the fact that the three proposed locations of Cocos (Keeling) Island, Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste for American military engagement sit along some of the critical SLOCS within the vicinity of the South China Sea, they act as crucial listening posts for MDA in the Indo-Pacific region. The second aspect is that these outposts should also be seen in the light of the ‘three island chain theory’, wherein China sees the need to assert its control of islands that dot its coastline and the coastal sub-regions in the Indo-Pacific region to have unhindered maritime access to the open seas the Pacific Ocean. This construct also envisages a fourth and fifth chain comprising the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean Region, respectively.[ix]

For the Chinese, the prospect of its maritime arteries being blocked by others, especially the US, is one of the reasons for its aggressive maritime outreach and posturing. It is for the very same reasons that the United States has been engaging with greater vigour in the recent past in the Indo-Pacific region, especially with the coastal states to limit the strategic influence of Beijing in this region. 

Expanded Frontiers! 

In terms of the island chain, the Philippines, along with Japan and Taiwan, have been an integral part of the American regional security architecture. Whereas Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste, though new to the American security calculus, play an important role. In the case of Papua New Guinea, this country's importance lies not only in its proximity to the SLOCs that crisscross the southern waters of Southeast Asia but also in the role that Port Moresby can play to counter the inroads that China seems to be making with Pacific Island countries in what was otherwise considered to be the traditional sphere of influence of Australia and New Zealand by deepening its ties with the United States.

Map I: Bismarck Sea and Papua New Guinea

Source: U.S. Set to Expand Naval Base in Papua New Guinea, US Naval Institute,
https://news.usni.org/2024/04/06/u-s-set-to-expand-naval-base-in-papua-new-guinea.

It is to be noted that in 2022 a security agreement was signed between the Solomon Islands and China,[x] which had only aggravated the anxieties of both Canberra and Washington. It was against this backdrop that both Australia[xi] and the United States[xii] inked a security and defence assistance agreement with Papua New Guinea in 2023. Based on this cooperation arrangement, the United States in April 2024 expressed its intention to renovate the existing facilities and also construct a Regional Maritime Training Centre in Lombrum Naval Base in Papua New Guinea’s Los Negros Island, which is located north of the Bismarck Sea.[xiii] (See Map I) 

On the contrary, the prospects of American presence in the Cocos (Keeling) merit greater scrutiny. For one, this non-descript island sits at the crossroads of the all-important trans-Indian Ocean SLOCs and thus acts as the gatekeeper of international shipping and, subsequently, global trade and hence the global economy. Secondly, it is not only Cocos Island’s location that has geo-strategic significance but also its proximity to an American military base, Camp Thunder Cove in Deigo Garcia, which is a part of the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean region. (See Map II)

Map II: Cocos (Keeling) Island and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean Region

Source: Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Global Security,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/australia/images/cocos-keeling-map-05.jpg 

Given the ongoing dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius over the sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, Cocos Island becomes all the more important. This is so as this Australian islet can become an alternative for the United States given that littoral countries of the Indian Ocean, especially India “continues its consistent support to Mauritius” on its claim over the disputed archipelago. The Indian position on the Chagos dispute is not based on geopolitical consideration but is a reflection of New Delhi’s principled “stand on decolonisation and support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations”.[xiv]

A New Security Paradigm 

What also makes the American interests in Cocos (Keeling) Island, Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste important rests with Washington’s evolving global security architecture, which has moved away from the hub and spoke doctrine that it had persuaded since the days of the Cold War to a “Lilly Pads” or a “latticework” approach. 

The Lilly Pad is aimed at having “flexible forward operating bases”, which are “small, secretive, inaccessible facilities with limited numbers of troops, spartan amenities, and prepositioned weaponry and supplies.”[xv] The Lilly Pad is similar to the “cooperative security locations” or CSL arrangement, as both have a low profile when compared to the traditional military bases of the United States. On the contrary, both Lilly Pad and CSL share similar characteristics, as they are small, well-dispersed forward facilities that are a part of a larger network of military positions and are widely spread around the world. It is to be noted that cooperative security locations are spread across the globe, including along the east coast of Africa,[xvi] since the primary task of the CSL is to carry out counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism operations. 

On the other hand, the latticework[xvii] was first mentioned in the “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States” released by the White House in February 2022, wherein it has been stated that a “latticework of strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions”[xviii] would be the framework under which Washington would be approaching this region. By leaning upon its allies and partners, the United States would be pursuing a flexible and ad hoc approach to the evolving security architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region,[xix] as the structure would not be American-centric but would also entail Washington’s allies and partners to “build connections within and beyond the (Indo-Pacific) region”.[xx] This would also include “finding new opportunities to link defence industrial bases, integrating of defence supply chains, and co-producing key technologies” between allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.[xxi]  

Sailing into Choppy Waters 

While Washington has articulated its ambitious approach to the security, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region, there will be unintended spinoffs that merit some appreciation. The first implication is that the Indo-Pacific region, which is already a focal point of geopolitical contestation, could be the global epicentre of global power play as Washington is expanding the scope and nature of this contestation. This is evident from the growing footprint of the United States and its open invitation for its extra-regional partners, mainly from Europe, to join the bandwagon. 

The second implication is that the flexible or ad hoc approach that the United States intends to pursue in the Indo-Pacific region adds to the uncertainty and will force regional players to hedge. Third, the Lilly Pad or the latticework approach would also expand the theatre of contestation, as any counter to the American advances would be reciprocated in equal measure. Translated, China too would be scouting out bases, mainly in islands that overlook SLOCs in the Indo-Pacific Region. 

Given its escalatory impact, this ad hoc approach also paves the way for a fourth implication. The geopolitical game of one-upmanship between China and the United States will have profound implications for the traditional security guarantors in the region and sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific theatre. The upshot of this would be that the regional/sub-regional order would undergo a further change in its architecture. Against this backdrop, the geographic location of the Cocos (Keeling) Island, Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste are significant, as they are located along the periphery of the maritime access points of Southeast Asia. This, when taken along with the history of close cooperation that the United States enjoys with Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, the impact of the PDI will be seen in both this sub-region of the Indo-Pacific theatre and also on the internal dynamics within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to begin with.

*****

*Dr. Sripathi Narayanan, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Kirsty Needham “US military eyes Australia's Indian Ocean toe hold to deter China”, Reuters, August 5, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-military-eyes-australias-indian-ocean-toe-hold-deter-china-2024-08-05/, accessed on August 30, 2024.

[ii] Seth Robson, “US to invest in Australian island facilities near Indian Ocean chokepoint”, Star and Stripes, August 7, 2024, https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2024-08-07/australia-china-indian-ocean-14772206.html, accessed online August 30, 2024.

[iii] Mac Thornberry and Kimberly Lehn, “To deter China, transform the Pacific Deterrence Initiative”, Defense One, January 30, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2024/01/deter-china-transform-pacific-deterrence-initiative/393739/, accessed on August 30, 2024.

[iv] European Deterrence Initiative, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 2021, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_EDI_JBook.pdf, Page 1, accessed on August 30, 2024.

[v] Deepened US-Australia security cooperation ‘risks exacerbating confrontation’, Global Times, August 6, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1317519.shtml, accessed on August 30, 2024.

[vi] Lt. James Magno, “The Pacific Deterrence Initiative: Defending Guam Is Paramount”, U.S. Navy Institute, July 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/july/pacific-deterrence-initiative-defending-guam-paramount, accessed on August 30, 2024.

[vii] Amendments to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search And Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual, International Maritime Organisation, May 25, 2012, https://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/msnote/pdf/msin1242anx1.pdf, accessed on August 30, 2024.

[viii] Nitin Agarwalaa, Ram Erezb and Suriya Narayananc, “Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness in the Indo-Pacific and the Eastern Mediterranean Regions: Indian and Israeli Perspectives”, National Maritime Foundation,

https://maritimeindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Enhancing-Maritime-Domain-Awareness-in-the-Indo-Pacific-and-the-Eastern-Mediterranean-Regions-NMF-HMS.pdf, accessed on August 30, 2024.

[ix] Andrew Erskine, “The Dragon and the Tides”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, January-February 2023,

https://media.defense.gov/2023/Feb/02/2003154182/-1/-1/1/06%20ERSKINE_FEATURE.PDF, Page 83, accessed on September 4, 2024.

[x] China Signs Security Agreement with Solomon Islands, Voice of America, April 19, 2022, https://voanews.com/a/china-signs-security-agreement-with-solomon-islands-/6535624.html, accessed on September 3, 2024.

[xi] Australia-Papua New Guinea Bilateral Security Agreement, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Australia, December 7, 2023, https://www.dfat.gov.au/countries/papua-new-guinea/australia-papua-new-guinea-bilateral-security-agreement, accessed on September 3, 2024.

[xii] Agreement Between the United States of America and Papua New Guinea, U.S. State Department, May 23, 2023, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/63374-Papua-New-Guinea-Defense-08.16.2023.pdf, accessed on September 3, 2024.

[xiii] Zach Abdi, “U.S. Set to Expand Naval Base in Papua New Guinea”, U.S. Naval Institute, April 6, 2024, 

https://news.usni.org/2024/04/06/u-s-set-to-expand-naval-base-in-papua-new-guinea, accessed on September 3, 2024.

[xiv] Media statement by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar in Mauritius, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,

 July 16, 2024 https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/37970/Joint_address_of_EAM_Dr_S_Jaishankar_with_Prime_Minister_of_Mauritius, accessed September 4, 2024.

[xv] Dr Vijay Sakhuja, “US Augments Military Bases, Revitalizes Lilly Pads and Pushes for Visiting Forces Agreements in the Pacific Ocean”, Vivekananda International Foundation, July 10, 2020, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2020/july/10/us-augments-military-bases-revitalizes-lilly-pads-and-pushes-for-visiting-forces-agreements-in-the-pacific, accessed on September 2, 2024.

[xvi] Department of Defense Press Briefing on U.S. Africa Command Investigation of Jan. 5, 2020, Al-Shabaab Attack at the Cooperative Security Location in Manda Bay, Kenya, U.S. Department of Defence, March 10, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2963240/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-us-africa-command-investigation-of-jan/, September 4, 2024.

[xvii] A lattice is a structure made from strips of wood or other material that cross over each other with spaces in between.

[xviii] Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, White House, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf, Page 9, accessed on September 3, 2024.

[xix] Biden’s ‘lattice’ Asia policy not meshing, United States Studies Centre, December 3, 2021, https://www.ussc.edu.au/bidens-lattice-asia-policy-not-meshing, accessed on September 3, 2024.

[xx] Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, White House, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf, Page 7, accessed on September 3, 2024.

[xxi] Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, White House, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf, Page 13, accessed on September 3, 2024.