Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Nicaragua unequivocally aims to enhance relations with like-minded countries, secure financing and armaments, and strategically position itself to avoid isolation from the West. 

Since assuming office in 2006, under the presidency of Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua has faced mounting criticisms from the United States, the European Union, and other Western countries.[i] These criticisms are based on allegations of suppressing civil liberties and the Catholic Church, a lack of transparency in conducting elections, and the arrest and expulsion of government critics. However, the left-oriented Nicaraguan government often dismisses these criticisms as ideologically driven bias from the West. In the aftermath of the 2018 protests in Nicaragua, relations between Nicaragua and the West strained further. During that period protesters demanded a rollback of certain reforms that increased taxes. Western countries condemned the countermeasures adopted by Nicaragua in dealing with the protests which left many dead and arrested, and was viewed by President Ortega as undue interference in its internal affairs. Since then, the West has periodically criticised President Ortega’s administration of violation of human rights and undermining democracy. 

To counteract political pressure from the West and avoid international isolation, Nicaragua has formed close relationships with countries that hold differing views. These include China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In Latin America, Nicaragua has strong ties with Venezuela and Cuba, while its relations with other countries fluctuate based on political scenarios. 

Despite its strained relationship with the United States, Nicaragua maintains significant economic ties with major countries in the hemisphere. It is a member of the SICA[ii] and other Latin American multilateral bodies such as the CELAC.[iii] Additionally, Nicaragua has a robust economic relationship with the United States and is a member of the DR-CAFTA.[iv] The United States is Nicaragua’s largest trading partner and a major investor. 

Nicaragua’s foreign policy extends beyond financial and trade relations, including ideological consideration and opposition to the West. It provides a gateway for countries like Russia, China, and Iran to position themselves strategically in the Hemisphere, which has significant implications for the United States. Additionally, Nicaragua serves as an important partner for Venezuela and Cuba due to their ideological leanings. 

This paper examines Nicaragua’s relations with its major partners and the reasoning behind them. 

Background of the Situation in Nicaragua 

Prior to delving into the details, it's important to understand Nicaragua’s situation in the historical context. The country endured a civil war in the 1980s between the ruling leftist FSLN[v] and the conservative Somozistas. During this time, the FSLN government implemented a left-leaning economic model amid the civil war.[vi] Elections were held in 1990 under the Central American Peace Accords, leading to a series of conservative governments from 1990 to 2006 that favoured free-market strategies. 

Following their victory in the 2006 elections, the FSLN, led by President Daniel Ortega, retained the market-oriented model while expanding social programmes. However, by 2016, Nicaragua’s economy had slowed, leading to widespread dissatisfaction. Large-scale protests erupted in 2018, which were met with government force, further dividing the administration, the opposition, and civil society groups such as the Catholic Church and business organisations.[vii] Criticism from the West towards President Ortega’s administration includes concerns about power consolidation, denial of political involvement to the opposition,[viii] repression of civil society and the Catholic Church, arrests of journalists, revocation of Nicaraguan citizenship, and disregard for the rule of law. Even Latin American countries such as Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay expressed apprehensions about the 2021 elections,[ix] casting doubt on their fairness. 

President Daniel Ortega’s Consolidation of Power 

President Ortega in a span of more than a decade since his election gradually consolidated power and redefined the FSLN, by removing members and officials who opposed his policies, and replacing them with confidants. In June 2021 for instance, President Ortega ordered the arrest of 13 prominent politicians including former General Hugo Torres who were mostly former members of the FSLN[x]. While President Ortega played an important part in the overthrowing of the earlier Somoza regime in 1979 and led the Junta of National Reconstruction[xi], there were many others who actively participated in that movement but became disillusioned with the FSLN and formed the MRS[xii] in 1995. This brought the FSLN and the MRS into direct confrontation as they have similar ideological leanings with the latter proposing various Presidential candidates for elections and with the exception that the FSLN is firmly in the hands of President Ortega. Hence, in order to consolidate his hold over government apparatuses, the FSLN led by President Ortega interned politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen who are critical and do not adhere to the Presidency. This practice continues till date. 

For instance, the arrest of former veteran of the FSLN Jorge Guerrero in 2024[xiii] on charges of drug trafficking and the house-arrest of Humberto Ortega, brother of the Nicaraguan President and a former General of the armed forces highlights the complete control of Daniel Ortega. Apart from taking punitive actions against dissidents, a variety of appealing imagery has been used to project President Ortega as a leader of the Sandinista revolution and a messiah. Murals and paintings depicting events of the Sandinista revolution of 1979 with the relentless central focus on President Ortega, revolutionary songs and the presence of the party flag in every nook and corner are instrumental in developing loyalty towards the President[xiv]. Social schemes such as distribution of foodgrains, medicines, and awarding scholarships for education, consolidating hold over the police, military and the press are other means employed to generate support.  

In addition to that the feud with the Catholic Church (Nicaraguans are mostly Catholic with a significant presence of protestant variations) has led to a division between a left-oriented government headed by President Ortega and a religious denomination that in 1979 had offered significant support to the Sandinista revolution. The Catholic Church wielded significant support among the people and since 2018 has faced significant criticisms from President Ortega for its critical views. The arrest of Bishop Rolando Alvarez in 2022[xv] and many other church leaders intensified the consolidation of the Presidency even over religious institutions. Hence, all these factors have led to the development of a personality cult in Nicaragua with supporters vouching for its President, while a fragmented opposition seeks countermeasures. 

Socio-economic Challenges, Arms and Drug Trafficking and Migration 

Nicaragua continues to be one of the lowest-income countries in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, with sanctions in place and export demand declining amid a weakening global outlook, economic development in 2024–2025 is expected to be uncertain[xvi]. Consequently, Nicaragua’s growing ties with Russia and China are becoming increasingly important. The country is particularly vulnerable to external shocks and natural disasters. Its growth potential is limited due to low human capital, infrastructure deficiencies, and an unstable business environment. 

Nicaragua is also one of the hotspots in Central America in terms of illegal arms trade, human and drug-trafficking. Nicaragua has a thriving human-trafficking market, with criminal organisations abusing both domestic and foreign victims in the country, as well as Nicaraguans living abroad. Furthermore, the lack of efficient investigation, prosecution, and preventive measures, widespread poverty, and vast numbers of persons without identification papers exacerbate the situation[xvii]. A substantial proportion of victims are women and children who are prone to trafficking, but labour exploitation is also common, particularly in the agriculture, construction, mining, and domestic-service industries. Nicaragua has a sizable arms trade business[xviii], with both legal and illegal firearms, including handcrafted ones, flowing across the country. Nicaragua has also been recognised as the origin of illicit weaponry flows to Costa Rica and Mexico. Notably, international actors are thought to be in charge of organising the market, while local groups handle transportation and logistics.  Nicaragua serves as a cocaine transhipment site due to its strategic placement on the route connecting South American producing countries to North American consumer markets[xix]. Local crime organisations frequently coordinate with Costa Rican and Honduran nationals to smuggle cocaine via Nicaragua, and Mexican cartels also have a significant presence in the country[xx]. The market is thought to have expanded in recent years, boosted by corruption. Cannabis is the most commonly taken substance in the country, particularly among youths due to its low cost. Local groups regulate manufacturing in the country, meeting local need, while trafficking surpluses. Additional cannabis is trafficked from Honduras and Costa Rica, although these flows are once again organised by Nicaraguan organisations[xxi]. 

Nicaragua is also a supply and transit point for human smuggling. It is part of an international route taken by irregular migrants from Cuba, Haiti, Africa, and Asia on their journey to the United States. Such issues have also led to frequent spurts in migration towards the United States, which led to frequent disagreements between both countries, with the United States accusing the Ortega Presidency of weaponizing migration. Already many Nicaraguans have emigrated due to lack of opportunities and for political reasons[xxii], added to that there are people of various nationalities such as Cubans, Haitians and even from Asian and African countries. Hence, instead of crossing the dangerous Darien Gap[xxiii], there are charter flights that bring migrants to Nicaragua who then move northwards towards the United States. These charter flights are exorbitantly expensive[xxiv] and also brings in revenue for the Nicaraguan government. The Nicaraguan government earns through various fees such as landing and departure fees. In addition, agents colloquially known as Coyotes (Coyotaje in Spanish) charge various amounts for their services such as transferring migrants to shelters and aiding them across the Nicaraguan border. 

Hence, Nicaragua in the past few years has emerged as a favoured destination for migrants leading to repercussions along the United States-Mexico border with many of them seeking entry, thus stressing established mechanisms to deal with migration. In doing so, Nicaragua has developed a leverage against the United States where migration is a sensitive issue and seeks to compel Washington to lift sanctions and end criticisms of the Ortega Presidency. Hence, apart from migration being a humanitarian issue, it has political contours which test the relationship between Washington and Managua.

Faced with economic and political challenges, the Nicaraguan government is aiming to avoid complete isolation and seeking alternative sources of external funding while collaborating with its allies. As a member of the DR-CAFTA, SICA, IDB,[xxv] and CABEI,[xxvi] Nicaragua has access to external financing from the region as well as from extra-regional partners. 

Nicaragua’s relations with countries in Latin America 

In Latin America, Nicaragua faces criticisms from countries across ideological spectrums[xxvii] and frequently encounters diplomatic tussles. For instance, based on criticisms made by right-wing President Javier Milei of Argentina, Nicaragua recalled its ambassador in 2023. As a response to the Ecuadorian police raid on the Mexican embassy in 2024, Nicaragua suspended diplomatic relations with Ecuador. Relations between Nicaragua and Panama turned tumultuous in 2024 as the former offered asylum to former Panama President, Ricardo Martinelli, who is facing charges of corruption. Similarly, despite Colombia and Chile having left-wing governments, there have been various instances of diplomatic souring. Since 2023, President Ortega and President Gustavo Petro of Colombia have expressed disagreements over various issues, and in August 2024, Nicaragua charged Colombia Ambassador[xxviii] León Fredy Muñoz with drug trafficking. In January 2023, President Ortega faced criticisms from Chilean President Gabriel Boric[xxix] at the CELAC Summit over allegations of violations of human rights. In August 2024, Nicaragua and Brazil expelled[xxx] each other’s ambassadors after Brazilian President Lula da Silva, at the request of the Pope,[xxxi]  tried to mediate and secure the release of Bishop Rolando Jose Alvarez, a critique of the Nicaraguan government who was jailed. Nicaragua criticised this effort as interference in its domestic affairs. In 2023, Nicaragua also withdrew from the OAS,[xxxii] [xxxiii] accusing it of interference[xxxiv] in its domestic affairs. 

Nicaragua’s closest allies in Latin America are Cuba and Venezuela, with whom it shares strong ideological connections. Besides ideological similarities, Cuba and Venezuela face economic sanctions from the United States and are closer to Russia and China. Just like Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela seek to circumvent economic sanctions and avoid isolation. 

Relations with Venezuela 

Venezuela and Nicaragua share a good relationship, which has strengthened since Hugo Chavez's tenure as President of Venezuela. In the current scenario, as Venezuela reels under criticisms in the backdrop the re-election of President Nicolas Maduro, ties with Nicaragua remain steadfast. Ideologically, both have left-wing administrations that oppose the United States and provide diplomatic support to one another. Both are members of the ALBA[xxxv] and CELAC and cooperate on multilateral and bilateral issues. They engage in economic cooperation, such as trade agreements and financial support. Venezuela, under former President Chávez and President Maduro,[xxxvi] supplied oil and offered financial assistance to Nicaragua under the Petrocaribe initiative, which was used to fund a variety of infrastructural and social programmes. This initiative enabled Nicaragua to purchase Venezuelan oil[xxxvii] on preferential conditions, including long-term financing options and lower interest rates. The subsidised oil was critical for Nicaragua since it reduced energy costs and offered a huge boost to the country’s energy sector. 

Venezuela has invested in a variety of Nicaraguan economic projects. These include infrastructural projects including road construction, housing complexes, and social programmes. The economic cooperation has also led to increasing trade between the two countries. Venezuela has been an important market for Nicaraguan exports, and efforts have been made to strengthen bilateral commerce through accords and cooperative arrangements.[xxxviii]Nicaragua has periodically provided humanitarian assistance to Venezuela, including funding for health and social projects. This assistance, however, has been less considerable than Venezuela's economic commitments to Nicaragua.[xxxix]

Relations with Cuba 

Cuba is another important partner of Nicaragua, sharing similar ideals and interests. Cuba had provided financial and military assistance to the FSLN government after they assumed power in 1979. Except for an interlude from 1990 when the FSLN lost power, the relationship improved since 2006 with the election of President Daniel Ortega. Both countries have continuously provided diplomatic assistance to each other. Cuba has provided major assistance to Nicaragua in the areas of health and education, with Cuban medical personnel offering medical services and contributing to public health programmes in Nicaragua. Cuba has also provided educational support and training for Nicaraguan students and professionals in a variety of disciplines. In addition to health and education, Cuba has provided technical and humanitarian help to Nicaragua. This includes assistance with agricultural projects, infrastructural development, and disaster relief.

Nicaraguans have received training in Cuba in sectors such as medicine, engineering, and agriculture. This partnership contributes to Nicaragua’s capacity building and strengthens bilateral ties. To facilitate trade and investment, the two countries have signed a number of economic accords seeking to strengthen economic relationships and promote mutual benefits in trade relations. 

Cuba has provided technical aid and support for agriculture, including crop cultivation and agricultural methods. This collaboration enhances Nicaragua’s agricultural output and promotes food security. Joint ventures and collaborations have occurred in various industrial areas, including pharmaceutical and manufacturing. The two countries have worked together on several development initiatives aimed at boosting infrastructure, public services, and social programmes. 

In recent years, Cuba has continued to provide military training and support to Nicaragua. This includes training Nicaraguan military troops and sharing knowledge in areas, such as counterinsurgency and security operations. Nicaragua and Cuba have conducted joint military exercises and coordinated their efforts. These initiatives are frequently aimed at improving regional security and collaboration in the face of mutual dangers. 

Nicaragua’s relations with countries outside Latin America 

On a global level, Nicaragua’s closest partners are Russia, China, with whom it shares cordial relations, while it is consolidating its partnership with Iran, North Korea and has recently made engagement with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 

Relations with Russia 

Relations between Nicaragua and Russia were revitalised in 2006 after President Daniel Ortega assumed office. Since then, economic relations have been on the upswing, and a slew of bilateral agreements pertaining to agriculture, mining, industries, and trade were signed. Nicaragua’s increasing isolation in the international arena necessitates the presence of a significant ally capable of offering broad-based political assistance in a variety of multilateral settings. Furthermore, it requires access to finance and armaments in order to avoid the West’s international sanctions. Moscow, on the other hand, sees Nicaragua through the lens of strategic reciprocity, with the Central American country’s geographical proximity to the United States serving as a key benefit. 

In the wake of the Ukraine Crisis in February 2022, Russia deepened its relationship with Nicaragua in order to build strategic depth against the United States. This enhanced relationship provides Nicaragua with increased access to technology, finance, and arms. 

While economic relations between both countries are pale in comparison to those of China and the United States, military cooperation comprises a far significant portion of the bilateral relationship. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, military cooperation between Nicaragua and Russia was reduced, but since 2006, there has been a considerable upswing. 

Managua and Moscow signed an agreement on military and technical cooperation,[xl] leading to an increase in the sale of armaments and spare parts. Russia also took steps to modernise Nicaragua’s obsolete arsenal by supplying tanks, armoured vehicles, and small arms. In 2008, when Nicaragua recognised the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent republics,[xli] three Russian warships paid a visit to Nicaragua and conducted joint naval exercises with the Nicaraguan navy.[xlii] In 2012, both countries agreed to conduct Joint Training Programmes for Nicaraguan Defence Forces personnel in Russian institutions. The following year, the then-Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, Vladimir Gerasimov, visited Nicaragua. In the course of his visit, Russia inaugurated a training centre[xliii] for the Nicaraguan military,[xliv] which specialises in armed conflict, conflict management, cyber-warfare, and technological operations. Both countries also agreed upon a Memorandum of International Security Cooperation, and Nicaragua recognised Russia as an important strategic partner. 

Furthermore, in 2015, Nicaragua and Russia agreed upon maritime coordination, and Nicaragua purchased 20 T-72B1 tanks, which are superior to the T-55 tanks already in service in the Nicaraguan military. The weapon system includes a PN-72 function for gunners, a PKP-72 Falcon Eye option for commanders, automatic target tracking and control, modern navigation, a new gun stabiliser, and a remote-controlled anti-aircraft mount for machine guns. These tanks are Central America’s most sophisticated war equipment. Nicaragua also uses the Russian-made GLONASS navigation system, which can guide high-precision weapons in addition to its navigational capabilities. Nicaragua was the only Latin American country that participated in the Russian Vostok 2022 war games. Nicaragua has also benefitted from Russian law enforcement agencies and police equipment, including riot gear and surveillance equipment. The cooperation also extends to the realm of information technology and the media where Russia Today and Sputnik, which are important Russian media outlets, are active in churning information across Nicaragua. 

Hence, for both parties, the relationship is symbiotic with Russia gaining a strategic depth in the vicinity of the United States, especially during the ongoing Ukraine Crisis, while Nicaragua manages to avoid complete isolation. 

Relations with China 

Relations between Nicaragua and China are steadily picking up after Managua extended formal recognition in December 2021,[xlv] which was upgraded to a strategic partnership in December 2023. Nicaragua formally joined the Belt and Road Initiative in January 2022. In contrast to approaches by Russia, China has maintained a fair economic approach towards Nicaragua, with a focus on providing loans, joint economic ventures, and delegitimising Taiwan. After the establishment of a formal relationship, Nicaragua closed down the Taiwanese-Nicaraguan Business Chamber and the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce in Managua.[xlvi] China is already a big investor in Central and Latin America, and it might give Nicaragua financial assistance as the United States increases economic pressure on Nicaragua. 

Nicaragua is strategically important for China because of its proximity to the United States. In recent years, Beijing has progressively increased its diplomatic engagement in the region, establishing diplomatic relations with neighbouring Honduras in May 2023 and providing assistance to nearby, diplomatically isolated Cuba and Venezuela.[xlvii] As a result, China will look forward to giving additional economic help and advancing Beijing’s strategic goals in the region. China is also eager to strengthen its support and cooperation with Nicaragua on international issues and protect Nicaraguan interests on a global scale. Both countries formally signed a Free Trade Agreement on August 31, 2023,[xlviii] which became effective on January 1, 2024. 

On April 10, 2024, Nicaragua and China signed a credit agreement worth $26.9 million to develop three gas storage tanks in the country, reflecting Beijing’s rising engagement in regional energy infrastructure. It is vital to stress that Beijing does not provide sovereign loans; rather, its financing is secured by the recipient country’s natural assets or resources. From December 2023 to April 2024, the Chinese government approved US $602 million loan to Nicaragua.  In the same year a Chinese company, CIDCA[xlix] received a contract to construct 12,000 social housing units in various Nicaraguan towns, thus making a move towards housing infrastructure in the country. The entry of chain stores such as Casa China, which sells Chinese items, as well as other manufacturing units in 2023, highlights the two nations’ growing economic ties. Other initiatives include expanding the Puerta Huete Airport and executing a railway project. In the power sector, Chinese businesses have received awards for hydroelectric, thermoelectric, and solar projects, demonstrating their rising presence in Nicaraguan energy infrastructure. 

In the mining sector, in July 2023, the Nicaraguan government granted Zhong Fu Development of China two concessions totalling 15,400 hectares. They also include a train line from Managua to Masaya to Granada, which will be designed and built by the Chinese company, CCECC.[l] The CCECC will also study the potential for an ambitious interoceanic railway connection from Managua in the northwest to Corinto and Bluefields on Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast. Chinese corporations have signed deals with the Nicaraguan government for multiple highway projects, including one by CCCC [li] to repair road stretches from Guanacaste to Nandaime to Rivas and Rivas to Sapoa. Beyond road and rail developments, Nicaragua has also purchased 500 buses from the Chinese business Yutong, with plans to purchase another 2,000 in 2024. 

In the digital sector, Chinese enterprises, such as Xinwei, have established themselves. Huawei, based in China, is now partnering with the government to eventually create the country’s 5G network. Despite the growing economic relationship with China, Nicaragua’s exports to China totalled only $6.7 million, compared to nearly $1 billion in exports to the United States in 2023. 

In the space sector, Nicaragua intends to participate in the construction and operation of China’s ILRS.[lii] The China-led ILRS proposes building a permanent lunar base by the 2030s, with preliminary missions to test resource technology in situ near the lunar south pole beginning in the coming years. The agreement between Nicaragua’s SNAE[liii] and CNSA[liv] was signed in Wuhan during China Space Day 2024’s opening ceremonies. The agreement addresses education, capacity building, collaborative research, professional exchanges, and space architecture. 

Hence, Nicaragua seeks access to loans and financial opportunities, while for China, Nicaragua provides an opportunity to develop its position in Central America at the expense of the influence of the United States and Taiwan. 

Relations with Iran, North Korea and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

Aside from Russia and China, President Ortega’s administration has reached out to Iran for commercial and political cooperation. The Iranian government’s most recent major public diplomacy with Nicaragua was when then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited the country in 2012 as a part of his plans to engage similar-minded countries in the Latin American region. At the outset, it must be mentioned that Iran does not possess the military or economic capacity like China and Russia. However, given the anti-West orientation of Nicaragua and Iran, certain levels of cooperation are yet to develop to their full capacity. Iran, like Nicaragua, has broad strategic goals, such as using partnerships with other nations to avoid international sanctions and demonstrate its ability to oppose the United States. 

Despite reports of numerous Iranian investment initiatives in Nicaragua at the time, no commercial projects between the two countries materialised. Tehran and Managua signed three accords, one of which aimed to promote free trade. Javad Owji, the former Iranian oil minister, visited Nicaragua in May 2022 and signed memorandums of understanding in oil and agriculture sectors. Iran committed to supplying fuel to Nicaragua and discussed future investments in the country’s new oil refinery, the Supremo Sueño de Bolívar. Former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Nicaragua in 2023 highlighted that, despite slow progress, Nicaragua-Iran relations remain warm. Despite the lack of concrete actions following the meeting, the convergence of interests indicates the probability of increasing ties between both countries in the coming years. 

Interestingly, in 2023, Nicaragua expressed its intention to open an embassy in North Korea,[lv] which it did while shutting down its embassy in South Korea.[lvi] President Daniel Ortega’s return to power in 2006 created prospects for a partnership between Nicaragua and North Korea. While North Korea’s friendship with the Nicaraguan government is mostly symbolic, it illustrates how both countries seek common objectives and oppose the United States. In addition to that, Nicaragua has also established diplomatic relations[lvii] with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan by appointing a non-resident ambassador[lviii] becoming the only nation in the western hemisphere to do so. 

Conclusion 

Nicaragua’s foreign policy under President Daniel Ortega aims to expand its diplomatic relations with countries sharing similar ideological and strategic goals and opposition to the West. Due to its ideological and policy differences, Nicaragua has faced challenges in engaging with Western powers and certain Latin American countries, prompting it to seek closer ties with anti-West­ nations like China, Russia, and Iran. By doing so, Nicaragua not only secures access to financial resources and military support but also gains backing at the international and regional levels. It seems that the stronger the criticism and sanctions against Nicaragua, the more it will strengthen its relationships with these countries. 

Despite not being an economic powerhouse, Nicaragua holds significant strategic influence due to its proximity to the United States, making it an attractive partner for Russia, China, and Iran in furthering their strategic objectives. While some may view President Ortega’s foreign policy as brinkmanship due to its ties to Iran, North Korea, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as well as its unwavering diplomatic support for Russia during the Ukraine Crisis, Venezuela during the Esequiba Crisis, and the shift in diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, these actions illustrate Nicaragua’s efforts to bypass the West, display defiance, and maintain robust ties with these nations.

*****

*Dr. Arnab Chakrabarty, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.

End Notes

[i] Nicaragua has suspended diplomatic relations with the Netherlands and the Holy See (The Vatican).

[ii] Central American Integration System, a regional integration organisation founded in 1993 and has 8 members which are Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Belize and the Dominican Republic.

[iii] The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, a Pan-Latin American regional bloc consisting of the countries in the region which was founded in 2011.

[iv] The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, a free trade agreement with the United States that came into force in 2004.

[v] The Sandinista National Liberation Front, a left-wing political party in Nicaragua and the current ruling party.

[vi] BTI Transformation Index. (2024). Nicaragua Country Report. Accessed 28^th August 2024. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/NIC#pos21.

[vii] Elvira Cuadra Lira. (2022). Nicaragua: una política exterior de autoaislamiento. Dialogo Politico, Accessed 28^th August 2024. https://dialogopolitico.org/agenda/nicaragua-politica-exterior-autoaislamiento/.

[viii] The Dialogue. (2023). What led Ortega to expel hundreds of political opponents? Accessed 3^rd September 2024. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/what-led-ortega-to-expel-hundreds-of-political-opponents/.

[ix]  Ezekile Gonzalez et.al. (2021).  Nicaragua: How Latin America reacted. Americas Quarterly, Accessed 26^th August 2024. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/nicaragua-how-latin-america-reacted/.

[x] NACLA (2021).  Why did Daniel Ortega Imprison his Former Comrades? Accessed 19^th September 2024. https://nacla.org/ortega-elections-sandinistas-fsln.

[xi] The Junta of National Reconstruction was a provisional government that functioned from 1979 till 1985.

[xii] The Sandinista Renovation Movement, a party that was founded in 1995 by former members of the FSLN who had disagreements with President Daniel Ortega. It was renamed as Democratic Renovation Union or by its Spanish acronym, Unamos in 2021.

[xiii] Confidencial. (2024).  Daniel Ortega criticises his brother and calls him a traitor. Accessed 18^th September 2024. https://confidencial.digital/english/daniel-ortega-criticizes-his-brother-humberto-and-calls-him-a-traitor/.

[xiv] Global Post. (2016). Daniel Ortega’s cult of personality.  Accessed 18^th September 2024. https://theworld.org/stories/2016/08/02/daniel-ortegas-cult-personality.

[xv] The Tico Times. (2022). Ortega near total control in Nicaragua with both opposition and church muzzled.  Accessed 18^th September 2024. https://ticotimes.net/2022/10/11/ortega-near-total-control-in-nicaragua-with-both-opposition-and-church-muzzled.

[xvi] La Prensa. (2024).  La política exterior de Ortega: la diplomacia como herramienta dictatorial.  Accessed 28th August 2024. https://www.laprensani.com/2023/09/25/politica/3208712-la-politica-exterior-de-ortega-la-diplomacia-como-herramienta-dictatorial.

[xvii]Voice of Americas. (2024). US imposes sanctions on Nicaragua over repression, migrant smuggling. Accessed 19^th September 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-imposes-sanctions-on-nicaragua-over-repression-migrant-smuggling-/7613344.html.

[xviii] InSight Crime. (2021). Elites y crimen organizado en Nicaragua: Introducción. Accessed 19th September 2024. https://insightcrime.org/es/investigaciones/elites-crimen-organizado-nicaragua-introduccion/.

[xix] Michael Lohmuller. (2014). Is Nicaragua as effective at deterring drug-trafficking as it claims. Insight Crime. Accessed 20^th September 2024. https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/is-nicaragua-as-effective-at-deterring-drug-trafficking-as-claimed/.

[xx] Divergentes. (2023). Scholars explain why Nicaragua is a narco-state and how it operates with regime complicity. Accessed 18^th September 2024. https://www.divergentes.com/nicaragua-is-a-narco-state-that-operates-with-regime-complicity/.

[xxi] Katie Jones. (2020). Nicaragua not spared as Cocaine flows through Central America. Insight Crime. Accessed 20^th September 2024. https://insightcrime.org/news/nicaragua-cocaine-flows/.

[xxii] Boston Globe. (2024). Nicaragua’s weaponization of Migrants. Accessed 19^th September 2024. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2024/01/05/opinion/nicaragua-president-daniel-ortega-migrant-crisis-biden/.

[xxiii] The Darien Gap is located between Panama and Colombia and is covered with dense forests and mountains. Known for its difficult terrain, it has become a favoured route for migrants towards north despite the inhospitable geography.

[xxiv] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). Central America’s Turbulent Northern Triangle.  Accessed 19^th September 2024.  https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-turbulent-northern-triangle.

[xxv] Inter-American Development Bank

[xxvi] Central American Bank for Economic Integration

[xxvii] Raul Zibechi. (2023). The Latin American Left that turns its back on Dictatorship. NACLA. Accessed 24^th August 2024. https://nacla.org/latin-american-left-turns-its-back-ortega-dictatorship.

[xxviii] Divergentes. (2023). Ortega lashes out at Colombian and Chilean Presidents. Accessed 26^th August 2024. https://www.divergentes.com/ortega-lashes-out-at-boric-and-petro/.

[xxix] President Ortega has frequently criticised Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Chilean President Gabriel Boric on ideological grounds. In 2023, at the 44th anniversary of the National Police, President Ortega criticised the ideological dilution of Chile and Colombia and accused these governments of being closer to the United States.  Nicaragua has also criticised the presidents of these two countries in the context of the Venezuelan elections.

[xxx] Firstpost. (2024).  Brazil, Nicaragua expel ambassadors as ties worsen. Accessed 29th August 2024. https://www.firstpost.com/world/brazil-nicaragua-expel-ambassadors-as-ties-worsen-13802676.html.

[xxxi] Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). The Pope and the Church in Nicaragua. Accessed 2^nd September. https://www.cfr.org/blog/pope-and-church-nicaragua.

[xxxii] Organisation of American States, a Pan-Hemispheric organisation founded in 1948 which encompasses countries from North, South, Central America and the Caribbean.

[xxxiii] In 2021 Nicaragua had submitted its willingness to leave the OAS and in the following year, Nicaraguan police conducted a raid on the OAS premises which was strongly criticised by countries in the region.

[xxxiv] Alina Maria Ripplinger & Florian Kriener. (2022). Nicaragua’s OAS raid and the Inter-American System. Verfassungsblog. Accessed 1^st September 2024. https://verfassungsblog.de/nicaraguas-oas-raid-and-the-inter-american-system/.

[xxxv] Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, a left-wing regional organisation founded in 2004.

[xxxvi] The Conversation. (2018).  Venezuelan oil fuelled the rise and fall of Nicaragua’s Ortega regime. Accessed 2^nd September 2024. https://theconversation.com/venezuelan-oil-fueled-the-rise-and-fall-of-nicaraguas-ortega-regime-100507.

[xxxvii] Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela.  (2023). Gobiernos de Venezuela y nicaragua ratifican apuesta por el camino de la cooperación. Accessed 29th August 2024.  http://www.minec.gob.ve/gobiernos-de-venezuela-y-nicaragua-ratifican-apuesta-por-el-camino-de-la-cooperacion/.

[xxxviii] Juventud Rebelde. (2023).  Venezuela y Nicaragua fortalecen relaciones bilaterales.  Accessed 4th September 2024. https://www.juventudrebelde.cu/internacionales/2013-06-02/venezuela-y-nicaragua-fortalecen-relaciones-bilaterales.

[xxxix] Infodefensa. (2012). Nicaragua y Venezuela fortalecen acuerdos de cooperación en materia de Defensa. Accessed 4th September 2024.  https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3143104/nicaragua-venezuela-fortalecen-acuerdos-cooperacion-materia-defensa

[xl] The Dialogue. (2023).  Nicaragua in 2024: Preparing for the transformation and the day after. Accessed 3^rd September 2024. https://www.thedialogue.org/blogs/2023/12/nicaragua-in-2024-preparing-for-the-transition-and-the-day-after/.

[xli] Nicaragua supported Russia’s position in the Ukraine Crisis.

[xlii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2023). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s opening remarks at a meeting with President of the Republic of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, Managua. Accessed 4^th September 2024. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1864420/.

[xliii] Known as the Marshal Zhukov Center.

[xliv] Dialogo Américas. (2024). Nicaragua and Russia: Strategic Alliance or Spy Nest? Accessed 2^nd September 2024.  https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/nicaragua-and-russia-strategic-alliance-or-spy-nest/.

[xlv] Diplomatic ties between Nicaragua and China were established in 1985 but were severed in 1990 due to Nicaragua's support of Taiwan. Relations were restored in 2021.

[xlvi] Economist Intelligence. (2024). Understanding Nicaragua’s adoption of its One-China Policy. Accessed 4^th September 2024. https://www.eiu.com/n/understanding-nicaraguas-adoption-of-its-one-china-policy/.

[xlvii] Dialogo Politico. Nicaragua: a foreign policy of self-isolation. Accessed 4th September 2024. https://dialogopolitico.org/agenda/nicaragua-politica-exterior-autoaislamiento/.

[xlviii] Divergentes.  (2024). Ortega and Murillo consolidate alliances with dictatorships that brings no economic benefits. Accessed 5^th September 2024. https://www.divergentes.com/ortega-consolidate-alliances-with-dictatorships/.

[xlix] China International Development Cooperation Agency

[l] China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation

[li] China Communications and Construction Corporation

[lii] International Lunar Research Station

[liii] National Secretariat for Outer Space, Moon, and Other Celestial Bodies Affairs

[liv] China National Space Administration

[lv] Divergentes. (2023). Nicaragua in North Korea: Beyond Diplomacy and Ideological Brotherhood. Accessed 5^th September 2024.  https://www.divergentes.com/nicaragua-in-north-korea/.

[lvi] Nicaraguan Ambassador to North Korea, Manuel Modesto Munguia Martinez assumed the position in June 2024.

[lvii] The Hill. (2024). Nicaragua’s dictatorship opens a door to the Taliban.  Accessed 3^rd September 2024. https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/4738675-nicaragua-taliban-central-america/.

[lviii] Michael Campbell who is Nicaragua’s ambassador to China, will hold the additional responsibility for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as well.