Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Tensions between Israel and Iran have long been a point of contention, with various factions within government, academia, and society advocating for an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. While such a course of action may appeal to hardline proponents, this paper contends that it would not be a prudent decision for Israel. It provides an overview of Israel-Iran interactions and outlines five key reasons against military action targeting Iran's nuclear capabilities. 

Former Prime Ministers of Israel, Naftali Bennett and Ehud Barak have articulated the notion that a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities may serve as a potential course of action for Israel in response to the former’s recent provocations.[1] The recent cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities on the 12th of October have raised significant concerns. On 1 October 2024, Iran launched approximately 180 missiles at Israel, marking the second direct assault within six months. Although Israel has refrained from retaliating against the attack immediately, the current Prime Minister has issued a warning, characterising the assault as a significant error on Iran’s part.[2] While Iran is reported to have concluded the attack, the global community remains keenly observant of the developments in the region, particularly regarding the forthcoming actions of Israel. While the specific course of action is yet to be determined, it is highly likely that Israel may target Iran’s nuclear facilities in the near future. In the context of recent events, one must contemplate whether Israel would be inclined to escalate to such a degree. Certain reality checks are essential.  

The Nuclear tête-à-tête between Iran and Israel 

On 14 April 2024, Iran launched its first-ever full-scale mass drone and missile attack on Israel. This was in retaliation to Israel’s apparent role in the killing of two Iranian generals in an air strike in Syria.[3] Unlike in April, when Iran had forewarned Israel and its allies of an imminent attack, giving them 14 days to form a coalition and a plan of action to intercept the incoming projectiles, this time the attack came within days of the assassination of the Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah.[4] Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has said that the October attack was in response to the sustained attacks against the people of Gaza and Lebanon as well as the assassination of important leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah.[5] Nasrallah’s assassination served as the pivotal catalyst prompting Iran to launch its second direct attack, albeit without warning. 

In reaction to the attack directed at it, Israel had initially planned a larger attack but replaced it with a strike at Iran’s three strategic locations on 19 April 2024 to send a message and end the cycle of reprisal.[6] Israel’s restricted scope of the retaliatory attack and Iran’s subdued response to it ensured that the conditions did not deteriorate but the signalling was clear. One of the three sites attacked was the Natanz nuclear facility, where the strike ended up damaging the S-300 mobile radar, which forms a key part of air defence at the Esfahan and Natanz nuclear sites in Iran.[7] The attack showcased the capability and adeptness of the Israeli weapons system to strike deep into Iran’s territory, bypassing Iran’s defence systems, thus rendering its nuclear facilities increasingly susceptible to future attacks. This is not the only time that nuclear facilities have been at the centre of discourse in the exchange between Israel and Iran. 

In early July 2020, an explosion proceeded by a fire caused significant damage to the main assembly hall section of the Iran Centrifuge Assembly Centre (ICAC) at the Natanz nuclear site in Iran.[8] Initially, the damage was reported as limited by the Iranian officials. Post the satellite images were made public, reports started pouring in on how the damage was much more significant than was earlier anticipated.[9] The plant was previously at the centre of a cyberattack, which was believed to be carried out by Israel given the critical nature of the nuclear facility in the production of advanced centrifuges and the assembly of rotor assemblies (the rapidly spinning part of the centrifuge).[10] The blast at ICAC came at a time when Iran was under increased scrutiny given its alleged renewed enrichment efforts. 

Iran declared in May 2019 that it would go above the threshold of uranium enrichment set under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was designed to restrain its nuclear aspirations.[11] Under the JCPOA, uranium enrichment was capped at 3.67%, considered optimum for research purposes.[12] After the US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran’s incentives to continue with a deal that curbed its nuclear ambitions were reduced. Following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, sanctions were imposed on Iran for not complying with the agreement's terms. In response, Iran gave the remaining signatories—China, Germany, Russia, France, and the UK—a one-year deadline to protect it from the imposed US sanctions following which it would resume enrichment.[13] Furthermore, Iran announced that it would gradually reduce its commitments, which prevented it from enriching weapons-grade uranium, every sixty days thereafter. Iran first declared that it would begin enriching uranium to 5%. The threshold at which material for a weapon becomes within reach is after 20%.[14] Olli Heinonen, a former Deputy Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reports that enrichment at 20% is a short technical step away from uranium enrichment of 90%, which is weapons-grade level. It takes approximately a month for enrichment to progress from 20% to 60%, Further processing of uranium enrichment from 60% to 90% is theoretically possible in a week or so.[15]

In March 2024, an investigative report released by Iran International disclosed, “An industrial production workshop […] belonging to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was deliberately set on fire” in late July 2020 in the Shadabad neighbourhood of Tehran and is one of the sites that had not been previously disclosed to the IAEA.[16] Based on the analysis provided by the report, Iran has alleged that Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad, is behind the incident. The workshop in the report is described as a covert workshop, and hence, it has been difficult to determine the exact purpose of the workshop. Based on the Amad plan, the attacked area is known to have workshops that were involved in making the prototype re-entry vehicles for missiles.[17] Considering the information at hand, one can discern several potential purposes for the workshop in question, including a facility linked to the AEOI, the specific purpose of which remains unclear, or a workshop engaged in advanced research and development of centrifuges and/or the manufacturing and assembly of components under the auspices of either the AEOI or the IRGC.[18]

Back in 2015, the IAEA released a report on the final assessment of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, stating that there are no ‘credible indications’ of activities related to the development of a nuclear explosive device.[19] The report states, “The agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device was conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003”. The agency had declared that it found “… no diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program”. In the aftermath, the IAEA Board of Directors decided to conclude the investigations. The IAEA began its second leg of investigation in 2018 focused on the evidence suggesting Iran’s failure to declare its nuclear program and its failure to abide by the safeguard agreements. In an investigation that was conducted at three undeclared locations in 2019 and 2020 – Turquzabad, Varamin, and Marivan – the IAEA concluded to have found “uranium particles of anthropogenic origins”[20] and in June 2022, blaming the growing investigations, Iran declared that it would remove 27 surveillance cameras from its nuclear facilities. This move came after Iran was censured by the IAEA for its failure to address the enquiries directed at it regarding the enriched uranium found at its sites.[21]

In 2023, environmental samples collected from the sampling point of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant revealed that the sample consisted of highly enriched uranium particles with concentrations reaching 83.7%.[22] Iran has provided an explanation for this, citing the ownership of the warehouse previously by a private entity, which may have used the space to store equipment from Iran’s uranium mine. While Iran has been consistent with the statements throughout, as assessed by the IAEA, there is no way for the IAEA to confirm the correctness and credibility of Iran’s declarations under its safeguard agreement. These investigations are different from the JCPOA.

In a report that was derestricted on the 4th of June 2024, it was brought to attention that IAEA verification and monitoring measures with regard to the JCPOA requirements have been seriously affected given Iran’s failure to comply with the nuclear-related commitments of the JCPOA.[23] The agency has failed to carry out the surveillance owing to the disruption in its surveillance mechanism, causing a significant loss in the continuity of its knowledge. The removal of the surveillance mechanism also meant a serious hampering of the IAEA’s ability to provide any kind of assurance regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. 

Why Striking Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Might Not Be a Wise Idea 

Given Iran’s recent missile barrage, it is highly probable that Israel would not repeat its April plan, in which the extent of the reprisal was restricted to a counterattack rather than a full-scale invasion. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been vocal about Israel’s intention to strike back. Netanyahu has vowed to attack Iran, calling its missile attack a big mistake. In a televised address on the 5th of October, he reiterated his vow to attack Iran and stated that “Israel has the duty and the right to defend itself and respond to these attacks”.[24] With the increasing intensity of verbal warnings on the political front, many commentators across politics, governance, and academia have called for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities to put an end to the series of retaliatory actions. 

While this may seem to be a feasible solution in theory to eliminate the possibility of a nuclear Iran, the actual situation is likely to be far more intricate than one anticipates. It is essential to understand and assimilate the reality checks that could temper Israel’s temptation to go ballistic. When examined, it becomes evident that Iran’s trajectory is characterized by a pattern of two steps forward and one step backwards. Below are a few reasons that suggest that an assault by Israel on Iran’s nuclear facilities may not be prudent. 

Iran’s enrichment levels 

After the US unilaterally withdrew from JCPOA in 2018, Iran has charted its trajectory on the development of nuclear facilities in the country, unsupervised by the watchful eyes of the P5 and the IAEA. Since the dismantling of the JCPOA, Iran has repeatedly made it clear that it is not bound by any rules and has thus ventured into practice to expand its existing nuclear program while withdrawing from the monitoring requirements needed in place by the IAEA. According to an unclassified report released by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (US DNI) in July 2024 on Iran’s nuclear weapons capability and the terrorism monitoring act of 2022, it is asserted that Iran is “better positioned as a country which is capable enough to produce a nuclear weapon if it chooses to do so”.[25] In another report published by the IAEA in June 2024, it is articulated that as of 11 May 2024 the agency has estimated that of the total enriched uranium stockpile, 142.1 kg of uranium is enriched up to 60% U-235.[26] While Iran has indicated that it would reinstate its JCPOA limits if the US fulfils its JCPOA commitments and the IAEA withdraws its safeguards investigations, it continues to enrich uranium stockpiles while developing, producing, and operating advanced centrifuges.[27]

Although the timelines may vary slightly, various reports indicate a general agreement on Iran’s ability to develop fissile material required for nuclear weapons within 1–2 weeks.[28] The US DNI report indicates that Iran probably will consider installing advanced centrifuges enriching uranium stockpiles enriched to 90%, making it weapons-grade uranium.[29] Given the clandestine nature of Iran’s nuclear program, it is challenging to assess the precise capacity and capability of Iran’s weapons manufacturing, inventory, and delivery system. 

Failure of JCPOA 

Due to Iran’s failure to adhere to the IAEA’s international obligations regarding the advancement of its nuclear programs, sanctions were imposed by the European Union, the United Nations, and the United States in 2005.[30] In consideration of the potential for a post-sanction developmental surge, Iran consented to impose restrictions on its nuclear programmes and to undergo rigorous inspections, culminating in an agreement with the principal world powers in 2015. Under the agreement, numerous significant sanctions were to be removed, contingent upon Iran’s adherence to the stipulations of the accords, including the reduction of its stockpile of fissile material and centrifuges. Following the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the agreement, Iran, which is notably the second most sanctioned nation globally, has adopted the perspective of having nothing left to lose. Currently, the prospects for a revival from the US sanctions appear bleak, particularly following Trump’s withdrawal and Biden’s lack of enthusiasm regarding the restoration of the JCPOA. Consequently, the likelihood of lifting the sanctions remains minimal. As the US elections draw near, the probability of alleviating the sanctions remains bleak.  Trump has been vocal in registering his dissent against Iran and the chances of revival of the JCPOA in his administration seems highly unlikely. Conversely, Kamala Harris in an interview with the Council on Foreign Affairs in 2019 said she would be willing to rejoin the JCPOA contingent on Iran’s adherence to the terms of the agreement reflecting then-presidential candidate Biden's stance.[31] The deal went through a series of crests and troughs since then, and now the deal is essentially dead. Biden administration does not have a discernible policy on Iran or its nuclear program neither did Iran feature strongly in the only presidential debate held between the forerunners in the presidential race, Biden and Trump.  Harris is anticipated to mirror Biden’s stand on the JCPOA. The JCPOA failed to provide substantial repercussions for U.S. withdrawal, while the ramifications faced by Iran upon the re-imposition of sanctions were highly detrimental. Ever since, Iran has embarked on the development of its nuclear weapons program with remarkable speed, exuding confidence that aligns with the principles of offensive realism as it seeks to ensure its survival in an increasingly dynamic global order facing a revival of nuclear weapons. 

Nothing to lose 

Upon examining the historical context of the confrontations and interactions between Israel and Iran, it becomes evident that their exchanges are predicated on Israel’s assumption that increased pressure and heightened aggression will compel Tehran to yield. However, that has scarcely been the situation. Israel has maintained a nuclear weapons program since the mid-1960s. Owing to its Amimut policy, Israel has consistently maintained an ambiguous stance on its status as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS)[32]. Despite not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Israel has effectively established itself as a de facto NWS. According to the status of the World Nuclear Forces published by the Federation of American Scientists, Israel has produced enough plutonium for 100-200 warheads, the estimates suggest that the stockpile might include approximately 90 warheads.[33] The Israeli nuclear weapons program and delivery system is currently upheld by American airpower, German built submarines, and foundational research capabilities from France.[34] While Iran is completely aware of Israel's nuclear weapons capabilities, it has consistently maintained its stance, and the exchanges have proven to be costly as they have elicited a comparable military response. 

Alongside Iran’s apparent disposition of having nothing to lose, the advancements in their nuclear program have instilled a sense of confidence, prompting them to consider military responses to Israel’s actions. This instance is not unprecedented, as Israel has previously articulated concerns regarding Iran, nor is it the inaugural occasion of heightened tensions. A contingent of former Israeli security officials has been noted for publicly criticising their government’s stance against the nuclear agreement reached in 2015 between Iran and global powers.[35] They cautioned that the economic sanctions imposed on Iran have failed to impede its progression in developing its nuclear programme. Iran possesses a keen understanding of the nuclear capabilities that Israel maintains, which are supported by an advanced delivery system. The Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security has concluded, following an analysis of a February 2024 report by international inspectors, that Iran possesses sufficient enriched uranium to manufacture “seven nuclear weapons in one month, nine in two months, eleven in three months, 12-13 in four months, and 13 in five months”.[36] It is, therefore, a threshold nuclear power.[37] Pressing Iran into a corner may compel the nation to exhaust all available resources in a bid for survival, including the utilisation of its nuclear facilities. In this context, the foremost nations must set aside their egos and focus on practical solutions for engaging with one another. 

The US involvement 

Recent analysis from CSIS reveals the escalating severity and geographical expanse of violence in West Asia. By the last week of September, the violent incidents related to the Israel-Hezbollah fighting spiked 4.5 times more than the weekly average from 7 October 2023, to August 31, 2024.[38] In light of the recent declarations made by the Israeli Prime Minister regarding a commitment to retaliate against Iran, President Biden has cautioned Israel that any response must be proportionate. This is an implicit recognition by the US of the potential dangers associated with an all-out war between Israel and Iran. Netanyahu has maintained a close dialogue with the current US President to delineate the subsequent course of action as the US observes the unfolding geopolitical dynamics in the region with acute attention and keen involvement. The presence of the Iran hawks in the US policy circles has long advocated for Israel to launch military action against the nation. But such a development would inevitably entail direct US involvement in the region, something that would probably meet with high levels of disapproval from various quarters. Instances of rising anti-American sentiment in West Asia have become more pronounced, largely attributed to the interventionist actions of the US in the region following the events of 11 September.[39] The US committed a significant error by exiting the JCPOA. It dismantled a nascent American discourse with Iran that presented an opportunity to mitigate tensions in the region and provided Iran with a rationale to revive aspects of its nuclear programme that the JCPOA had boxed in. Participating actively in a comprehensive conflict could undermine the long-term strategic interests of the US in West Asia and result in significant financial burdens for both the US and Israeli economies.[40]

Risking the creation of a nuclear West Asia 

Any use of nuclear weapons in the region could trigger a response in the area for other countries to develop nuclear weapons. Although Egypt and Iran proposed to create a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in 1974, West Asia has not been categorised as such. A NWFZ has been 50 years in the making without any real progress owing to the lack of trust as well as outright hostility among the countries.[41]  With a de facto NWS in the region, strong conjecture about Iran’s nuclear weapons capacity, and a history of non-compliance with the additional protocol by nations signatories to the NPT- Iran, Iraq, and Syria,[42] a nuclear weapons-free zone seems like a far-off reality. In 2018, it was reported that the Saudi Crown Prince indicated Saudi Arabia’s intentions to pursue the development of its nuclear weapons program in response to Iran's development of nuclear weapons. He reiterated this thought in 2023 suggesting that military options are still a factor in the kingdom's nuclear planning.[43] Any use of nuclear weapons by Israel could ostensibly cause the states to acquire nuclear weapons in an attempt to project themselves as nuclear equalisers.[44]

Conclusion 

At some point, a confrontation could reach a juncture of either hubris or miscalculation, and the possibility of military conflict grows dramatically. Israel is not facing an existential threat from Iran, and Israel has to be aware of this while being mindful of the current situation thus refraining from attacking Iran. Any large-scale action would necessitate an escalation in Iran’s military response, potentially leading to a transformation in Iran’s deterrence strategy. In discussions regarding nuclear weapons, Iran frequently references the fatwa, a formal religious prohibition on the development of such armaments, established by Khomeini in the 1990s, banning the development of nuclear bombs.[45] However, it is evident from the multitude of reports issued by the IAEA regarding enriched uranium, clandestine locations, and an extraordinary confidence that comes only with an assurance of such kind that its nuclear facilities are operational. Israel’s attack on Iran could significantly and would likely galvanise the ‘axis of resistance’ composed of Iran-aligned factions in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen to unprecedented levels of action against Israel, in light of what is currently transpiring in Gaza. Against the growing international condemnation of the actions in Gaza, a direct military attack on Iran, particularly nuclear facilities, would be hard to justify for Israeli leaders at the UN. Such moves would undoubtedly stress the limits of this touted unwavering support from their Western allies. In conclusion, any attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, however tempting for some, must be avoided at all costs for it would mark the genesis of another de facto NWS in the region, and the beginning of a new nuclear age. 

Contrary to Matthew Kroenig, striking Iran may not be the only option to prevent the Lazarus of a nuclear Iran.[46] It remains no more a question of success but what can be achieved at what cost. The cost in case of a nuclear attack is off the charts.

*****

*Prachi Lokhande, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[1] AFP. “Israel’s Ex-PM Calls for Destruction of Iran Nuclear Facilities after Attack.” The Hindu, October 2, 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/israels-ex-pm-calls-for-destruction-of-iran-nuclear-facilities-after-attack/article68709742.ece. (Accessed October 3, 2024); Borger, Julian. “Israel May Launch Symbolic Attack on Iran Nuclear-Related Facilities, Says Ehud Barak.” The Guardian, October 4, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/04/israel-may-launch-symbolic-attack-on-iran-nuclear-facilities-says-ehud-barak. (Accessed October 8, 2024)

[2] Express web desk. “Iran made huge mistake with missile strike, will pay for it’ warns Israel PM Netanyahu”. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/world/iran-made-huge-mistake-missile-strike-pay-for-it-israel-pm-netanyahu-9599101/ (Accessed October 7, 2024).

[3] Wintour, Patrick. “Iran Vows Revenge after Two Generals Killed in Israeli Strike on Syria Consulate.” The Guardian, April 1, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/01/israeli-airstrike-on-iranian-consulate-in-damascus-kills-irgc-commander. (Accessed October 9, 2024)

[4] Al Jazeera staff. “Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah leader, killed in Beirut in Israeli strike”. Al Jazeera, September 28, 2024. (Accessed October 9, 2024)

[5] Al Jazeera staff. “Iran’s missile attack against Israel: What we know and what comes next.” Al Jazeera, October 1, 2024. (Accessed October 9, 2024)

[6] Atlantic Council Experts blog. “Experts react: Israel just conducted a limited strike in Iran. Is this the end of the tit for that?”. Atlantic Council, April 11, 2024. (Accessed October 3, 2024)

[7] Albright D, et al. “Assessment of Israeli strike on Iran near Esfahan”. Institute For Science and International Security. April 23, 2024. (Accessed October 9, 2024)

[8] Albright D, et al. “Assessment of Israeli strike on Iran near Esfahan”. Institute For Science and International Security. April 23, 2024. (Accessed October 9, 2024)

[9] Walshi N. “Mystery fire at Iranian nuclear facility is the latest in series of unexplained incidents”. CNN. July 6, 2020. (Accessed October 4, 2024); Reporter. “Iran nuclear program set back months; bomb used, official says. NYT. July 5, 2020. (Accessed October 3, 2024)

[10] Chulov M. “Israel appears to confirm it carried out cyber attack on Iran nuclear facility”. The Guardian. April 11, 2021. (Accessed October 4, 2024)

[11] Fact sheet on restoring the JCPOA’s Nuclear limits. Arms Control Association. February 2022. (Accessed October 5, 2024)

[12] Brief on the historic deal that will prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. White House Archives. (Accessed October 5, 2024)

[13] Marcus J. “Battle for the fate of the Iran nuclear deal begins”.  BBC. May 8, 2019.https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48203415. (Accessed October 10, 2024); Wintour P. “Iran nuclear deal in jeopardy after latest enrichment breach”. The Guardian. July 7, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/07/un-inspectors-to-verify-iran-claim-it-has-broken-nuclear-deal. (Accessed October 10, 2024)

[14] Fact sheet: Uranium enrichment: For peace or for weapons. Centre For Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. August 26, 2021. (Accessed October 8, 2024)

[15] TOI Staff. “Ex-IAEA official: In theory, Iran could reach weapons-grade enrichment in a week”. April 16, 2021. (Accessed October 8, 2024)

[16] Kazemi M. “How a secret atomic workshop in Iran went up in flames”. Iran International. (Accessed October 10, 2024)

[17] The Amad plan was a clandestine, crash nuclear weapons program that was functional through the late 1990s and early 2000s. The details regarding the Amad plan were discovered following a covert Israeli operation in 2018 which uncovered Iran’s nuclear archives exposing its plan to produce five nuclear weapons by early 2004 among other plans. For more on the Amad plan: Albright D, and Burkhard S. “Highlights of Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons”. Institute For Science and International Security. August 25, 2021. 

[18] Albright D et al. “Memo on reported destruction of secret workshop in 2020”. Institute For Science and International Security. April 2, 2024. (Accessed October 10, 2024)

[19] Report by the DG IAEA. “Final assessment on past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program”. IAEA, December 2, 2015. (Accessed October 10, 2024)

[20] Report by the DG IAEA. “NPT Safeguards agreements with the Islamic Republic of Iran”. IAEA, August 29, 2024. (Accessed October 10, 2024)

[21] Report. “Iran removing 27 surveillance cameras at nuclear sites: IAEA. Al Jazeera, June 9, 2022. (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[22] Report by the DG IAEA. “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). IAEA, May 31, 2023. (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[23] Report by the DG IAEA. “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). IAEA, May 27, 2024. (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[24] Amori S. “Israel’s Netanyahu again vows to respond to Iranian missile attack”. Anadolu Ajansi, October 5, 2024. (Accessed October 8, 2024)

[25] Report. “Iran’s Nuclear weapons capability and terrorism monitoring act of 2022”. Office Of the Director of The National Intelligence, July, 2024. (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[26] Report by the DG IAEA. “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). IAEA, May 27, 2024. (Accessed October 11, 2024)

[27] Report by the DG IAEA. “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). IAEA, May 27, 2024. (Accessed October 11, 2024)

[28] Flash brief, “Iran one or two weeks away from producing deadly nuclear fissile material, Blinken warns”. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. July 19, 2024 (Accessed on October 12, 2024); Lazaroff T, “Iran can produce fissile material for a nuclear bomb within 2 weeks- US.” The Jerusalem Post.  October 1, 2023. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-761161. (Accessed on October 12, 2024; Albright D. “How quickly could Iran make nuclear weapons today?”.  Institute for Science and International Security. January 8, 2024. (Accessed on October 12, 2024)

[29] Report. “Iran’s Nuclear weapons capability and terrorism monitoring act of 2022”. Office Of the Director of The National Intelligence, July, 2024. (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[30] Laub Z. “International sanctions on Iran”. Council Of Foreign Relations, July 15, 2015. (Accessed October 11, 2024)

[31] Candidates answer CFR’s questions-Kamala Harris. Council On Foreign Relations. August 21, 2019. (Accessed on October 11, 2024)

[32] Israeli, Ofer. "Israel's nuclear Amimut policy and its consequences." Israel Affairs 21, no. 4 (2015): 541-558. (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[33] Kristensen H et al. “Status of World Nuclear forces”. Federation Of American Scientists. March 29, 2024. (Accessed on October 12, 2024).

[34] Schofield, J. (2014). French Nuclear Assistance to Israel. In: Strategic Nuclear Sharing. Global Issues Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London.; Fact sheet. “Israeli submarine capabilities”. Nuclear Threat Initiative. August 15, 2024. Fact sheet. “Nuclear disarmament Israel”. Nuclear Threat Initiative. September 10, 2024. (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[35] Rubin S. “Israel opposed the Iran nuclear deal, but former Israeli officials increasingly say US pullout was a mistake”.  The Washington Post. December 9, 2021.  (Accessed October 11, 2024)

[36] Albright D et al. “Analysis if IAEA Iran verification and monitoring report- February 2024”. Institute For Science and International Security. March 4, 2024. (Accessed October 11, 2024) 

[37] For more on threshold nuclear power: Hymans, Jacques EC, and Matthew S. Gratias. "Iran and the nuclear threshold: Where is the line?" The Non-proliferation Review 20, no. 1 (2013): 13-38; Bowen, Wyn Q., and Joanna Kidd. "The Iranian nuclear challenge." International Affairs 80, no. 2 (2004): 257-276.

[38] Byman d et al. “escalating to war between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran”. CSIS. October 4, 2024. (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[39] Rabasa A et al. “The Muslim world after 9/11”. RAND Corporation. (Accessed October 12, 2024) 

[40] Bluedorn J, and Koranchelian T. “Middle East conflict risks reshaping the regions economies”. IMF. December 1, 2023. (Accessed October 4, 2024) 

[41] Cronberg, Tarja. 2022. “The Security of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Middle East as a Test Case for Unconditional Security Assurances.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 5 (1): 45–60. doi:10.1080/25751654.2022.2090097. (Accessed October 12, 2024) 

[42] Treaty Overview”NPT- Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”. Nuclear Threat Initiative. (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[43] Borger J. “Crown prince confirms Saudi Arabia will seek nuclear arsenal if Iran develops one”. The Guardian. Sepptember 21, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/crown-prince-confirms-saudi-arabia-seek-nuclear-arsenal-iran-develops-one (Accessed October 12, 2024)

[44] An example of this would be observing the patterns of NWS acquiring nuclear weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons by the USA led to the USSR acquiring nuclear weapons, who then shared the technology with China spurring India to emerge as a nuclear equaliser. For more: Sagan, S. D. (1996-1997). Why Do States Build nuclear weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb. International Security, 21(3), 54-86; Hymans, Jacques E.C. “Leaders’ National Identity Conceptions and Nuclear Choices.” Chapter in The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy, 16–46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

[45] Porter G. “When the ayatollah said no to nukes”. Foreign Policy. October 16, 2014. (Accessed October 3, 2024)

[46] Kroenig M. “The case for destroying Iran’s nuclear program now”. Foreign Policy. October 3, 2024. (Accessed October 5, 2024)