Abstract: There is a considerable shift in the tone and nature of North Korea’s rhetoric, especially in 2024 with the abandonment of reunification goals and an increased aggressive military posture. The physical destruction of buildings, roads, and railways that were once symbols of the inter-Korean dialogue has begun a new cycle of escalation in the Korean Peninsula with the threat of imminent military action on the horizon.
Introduction
For the Korean Peninsula, the year 2024 began on a considerably serious note. The North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, during his speech on 15 January 2024 at the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), announced revision of their Constitution, abandoned the 80-year old policy of reunification, and invariably declared South Korea a “primary enemy state”.[i] Latest developments following announcements by the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) on 9 October 2024 have resulted in measures being undertaken by Pyongyang to “completely separate” North Korea’s territory from that of South Korea.[ii]
Provocations through Drones and Trash Balloons
The cycle of escalation reached perhaps a pivotal moment on 11 October 2024, when North Korea issued a statement claiming that South Korean unmanned drones dropped propaganda leaflets over Pyongyang[iii] on 3, 9, and 10 October.[iv] Since then, the North Korean side is stated to have ordered its frontline troops near the border with South Korea to fully prepare to shoot and take retaliatory action in case drones are flown again into the North.[v] The South Korean Defence Minister Kim Yong-hun had denied sending drones across the border, and the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) also stated that it could not confirm whether the North’s claims were true.[vi]
Prior to the allegations of South Korean unmanned drones operating over Pyongyang to drop leaflets, the North Korean side had already been sending trash balloons to the Southern side since late May.[vii] With neither side pulling back but warning each other of “horrible disaster”[viii] and “end of regime”[ix] if there is a continued provocation, tensions in the Korean Peninsula are undesirably escalated with threats of imminent military action.
Symbols of Reunification Aspirations Destroyed
On 15 October 2024, Pyongyang began following up on its calls for completely severing all roads and railways connecting North’s territory to the South by blowing up parts of the Gyeongui and Donghae roads north of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).[x] The roads and railways were once considered key symbols of inter-Korean reconciliation. The JCS stated that South Korea’s military responded by “firing shots south of the MDL as a means of self-defence and as a warning against acts that likely violate the Armistice Agreement”.[xi]
The situation is becoming further grim with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un even warning of physical force against any violations to North Korea’s sovereignty by South Korea, whom he has labelled as a “foreign country and an apparent hostile country”.[xii] The developments point towards Pyongyang no longer harbouring any inkling towards reunification with its Southern neighbour. Moreover, Kim Jong-un’s latest inspection of the headquarters of the 2nd Corps of the KPA positioned on the frontlines near the inter-Korean border suggests that plans are in order for proper military action to cope with possible different circumstances.[xiii]
Geopolitical Context of the Escalations
The tensions in the Korean Peninsula are also being additionally influenced by speculations of North Korea preparing or already having deployed 10,000 troops to help Russia.[xiv] Initially, the South Korean side, through its Vice Minister of Defence Kim Seon-ho, suggested that the North Korean side may be sending civilian personnel rather than military forces to Russia.[xv] Observers opined that Pyongyang may have sent engineers to operate North Korean missiles sold to Russia.[xvi] Even so, the engineers who may have been deployed or are being deployed would eventually be able to assess the capabilities of any North Korean artillery used in the conflict and gather data to later improve North Korea’s weapons.
However, there are now reports with video footage and documents which corroborate the claims that Pyongyang has already been deploying its troops to Russia to fight in Ukraine.[xvii] The evidence suggests that over 1500 soldiers from North Korea were already transported on Russian Navy ships.[xviii] As per certain experts, the step taken by North Korea could also prompt South Korea to rethink its form of support for Ukraine.[xix] Following confirmation of North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia, South Korea faces a dilemma and heightened security threats on whether to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine.[xx]
It was in June 2024, after Putin’s visit to North Korea and the mutual defence pact signing between the two countries, that South Korea had stated it would review its policy of direct arms supply to Ukraine.[xxi] After the reports of the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, the South Korean side is now hinting at providing “defensive” weapons and potentially progressing to “offensive” weapons to Ukraine, marking a shift from its previous stance of only offering non-lethal aid.[xxii] There has also been a statement that the South Korean presidential National Security Council (NSC) meeting agreed “to implement strong and effective measures in close coordination with its allies and partners, preparing for potential scenarios and taking phased actions after assessing the security implications” in response to the North Korea-Russia military cooperation.[xxiii] Seoul is also reportedly considering sending personnel to Ukraine to monitor North Korean troops.[xxiv] President Yoon Suk Yeol is dispatching a delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to share information on North Korea's troop deployment as he shared concerns with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.[xxv]
The timing of the aggressive posturing is also inconveniently close to the upcoming elections in the United States poised for November 2024 and Japan’s snap elections scheduled on 27 October. The proximity of the new cycle of escalations with the elections in the US and Japan can also be perceived as a North Korean tactic not only for domestic consumption but to destabilise South Korea and its allies, the US and Japan, during their most vulnerable stages of transition.
Conclusion
North Korea’s actions are reflective of how Kim Jong-un is enforcing his authority as a leader. His decision to rewrite their Constitution and even abolish all goals of reunification that were adhered to since the time of his late grandfather and eternal leader Kim Il Sung indicates attempts at creating his own legacy. To an extent, Kim Jong-un’s actions can be said to be motivated by intensified desires for security and power.
Despite Pyongyang’s longstanding history of bellicose rhetoric, the escalating tensions in 2024, marked by the explicit abandonment of reunification goals and the destruction of inter-Korean dialogue symbols, echo a significant shift in North Korea’s foreign policy.[xxvi] On both sides of the 38th parallel, two heavily militarised armed forces are ready to take action upon any further provocation.
On October 13, there were reports of the North Korean KPA ordering eight artillery brigades to remain on standby to open fire, as well as reinforcement of anti-air observation posts in Pyongyang.[xxvii] Wartime rhetoric of 1.4 million people volunteering to join the KPA has been repeated.[xxviii] Additionally, Kim’s visit to the 2nd Corps of the KPA at the frontline, where he threatened to use unconditional force against the South in self-defence indicates an imminent military action when viewed in tandem with the ongoing tensions.[xxix]
There is an urgent need for stakeholders to address the deteriorating situation on the Korean Peninsula. If any untoward incident were to occur in this region, it would further complicate matters with the already severe and complex security environment following the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the spiralling crisis in West Asia.
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*Dr. Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Rodong Sinmun, 2024, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at 10th Session of 14th SPA,” KCNA Watch, January 16, 2024, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1705399837-434912951/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-makes-policy-speech-at-10th-session-of-14th-spa/ (Accessed 14 October 2024)
[ii] The Korea Times, 2024, “N. Korea appears to be preparing for explosions on roads connected to S. Korea: JCS,” October 14, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/103_384170.html (Accessed October 14, 2024)
[iii] The Korea Times, 2024, “NK says S. Korea sent unmanned drones over Pyongyang,” October 11, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/103_384080.html (Accessed October 14, 2024)
[iv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 2024, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Statement of Crucial Importance,” KCNA Watch, October 11, 2024, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1728788680-855044268/dprk-foreign-ministry-issues-statement-of-crucial-importance/ (Accessed October 14, 2024)
[v] Choi Kyong-ae, 2024, “N. Korea says ordered artillery corps near border to fully prepare to shoot,” Yonhap News Agency, October 13, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241013004000320?section=nk/nk (Accessed October 14, 2024)
[vi] The Korea Times, 2024, “NK says S. Korea sent unmanned drones over Pyongyang,” October 11, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/103_384080.html (Accessed October 14, 2024)
[vii] The Korea Times, 2024, “NK says S. Korea sent unmanned drones over Pyongyang,” October 11, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/103_384080.html (Accessed October 14, 2024)
[viii] Kim Seung-yeon, 2024, “N. Korean leader’s sister warns of 'horrible disaster' if S. Korean drones found again,” Yonhap News Agency, October 13, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241012003851315?section=nk/nk (Accessed October 14, 2024)
[ix] Choi Kyong-ae, 2024, “S. Korea warns N. Korea will see end of regime if it harms its people,” Yonhap News Agency, October 13, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241012003854315?section=nk/nk (Accessed October 14, 2024)
[x] Kwak Yeon-soo, 2024, “North Korea blows up parts of inter-Korean roads amid escalating tensions,” The Korea Times, October 15, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/103_384308.html (Accessed October 16, 2024)
[xi] Lee Minji, 2024, “N. Korea blows up inter-Korean roads, cuts off land routes with South,” Yonhap News Agency, October 15, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241014004653315?section=nk/nk (Accessed October 16, 2024)
[xii] Kim Han-joo, 2024, “NK leader calls S. Korea 'foreign country,' 'hostile country,' warns of using physical force,” Yonhap News Agency, October 18, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241018000351315?section=nk/nk (Accessed October 18, 2024)
[xiii] KCNA Watch, 2024, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects 2nd Corps Headquarters of KPA,” October 18, 2024, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1729202968-337049579/Respected-Comrade-Kim-Jong-Un-Inspects-2nd-Corps-Headquarters-of-KPA/ (Accessed October 18, 2024)
[xiv] Kim Eun-jung, 2024, “Zelenskyy says N. Korea is preparing 10,000 troops to help Russia,” Yonhap News Agency, October 17, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241017009700315?section=nk/nk (Accessed October 18, 2024)
[xv] Kim Seung-yeon, 2024, “N. Korea's support to Russia may be civilian personnel rather than troops: S. Korean vice defense minister,” Yonhap News Agency, October 18, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241018001900315 (Accessed October 18, 2024)
[xvi] Lee Hyo-jin, 2024, “Did North Korea deploy troops to Ukraine?,” The Korea Times, October 17, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/103_384462.html (Accessed October 18, 2024)
[xvii] Kim Hyun-bin, 2024, “Evidence shows North Korea deploying troops to support Russia in Ukraine war,” The Korea Times, October 20, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/103_384591.html (Accessed October 21, 2024)
[xviii] Kim Eun-jung, 2024, “S. Korean satellite captures image of N. Korean troop movement to Russia: source,” Yonhap News Agency, October 20, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241020002800315?section=nk/nk (Accessed October 21, 2024)
[xix] The Korea Times, 2024, “Reports of N. Korea sending troops to Russia may prompt Yoon to reconsider its support for Ukraine: US expert,” October 17, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/113_384459.html (Accessed October 18, 2024)
[xx] Anna J. Park, 2024, “S. Korea faces dilemma of providing lethal weapons to Ukraine,” The Korea Times, October 20, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/103_384603.html (Accessed October 21, 2024)
[xxi] Kim Eun-jung, 2024, “S. Korea's level of arms supply to Ukraine hinges on Russia's actions: presidential office,” Yonhap News Agency, June 21, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240621006000315 (Accessed October 22, 2024)
[xxii] Anna J. Park, 2024, “S. Korea hints at supplying offensive weapons to Ukraine,” The Korea Times¸ October 22, 2024, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/10/103_384762.html (Accessed October 22, 2024)
[xxiii] Kim Eun-jung, 2024, “S. Korea vows to take 'phased measures' in response to N. Korea-Russia military cooperation,” Yonhap News Agency, October 22, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241022005551315?section=national/defense (Accessed October 22, 2024)
[xxiv] Chae Yun-hwan, 2024, “S. Korea considering sending personnel to Ukraine to monitor N. Korean troops: source,” Yonhap News Agency, October 22, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241022003400315?section=nk/nk (Accessed October 22, 2024)
[xxv] Kim Eun-jung, 2024, “S. Korea vows to take 'phased measures' in response to N. Korea-Russia military cooperation,” Yonhap News Agency, October 22, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241022005551315?section=national/defense (Accessed October 22, 2024)
[xxvi] Pyongyang Times, 2024, “Decision of DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly on abolishing some organizations”, KCNA Watch, January 16, 2024, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1705399836-312376461/decision-of-dprk-supreme-peoples-assembly-on-abolishing-some-organizations/ (Accessed October 18, 2024)
[xxvii] KCNA, 2024, “Statement of Spokesman for Ministry of National Defence of DPRK,” October 13, 2024, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/9c10349c16bb1e3a298ea150ee7d7479.kcmsf (Accessed October 22, 2024)
[xxviii] KCNA, 2024, “Many Youth and Students in DPRK Volunteer to Join or Rejoin KPA,” October 16, 2024, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/338cd4183c5fe5a58c98cd14e59b99af.kcmsf (Accessed October 22, 2024)
[xxix] John Feng, 2024, “North Korea Won't Hesitate To Use Force: Kim Jong Un,” Newsweek, October 18, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-kim-jong-un-use-force-against-south-korea-if-attacked-1971052 (Accessed October 22, 2024)