Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994, marked its 30th anniversary in 2024. It is now 30 years since Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees by Russia, the US, and the UK. The promises remain unfulfilled and have left Ukraine in a precarious position, casting a shadow of doubt over the promises of security assurances in an anarchic international system. The article explores the failure of the Budapest Memorandum and the five ways it has affected the discourse on geopolitics and nuclear disarmament.  

On 5 December 2024,the Budapest Memorandum marked its 30^th anniversary. In 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal by signing the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for security guarantees. Thirty years on, that choice has evolved into a poignant lesson for geopolitics.[1] The memorandum, officially known as the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, marked a pivotal moment in post-Cold War international relations and shaped the discourse on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. However, subsequent events like Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have shown that the promises that were enshrined in the memorandum were not fulfilled. These developments left Ukraine in a precarious position and sparked intense debate over the reliability of security assurance in an anarchic international system. 

The memorandum was signed on the sidelines of the Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) by three guarantors’: the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland. The treaty facilitated the accession of three countries, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, formerly a part of the Soviet Union, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states in exchange for security guarantees. 

The Budapest Memorandum was a landmark agreement. In exchange for Ukraine’s accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear state, the signatories pledged to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence in accordance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE.[2] Key provisions of the memorandum included the reaffirmation to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and existing borders; to refrain from using or threatening force against Ukraine’s territorial integrity or political independence, except in self-defence or as per the UN Charter; pledge to seek immediate UN Security Council action if Ukraine is subjected to aggression involving nuclear weapons; commitment to avoid economic pressure undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty; and assurance not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states like Ukraine, except under specific conditions involving attacks by nuclear-armed alliances.The assurances were intended to provide Ukraine with the security guarantees it required in a precarious geopolitical environment. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 reshaped the global politics of the time, creating new independent states, each grappling with its share of the Soviet legacy. Among these, Ukraine emerged as the unintentional nuclear power. Ukraine, by virtue of its geography within the erstwhile Soviet Union, had inherited approximately 1900 strategic nuclear warheads along with advanced delivery systems like Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and strategic bombers and became the third-largest nuclear power in the world.Ukraine’s nuclear inheritance came with its significant set of challenges.[3]Retaining these weapons became a contentious issue both domestically and internationally for Ukraine owing to the geopolitical and economic realities that it faced post disintegration of Soviet Union. Although it inherited a vast number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, the command and control of the infrastructure remained in Moscow, leaving Ukraine partially paralysed in making use of the warhead independently, diminishing the strategic value of the weapon. On the economic front, things weren’t looking great either. Maintaining a large fleet of nuclear weapons would’ve required a significant portion of Ukraine’s economy to be engaged perpetually in this. At the same time, it struggled to stabilise its economy and transition to a market-based system. Maintaining a nuclear arsenal is prohibitively expensive, particularly without external financial or technical support. The international community, particularly the US and Russia, were adamant about preventing nuclear proliferation in the post-Cold War era. A medley of these push and pull factors created a conducive environment for disarmament negotiations, culminating in the 1994 Budapest memorandum on security assurances. 

These assurances were pivotal in persuading Ukraine to transfer its nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling and effectively denuclearising its territory. Ukraine engaged in its disarmament program, and by 1996, Ukraine had transferred all its strategic warheads to Russia.[4] The US-funded technical and financial support through the Cooperative Threat Reduction(CTR) program, also known as the Nunn-Lugar program, aided the process.[5]The memorandum was not a legally binding document, rather a political commitment. Unlike NATO Article 5, which obliges collective defence, the memorandum relied on political commitments rather than enforceable legal mechanisms. This distinction eventually proved critical as it allowed signatories to avoid substantive military intervention when Russia invaded Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent military actions directly contradicted the memorandum’s assurances, exposing the fragility of such agreements in which major powers prioritise strategic interests over normative commitments. 

Implications for Global Nuclear Non-proliferation 

The Ukrainian case serves as a stark cautionary tale for states contemplating disarmament in exchange for security guarantees. The Budapest memorandum’s failure to protect Ukraine has led to the erosion of the trust factor in such assurance, casting a shadow of doubt on their reliability. In a world where international agreements are often undermined due to the shifting power dynamics, Ukraine’s experience raises legitimate concerns for countries that are facing security threats or are dependent on the extended deterrence of major powers. 

North Korea’s strategy stands in stark contrast with that of Ukraine. By retaining its nuclear arsenal, North Korea has maintained a deterrent capability that has arguably ensured its regime’s survival despite being deemed as a pariah state in the international society. Ukraine’s disarmament and its subsequent vulnerability have likely reinforced North Korea’s resolve to continue resisting nuclear disarmament procedures for external security guarantees. The divergence underscores the critical role nuclear weapons continue to play in the security calculus of states that operate in an ever-changing geopolitical environment. 

The implications for the NPT are equally concerning. The case of Ukraine stands as a precedent that weakens the credibility of the security guarantees offered to non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT, potentially undermining global non-proliferation efforts. For states like Iran and Saudi Arabia, which continue to operate in a highly volatile region, the erosion of trust in security assurances could spur nuclear proliferation, eventually complicating the efforts to maintain regional and global stability.The Russia–Ukraine conflict has highlighted the limitations of conventional deterrence against nuclear-armed states. This dynamic also risks thinking and discourse on the return to great power competition, where non-nuclear weapon states face increased vulnerabilities in the absence of reliable international security mechanisms. 

The memorandum’s failure to prevent aggression against Ukraine profoundly impacts today’s discourse on geopolitics and nuclear disarmament. First, it underscores the erosion of trust in international security frameworks and the ineffectiveness of non-binding assurances in safeguarding sovereignty, which is highlighted by Ukraine’s experience.Second, it amplifies proliferation risks. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the numerous threats of the use of nuclear weapons have deepened the divide between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots and reignited the discourse in the belief that nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, thus encouraging states like North Korea and others to prioritise nuclear retention. Third, as nuclear powers change their strategies to counter countries like Russia, non-nuclear weapon countries are left vulnerable as they cannot rely on the mercy of these states to ensure their security and, by extension, their survival in a volatile international system. Finally, it highlights the need to rethink alliances and deterrence strategies, focusing on security guarantees that are enforceable, and strong regional security systems to tackle the challenges of a multipolar world. This requires reforms in global governance to balance deterrence with reliable commitments, ensuring future stability and preventing violations.

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*Prachi Lokhande, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[1]United Nations Treaty Collection. “Memorandum On Security Assurances In Connection With Ukraine’s Accession To The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons”.https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf. (Accessed on 27^th November 2024)

[2]To read more about the Helsinki Final Act 1975: The United States Office Of The Historian, “Helsinki Final Act, 1975”. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/helsinki#:~:text=The%20Helsinki%20Final%20Act%20dealt,confidence%20building%20measures%20between%20opposing. (Accessed on 29^th November 2024)

[3]Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Report- Nuclear Disarmament Ukraine”. https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ukraine-nuclear-disarmament/#:~:text=Progress%20in%20Disarmament,funded%20Cooperative%20Threat%20Reduction%20Program%20. (Accessed on 29^th November 2024)

[4]Ibid

[5]Center For Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “Fact Sheet: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program”. https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ukraine-nuclear-disarmament/#:~:text=Progress%20in%20Disarmament,funded%20Cooperative%20Threat%20Reduction%20Program%20. (Accessed on 29^th November 2024)