Since 2019, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has decisively enforced a series of security measures known as Mano Dura[i] to combat organised crime in El Salvador. The country has faced unprecedented crime, including homicides, kidnappings, and extortion. Organised crime and criminal syndicates are infamous in the Northern Triangle in Central America comprising El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. These gangs[ii] operate within a strict hierarchical structure, engage in violent turf wars,[iii] and ruthlessly compete for territory causing harm to civilians and security personnel. While the governments of these countries have over a period of time adopted various approaches to deal with these criminal organisations, the results have been below potential.

President Bukele’s Mano Dura is anchored on three pivotal pillars: enforcing stringent punitive legal measures, expanding the definition of gangs or criminal organisations, and consolidating executive power within the presidency. Since declaring a state of emergency,[iv] his administration has initiated an aggressive campaign against gangs, yielding significant results. 

This crackdown[v] has led to the swift apprehension of countless gang members, empowering security forces to reclaim territories, disrupt communication channels, dismantle criminal networks, and imprison gang leaders. Consequently, the hierarchical structure of these gangs has been significantly weakened, and the likelihood of a coordinated counteroffensive from them appears minimal given the current effectiveness of Mano Dura policies. 

The visible trend is that, crime has significantly decreased in El Salvador owing to the Mano Dura policy of President Bukele, an important achievement in the Northern Triangle region of Central America. This indicates that strong decisions, a well-formulated plan and smooth execution are critical to achieving success in dealing with organised crime. 

However, despite the success of the Mano Dura, challenges such as the root causes for organised crime which include various socio-economic issues require addressing. Long-term sustainability of the recent measures and social mainstreaming and integration of the criminal elements remain to be big issues. 

This paper highlights the Mano Dura policy, its results and offers a glimpse into future possibilities and challenges. 

Background of the Current Situation 

The origin of the gangs in the Northern Triangle[vi] can be traced to the Central American diaspora in the United States who sought refuge from the ongoing civil war in Central America in the 1980s[vii]. Many of these individuals who were deported by the United States were associated with gangs such as MS13 and Barrio 18, and upon their return, they quickly established new criminal networks that mirrored the gangs in the United States. As a result, the gangs expanded rapidly, forming loose yet effective cell structures. By dominating specific regions, they seized control over lucrative illicit economies, such as extortion and drug trafficking[viii]. This expansion inevitably led to brutal territorial disputes, with rival gangs vying for power and engaging in violent confrontations with each other and law enforcement agencies. To confront the escalating gang violence, governments in the 2000s implemented a series of stringent security measures. Under former President Francisco Flores Pérez (1999–2004)[ix] and his successor Antonio Saca (2004–2009), initiatives labelled Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura aimed to drastically ramp up police presence and increase the imprisonment of gang members were undertaken. While these operations produced some short-term reductions in violence, they ultimately failed to curtail the growth of these organisations or disrupt their illegal activities. The overcrowding of prisons and inadequate security allowed many incarcerated gang members to consolidate their power, develop more organised criminal operations, and further fortify their networks from within. 

During the 2010s, gang violence in El Salvador reached alarming levels, forcing the government to take decisive action. In early 2012, President Mauricio Funes (2009–2014) brokered a truce between the notorious MS-13 gang and two factions of Barrio 18, the Revolucionarios and the Sureños. In return for a reduction in violence, the government made the decision to offer concessions to gang-leaders in prisons, and transfer gang leaders from maximum-security prisons to ordinary jails. Initially, this tregua (truce) resulted in a decrease in homicides. However, the advantages were short-lived, and the truce ultimately collapsed, leading to violent clashes between rival gangs and law enforcement agencies. By 2015, El Salvador recorded the highest annual homicide rate in the Western Hemisphere, soaring to 103 per 100,000 inhabitants. Recognising these inadequacies, the current administration under President Bukele has adopted a more robust and phased strategy through its Mano Dura policies which was also a part of his election promises in 2019. 

Explaining the Mano Dura 

President Bukele launched the Mano Dura or the Territorial Control Plan, carried out in multiple phases. His commanding political and legal power, including a supermajority in the legislature, allowed for the seamless execution of the Mano Dura strategy, avoiding any legal or political obstacles. To support this plan, new legal mechanisms were implemented, including legislation specifically aimed at arresting gang leaders and members, conducting searches without warrants, and ensuring the detention of gang members in prison[x]. In March 2022,[xi] Congress enacted significant revisions to the law, increasing penalties for gang participation, abolishing the option of home arrest for gang affiliates, and empowering security forces to make arrests based solely on suspicion, even in the absence of concrete evidence. The minimum age for the prosecution of gang-related offences was also lowered to just 12 years. Additionally, the Salvadoran Supreme Court firmly upheld a ruling that classified gangs as terrorist organisations, further enhancing the authority of the presidency to execute its agenda with determination. 

The initial phase of the Mano Dura[xii] aimed to deter and suppress crime by asserting control over jails and ramping up police and military presence throughout the country. Before President Bukele’s administration, gang leaders lived in luxury while orchestrating murders and managing gang activities directly from the jails. To effectively sever the ties between gang leaders and their members within the prison system and those outside, the government took bold and specific actions. First, officials suspended all visits to maximum-security prisons, ensuring that inmates could no longer communicate with the outside world through phone calls or personal visits. Furthermore, key gang leaders and those accused of orchestrating murders were swiftly transferred from regular jails to maximum-security facilities[xiii]. In a groundbreaking and unprecedented move, President Bukele mandated that rival gang members be housed in the same cells, reducing the influence of any single gang. A rigorous lockdown policy was also enforced, barring prisoners in all maximum-security prisons from leaving their quarters. During this critical first phase, Salvadoran authorities dramatically intensified military and police presence in communities overwhelmed by gang and organised crime activity. By mid-2024, they had arrested a staggering 52,541 members of MS13, 13,682 members of Barrio 18 Sureños, and 10,741 members of Barrio 18 Revolucionarios. These numbers encompass collaborators, Homeboys, and Chequeos[xiv], reflecting an unwavering commitment to reclaiming public safety. 

The second phase was a decisive move to address the social dimensions of crime while rehabilitating the country’s social structure. Its primary objective was to create substantial opportunities for young people. During this phase, the government implemented comprehensive training programmes across various disciplines to equip youth with the skills necessary to secure meaningful employment and steer clear of criminal groups. Additionally, the establishment of community centres called "Urban Wellness and Opportunities Centres" (CUBOS) provided a vital space for young people to engage in productive activities and resist gang influences[xv].

The third phase demanded an urgent upgrade of the technology employed by security officers. This included the acquisition of advanced tools, such as drones, night vision equipment, and state of the art video cameras. Improved gear like firearms, bulletproof vests, patrol units, and uniforms were prioritised. The administration was determined to modernise the national police force, providing them with cutting-edge technologies to enhance operations. 

In phase four, additional police and military personnel were deployed to high-crime areas with strategic precision. The plan called for doubling the troop presence from 20,000 to 40,000,[xvi] reinforcing government’s commitment to maintaining security and territory control. 

Phase five concentrated on identifying and capturing all gang members who continued to hide within neighbourhoods across the country. Security forces executed targeted operations to surround major localities, ensuring that no remnants of gangs could persist. 

Phase six launched the National Directorate of National Integration[xvii], a crucial step in addressing both medium and long-term societal needs. This new Directorate is tasked with overseeing a robust training system that emphasises employment, authorising critical training programmes, and spearheading initiatives aimed at poverty reduction. This comprehensive approach is essential for fostering lasting change in the community. 

The Aftermath of the Mano Dura 

The current Mano Dura policies have dealt a decisive blow to the gangs, and they have been effectively neutralised for the moment. Homicide rates[xviii] have dropped sharply by 70 per cent between 2021 and 2024, with 1147 homicides registered in 2021, 496 in 2022, and only 142 in 2023. With over 65,000 members arrested and interred in various jails,[xix] the government has managed to wipe them off their territories. 

The state of emergency,[xx] and rigorous crackdowns obliterated gang operations, compelling members to flee abroad or go into hiding. Consequently, the gangs have lost their street-level organisations and can no longer establish control over territories or engage in criminal activities. This has led to relative calm in neighbourhoods that previously reported high criminal activities, resulting in businesses running smoothly without the fear of extortions or reprisals. It is also worth noting that due to the policies adopted by the government, teenagers no longer feel pressured to join gangs, which is significant in a country where most of the entrants in such groups are young people. 

In stark contrast to previous crackdowns, the gangs have not responded with violence to the emergency declaration. While previous governments used overwhelming force against the gangs, they could not sustain them for long and the gangs always found new ways of rebuilding their networks and continuing with their clandestine activities. In contrast, the current policy also focuses on preventing the gangs from coordinating, rebuilding their organisations, and mounting an effective response.[xxi] This lack of a coordinated response indicates an overwhelming inability to react effectively to the swift and comprehensive raids. The Mano Dura tactics as explained are divided into various phases and aimed at instilling fear[xxii] among the gangs of heightened government response to crime. Deterrence from the government, which is an essential part of the policy, has led to a muted response from the gangs. 

At present, gang members are maintaining an extremely low profile. In El Salvador, they are acutely aware of the risks of capture and avoid leaving their hideouts. Those[xxiii] seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, such as Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States, are opting to refrain from criminal activities to evade deportation. Within the prison system, gang members are facing severe challenges. Reports from El Salvador’s jails confirm that government troops exercise near-total control over inmates. Gangs are largely cut off from the outside world and struggle with communication. So far, significant subordination has thwarted their ability to leverage the prison overcrowding to consolidate power, recruit new members, or reorganise their networks and operations. 

The government’s strong measures for apprehending gang members make a swift comeback almost impossible unless there is a significant shift in security policies. However, ongoing social and economic hardships, which initially fuelled the rise of these gangs and continue to impact areas once controlled by MS13 and Barrio 18, could compel remnants of these groups to engage in criminal activities[xxiv]. Nonetheless, with a noticeable reduction in crime and criminal activity on the streets, citizens are experiencing a genuine sense of calm. 

Hence, achievements under the policy of Mano Dura cannot be belittled, especially in the context of El Salvador, which has witnessed some of the worst rates of homicides[xxv] and various levels of crime. 

Future Outlook and Possibilities 

Unlike past government crackdowns on gangs, President Bukele’s approach has decisively reduced gang violence and its foothold throughout the country. Key factors behind this success include executive power wielded by the President, extraordinary authority granted to security forces for conducting operations by the legislature and the executive, and strong public backing and his high popularity. Given the current circumstances and the government’s robust legal and punitive options, it is highly unlikely that the gangs will reorganise or reclaim lost territory anytime soon. With their territory and illegal businesses stripped away, gangs are now operating in survival mode. 

Nevertheless, critical challenges remain. Deep-rooted socioeconomic issues, such as widespread poverty, soaring unemployment, inadequate education, broken families, and a high prevalence of domestic violence persist in both urban and rural areas where MS13 and Barrio 18 first emerged.[xxvi] Mass arrests have likely intensified these social problems, severing family ties, straining finances, and labelling at-risk youths as gang members. Civilians, particularly young people, are caught in the crossfire, suffering from both gang violence and the harsh measures of security forces. While gangs may coerce individuals into joining their ranks, the punitive actions of security forces leave lasting psychological scars. However, both Barrio 18 and MS13 have a proven track record of adapting to survive. Former gang cells can easily morph into new organisations and revive illegal enterprises, such as drug trafficking and extortion.[xxvii] A significant number of seasoned gang members remain at large; as of September 2024, police estimates reveal that over one-third of Barrio 18 and MS13 members are still unaccounted for, including 19,000 collaborators and more than 21,000 full-fledged gang members. 

Additionally, officials estimate that 53 armed organisations still operate in El Salvador, underscoring the existence of residual gang structures, albeit inactive. Individual gang members are likely to seek alliances with existing criminal organisations to reestablish their networks. Overcrowded prisons cannot be indefinitely monitored, allowing gangs the opportunity to gradually regain strength and reorganise[xxviii]. The government may implement a comprehensive socio-economic strategy to tackle these persistent issues. Collaborating with religious and sociocultural organisations may be instrumental in creating job opportunities and offering viable alternatives to gang affiliation. It is imperative to recognise that previous administrations attempted similar tactics to dismantle criminal networks yet ultimately failed due to the enduring socioeconomic challenges. Thus, it is essential to integrate punitive measures with long-term strategies to effectively eradicate the gang threat once and for all. 

Conclusion 

The Mano Dura policy has decisively achieved its goals: crime has visibly decreased, gang organisations have been dismantled, and their territories have been reclaimed. Consequently, the security situation has improved markedly. El Salvador has emerged as an example in the Northern Triangle in curbing gang-violence, perhaps leading the way for Honduras and Guatemala to organise similar operations. 

Across the region, various media outlets and organizations focused on policy-making exhibit two diverging approaches toward crime reduction. While many view the Mano Dura model as an effective method to combat crime, others question its long-term effectiveness. Political groups and individuals in Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Chile, and Peru have shown support for President Bukele’s approach to crime management. In Honduras, President Xiomara Castro appears to be adopting a strategy similar to the Mano Dura policy, which includes building a mega-prison, granting greater authority to the police force, and increasing arrests of criminals. However, this has not led to a widespread adoption of the Mano Dura policy throughout the region. Policymakers and political leaders continue to study and deliberate on this model. 

However, history has shown that although similar policies have produced temporary results, they have failed to tackle the root causes of gang-related violence. Long-term socio-economic challenges require addressing to preventing further gang recruitment. Rehabilitation of homeboys and Chequeos require special attention. 

Moreover, it is essential to recognise that if the government eases its security measures, gangs will inevitably attempt to reorganise and regain their footing. Therefore, while the current results are commendable, they represent just a partial victory. A comprehensive and strategic approach is imperative to decisively eliminate the threats posed by these criminal organisations for good.

*****

*Dr. Arnab Chakrabarty, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Mano Dura would literally translate into Hard Hand or Iron Fist. It refers to a series of security measures that involve heavy securitisation to combat crime across Latin America. Mano Dura tactics and policies have been adopted and implemented in various Latin American countries with varying success. Officially it is known as the Territorial Control Plan.

[ii] El Salvador is primarily dominated by three principal gangs: Mara Salvatrucha 13, Barrio 18 Sureños, and Barrio 18 Revolucionarios.

[iii] Sebastian Cutrona et.al. (2024). Conceptualizing Mano Dura in Latin America. Latin American Politics and Society. Accessed 13th November 2024. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/conceptualizing-mano-dura-in-latin-america/5B422E72251729BA30782DC3C7415EDD.

[iv]  Also known as the régimen de excepción, a state of emergency which awards the Executive with unprecedented power to take critical decisions.

[v]Compared to earlier crackdowns, these emergency powers have allowed security forces to launch a blitz against the gangs, apprehending gang members and alleged collaborators without a warrant or based on anonymous information, and consequently, considerably more quickly and with much less discretion. For instance, over 33,000 people were detained by security personnel during the first two months of the state of emergency in March 2022.

[vi] In this context, gangs are known as Maras and not Pandillas. Maras have transnational roots that originated in the United States among the Central American diaspora, whereas Pandillas are homegrown gangs devoid of any transnational roots.

[vii] Antonia Does. (2013). The construction of the Maras. Graduate Institute Publications.  Accessed 14^th November 2024. https://books.openedition.org/iheid/716.

[viii] Global Conflict Tracker. (2024). Instability in the Northern Triangle. Accessed 17^th November 2024. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-instability-northern-triangle.

[ix] El Salvador’s State of Emergency: How Bukele’s Government Overpowered Gangs. Insight Crime. Accessed 6^th November 2024. https://insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/El-SalvadorsPerpetual-State-of-Emergency-How-Bukeles-Government-Overpowered-Gangs-InSight-Crime-Dec-2023.pdf.

[x] Sonja Wolf. (2024). El Salvador bajo Nayib Bukele: el giro hacia el autoritarismo electoral. Accessed 17th November 2024. https://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-090X2024000200295.

[xi]  In March 2022, 87 people were murdered in a single day by various gangs which turned out to be one of the worst days considering homicide in the country.

[xii] Asamblea Legislativa. (2022). Diputados aprueban seis reformas a códigos y leyes relacionadas a la protección de la población, tras crímenes de pandillas. Accessed 4th November 2024. https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/node/12072.

[xiii] Eddie Galdanez. (2024). Nayib Bukele’s Territorial Control Plan: Transforming El Salvador’s Security Landscape. El Salvador Info. Accessed 18th November 2024. https://elsalvadorinfo.net/nayib-bukeles-security-plan/.

[xiv] Homeboys and Chequeos are usually teenagers or younger who may not actively participate in gangs but run errands for them, such as being look-outs, informers or peddlers.

[xv] Anthony Maingot. (2023). Models for fighting crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. GIS Reports. Accessed 13^th November 2024. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/crime-central-america/.

[xvi] Lucia Dammert. (2023). El Modelo Bukele y los desafíos latinoamericanos.  Nueva Sociedad. Accessed 15th November 2024. https://nuso.org/articulo/308-modelo-bukele-desafios-latinoamericanos/.

[xvii] Isabella de la Parra Garav. (2023). El Salvador de Bukele” El impacto de las políticas de seguridad en las relaciones del país con la comunidad internacional (2019-2023). PontificIA Universidad Javeriana, Bogota, Accessed 12th November 2024. https://repository.javeriana.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10554/67585/Trabajo%20de%20Grado%20-%20Isabella%20De%20La%20Parra.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

[xviii] In other words, homicide rates dropped from 18 persons per 100000 inhabitants in 2021 to just 8 in 2023.

[xix] A mega prison was inaugurated in 2023 which is known as the Terrorism Confinement Centre (CECOT), and houses the largest number of interned gang members.

[xx] Alex Papadovassialakis. (2023). Too many Soldiers: How Bukele’s crackdown succeeded where others failed. Accessed 4^th November 2024. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/too-many-soldiers-how-bukele-crackdown-succeeded-where-others-failed/.

[xxi] Lucas Proto. (2024). Cinco años más de Bukele (y los que quedan): el mesías de la mano dura arrasa en El Salvador. El Confidencial. Accessed 13th November 2024. https://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/2024-02-05/elecciones-salvador-gana-bukele-mesias-mano-dura_3823844/.

[xxii] The Dialogue. (2024). Is there a real-world alternative to Bukele on crime? Accessed 6^th November 2024. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/is-there-a-real-world-alternative-to-bukele-on-crime/

[xxiii] A significant portion of those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries are former gang members, who still fear arrest due to their previous criminal activities. Colloquially known as Calmados, the government arrested many of them to prevent them from taking over dismantled gangs.

[xxiv] Seth Robbins. (2022). Mano Dura Redux: The Price of Mass Gang Arrests in El Salvador. InSight Crime. Accessed 14^th November 2024. https://insightcrime.org/news/interview/mano-dura-redux-the-price-of-mass-gang-arrests-in-el-salvador/.

[xxv] J. Rosen et.al. (2023). Gangs, violence, and fear: punitive Darwinism in El Salvador. Crime Law Social Change (79); 175-194. Accessed 14^th November 2024. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-022-10040-3#citeas.

[xxvi] Jose Miguel Cruz & Mary Speck. (2022). Ending El Salvador’s cycle of Gang violence. USIP. Accessed 8^th

November 2024. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/ending-el-salvadors-cycle-gang-violence.

[xxvii] Ellen Ioanes. (2024). Why Latin American leaders are obsessed with mega prisons.  Vox. Accessed 7^th November 2024. https://www.vox.com/world-politics/355953/honduras-el-salvador-bukele-castro-narcos-noboa-gang-mano-dura-ecuador.

[xxviii] Carlos Jose Reyes. (2023).  How effective is the tough on crime policy? Portafolio.Accessed 18^th November 2024. https://www.portafolio.co/internacional/que-tan-efectiva-es-la-politica-de-mano-dura-contra-la-criminalidad-el-salvador-592219.