Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The weakening of Algeria’s position in the Sahel and North Africa region and the growing geopolitical power of Morocco have created an impetus for France to side with Morocco on Western Sahara.

Introduction

On 30 July 2024, France changed its decade-old position on Western Sahara by shifting its support from Algeria to Morocco’s “autonomy plan” to make it an autonomous region under Moroccan control. The French government issued a statement wherein it stated that “the present and future of Western Sahara fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.”[i] Earlier, the successive French governments had maintained a neutral position on Western Sahara by endorsing the UN resolutions for a peaceful settlement of the political question of the struggle led by the Sahrawi people’s organisation Polisario Front.[ii] The implication of France’s neutral position was that the relations between Paris and Rabat remained deteriorated. Now, France is not the only country that has extended its support to Morocco over Western Sahara, as more than 35 countries, including Spain and the US, have supported Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. In reaction, Algeria has recalled its ambassador, hinted at possible sanctions against Paris, and refused to take back its citizens deported from France. France changed its position on Western Sahara because geopolitical dynamics are changing in the North Africa and Sahel regions. Notably, the North African region is witnessing a geopolitical transformation after the signing of the Abraham Accords that strengthened Morocco’s position in the region vis-à-vis Algeria. France finds Morocco a more suitable partner in North Africa and the Sahel regions, as it has strong linkages with Western countries and can secure geopolitical and economic deals in the Sahel region. Algeria, on the other hand, as a ‘mediator’ could not resolve the political crisis in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger where pro-French governments were removed through coups followed by popular protests. The weakening of Algeria’s position in the Sahel and North Africa region and the growing geopolitical power of Morocco have created an impetus for France to side with Morocco on Western Sahara. In this context, the paper aims to focus on the implications of the changing position of France on the Western Sahara and its relations with Algeria vis-à-vis Morocco. 

Background

Morocco took control of most of Western Sahara in 1975, following an agreement with Spain and Mauritania. This led to a guerilla war by the Polisario Front against the Kingdom of Morocco, which claimed that the region belonged to the Sahrawi people. Morocco claims sovereignty over Western Sahara and considers it part of its national territory. However, Algeria does not claim the territory but is a staunch supporter of the Polisario Front’s quest for independence. The Front’s self-proclaimed government is based in Algeria. It rejected solutions and proposals that did not mention its independence. The UN does not recognise Morocco’s sovereignty claims or the Polisario Front. Therefore, Western Sahara is not legally part of Morocco and is administered under international law by the UN military forces. The UN recognised the contested region as a non-self-governing territory.[iii]

Since the beginning of the conflict, the course of the Western Sahara conflict has been determined by the outcome of the geopolitical rivalry between Algeria and Morocco. The former endorsed the self-determination of the Sahrawi people to establish their independent state. At the same time, the latter had formed a Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs in April 2006, which submitted a proposal[iv] called an “autonomy plan” to the UN in April 2007 that would grant autonomy to the people of Western Sahara.[v] As per the plan, the Saharawis will have their own autonomous government, while Morocco will control its defence and foreign affairs. 

With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, the US recognised Rabat’s claims over the disputed territory of Western Sahara in exchange for Morocco normalising its relations with Israel. Since then, Morocco has successfully influenced Western countries to support its “autonomy plan” for the Western Sahara. As a result, Spain reversed its four-decade-old neutrality on the disputed territory in March 2022 and endorsed Morocco’s “autonomy plan.”[vi] As support for Morocco had grown in the western countries, it further pressed the countries to support its autonomy plan. In this context, in October 2022, Moroccan King Mohammed VI made it clear that the “era of diplomatic tightrope walking was over, and a clear position on Western Sahara was the only measure of true friendship with Rabat.”[vii]

France had been working on changing its position on Western Sahara in favour of Morocco because of its growing economic, geopolitical and security needs, which it considered Algeria unable to fulfil. In 2022, Morocco emerged as the top African investor in France, with Rabat’s foreign direct investment in France reaching approximately two billion. Trade reached 14.1 billion in 2023, primarily driven by Morocco’s automobile industry and France’s transport equipment and grain sales.[viii] In March this year, the French cabinet minister visited Morocco and announced to fund a project involving a high-voltage line between Dakhla, the capital of Western Sahara and Casablanca, under the auspices of the Atlantic Initiative[ix] of the Kingdom of Morocco. The growing economic and geopolitical convergence has contributed more to why France changed its position.

Reasons for France’s Shift in Its Position

Western Sahara is not the only issue that has strained relations between France and Algeria. Algeria-French relations have been strained on several occasions in recent years. Under President Emmanuel Macron, the French government made half-hearted attempts at historical reconciliation with Algeria, its former colony. Also, the controversial nuclear tests in the Algerian Sahara, which cost the lives of more than 42,000 people, remain a bone of contention because France has yet to completely compensate the victims.[x] France did not accept the demands of the restitution of the sword as well as the burnous of Emir Abdelkader[xi] which are keys to the reconciliation of the colonial legacy. The colonial baggage and its impact on contemporary relations created hurdles in upgrading the bilateral relations between France and Algeria, and its impact was also visible in the region.

The decision of France was also significantly shaped by economics, as Morocco is a more vital trading partner than Algeria, and by politics, as France has been emboldened by rising international support for Morocco’s position via the US and Spain. France is primarily interested in potential economic gains from Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative that connects Sahel countries to the Atlantic through a harbour in Dakhla, the capital of Western Sahara.

In the Sahel region, France witnessed the twilight of its influence as more and more countries protested against its role in particular the participation of its military to “stabilise” the region. Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and other countries faced military coups supported by the people to remove the French military presence from these countries. In this critical situation, Paris expected Algeria to act as a “mediator,” but it also lost its influence in the Sahel region. Algeria suspended its mediation efforts intended to resolve the political crisis in the coup-stricken Niger because it did not get the “clarifications that it considers necessary regarding the implementation of Algerian mediation” from the Niger’s government authorities. Also, Algeria, having border with Niger, has turned back more than 20000 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Niger that increased the tensions between the two countries.[xii]

Algeria’s relations with Mali have soured on the issue of the growing threat to Algeria’s national security and territorial integrity from Malian militants. France perceived that Algeria did not have the leverage to facilitate its influence in the Sahel region. Therefore, it is also one of the causes for shifting its stand on the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco is filling the vacuum left open by the withdrawal of France through diplomatic exchanges and geopolitical and economic deals between the Kingdom and Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, and other states in the coup-stricken region. Morocco has several interests in the Sahel region, ranging from containing irregular migration to sustainable economic development, trade and economic partnership. The region is a geopolitical microcosm that Rabat desires to use to assert itself against its historical rival, Algeria.[xiii] Therefore, it was imperative for France to rethink its strategy. The French business and diplomatic circles successfully influenced their government to shift closer to Morocco to meet their economic and diplomatic interests. The Algerian government, in return, did not prioritise Paris as a critical ally in defence and economic relations as it moved towards Russia.

Besides, there are several challenges to French and Algerian relations in the contemporary period, ranging from economic cooperation as there is competition in the energy and trade sectors, which is creating friction because Algeria is pushing for the diversification of its economy, which poses challenges to French interests; migration and diaspora are other factors, which are severe challenges to their relations because incidents of racism and discrimination are growing in France.

The Implications of France’s Changing Position

The Polisario Front vowed to push back against Morocco and France and called it a “violent and illegal occupation by Morocco.” Algeria did not announce hydrocarbon gas export sanctions on France because the Algerian economy is not strong at the global level, and it is in Algeria’s interest to continue exporting gas to France. Hydrocarbon gas is the primary source of income and the lifeline of the country’s economic development. The Algerian economy is strongly interdependent with France and the other member states of European Union. Also, as a leading gas exporter, Algeria is bound by long-term contracts that are difficult to terminate with France and other European countries. Algeria continued to supply gas to Spain despite it endorsed Morocco’s position on Western Sahara in 2022. Algeria has honoured the existing commitments so far but may be less accommodating regarding future partnerships. France had understood from the “Spanish scenario” that changing its position on Western Sahara would not significantly impact the energy relations with Algeria.

The decision of the French government unravelled new dynamics in the French political system. The far-right parties, including the National Front, had endorsed the French government’s decision because they considered the Western Sahara an integral part of the Moroccan Kingdom. The left-wing parties, traditionally more aligned with Algeria, have criticised Macron’s decision as an individual choice. The leader of the Left-Wing Alliance La France Insoumise (LFI), which won a majority of the seats in the legislative elections, has extended support for Western Sahara’s independence.

It is also important to note that currently, Algeria is working to expand its defence and economic ties with Russia, China and Iran. The French government’s support for Morocco will provoke Algeria to form closer partnerships with these countries, which could create a locus of greater geopolitical competition for proxy influence on the continent.[xiv]

There is also a high possibility that the French decision to support Morocco will erode the confidence of the African countries in Western countries’ support of international law because the UN General Assembly’s resolution 3437 in 1979 “reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence.”[xv] The African Union recognises the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Several international law scholars have considered the “occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco is a violation of international law.”[xvi]

Besides, many analysts consider that the international momentum is on Morocco’s side, making the conflict likely to end in a “negotiated settlement” that is set to improve regional stability. However, some have also outlined more pessimistic views, suggesting that UN Security Council decisions would require securing stability and that they are likely to get vetoed by China and Russia, which will continue the stalemate.[xvii]

Conclusion

The weakening of France’s position in North Africa and the Sahel regions created impetus for Paris to reset its relations with these regions to meet its geopolitical and economic interests. France has faced strong resentment against its military presence in the Sahel region, which led to protests that ultimately dislodged the pro-French governments through military coups. The recent shift in France’s position on the Western Sahara was part of its diplomatic, economic and geopolitical manoeuvring following its displacement from the Sahel region and the failure of Algeria as a “mediator” to resolve the internal crisis in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Therefore, France had fewer investment opportunities and access to the Sahel region and needed alternatives to meet these goals. Morocco has successfully emboldened its geopolitical power and claim on Western Sahara following the Abraham Accords and the acceptance of its sovereign claims by more than 35 countries, including the US and Spain. Besides, it also secured economic and geopolitical deals with the Sahel countries. In this context, France has renewed its relations with Morocco by siding with Morocco’s claim on Western Sahara. On 28 October 2024, President Macron visited Morocco to expand the economic partnerships in sectors, including high-speed railway lines, shipping and control of irregular migration worth 10 billion euros. The visit further expanded the bilateral partnership between Paris and Rabat. However, the growing support for Morocco’s claim on the contested region has challenged the UN-mediated “self-determination” process for the Sahrawi people in Western Sahara. Algeria has also started reworking its relations with Niger and other Sahel countries. On October 2, 2024, Algerian and Niger top officials met in Algiers to revitalize the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project.[xviii] The changing geopolitical dynamics have broader implications for the stability and security of the North Africa and Sahel regions.

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*Dr. Arshad, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] “France reverses course to back Moroccan autonomy plan for disputed Western Sahara,” France 24, July 30, 2024, accessed https://tinyurl.com/56k46rcb, October 12, 2024

[ii] The Polisario Front has sought self-rule based on a shared ethnic and national identity of mixed Berber and Arab descent, seeking their independence first from the Spanish and today from Morocco.

[iii] “Morocco’s territorial claims on Western Sahara: A new conflict brewing?” Frontline, July 20, 2023, accessed

https://tinyurl.com/2mv4zjzj, October 13, 2024

[iv] The proposal has been endorsed by the US, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Kenya, Somalia, Malta and Ukraine.

[v] “Western Sahara: Everything you should know about Morocco’s autonomy plan,” Morocco World News, November 6, 2018, accessed https://tinyurl.com/233k8ekn, October 14, 2024

[vi] “Spain, seeking better ties with Morocco, shifts stance on Western Sahara,” The New York Times, March 19, 2022, accessed https://tinyurl.com/3jnhjyp9, October 14, 2024

[vii] “Macron’s tightrope act with Algeria and Morocco,” The New Arab, October 24, 2022, accessed

https://tinyurl.com/mu83p5ea, October 15, 2024

[viii] “Morocco, France forge deeper ties with 22 new agreements,” Morocco World News, October 28, 2024, accessed

https://tinyurl.com/2prn2f7w, October 25, 2024

[ix] The royal initiative aims to explore solutions for integration and economic transformation in the Sahel region.

[x] “Impact of France nuclear tests persists: Algeria,” Anadolu Agensi, February 14, 2021, accessed

https://tinyurl.com/4ejbcnsm, October 16, 2024

[xi] Emir Abdelkader was the symbol of Algerian resistance to French occupation whose swords and burnous are currently held in French museums.

[xii] “Algeria faces tensions with Niger as it turns back migrants across border,” The Arab Weekly, March 09, 2024, accessed https://tinyurl.com/4t29rb43, November 12, 2024

[xiii] “Morocco aims to become the regional leader needed in the Sahel,” Universidad de Navarra, February 22, 2024,

https://tinyurl.com/yhbfh9dc, October 17,2024

[xiv] “France has sided with Morocco on the Western Sahara: How might Algeria respond,?” Atlantic Council, August 1, 2024, accessed https://tinyurl.com/mryx6tb4, October 18, 2024

[xv] Smith, J.J. (2010). 'State of Self-Determination: The Claim to Sahrawi Statehood' (2010), accessedhttps://tinyurl.com/ktxptx23, October 19, 2024

[xvi] Smith, J.J. (2020). A Four-Fold Evil? The Crime of Aggression and the Case of Western Sahara. International Criminal Law Review, 20(3), 492-550. https://tinyurl.com/bdcxs2mk, p.3

[xvii] “France’s New Western Sahara position marks a turning point in North Africa-But for Better or Worse,” Just Security, September 4, 2024, accessed https://tinyurl.com/47mh7d93, October 28, 2024

[xviii] The gas will be exported from Niger to Algeria to European countries.