Indian Council of World Affairs

Now that Donald Trump has officially won the race to the Oval Office, the world looks at how he intends to keep up his claim of ending the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of his presidential inauguration on January 20 next year. Meanwhile, the battlefield in Ukraine has turned decisively in favour of Russia, as President Zelenskyy has hinted at a major shift in Ukraine’s policy of getting back lost territories as a precondition to any settlement to end the war, in a relative hardening of Ukraine’s position. 

In an interview with Sky News, President Zelenskyy talked about ending the hot phase of the war with a NATO security guarantee and finding a diplomatic solution later for the areas currently under the control of Russian forces. It seems President Zelenskyy’s current priority is to prevent further loss of territories as Ukraine is struggling to recruit new soldiers amidst rising desertion. In the first 10 months of 2024, Ukraine has booked at least 60,000 soldiers for desertion and abandoning their posts on the battlefield, which is double the number of desertions recorded in the last two years.[i] This is happening at a time when the Russian forces are capturing territories at a much faster rate than at any time since the war began in 2022.[ii]

Trump’s Previous Presidency: A times tested approach to end the War in Ukraine

Trump’s supporters argue that he has a successful track record of preventing conflicts and securing America’s interests without risking American lives. His first presidency saw decisive foreign policy making, where Trump used strength as a means to bring deterrence and peace. It is argued that by pushing for more European defence spending, sanctioning Nord Stream II, pressuring the European countries to reduce dependence on Russian gas imports, withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty and supplying a lethal military aid package to Ukraine, Trump did more for strengthening European security and defence than his predecessor Barack Obama.[iii] Trump at the same time did not demonise Putin and adopted a more practical approach of cooperation with Russia, a policy that had been used by many American Presidents to deal with Soviet leaders during the Cold War era.[iv] Thus, Trump and his supporters insist that a time-tested and practical policy approach, unlike Biden’s idealistic agendas and hostile policies against Russia, already exists, which can be used for bringing an end to the  war and restoring working relations with Kremlin.

Ideas of Trump, Vance and Mike Pompeo

Throughout his Presidential campaign and debates Trump repeatedly indicated about his good relationship with both Putin and Zelenskyy and his intention to use this goodwill to bring the two parties to the negotiation table. In a more recent interview with Time, that had declared Trump as the Person of the Year, he criticised Biden’s decision to send American missiles along with other weapons to Ukraine as an escalatory move but at the same time emphasised that his peace plan does not include abandoning Ukraine. Although Trump has talked at lengths about Ukraine and the overall Russia-America relationship, he has avoided outlining a well-structured peace plan for Ukraine.  

Unlike Trump, JD Vance, now the Vice President-elect, has been more forthcoming on this issue. In response to a question regarding Trump’s plan on Ukraine in “The Shawn Ryan Show” during the election campaign, Vance said that Trump’s first action would be to sit down with the Russian, Ukrainian and European stakeholders and convince them to reach “a peaceful settlement.” Vance further explained that the current line of demarcation between Russia and Ukraine would become a heavily fortified demilitarised zone to prevent Russia from “invading again.”, thus reaching a situation where Ukraine would keep its sovereign status and Russia would get its desired neutrality from Kyiv.  

Mike Pompeo and David Urban proposed a peace plan for Ukraine that included policies like rebuilding ties with allies and partners, imposing real sanctions on Russia, revitalising NATO, creating a $500 billion “lend-lease” programme for Ukraine and lifting restrictions on Ukraine’s use of weapons against Russia.[v] Trump’s decision, however, to not include Mike Pompeo, who served as the Secretary of State in Trump’s first administration, in his government is a clear indication that Trump does not endorse Pompeo’s plan as the arguments put forth by Pompeo clearly contradicted with what Trump had promised. Revitalising the NATO and allowing Ukraine to hit inside Russian territories, for example, clearly is a recipe for further escalation and does not promise the end of the war. 

America First: Replacing the “as long as it takes” approach

At the core of Trump’s plan for Ukraine, however, is the policy of America First, which is a comprehensive strategy to bring an end to the war, per Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia. In a policy document presented to Trump in April, Kellog and former CIA analyst Fred Fleitz formulated a plan that builds on realities on the ground and suggests practical policy options to end hostilities and bring the two sides to the negotiating table.[vi] For Kellogg and Fleitz, the America-First approach is not isolationist and intends to keep the Americans out of endless conflicts as it seeks to replace idealistic policy goals with practical interests. 

The America-First approach will replace the “as long as it takes” approach and shift the attention to the negotiating table from the battlefield while also listening to suggestions, ideas and peace offers from Putin. There is a growing realisation that as the war lingers on, it will ultimately impact America’s stockpiles of advanced weapons, which could drastically alter the balance of power in other conflicts, such as Taiwan. At the same time, Kellogg and Fleitz note that the war in Ukraine has pushed Russia closer to China, and a new axis of anti-West powers has emerged in the form of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, coordinating their policy options, and thus, a prolonged war will only deepen the relationship among these countries. Thus, a ceasefire and negotiated settlement of the Ukraine conflict at the earliest is needed to protect American interests, without abandoning the needs and interests of Ukraine. 

Contrary to popular belief, the policy document has no hint of a sudden withdrawal of American aid to Ukraine and thus leaving Kyiv to capitulate to Russian forces. Instead, it takes a carrot and stick approach where both Russia and Ukraine have something to gain in return of sacrificing some of their goals.  For Trump advisors and particularly Kellogg, who will now lead American engagements with Ukraine and Russia, a ceasefire followed by a negotiated settlement will be the priority. However, American support will continue to strengthen Ukrainian defence and security but on the condition that Kyiv has to participate in peace talks with Russia.[vii] It should be noted that Zelenskyy has refused to engage with Russia in peace talks after he alleged Russian troops of committing war crimes in Bucha. To bring Russia to the negotiating table, the United States may offer to “put off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable peace deal with security guarantees.”, suggests Kellogg and Fleitz. [viii]

The Trump office may also be open to offering limited sanctions relief to Russia without forcing Kyiv to relinquish its lost territories, which, as per the document, should be achieved through dialogue and diplomacy. Zelenskyy has already hinted that he is open to negotiations for regaining the lost territories at a future date.  Trump’s office is also open to completely lift the sanctions on Russia, once a peace deal, which respects the sensitivities of Ukraine, is reached. But it has to be seen how Russia reacts to this proposal, especially when the Kursk incursion (which was largely aimed at gaining a strong position for Ukraine as and when negotiations were to be resumed) has largely failed and the Russian forces are successfully gaining more ground in eastern Ukraine with increased pace.

Trump’s Plan and Russian Perspective:  Why negotiating peace is easier said than done?

Although President Putin has expressed a willingness to engage with the Trump administration, it is difficult to predict whether Russia will accept the conditions outlined in Trump’s plan. While it is true that Putin may find it easier to engage with Trump than with his predecessor, a closer analysis of Russia’s stance on Ukraine suggests that a resolution to the conflict remains distant. Regardless of Western perspectives, Russia views the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat. Putin has repeatedly voiced strong opposition to NATO’s continued eastward expansion, making it highly unlikely that Russia will agree to anything short of Ukraine’s permanent neutrality. 

The War in Ukraine is not just about Russia and Ukraine. It is a cumulative result of Russia’s dissatisfaction with the post-Cold War European security architecture. For Russia, the European security architecture that evolved after the dissolution of the Soviet Union favoured the Western interests and goals (as evident in not only the continuation of the NATO but also its expansion) and at the same time marginalised Russia’s role in this new architecture by ignoring its genuine security interests. Although Kellogg talks about the need for a new security architecture in Europe and suggests delaying NATO membership talks with Ukraine, President Putin will surely want the negotiations to cover broader aspects of European security and a reorganisation of the prevailing security architecture that respects Russia’s security concerns and restore Kremlin’s sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. 

Both Russia and Ukraine are fighting for completely opposite goals where the victory for one is surely a loss for another. For Putin to let go of the Ukrainian territories, occupied after 2014, without a comprehensive reorganisation and restructuring of European security architecture, where Ukraine permanently abandons its NATO ambitions, is as much an unacceptable term as Ukraine renouncing its NATO plans without getting back its lost territories (including Crimea) and an effective security guarantee. So, the real question here is how far the two sides are willing to sacrifice their war goals for a negotiated peace especially when both Moscow and Kiev considers their national interests as existential in nature. 

As the war drags on there is no reason for Putin to settle for a negotiated peace especially when the Russian troops are taking Ukrainian territories at a much faster rate. Contrary to the Western expectations Russian economy is still standing, inflation is under control and there is no dearth of customers for Russian oil and gas. On top of that, Putin continues to enjoy consistent support among the Russian population for his activities as President of the Russian Federation. Besides, Russia’s demography too supports a continued war, a luxury not available to Ukraine. Thus, to expect that Trump will use his charm and direct the two sides to negotiate the terms of peace and end the war in a day is a little too optimistic by any standards. Peace is impossible for Russia until Ukraine’s NATO ambitions are kept alive and peace is also impossible for Ukraine until its future is secured from a future Russian aggression. Thus, the possibility of reaching a consensus where the two sides sacrifice their completely opposite goals and bring an end to the war looks grim at the moment.

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*Aman Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes 

[i] Isobel Koshiw. “Ukraine struggles to recruit new soldiers as desertion rise,” The Financial Times, December 01, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/9b25288d-8258-4541-81b0-83b00ad8a03f (Accessed December 03, 2024).

[ii] Constant Meheut. “Russia forges ahead in Eastern Ukraine, capturing more villages,” November 30, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/30/world/europe/russia-advances-eastern-ukraine.html (Accessed December 03, 2024).

[iii] Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz. “America First, Russia and Ukraine,” Centre for American Security, April 11, 2024, https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-first-russia-ukraine (Accessed December 03, 2024).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] David Urban and Mike Pompeo. “A Trump peace plan for Ukraine,” The Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-trump-peace-plan-for-ukraine-russia-foreign-policy-926348cf (Accessed December 03, 2024).

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz. “America First, Russia and Ukraine,” Centre for American Security, April 11, 2024, https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-first-russia-ukraine (Accessed December 03, 2024).

[viii] Ibid.